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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ORDERED ANARCHY:
THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF A SOCIETY OF STATES
IN SOUTH AMERICA, 1864–1939
by
Nicolás Terradas
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor Félix E. Martín, Major Professor
The present dissertation studies why South American states have fought so few wars among
one another since their independence in the early 1800s, and why those wars in which they
did enter were limited in intensity, casualty rates, number of battles, and overall duration.
It offers an extensive review of the literature on South America’s long peace and advances
two critiques. First, that the existing studies have usually followed either a narrow
quantitative definition of war, or a broad qualitative definition of peace. And second, that
the literature tends to neglect the relevance of the 19th century in the historical formation
underpinning South America’s long peace. In this context, and drawing from the
International Society perspective, the dissertation argues that between the mid-1860s and
the late 1930s, the region developed from a mere system to a society of states through the
consolidation of three key factors: first, a common interest in restraining, or taming, war in
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the region; second, the progressive institutionalization of regional order and cooperation;
and third, the emergence of a pragmatic solidarity among South American neighbors when
facing common threats as a region. Drawing from a large pool of primary and secondary
sources collected in eight South American countries, the dissertation offers a processtracing analysis of these three causal-mechanisms across four historical case-studies: the
Guano War (1864–1871), the War of the Triple Alliance (1864–1870), the War of the
Pacific (1879–1884); and the Chaco War (1932–1935). For each case, six alternative
hypotheses are tested in detail against both the historical record and the leading hypothesis.
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INTRODUCTION

South America is unique among the regions of the world. Since achieving independence
from the Spanish and Portuguese empires in the early 19th century, South American states
have been at war with one another only sporadically and with restraint. No war, for
example, has been fought over ideological, religious, or ethnic differences, and no state in
South America has ever disappeared after being defeated in a war. Moreover, since the end
of the war between Bolivia and Paraguay over the Chaco Boreal region in 1935, no new
major war has broken out among South American states. This marked decline not just in
the frequency but also in the intensity of the armed conflicts of the region raises an
interesting puzzle for traditional theories of war and peace in the field of International
Relations (IR). Although many explanations of this inter-state “long peace” have been
proposed over the years, there is still little agreement about its main causes.1
1

For some of the most representative works on the “long peace” in South America, see Walter Little,
“International Conflict in Latin America,” International Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 4 (October, 1987), pp. 589–
601; Jack Child, “Interstate Relations in Latin America: Peaceful or Conflictual?” International Journal,
Vol. 43 (Summer, 1988), pp. 378–403; David McIntyre, “The Longest Peace: Why Are There So Few
Interstate Wars in South America?” Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Chicago (1995); Félix E. Martín
González, “The Longer Peace in South America, 1935–1995,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University
(1998); Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge University Press, 1996), esp. pp.
150–182; Arie M. Kacowicz, Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in
Comparative Perspective (SUNY Press, 1998), esp. pp. 67–124; Andrew Hurrell, “Security in Latin
America,” International Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3 (July, 1998), pp. 529–546; Hurrell, “An Emerging Security
Community in South America?” in Security Communities, ed. by Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett
(Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 228–264; David R. Mares, Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate
Bargaining in Latin America (Columbia University Press, 2001); Miguel Á. Centeno, Blood and Debt: War
and the Nation-State in Latin America (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002); Jorge I.
Domínguez, “Boundary Disputes in Latin America,” Peaceworks, No. 50 (USIP, September, 2003), pp. 1–
45; Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge
University Press, 2003), pp. 263–342; Andrea Oelsner, International Relations in Latin America: Peace
and Security in the Southern Cone (Routledge, 2005); Félix E. Martín, Militarist Peace in South America:
Conditions for War and Peace (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Kacowicz, The Impact of Norms in
International Society: The Latin American Experience, 1881–2001 (University of Notre Dame Press,
2006); and Benjamin Miller, States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and
Peace (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 306–336.

1

What makes South America particularly unique is that, unlike other regions, it has
remained free of major war in the absence of the same factors that have kept other parts of
the world at peace. 2 South American international relations, for example, cannot be
explained by nuclear deterrence or the military presence of a preponderant power
guaranteeing regional order in situ. 3 Similarly, the Kantian idea of “peace among
republican democracies” runs into serious empirical problems when applied to South
America. During the 1930–1990 period, the region was populated by a multiplicity of
authoritarian regimes, yet inter-state peace prevailed. Furthermore, one of the most
enduring rivalries in 20th-century South America was precisely between two democracies,
Ecuador and Peru, which also led to other limited armed confrontations in 1981 and 1995.4

2

An important recent body of literature has established that both inter-state war and inter-personal violence
have been in steady decline globally since the mid-20th century. The main theoretical explanations for
these general trends, however, do not apply well to the South American case. For some of the best
exponents of this literature, see Steven A. Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has
Declined (Viking, 2011); Andrew Linklater, The Problem of Harm in World Politics: Theoretical
Investigations (Cambridge University Press, 2011); Linklater, Violence and Civilization in the Western
States-Systems (Cambridge University Press, 2017); Joshua S. Goldstein, Winning the War on War: The
Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide (Plume, 2012); Azar Gat, The Causes of War and the Spread of
Peace: But Will War Rebound? (Oxford University Press, 2017). For some of the sharpest critical reviews
of this literature, cf. Andrew Lawler, “The Battle Over Violence,” and “Civilization’s Double-Edged
Sword,” both in Science, Vol. 336, No. 6083 (May 18, 2012), pp. 829–830, 832–833; John Gray,
“Delusions of Peace,” Prospect (October, 2011), pp. 40–44; Elizabeth Kolbert, “Peace in Our Time,” The
New Yorker, Vol. 87, No. 30 (October 3, 2011), pp. 75–78; Page Fortna, John J. Mearsheimer and Jack S.
Levy, “Review Symposium: Has Violence Declined in World Politics?” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 11,
No. 2 (June, 2013), pp. 566–577; Jacqui True, “Are War and Violence Really in Decline?” Australian
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 5 (2014), pp. 487–494; Brett Bowden, Civilization and War
(Edwards Elgar, 2013); Steven A. Pinker, Bradley A. Thayer, Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson,
“The Forum: The Decline of War,” International Studies Review, Vol. 15, No. 3 (September, 2013), pp.
396–419; and Michael Mann, “Have Wars and Violence Declined?” Theory and Society, Vol. 47, No. 1
(February, 2018), pp. 37–60.
3

The most well-studied cases are that of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and
that of the United States’ presence with large military bases in East Asia. Other, less well-studied, cases are
that of the Sub-Saharan Africa and the Norden Region. Traditional theories of IR encounter no problems
for explaining the prevalence of order and peace in these cases.

4

These limited armed conflicts are commonly known, respectively, as the Zarumilla–Marañón, the
Paquisha, and the Cenepa disputes. For a historical overview of this enduring rivalry, see David H. Zook,
Zarumilla–Marañón: The Ecuador–Peru Dispute (Bookman, 1964); Bryce Wood, Aggression and History:
The Case of Ecuador and Peru (UMI, 1978); Wood, The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932–

2

In parallel to this relative “long peace” among states, South America has also
experienced high levels of intra-state armed violence for most of its history. This
phenomenon, which one scholar has called the “external-peace–internal-violence
paradox,”5 has been particularly pronounced since the 1930s, when a wave of dictatorial
regimes began to spread across Latin America.6 Indeed, the egregious record of human
rights violations and protracted civil wars in Latin America has few parallels anywhere else
in the world. Despite the advent of a new and more stable wave of democratic regimes in
the late 1980s, Latin America still occupies today the rarest of positions: it is
simultaneously one of the safest neighborhoods for the state, while also the most violent
and dangerous region for the individual citizen.7
This aspect of the region, however, challenges not only popular ideas about the
impact of the type of regime on the achievement, maintenance, or deepening of regional

1942 (Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 167–342; and David R. Mares and David S. Palmer, Power,
Institutions, and Leadership in War and Peace: Lessons from Peru and Ecuador, 1995–1998 (University of
Texas Press, 2012). In 1932, Peru was also engaged in a border dispute with Colombia, which is commonly
known as the Leticia dispute. For a brief history of this dispute, see Wood, The United States and Latin
American Wars, pp. 167–251; Juan M. Bákula, La política internacional entre el Perú y Colombia (Bogotá:
Temis, 1988); Alberto Donadío, La guerra con el Perú (Hombre Nuevo, 2nd ed., [1995] 2002); Ronald
Bruce St. John, La política exterior del Perú (AFSDP, 1999), pp. 162–185; Juan C. Restrepo Salazar and
Luis I. Betancur, Economía y conflicto colombo–peruano (Villegas, 2001); and Carlos Camacho Arango,
El conflicto de Leticia (1932–1933) y los ejércitos de Perú y Colombia (Universidad Externado de
Colombia, 2016).
5

The concept was first introduced in 1998 by Martín, “The Longer Peace in South America,” pp. 367–368.
See also Martín, Militarist Peace in South America, pp. 163, 179, 6, 7, 149. A similar dynamic is identified
in Centeno, Blood and Debt, pp. 66, 262–264; Kacowicz, The Impact of Norms in International Society, p.
10; and Kacowicz, Zones of Peace in the Third World, p. 70.
6
See, e.g., Stanislav Andreski, “On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships,” Journal of
Strategic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1980), pp. 3–10. The number of coups d’état in Latin America has always
been high. In the 20th century, however, military rule became a more stable phenomenon. For an excellent
discussion of this trend, see Walter Little, “Military Power in Latin America: An Overview,” Working
Paper No. 4 (University of Liverpool, Institute of Latin American Studies, 1986), pp. 1–91.
7

See, e.g., Daniel M. Goldstein and Enrique D. Arias, eds., Violent Democracies in Latin America (Duke
University Press, 2010); David Luhnow, “Latin America is World’s Most Violent Region,” The Wall Street
Journal, April 11, 2014; and Amanda Erickson, “Latin America is the World’s Most Violent Region: A
New Report Investigates Why,” The Washington Post, April 25, 2018.

3

peace, but also other popular types of explanations. Cultural explanations, for example,
which highlight Latin America’s relative homogeneity in language, religion, customs and
cultural identity as a factor conducive to peace, have equally failed to account for the
region’s persistent low levels of political and economic integration, as well as the
problematic coexistence of high levels of intra-state violence amid international peace. All
of these factors make South America’s “long peace” an exceptionally hard regional test for
traditional theories about the causes of war and the conditions for peace.
In this context, this dissertation examines the most fundamental puzzle confronting
those who seek to explain enduring types of regional order. The type of questions addressed
in this study are the following: What are the main causes of stable regional order? More
specifically, what explains South America’s regional order in the absence of traditional
sources of international peace and the presence of enduring intra-state insecurity? What are
the historical preconditions that made such a paradoxical regional order possible in the first
place? In short, what are the historical causes of South America’s “long peace”? These
questions arise from the distinctive and challenging nature of South America as a regional
case study in IR. While other prominent instances of stable regional order have been wellstudied through major theoretical approaches, South America continues to resist similar
explanations.8
Although the study of this long regional peace has generated a rich and ongoing
academic debate, it remains a highly contested area of research. Scholars often disagree

8

Despite its relevance as a regional case study, attention to this topic is still poor. One of the best recent
contributions to regional studies from an IR-theory perspective, for example, barely makes any reference to
Latin America—apart from mentioning the word “MERCOSUR” only three times in one chapter. See Tazha
V. Paul, ed., International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation (Cambridge University Press,
2012).

4

over concepts as foundational as war or peace, and still continue to dissagree on the
characteristics and periodization of the “long peace” itself. In this sense, attention is often
paid almost exclusively to either quantitative definitions of war, or to qualitative definitions
of peace. Additionally, while some works focus only on the inter-state side of the debate,
others recognize its coexistence with factors like domestic armed violence and dictatorial
regimes, yet no general explanation has emerged to support an academic consensus on the
causes of the “long peace.” What is perhaps most disconcerting about the academic
“debate” is the fact that scholars have only rarely addressed each other’s arguments
directly, avoiding for the most part to engage with other specific contending explanations.9
Despite the absence of an academic consensus, policy commentary often takes the
“peaceful” nature of the region largely for granted. 10 The risks of such declarations,
however, are multiple. Apart from fueling a problematic sense of optimism in viewing the
region as an already consolidated “zone of peace,” similar ideas regularly influence foreign
policy and decision-making across the region. South America is thus often presented as a
“model” or an “example” for other regions to follow and imitate. 11 These popularized
views may give a false impression of the region as “inherently peaceful,” and thus draw
attention away from the examination of the intra-state dimension of the problem—a
dimension that upon closer scrutiny evokes more concern than admiration. A failure to

9

While some contributions do contrast their arguments with major IR theories of war and peace, no single
study directly engages the specific contending arguments for the “long peace” in South America per se. For
a critical review of the debate, see Nicolás Terradas, “El dilema de la seguridad en América del Sur: Una
revisión del debate sobre la ‘larga paz’ sudamericana,” M.A. Thesis, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (2010).
10

See, e.g., the “Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace,” Havana, Cuba, IV
Doc. 3.3, January 27, 2014.

RMRE
11

Only a limited number of contributors has raised awareness of the potential dangers of such claims. See,
e.g., Centeno, Blood and Debt, pp. 264, 99–100; Martín, Militarist Peace in South America, pp. 181–182;
Mares, Violent Peace; and Kacowicz, Zones of Peace in the Third World, pp. 69–70.

5

understand the importance of deriving good policy from good diagnosis could have
negative consequences for the future of the region itself. By uncritically assuming that both
the external and internal aspects of this “long peace” can be kept analytically separate, for
example, as if both factors were mutually independent from one another, policy-makers
could come to implement policies that in the longer run may end up undermining—rather
than upholding—the present regional order. In this context, developing a good historical
diagnosis emerges an indispensable task required before any policy is responsibly
suggested, promoted, or consciously followed.

The Argument
The central argument of this dissertation is that the “long peace” in South America is the
result of a historical process of formation and consolidation of a regional society of states.
The progressive consolidation of such a society has alleviated the intensity of security
competition among South American states and, thereby, made war less frequent and less
intense over time. When states see themselves as members of a society of states they
develop a sense of common strategic interests through which their conceptions of the
“national interest” (or raison d’état) are intertwined with the larger interest of the group of
states as a whole. When their strategic interests so converge, the society of states
strengthens and security competition substantially relaxes, giving way to a more enduring
regional order. When such interests do not converge, or do so only minimally, purely
selfish conceptions of the national interest come to predominate and the society of states

6

weakens. Under these conditions, security competition is stressed and war becomes a more
frequent and intense regional phenomenon.12
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states becomes
conscious of certain common interests and values. Thus, member states come to conceive
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and
share in the working of common institutions.13 States, however, do not have minds of their
own and can only be considered “to act” or “to have interests” at all via the thoughts and
actions of those individuals located in key positions of power with enough authority to
design and implement policies in the name of the states and societies over which they
preside. 14 In an empirical sense, therefore, a society of states is characterized by the
presence of national elites in charge of foreign policy and diplomacy who come to perceive
their own nations’ strategic interests and values as inescapably interdependent with the
interests and values of the overall society of states. In this context, when national interests
are perceived in this particular way by enough states in a certain region, it is possible to
speak of these elites as upholding a raison de système in how they conceive, plan, and
execute foreign policy. A raison de système (or “visión de conjunto”) is thus not an outright
rejection of the logic of raison d’état that characterizes traditional power politics, but
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implications for Bull’s approach to the study of “anarchical orders” in general, see Nicolás Terradas, “The
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simply a more encompassing understanding of the long-term “true interests” of the state.
As Adam Watson eloquently put it, raison de système can be defined as “the belief that is
pays to make the system work.” 15 Conceiving, articulating, and ultimately pursuing
strategies under the belief that a state’s national interest cannot be fully disentangled from
the interests (and survival) of the system of states as a whole leads to different types of
behavior and regional dynamics than the ones hypothesized by more traditional theoretical
approaches to IR.
When a strong society of states forms, therefore, three fundamental aspects
characterize the international relations of its members: (a) the use of force is restrained or
tamed, and traditional power competition acquires a less extreme tone and character; (b)
members of a society of states increasingly institutionalize their relations, creating a
“thicker” set of rules and norms that can be reinforced by developing formal regional
organizations; and (c) states display a tendency towards “pragmatic solidarity,” usually in
the form of a collective defense of regional order, but also in efforts towards the prevention
of war and the preservation of peace among members of a society of states. Overall,
although the use of force is not wholly eliminated, it is severely restrained,
institutionalized, and regulated.

15
See Adam Watson, Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States (Routledge, 1983), pp. 201ff; Watson,
“Systems of States,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1990), p. 104; Watson, The Evolution
of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis (Routledge, 1992), p. 14; Watson, The Limits
of Independence: Relations Between States in the Modern World (Routledge, 1997), pp. 95–105, 149–50.
See also Herbert Butterfield, “Raison d’État: The Relations Between Morality and Government,” The First
Martin Wight Memorial Lecture delivered in the University of Sussex on 23 April 1975; and Alberto R.
Coll, The Wisdom of Statecraft: Sir Herbert Butterfield and the Philosophy of International Politics (Duke
University Press, 1985).
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Taming War
In a society of states, “raw” power politics gives way to diplomatic accommodation, as
state survival and other existential concerns become secure. This change can be most
clearly seen in the way in which states exercise force towards other members of the society
of states, on the one hand, and towards extra-regional states or non-members, on the
other.16 War is thus “tamed” in the sense that it is only invoked and practiced collectively
against a common threat (either from within or without the region) or in cases of strict selfdefense.17 War is also tamed in the sense that members will mutually recognize certain
limits in the application of organized armed violence against one another by accepting
shared standards of normative and procedural restraint—standards that are largely followed
even during war and which are further institutionalized in treaties, legal conventions, and
regional organizations. States will take prisoners, instead of mercilessly killing the captured
enemy troops; they will abide by commonly agreed legal and cultural practices of
international military etiquette and “civilized” behavior; states will also try to prevent wars
among neighbors from happening, or to stop them once they break out, instead of actively
promoting them or rapaciously taking advantage of the neighboring belligerent states.
Consequentially, states will collectively reject offensive war and agree to use force only in
a proportionate and legitimate manner. The taming of war among members, therefore, not
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only narrows the scope of issues over which a legitimate war can be fought, but also
moderates the extent of violence that participants and non-participants are expected to use
in a reciprocal manner.
Although occasional violations of formal and informal procedures of restraint can
certainly happen, violators will go to great lengths in trying to justify their acts as
“legitimate” ones. In such cases, states will try to convince others that their use of force is
still in accordance with the rules and values of international society, or that it is an
exception that should be considered. In a society of states, unlike in a mere system, these
efforts in justification and legitimation—even when constituting outright “lies”—are an
important aspect of the functioning of diplomacy and the society of states as a whole.
Losing the legitimacy game, for instance, could trigger a collective repudiation (or even
concerted action) against the violator itself. Under these circumstances, states will care a
great deal about gathering support for their cause and being identified by others as just,
moderate, or responsible international actors. The extent to which states make frequent and
costly efforts in justifying their international behavior to others is a good indicator of the
level of “maturity” (or strength) of a society of states. It also expresses an interest in
behaving in concert with others by taking into account their interests and opinions
regarding what is considered by all as legitimate, responsible, and acceptable behavior.
It is important to underscore that these efforts are done not out of a sense of selfless
altruism, but as a well-conceived strategy for advancing what is perceived by the ruling
elites as the long-term national interest of the state. Understanding South America as a
society of states, rather than a mere regional “balance of power,” or “zone of peace,” or
“security community,” as in the extant literature, helps to recapture the crucial role that the
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use of force can have in upholding regional order when fundamentally threatened or
contested. In short, it avoids treating war (or the use of force, more generally) only as a
destabilizing factor or as something to be eradicated in order to achieve regional peace.

Institutionalizing Order
A second fundamental change that occurs when a society of states forms is that traditional
inter-state competition takes on a more institutionalized character—both formally and
informally. In a society of states, foreign policy is channeled through sustained institutional
practices, such as the upholding of a “conscious” (or intended) balance of power, the
primacy of diplomacy, and the honoring of international law and agreements. There is also
an implicit recognition of those members deemed capable and willing to uphold the
system’s interest when threatened. That is, the strongest states (both economically or
militarily) will be expected to be the “outstanding citizens” of the society of states, and will
be held accountable by others for it. Thus, regional “great powers” become the “great
responsibles” by taking on more roles and responsibilities than the other members in
relation to the protection and effective functioning of the society of states itself. It is
important to note that states do not abandon their sovereignty, giving way to a “centralized”
or hierarchical society—or a supranational state. States, in fact, continue to jealously
defend their respective autonomies and resist any pulls for supranational unification or
political integration, as well as against other centripetal forces pulling towards greater
fragmentation and national autarky. They form, in the proper sense of the term, an
“anarchical society” of states. By conferring larger roles and responsibilities to the the
strongest regional powers, the subyacent assymetries of power can be stabilized and
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managed more peacefuly by implicating every member in a binding association forged by
common interests in the preservation of each others’ autonomies and independence.
When such arrangements take root, international relations can also develop more
formal institutions. Apart from the traditional sustained normative practices identified
above, regional organizations and other fora, like amphictyonic congresses or international
conferences, emerge as common diplomatic machanisms where the general interest of the
regional system is invoked and discussed multilaterally—rather than imposed unilaterally
by some preponderant power. In sum, states acknowledge the limits of autarky and
recognize each other’s in-dependence as well as inter-dependence; they commit to respect
their mutual sovereignty and international agreements, and to further subject themselves to
certain limitations in the use of force towards one another, according to agreed standards
of “civilized” behavior.18

Pragmatic Solidarity
When a society of states forms and consolidates, war declines in frequency and intensity.
The use of force becomes a highly-regulated activity to be employed only in exceptional
circumstances and according to legitimate reasons. The third fundamental change,
therefore, is reflected in the way in which neighboring states react to challenges and threats
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to regional order. When force is employed in illegitimate ways, or when it is used by an
extra-regional power against a member of the society of states, neighboring states will
display a sense of “pragmatic solidarity” by identifying the threat as a collective one,
common to all—even when not directly involved in the conflict per se (see Chapters 2–5
of this dissertation). In short, the strategic awakening that entails developing a raison de
système and forming a society of states affects how threats to the regional order are
collectively perceived and dealt with.
In this context, when a society of states is weak, neighboring states will interpret
their national interests in a purely selfish way and will react towards regional threats with
indifference and calculated opportunism. For example, when states fail to conceive
themselves as members of a society of states, they will often take strategic advantage of a
war occurring between two neighbors, or between a neighbor and an extra-regional great
power. Such purely self-serving acts will take the form of more than a simple declaration
of neutrality, which would already imply a set of rules and expected behaviors defining
what the roles and responsibilities of a neutral state would be. Instead, these acts would
normally take the form of assistance to the aggressing state, or even a direct aggression
against the weaker side in a dispute. In other words, a state would take advantage of a
neighbor’s misfortunes in war to further its own selfish short-term national interest.
On the contrary, when a sense of society among states is strong, national interests
are unavoidably connected to the common interest and fate of the overall regional system.
In this case, states cannot afford to be indifferent to such critical situations as, for example,
a major war or a foreign intervention in their same regional neighborhood. The reason is
simple: Cold and calculated indifference, or mere proclamations of neutrality, can become
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extremely costly for other actors beyond the belligerents themselves. A major war can
potentially destabilize the functioning of the entire regional order, and thus undermine the
security and survival of all the other states combined. A society of states, therefore,
develops on the basis of a shared sense of common strategic interests, while simultaneously
being affected by a geographical identification given by spatial and historical proximity.
The use of force is thus only tolerated when employed for the enforcement, or protection,
of the legitimate interests of the society of states itself.19

The South American Experience: 1864–1939
In the case of South America, in the span of less than sixty years, relatively new and
unexperienced states established from the rubble of the independence wars a highly
complex regional system of states.20 This system imported not only industrialized products
and people from Europe and elsewhere, but also ideas, culture and diplomatic standards to
cope with their rapidly growing domestic and regional political scenarios. If the 1810–1830
was a period of wars of emancipation and state-formation, the 1830–1880 was one of stateconsolidation—both internally as much as internationally. During this period, states
became strongly “inward-looking,” as they focused on achieving internal order against
indigenous communities, recalcitrant caudillos and other regional leaders, who violently
resisted the growing political and territorial encroachment by centralizing “national”
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governments throughout the region. The simultaneity of each state-building project,
however, created externalities for the development of a region that escape the classical
Tillyan dialectic between state-making and war-making. 21 The stabilization of an
“external” order, in short, became as important as the maintenance of the “internal” one.22
In 19th-century South America, diplomatic practices and institutions were
transposed and copied directly from European standards of the time. These standards,
moreover, played a crucial role in framing their common struggle for independence and,
later, their wars of state-formation and consolidation between the 1860s and the late 1880s.
This also gave birth to a strong regional interest in the maintenance of order inter se, partly
as a safeguarding mechanism against interventions from European powers, and partly as a
reassurance of the stabilization of their respective domestic orders. In the context of that
century, for example, republicanism (as a relatively new form of government) had not yet
acquired an established international status. For this reason, several European powers
pressured and coerced weaker nations on a regular basis throughout the 19th century in the
hopes of reasserting themselves in the Americas via the infamous practice of “gunboat
diplomacy.”23
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Although a common interest in securing internal and regional order was present
from the very beginning of the post-independence period, as evoked by some of its most
renowned national heroes, such as Simón Bolívar, Bernardo O’Higgins, or José de San
Martín, it was not until the internal unification of major South American states was finally
achieved that a shared sense of regional interest (or raison de système) could successfully
develop and shape diplomatic relations in South America. Before the 1860s, for example,
permanent diplomatic representations were almost non-existent among most Latin
American nations. 24 It was not until internal order was secured that an order among
neighbors could become a viable strategic concern and a stable basis for interaction. As
South American states soon came to understand, sometimes at the heavy cost of losing
blood and treasure in a major war, the protection of the one was inextricably linked to the
creation and maintenance of the other.
By the end of the 1880s, therefore, South America had experienced a quick process
of state-consolidation that left on its path the most violent conflicts of its shared history.
Even after this process was over, several border and territorial issues remained unresolved
and the focus of intense diplomatic disputes and negotiation during the early decades of
the 20th century. As Chapter 4 shows, for example, although the War of the Pacific between
H. Doyle (The University of North Carolina Press, 2017), pp. 185–203; Carmen Mc Evoy and Ana M.
Stuven, eds., La república peregrina: Hombres de armas y letras en América del Sur, 1800–1884 (Lima:
Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos; Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2007); Joaquín Fermandois and
Mariana Perry, “El factor internacional en la conciencia del estado-nación: Chile entre Argentina y Brasil,
1889–1902,” in Estado y nación en Chile y Brasil en el siglo XIX, ed. by Ana M. Stuven and Marco A.
Villela Pamplona (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 2009), pp. 209–226. See also John F.
Cady, Foreign Intervention in the Rio de la Plata, 1838–50: A Study of French, British, and American
Policy in Relation to the Dictator Juan Manuel Rosas (AMS Press, 1969); and Joseph Smith, Illusions of
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Chile and the Peru–Bolivia alliance officially ended in 1884 with the signing of the Treaty
of Valparaíso by Bolivia
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several provisions of the final agreements remained

controversial and unfulfilled. This soon created new sources of diplomatic tension that
lasted for more than four decades. Similarly, the end of the War of the Triple Alliance
against Paraguay in 1870, examined in Chapters 3 and 5, opened a series of controversies
regarding the territorial borders between Paraguay (utterly defeated in the war) and
neighboring Bolivia (later defeated in the War of the Pacific). This long-standing and
equally unresolved dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay over the demarcation and
ownership of the Chaco Boreal region generated tensions that lasted for more than fifty
years and that finally erupted in the largest South American war of the 20th century: the
Chaco War of 1932–1935.
These major armed conflicts, therefore, are profoundly interconnected one with the
other and cannot be properly studied from an IR perspective as anything but as episodes in
a long and complex historical process—rather than as discrete and self-enclosed conflicts.
The traditional approach by Latin American historians has been to produce erudite, but
partial, histories of each of these major wars through the eyes of one, or a few, of the states
involved in the war. These “national histories,” however, are rarely framed in a proper
global perspective, nor do they contextualize the war itself as part of a larger historical
evolution of the region itself. Although attention is often paid to the military-diplomatic
aspects of these wars, no IR theory or theoretical approach is ever employed to approach
these conflicts from a regional or global perspective. At best, historiographical work
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remains confined to erudite “diplomatic histories” which pay little attention to theoretical,
or more abstract, sets of explanations.26
In sum, during its historical evolution, South America became a society of states
that progressively regulated and tamed the use of force as a tool of statecraft and diplomacy.
The further institutionalization of this society and the reinforcement of a common interest
in order made regional dynamics less violent and more stable over time. Although in many
instances war could not be prevented in South America, as the case studies in this
dissertation show, the presence of a society of states had an important impact on how those
wars were waged and, ultimately, resolved. International society has had an additional
direct impact on the reduction in the number and intensity of wars in the region—
specifically underpinning the region’s “long peace” during the 20th century. Upon closer
scrutiny, South America’s major wars show that these were not simply violent encounters
among bitter or irreconcilable enemies, bent on utterly destroying or annihilating one
another a la romana, nor conflicts waged without any standards of conduct and restraint in
the extent of the means of violence employed. As shown in the four case studies, the
political objectives of these wars were typically limited—and so was also the way wars
were fought in South America.27
26

See, inter alia, Efraím Cardozo, Hace 100 años: Crónicas de la guerra de 1864–1870 (Asunción: El
Lector, 2nd ed., [1967] 2010). 4 vols.; Ramón J. Cárcano, Guerra del Paraguay: Orígenes y causas
(Buenos Aires: Viau, 1939); Cárcano, Guerra del Paraguay: Acción y reacción de la Triple Alianza
(Buenos Aires: Viau, 1941). 2 vols.; Thomas L. Whigham, La guerra de la Triple Alianza (Asunción:
Taurus, 2010–2012), 3 vols.; Juan J. Fernádez Valdés, Chile y Perú: Historia de sus relaciones
diplomáticas entre 1819 y 1879 (Santiago: Cal & Canto, 1997); Fernádez Valdés, Chile y Perú: Historia de
sus relaciones diplomáticas entre 1879 y 1929 (Santiago: RIL; ADICA, 2004); and Juan M. Bákula, Perú,
entre la realidad y la utopía: 180 años de política exterior (Lima: Fundación Academia Diplomática del
Perú, 2002). 2 vols.
27

On the issue of “limited war” as a resultant of the existence of a society of states, see Ian Clark, Waging
War: A New Philosophical Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., [1988] 2015), esp. pp. 13–32,
51–68; and Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 184–199.

18

It is to other factors beyond simply the type of war, therefore, that one should direct
attention to account for the proverbial high costs of South America’s major wars in terms
of “material” effects and in human lives. It is factors such as pandemics, dehydration, or
the immediate implementation on the battle-field of constant technological innovations,
and the lack of reliable information, capacity or military professionalism, that actually
account for as many as two-thirds of the casualties in the War of the Triple Alliance, the
War of the Pacific, and the Chaco War. That so many people died in each of these armed
conflicts seems to have had less to do with the brutality or intensity of the actual fighting
than with the impact of poor strategic planning and preparedness, as much as the high level
of foreign-policy improvisation and the lack of reliable information by those who
conducted the military operations. In such a global and regional context, standards of
“civilized” and restrained behavior must be given a serious recognition, for they played an
equally important role in taming war, institutionalizing politics, and fostering solidarity—
thus, also underpinning regional order.
South America’s traditional tolerance for political violence changed dramatically
in the 1860s.28 Violence was common, for example, during national or local elections, often
directed against the political opposition, or even during open civil war. Upon defeat in a
civil war, enemies were regularly assassinated, tortured, and later desecrated. These were
accepted practices that were progressively abandoned towards the second half of the 19th
century. This change, however, also took place in the way states conducted diplomatic
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relations and war with one another. During the major armed conflicts of the 19th century
in South America, for example, central governments grappled with “dual threats” to their
internal and external orders.29 In this complex scenario, efforts were increasingly made to
abide by contemporary regional and international standards regarding what was seen as
proper or “civilized” conduct in relation to the use of force—both at home and abroad. This
dramatic change in regional attitudes is indispensable in any analysis of the consolidation
of a society of states given that a strong sense of “insiders” and “outsiders” developed
precisely along the same lines of so-called “civilized” and “barbaric” behavior, in
accordance with the prevailing cultural views of the time. Those considered part of the
society of states were seen as “civilized” and enjoyed the benefits of reciprocal rights,
privileges and duties—which were simultaneously denied to the “un-civilized.” Those
located outside the society of states were thus seen as “barbaric” and considered a threat to
regional order and contemporary notions of “progress.”
During the 19th century, South American states also made persistent efforts in
institutionalizing their international relations through a series of regional congresses and
diplomatic conferences. As early as 1826, for instance, the Congress of Panama showcases
the region’s initial preference for diplomatic and institutionalized forms of interaction—
rather than unabashed power-political competition. Several congresses were celebrated
29
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during the rest of the century: in Lima in 1848 and 1864, and in Santiago in 1857, to discuss
regional strategic matters, such as common defense, the issue of war, and the development
of diplomacy and law on a continental level. The shared necessity of consolidating their
newly acquired status as independent nations vis-à-vis Spain (and Europe as a whole)
further incentivized collective efforts in concert diplomacy (“concertación”) and commondefense arrangements against extra-regional aggressions—mostly by European
monarchies up until the 1860s, but also by the United States during the 1850s and the 1890–
1920s.30

Implications of the Argument
There are many implications of the central argument introduced above, which touch on
some of the existing works on the long South American peace, as well as on other historical
and theoretical contributions. The main implication is that a regional order can be expected
to be more stable and long-lasting when a society of states (or international society) is
stronger. That is, if the level of awareness of common interests that make up an
international society is high among the national elites in charge of foreign policy and
diplomacy, then their international relations will display a decline in the frequency and
intensity of the use of force over time. A growth in prominence of regional institutions and
organizations will also take place, accompanied by a more pronounced pragmatic solidarity
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towards the protection of the region’s systemic interest—thus, further dampening conflict.
On the contrary, when the level of awareness of common interests declines and there is
little (or no) convergence of such interests, regional instability will rise, leading to a higher
level of apathy towards others’ uses of force in the region, and to a higher frequency and
intensity in the employment of armed force to solve diplomatic disputes. If, and when, a
common sense of legitimate norms and standards of conduct breaks down, then a further
consequence is a decline in the use of institutional mechanisms for conducting intraregional diplomatic relations and restraining power competition.
A second implication of the international society argument indicates that, in a
society of states, wars will become limited not just because of geopolitical obstacles or the
lack of technological and material capabilities. The development of a raison de système is
an additional factor that must also be considered. Strongly institutional-organizational and
materialistic accounts of South America’s long peace explain it as the “incapacity” of South
American states to fight “the right kind of wars,” in the sense first identified by Charles
Tilly in his classical study of the European experience.31 In this context, an international
society argument can also contribute an important factor to the classical formulation
regarding “state-weakness” as an explanation of the long South American peace.
Specifically, it can help identify an additional source of limitation that is more qualitative
(self-restraint) than the classical institutional-organizational argument (state-weakness).
Although the state-weakness argument applies quite well to the 19th century, when most
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“states” were weak and poorly consolidated, it requires further qualification when applied
to: (a) the independence wars, when the states were at their weakest, yet successful
expeditions were carried out over vast geographical distances and across the Andes by both
Bolívar and San Martín; and (b) the bulk of the 20th century, given that most states grew
considerably in strength and capacity, yet major wars have not occurred.32
Miguel Centeno’s classical argument about state-formation in Latin America,
therefore, can be supplemented by a parallel process of regional-society–formation,
considering elements of self-restraint, the role of common interests and institutional
arrangements, in order to capture not just the incapacity of states to fight large wars, but
also their political willingness to collectively limit the use of force inter se. Under these
circumstances, although force remains a valid instrument of statecraft, it is important to
understand how the formation of a society of states played a crucial role in making war
progressively more institutionalized, less intense, and less frequent over time: War is thus
tamed or limited, yet not eliminated. The international society perspective adds an
important nuance that complements, rather than supersedes, Centeno’s formulation by
simultaneously exploring the mirror-image of his central argument. That is, it moves the
focus away from the dialectic interaction of “state and war” (à-la Tilly) and delves deeper
into the role of other reciprocal effects between “international society and war” (à-la Bull)
at the regional level. In short, it looks into the parallel and dual processes of state-formation
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and consolidation, on the one hand, and region-formation and consolidation, on the other,
as component parts of a continuous historical dynamic. This is why the international
society approach takes special interest in studying the interaction and reciprocal influences
between the major wars and their impact on the region’s tendency towards varying levels
of indifference/solidarism, as well as the content and direction of institutional efforts
towards the taming of war and the preservation of order.
One of the more theoretical implications of the argument is related to the claim that
South America formed in the mid-19th century not only a system, but also a society of
states. 33 The main difference between one and the other is that in a society of states,
members engage in more than just recurrent, almost mechanical or automatic, strategic
interactions that could be more or less violent. Members of a society of states not only input
the existence and intentions of others into their own power calculations,34 but also frame
those social interactions through an acquired sense of common interests and values—a
“strategic awakening” of sorts—which they further support by creating rules and
institutions to govern those interactions. 35 Regional institutional dynamics are thus
consciously designed and maintained, rather than mere unintended products (or “outputs”)
of systematic interactions.36 Seen in this light, therefore, a society of states does not replace
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or transcend a system of states; it builds upon its foundations and profoundly shapes how
actors interact.37
An additional theoretical implication also touches on the issue of culture. The
sharing of a pre-existing common culture (as in the South American case) does not
determine, although it may facilitate, the working of a society of states. A common
language, religion, customs, or tradition can help states communicate and understand one
another better, making it easier for a system to transition to a society of states, and thus
share in the construction of common institutions. In most Constructivist accounts of the
long peace, the idea of a “shared culture” acquires a central role and is commonly presented
in the form of a “security community.”38 Contrary to this view, a society of states differs
from a security community in that interactions are still mainly driven by “interests” and
not just by transformations of collective identity towards peace. Equally important is the
fact that in a security community threats are expected from outside the community—that
is, there should be a pooling of sovereignty to collectively project force outwards, not
inwards. In a society of states, force is not eradicated, as it remains a fundamental
component of the protection and maintenance of order. Unlike a security community, there
is no “cultural” transformation from “enmity” to “rivalry” to “friendship.”39
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The implications are important, for in a Constructivist sense South American
nations should be expected to become an “amalgamated security community” over time,
in the sense first advanced by Karl Deutsch.40 That is, they should logically unite into one
supra-national entity. Of all the regions in the world, South America should be the strongest
case for this perspective, given the extent of its cultural and identitary commonalities. But
despite a strong shared cultural heritage from their common colonial past, South American
nations remain politically and territorially divided, and states fiercely defend their
autonomy not simply against extra-regional great powers, such as the United States, but
also against one another. In this regional society of states, ultimately, the legitimate use of
force is kept as an institution that protects “order” itself from one another, as much as from
extra-regional interference. The persistent resistance of South America’s society of states
to further integrate into a larger supra-national regional entity shows that shared “cultural”
factors may perhaps assist in the functioning of common institutions and organizations, but
do not determine how international relations in the region come to be in the first place, or
how they actually unfold in practice. In this sense, as well, the creation of regional
organizations should not be interpreted as stepping stones towards a future political
unification or integrated supra-national state.
Similarly, the international society argument advanced in this dissertation differs in
important ways from the Liberal approach. While the Liberal argument maintains that

40

See Karl W. Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International
Organizations in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton University Press, 1957); and Adler and
Barnett, Security Communities. See also Alexander Wendt, “Why a World State is Inevitable,” European
Journal of International Relations, Vol. 9, No. 4 (2003), pp. 491–542, who works as a perfect example of
how, from a Constructivist point of view, integration into a single political unit over time is the most
logical end-point of the Constructivist teleology.

26

democracies “of the right kind” (that is, republican democracies) do not fight wars with
one another, it strictly associates one type of regime with external pacifying effects for the
(regional or global) system as a whole. It claims, in other words, that a society of states can
only form among democracies. The international society approach, however, refuses to
associate only one specific type of regime as the indispensable component for the formation
a society of states. In fact, it argues that societies of states can form and sustain themselves
even among a pluralist set of states governed by different types of regimes. As with the
cultural arguments, the sharing of a similar type of regime among neighbors can perhaps
facilitate the working of common institutions and rules, but it is not a sine qua non for the
formation and consolidation of a society of states itself.
The South American case offers a good way to test this proposition, given that
during most of the 19th century the issue of the type of regime was a relevant one for the
newly independent republics. The history of these young republics shows that coexistence
with the Brazilian Empire (a monarchical regime between 1822 and 1889) was not an
impediment in the creation and maintenance of a regional society of states in South
America. Despite deep-seated suspicions and animosities regarding the Brazilian Empire
during most of the 19th century, the South American republics consistently entered into
alliances, signed treaties, and established formal diplomatic relations with Brazil when
necessary. Local caudillos and regional chieftains in Argentina and Uruguay, moreover,
often invoked—and promptly received—the financial and military support of the
neighboring monarchical regime in their multiple revolts and political uprisings. The
history of Brazil’s relations with the South American republics of the 19th century is, in
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fact, a history of accommodation, progressively peaceful resolution of disputes, growing
mutual respect, and diplomatic tolerance.41
In sum, both Constructivist and Liberal perspectives face a challenging puzzle
when trying to account for the paradoxical aspect of South America’s long peace. For both
approaches, the values embedded in the domestic orders of states (e.g., types of regime)
must correspond with their international behavior towards other similarly-organized states.
While Liberals confine their analysis to inter-democratic societies, Constructivists would
apply a similar logic for any pairings of types of regime—as long as they are similar to one
another. Thus, not only an inter-democratic peace is possible, but also an inter-autocratic
peace, inter-monarchical, etc. But in this sense, however, South America’s high levels of
internal violence amid an ongoing stable peace among states is quite incompatible with
explanations based on the congruence between a state’s sense of identity and its external
behavior.
For the international society approach, the type of regime of a state should not
necessarily correspond to any particular effect regarding international or regional order. In
pluralistic societies of states, where differences in the type of regime matter little (or not
at all), or when the consensus over the “thickness” of the common interests is rather
shallow, the coexistence of external peace and internal violence does not present similar
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logical or theoretical problems. In fact, this is precisely why such divergence between the
internal and external orders can be sustained over time, for the inter-state peace and
stability can act as an “insulator” for what goes on inside a country’s borders. International
societies can, however, develop into more solidaristic forms, in which the internal
compositions of states (sets of values, norms, and even culture) can be an active component
of the consensus over common interests among states.42 In other words, in the international
society argument, common interests can be strong (“thick”) or weak (“thin”) depending on
the type of normative content that makes up the consensus among member states.

The Literature
Since South America represents a theoretical puzzle for mainstream IR theories, most
works on the region’s long peace have traditionally adopted two concrete positions. The
large majority agrees in characterizing South America as anomalous or puzzling,
emphasizing the region’s uniqueness and often elevating it to an exemplary status worthy
of imitation by other regions.43 There are multiple explanations offered for the long South
American peace within this first group, ranging from the traditional Liberal triangulation
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of peace (democracy, economic inter-dependence, and institutions),44 or the hegemonic
role of the United States,45 to the relative weakness/strength of the state,46 the roles of
military confraternities47 and shared cultural identities, religion, language, and a common
anti-monarchical past,48 and, finally, the construction of a “zone of peace” and a pluralistic
security community.49
A smaller group, however, takes a more provocative position that denies any truly
“peaceful” condition for the region. Although agreeing that South America is an
exceptional case and a “microcosm,” this second group tends to highlight the
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commonalities of the region with other cases around the world, thus relegating its
“peaceful” characteristics to mere methodological technicalities or ideological artifice.50
This group argues that states have always used force, although for limited objectives, and
that this trend has continued throughout the entire 20th century.51 In this particular view,
the region’s geopolitical dynamics have typically favored the defense à-la Clausewitz, due
to its large geographical extensions, low population densities, and difficult—sometimes
unsurmountable—terrains. Since the geography of the region has not fundamentally
changed, scholars within this group tend to be pessimistic about the idea of South America
as a “zone of peace” where the use of force has entirely disappeared as an instrument of
diplomacy.52
Both groups, and each of their specific types of explanations, will be addressed in
detail in Chapter 1, which presents them as formal testable propositions in contention with
the international society argument. Beyond their initial differences in diagnosis, however,
both groups entail a number of problems that must be addressed. The literature, for
example, tends to focus on the study of South America exclusively in the post-1935
period—after the last major war in the region. With few exceptions, the search for a
potential explanation is reserved to the study of what has happened within the period of the
“long peace” itself (i.e., from 1935 up to now). This neglects, therefore, the study of the
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historical preconditions and alternative potential explanations located before the 1935
benchmark.53 To a large extent, the popular focus on “the last war” as the standard criterion
to set the clock for the South American peace can be explained by the long-lasting influence
of the Correlates of War project (COW) in how most scholars approach the study of war and
peace in IR. According to this widely consulted database, there has been only one major
interstate war in South America in all of the 20th century: The Chaco War, from 1932 to
1935.54 Other minor armed conflicts, such as those between Peru and Colombia in 1932 or
the recurrent military confrontations between Peru and Ecuador in 1941, 1981, and 1995,
are thus dropped from the analysis. The COW project establishes certain strict criteria for
considering an armed conflict as a “war.” One of these criteria is the 1,000 battle-related
casualties indicator. Following this criterion, therefore, the Peru–Colombia and Peru–
Ecuador disputes fall below the threshold and are not considered as wars.55 This single
statistical finding from the 1980s gave a somewhat exaggerated sense of the extent to which
South America could be considered “peaceful,” and further established the study of the
region as an “anomaly.” Despite its many limitations, the
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project gave a valuable
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impetus to a growing academic interest in the development of concrete explanations for
this South American “statistical” puzzle.
The study of the marked infrequency in inter-state war in South America, therefore,
has necessarily have to take place on the fringes of the major theoretical approaches in IR.
It has pushed students to develop new and creative explanations to confront the South
American “anomaly,” for mainstream IR theories have been unable to provide much
guidance for the South American case. As one student of the region has eloquently put it,
South America’s long peace
[…] appears to defy the logic and explanatory power of the two most prominent schools of
thought in international relations: Political Realism and International Liberalism.
Expressed succinctly, the causes of war presupposed in realism were present in South
America, yet interstate war did not erupt. Conversely, the causes of peace assumed in
liberalism were absent, but interstate peace has prevailed in this subregion.56

More specifically, as Kalevi Holsti maintains:
Presently available theories of international politics do not explain the South American
case. Neo-realist predictions are not borne out by the record; dependency theory would
emphasize the economic roots of many of South America’s conflicts, but there have also
been conflicts where economic stakes were minimal; and liberal-institutionalist theories do
not take us very far because until recently there have been only low levels of integration
and successful multilateral institution-building in the region. Deutsch’s theories of
integration do not hold either because rich communication flows, democratic governments,
and a common external threat have not been important features of the regional system.57

Influenced by this particular framing of the issue, a major difficulty for scholars trying to
tackle the long South American peace has been their inability to move beyond the simple

56

Martín, Militarist Peace in South America, p. 2 (see also p. 177). A similar point is made by McIntyre,
“The Longest Peace,” p. 24.

57

Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, p. 161. Similar arguments are also found in Mares, Violent
Peace, p. xii; Miller, States, Nations, and the Great Powers, pp. 326–327; and Buzan and Wæver, Regions
and Powers, pp. 304–340.

33

“counting” of wars. The overall peacefulness of the region is evidenced not simply by the
declining number of major inter-state wars (in

COW

terms), but also by the increasingly

limited nature of the wars that were actually fought. In this sense, South America’s long
peace is not only longer in duration (almost two-hundred years) than what most studies
acknowledge, but also must be defined in more than purely quantitative or materialistic
terms. As the works of Miguel Á. Centeno, Andrew Hurrell, and Charles A. Jones suggest,
beyond the relative absence of major war during most of the 20th century and beyond, even
when South American states were involved in wars with one another these conflicts were
limited in duration, scale and political objectives. As Centeno puts it, “[…] in general, Latin
America has experienced low levels of militarization, the organization and mobilization of
human and material resources for potential use in warfare. Latin Americans have frequently
tried to kill one another, but they have generally not attempted to organize their societies
with such a goal in mind.” 58 Additionally, he argues, “[n]o countries have fought one
another as representatives of an ideology or a religious faith.” 59 The wars of South
America, Centeno concludes,
have also been relatively short and with simple linear narratives. Most have been settled by
one or two decisive battles […]. Bibliographic accounts are remarkably simple. There is
often no need for more than one strategic map, battles can be described in a single
paragraph, and whole wars summarized in a few pages. Not surprisingly, by contemporary
standards, the wars involved relatively few men and minimal equipment.60
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As Centeno acknowledges, an important exception is the War of the Triple Alliance (1864–
1870), which had devastating effects for the overall male population in Paraguay—
although an important qualification on this point is added in Chapter 3 of the present study.
An additional problem is the overall neglect of the study of the historical
preconditions underpinning the long peace in South America.61 This has translated into a
sustained neglect of the 19th century as a relevant source for developing a consensual
explanation. Scholars often black-box this period as “violent” or “conflictual,” and readily
concede its explanation to Realist theories—thus rendering almost half of the period of the
“long peace” as unworthy of closer inspection.62 This generalized neglect of the historical
conditions under which the region’s decline in the frequency and intensity of war took
place is problematic because it assumes there is nothing important to learn from the more
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account well, or in its entirety, for South America’s 19th century international relations. See, e.g.,
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35

systematic study of the region’s historical evolution. Moreover, since “causes” must
logically precede “effects,” they run the risk of reducing the analysis of the long peace to
a mere description of the “symptoms,” rather than a full excavation of the anteceding
causes. Such is the case of the three major armed conflicts in the history of South America,
which occurred in the 1860s, 1880s, and 1930s, but which are normally left unstudied, as
they are seen as part of the “normal” conflictual nature of traditional international relations
prior to the advent of the long regional peace.
Confronted by these factors, in the 1990s and 2000s a series of studies have
advanced several hypotheses to explain South America’s historical pattern of war and
peace. However, none has been able to account unproblematically for this regional long
peace in all its complexities. At best, some contributions have helped in understanding
temporal segments or specific aspects and manifestations of the dynamics of regional
peace, while still leaving the South American case in need of an encompassing explanation.
That is, an account not simply “from the last war forward,” but in terms of the historical
roots and preconditions that made the decline in the number and intensity of war-fighting
possible in the first place. At worst, some contributions have advanced highly-original
arguments that as a whole are logically incompatible or methodologically
incommensurable inter se. The proliferation of such contributions, however, has hindered
the construction of a unified explanation of the region’s evolution as a historical process.
One of the central problems of the existing literature is the rather uncritical adoption
of mainstream theoretical assumptions about immediate and underlying causes of war and
peace, which typically lead them to conclude that the South American condition is
“anomalous.” The value of this popular assertion, however, cannot be productively
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ascertained in the absence of a larger discussion of what is to be considered the “normal”
state of affairs. A lack of engagement with this important issue has led scholars to a rather
unsatisfying conclusion, whereby a theoretical puzzle is left partially unexplained, or rather
“explained away,” as an exception to a normality that is kept unexposed and
unquestioned.63 This is connected to another problem, which is the normalization of the
recurrence of war. By leaving the theoretical assumptions about war and peace dynamics
unchallenged, peace is seen as “anomalous” when uninterrupted by war for several
decades. This, once again, normalizes war and makes a “long peace” among states an
exception; a rare non-event in need of explanation due to its abnormality. It is unsurprising,
therefore, that explanations armed with this particular type of analytical tools have
struggled so much to come up with an encompassing argument for South America’s case.
Two final problems are also worth mentioning. One of them is the lack of consensus
on some core definitions, which has led to a problematic set of periodizations of the same
historical phenomenon. This has been fueled by a narrow disciplinary understanding of
war and peace in IR, both in quanti- as well as in qualitative terms. While most works tend
to “count” how many wars have occurred in the region and then proceed to focus on
historical developments within the period of “no-war” (or “negative peace”), others have
over-reacted by adopting a strictly qualitative understanding of peace that commits the
mirrored mistake of narrowly focusing on one of the two factors at play, losing sight of the
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interplay between both.64 Thus, the study of war and peace in South America has remained
compartmentalized and unsystematic, advancing on parallel and independent tracks: some
works focusing exclusively on the study of the number of wars and their material effects,
while others on the type and quality of peace.
Finally, a problem has emerged in the form of a recent tendency to resolve the
regional puzzle via “patchwork” theorization—that is, the attempt to artificially connect
one path (quantitative study of war) with the other (qualitative study of peace) in stages or
according to a linear historical sequence of “progress.” This is an artificial, and in the end
unproductive, solution simply because instead of reconciling the existing problems in
search of a superior synthesis, it creates an internally inconsistent larger explanation where
each theoretical “path” is reserved a partial (historically contingent) explanatory role at
different moments of the evolution of the region. In this way, explanations that are at their
core incommensurable and mutually exclusive are distributed longitudinally across the
history of the region and assigned “pockets” or “patches” of explanation. No successful
attempt is seriously done, however, in linking all the patched explanations into one macro,
“eclectic” theoretical argument—this is, in part, because ultimately the particular
explanations employed cannot be internally reconciled inter se.65
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Only rarely has the literature provided a more in-depth analysis of the region in its
historical complexity, providing justice to the often non-linear evolutionary paths and
important pre-1935 foundational “stepping stones” that opened the way for a stable peace
in later decades. This is precisely what this dissertation aims to do, by way of focusing not
on the post-1935 period, but on the historical period immediately preceding it (1860s–
1930s)—between the consolidation of most states’ independence and sovereignty, and the
end of the last major inter-state war in 1935.

Research Methods
The method used in this dissertation is theory-informed process tracing, supplemented by
historical analysis and multi-site archival research.66 Process tracing is a well-established
methodology in the social sciences that attempts to identify an intervening causal process
(or causal mechanism) between an independent variable (IV) and the outcome of the
dependent variable (DV).67 It implies “the tracing of any causal process by which initial
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conditions are translated into outcomes.”68 Following the metaphor of falling dominoes,
process tracing forces the investigator to consider the alternative paths through which the
outcome could have occurred (that is, to take equifinality into account), as it explores a
chain of events or decision-making processes by which initial case conditions lead to
particular outcomes. That is, it asks “how” and “why” the row of dominoes fell. The
metaphor, however, is limited in that is says little about the direction and timing of the
chain reaction itself.
The cause–effect link that connects the IV and the DV is thus unpacked and divided
into smaller steps in which the investigator looks for observable evidence of each
individual step.69 The emphasis on “unwrapping” causal mechanisms provides stronger
mechanistic evidence of causal relationships between specific causes and outcomes, for
each part of the mechanism is traced empirically. As Beach and Pedersen argue, “tracing
mechanisms in a case also sheds light on how a given theoretical cause (or set of causes)
produces an outcome.”70 This evidence, in turn, can take the form of testimony by the
actors themselves, reflecting or commenting on their actions, or it can also be acquired
from the structure and sequence of events.71
However, as Bennett and Checkel point out, the investigator must not confuse the
metaphor with the logic of process tracing itself, for an

IV

could also be producing the

intervening causal mechanisms themselves that then lead to the outcome of a DV. In these
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situations, the intermediate events are simply “diagnostic evidence” that show the kind of
process tracing taking place, but add no causal power to the intervening variables. The type
of intervening variables or causal mechanisms that matter in process tracing are those that
temporally or spatially are not fully determined by the

IV,

for “these events do have

independent effects on the nature, timing, or magnitude” of the DV.72 With this important
caveat in mind, process tracing can be understood as “the analysis of evidence on
processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purpose of either
developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might actually explain the
case.”73
There are two main reasons why process tracing is suitable for the present study.
First, process tracing generates numerous observations within a single case. This is
extremely useful in cases, such as the long South American peace, that are rare or unique
in the larger universe of cases.74 Process tracing, however, is not just particularly suited to
study deviant or unique cases, for it can also be applied to other common (or “large-n”)
cases when involving other levels of analysis.75 The value of breaking a single case into
smaller within-case studies is that it allows the investigator to link these smaller cases in
ways that help construct an explanation for the larger case. A second reason is that process
tracing offers a powerful way to make causal inferences in singular cases where other
methods (e.g., controlled comparison) are not possible. 76 In this sense, process tracing
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helps avoid the dual problems of indeterminacy and confirmation-bias (or “story-telling”),
for it offers the strongest type of inferential tests available in case-study research.77
“Good” process-tracing analysis, therefore, must also involve attempts to test and
eliminate alternative (or rival) causal processes or mechanisms that could, in principle, lead
to the same observable outcome. This is why it is so important to identify causal
mechanisms that are not exclusively caused by the

IV

hypothesized by just one of the

approaches, for in those cases the testing of alternative hypotheses would be rendered
meaningless as the chosen

IV

would leave no room for potential alternative explanations

that also employ those same intervening causal mechanisms. It would fail to account, in
other words, for the problem of equifinality. In order to check for these factors, Stephen
Van Evera identified a set of tests that measure the level of strength and type of predictions
expected from the hypotheses and causal processes employed. Strong tests are those
“whose outcome is unlikely to result from any factor except the operation or failure of the
theory.”78 These tests can be either certain and unequivocal, or unique and particular. The
more certain and unique the prediction, the stronger the test. A “certain” prediction is one
that is found in the empirical evidence, but which is also shared by other competing
hypotheses. A “unique” prediction, on the contrary, is one that is found in the empirical
record but which is only shared by few (or none) of the competing hypotheses.
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As TABLE 1 (see infra) illustrates, the first type of test, called the “hoop test,”
evaluates predictions of high certitude, but of no uniqueness. Although passing this test is
a necessary requirement for competing hypotheses to remain under consideration, it adds
little support to any one of them in particular. The second type of test is the “smoking-gun
test,” which evaluates the reverse condition: high uniqueness, but no certitude. Passing this
test corroborates the hypothesis, but casts little doubt on those explanations that fail. A
third type is the “doubly-decisive test,” which evaluates predictions of high uniqueness and
high certitude. Passing this test decisively corroborates an explanation, while failing it
eliminates it altogether. A final type is the “straw-in-the-wind test,” which evaluates
predictions of low certitude and low uniqueness. These are indecisive tests that cannot add
strong corroboration to any one explanation.79

TABLE 1. Types of Tests in Case-Study Research

Low

High

“doubly-decisive test”

“smoking-gun test”

Low

UNIQUENESS

CERTITUDE
High

“hoop test”

“straw-in-the-wind test”
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The dissertation follows a theory-informed type of process-tracing analysis not only
because of the singular nature of the case study in question, but also because the
international society argument contains an implicit causal chain mechanism that has been
unexplored in regional case studies and untested against alternative competing
arguments. 80 For all its self-professed attention to history, political philosophy, and
international law, the international society approach has demonstrated in practice a
tendency to indulge in simplistic historical narratives and “story-telling” in ways that
preclude the systematic testing and comparing vis-à-vis other cases and approaches. 81
Works within the international society approach usually offer, at best, taxonomical theories
that create and define concepts well, but which rarely systematize variables and
hypotheses, operationalize causal mechanisms, or advance formal and testable
propositions. It also offers comparative cases that, nevertheless, do not discuss any of the
methodological aspects inherent to comparative case-study research, nor present clear and
testable parameters to guide their comparison. 82 In this dissertation, the international
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society argument is presented and operationalized with a formal hypothesis and a set of
testable propositions. It is then tested via the process-tracing method against the historical
record and other competing hypotheses.
With these considerations in mind, two other methods are used to reinforce the
process testing. First, this study makes complementary use of historical analysis as a way
to contextualize each of the within-case studies both analytically and in time, and to frame
the alternative competing hypotheses by making use not just of the IR-theory literature, but
also of the main historiographical debates relevant for each case study. Relying on an
extensive survey of the historical literature, this dissertation offers an analysis of four
within-case studies and identifies the areas of contestation that remain open among
historians themselves. Incorporating some of these debates is important for exploring other
hypotheses beyond the ones typically debated in the South American “long peace” debate,
or in IR theory itself. The premise is to sacrifice some degree of depth on the altar of
inclusiveness, for it is much preferable to err on the side of comprehensiveness than on that
of narrow precision.83
In this study, historical analysis is also supported by more than simply a wide
selection of secondary sources. It also makes use of multi-site archival research, with more
than eighteen historical and diplomatic archives consulted in situ in eight different South
American countries: viz., Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and
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Uruguay. Apart from the archives of the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs and other
national archives, access to many national public and private libraries offered the unique
possibility of consulting some of the best historical works from each country—for the most
part, inaccessible from abroad. The simultaneous use of primary and secondary sources,
therefore, helps to avoid the problems of incomplete, selective, or biased contextualization
of the actors’ own words and actions in process-tracing analysis. It also acts as a corrective
against many of the profoundly nationalistic, ideologized, or polemical history books that
still pervade much of the historiographical production in Latin America. By using a healthy
mix of primary and secondary sources the investigator can rely more confidently on the
causal inferences made for each causal mechanism tested, and insulate its work from the
most common distortions affecting process-tracing analysis.
In sum, the bonus of conducting archival research in almost all the countries of
South America is that the investigator can acquire a better grasp and develop a wellgrounded expertise on the subject matter to discern more intelligently between “good” and
“bad” secondary sources.84 This helps avoid what some scholars have called the “parasitic”
use of history, which reduces historical complexity to a few simple variables relevant only
to the researcher. 85 Finally, the combined use of primary and secondary sources helps
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discern sloppy, polemical or unreliable historical work from the best examples of wellresearched and well-documented analysis. Since historiography in Latin America remains
a highly politicized activity, direct access to primary sources critically assists in correctly
identifying and balancing among historians’ own contending national views.

Case-Study Selection
There are not many historical cases of regional long peace, such as the one in South
America. Those other cases, however, have been successfully explained using major IR
theories, such as Neorealism’s balance-of-power theory, Liberalism’ inter-democratic and
institutionalist theories, or Constructivism’s security communities. The most well-studied
case is the European regional order post-1945, which finds in the overarching military
presence of the United States via

NATO

a powerful security deterrent against any

aggressor—from within or without Europe. The bipolar structure of the Cold War and the
presence of nuclear armed powers also constitute an additional deterrent to maintain such
stable regional order in place. The consolidation of republican democracies across the
European Union is also commonly invoked as a major explanation to account for Western
Europe’s stability and the longevity of its regional peace.86 The so-called Scandinavian
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peace, for its part, has also been associated to social democracy and high-standards of
living for sustained periods of time. Being part of the European system has also been a
contributing factor, coupled with “cultural” arguments highlighting a common culturalhistorical past, and the sharing of similar linguistic and religious characteristics.87 The case
of Sub-Saharan Africa, moreover, has been unproblematically explained by mainstream IR
theories as one of the legacies of the colonial period, where territorial boundaries remained
stable and largely uncontested, while insecure governments remained threatened by
transnational ethnic and religious hatreds, as well as by civil war, paradoxically occurring
within and across those same stable borders.88
Unlike these other regional cases, South America defies most of the traditional IR
theory expectations. Seen in this aggregate level of analysis, South America can be seen as
a “deviant case”; but in the context of this dissertation, however, the focus is placed on four
within-case studies of major regional diplomatic disputes that later evolved into a major
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war. Each successive historical chapter looks at four different wars and the negotiated
peace agreements that followed them. The first three cases are from the 19th century: (a)
the “Guano War” of 1864–1871; (b) the War of the Triple Alliance of 1864–1870; and (c)
the War of the Pacific of 1879–1884; while the last case is from the early 20th century: (d)
the Chaco War of 1932–1935. Although there are other minor armed conflicts in the history
of the region, these four cases represent key milestones in the history of South America’s
international relations. They left enduring legacies of intra-regional power disparity and
hierarchies of prestige; they molded national histories, shaped cultural stigmas and selfimages, and reinforced economic and financial patterns of dependency among neighbors.
Most importantly, they left a geopolitical “footprint” that still continues to affect the
foreign policies of the victors and defeated alike.
In the 19th century, there were many conflicts in South America. None, however,
had the scale or importance of the four cases selected for this study. An important
antecedent to the War of the Pacific (1879–1884), for example, was the War of the Peru–
Bolivian Confederation (1836–1839), which also confronted Chile with Peru and
Bolivia—temporarily unified under the leadership of Andrés de Santa Cruz. Against the
background of this war, also, one must contextualize the “Guano War” (1864–1871) which
is the focus of Chapter 2. In these two conflicts, former enemies fought together some thirty
years later against the Spanish Empire, only to become rivals once again in the War of the
Pacific (1879–1884). Other conflicts, such as the multiple confrontations during the mid19th century involving Peru, Ecuador and Colombia were minor border conflicts that
developed on the fringes of ongoing civil wars and regional caudillo rivalries. Although
these conflicts also serve as a historical context for the disputes between Peru–Ecuador
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(1941, 1981, 1992) and Peru–Colombia (1932), their “limited” aspect renders them less
useful (“weaker tests”) for analyzing the potential impact of international society on the
progressive taming of war in South America.
At this point, two clarifications are in order. One is chronological, regarding the
timeframe of this study; and the other spatial, regarding the geographic scope of the
argument. Since the present study traces the origins and evolution of South America’s
society of states, it focuses on the 1860s–1930s period. This has two main reasons: First,
given that a “society” of states presupposes a “system,” the analysis must necessarily start
with the emergence and consolidation of a system of states itself before any consideration
of a society can be even attempted. This explains why, in the interest of tracing the origins
of South America’s society of states, the study begins in the 1860s and not before. Prior to
this critical decade for South America, states were not consolidated and a system of
states—properly defined—had not yet been established. At best, one can speak of a system
in formation between the achievement of independence (1820s) and the 1860s.89
Second, the study’s interest in the historical evolution of this society, and its
subsequent impact on the “long peace” phenomenon, creates the need to engage with the
history of South America’s international relations in a longitudinal approach that covers
several decades and identifies crucial moments along the way. The in-depth study of the
entire history of the region, however, would not be practical or truly possible under one
single volume. This dissertation, therefore, evaluates only the initial period (that between
1860s and 1930s) of the region’s complete historical evolution (1810–2018). A second
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(future) volume could not only incorporate some of the other possible within-case studies
not included in this dissertation, but also continue temporally from the 1940s until the
present time. This second volume could build upon the present study’s focus on “origins”
and “evolution,” and concentrate on the further “consolidation” (or maturation) of the
society of states after the emergence of more formal institutional arrangements, such as the
OAS, UNASUR,

or other economic integration projects, such as MERCOSUR.

As far as the geographic scope of the study is concerned, it is necessary to explain
why the argument is limited only to South America, and not simply Latin America.
Although many existing discussions talk indistinctively about South and Latin America,
the distinction between both is of paramount importance. First of all, in purely empirical
terms the “long peace” obtains only in the South America sub-region of the American
continent. The twelve countries that now compose this sub-region (including Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay
and Venezuela) constitute together not just a discrete geographical space, but also display
a distinctive “self-image” that has been well-documented over the years by regional
specialists and historians. 90 Separated from the Caribbean and Central American subregions by more than vast distances, South America shares a unique sense of self, forged
in a common history of anti-Spanish colonialism that differs from its neighboring regions
in term of their distance from the United States, the lesser influence and type of French,
British and Dutch colonialism, as well as higher economic, developmental conditions and
overall standing in the world. Most importantly, South American nations have always
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enjoyed a higher level of regional semi-isolation and autonomy vis-à-vis the rest of the
Western Hemisphere. While a professed Latin American “brotherhood” (or “hermandad”)
has always been part of the intellectual arsenal of Latin American prominent historical
figures (such as intellectuals, poets, revolutionaries, politicians, and philosophers), there
has always been in practice a stronger sense of belonging among those countries most
immediately proximate. The international relations of Central American and Caribbean
nations, moreover, escape the paradoxical nature of South America’s “long peace”
entirely.91 It is for all these aspects that South America must be studied separately.
Studying the “long peace” by referring to Latin America can dramatically alter the
analysis. Including Central America, for example, can blind observers from clearly
identifying the distinctive nature of the South American experience. This is why Miguel
Centeno, Félix Martín, Arie Kacowicz, and many other contributors to the long peace focus
exclusively on South American international relations. A problematic case, however, is
that of David R. Mares, who in his study of the long peace not only includes the whole of
Latin America, but also lowers the threshold for what should be considered a war—
employing the MID dataset instead of the traditional COW project database on war. Mares’
double move biases the analysis in favor of conflictivity and thus fails to appreciate the
important differences in the patterns found in each sub-region of the Americas. As this
study shows, a “society of states” formed only in South America in the mid-1860s, both in
terms of self-images and self-references as a “region,” as well as in terms of the levels of
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identification and solidarism evoked by what were considered “threats” and “common”
problems.92 The focus on interests in the international society approach, contrary to the
identitary and cultural focus of other approaches, can explain better these intra hemispheric
differences in solidarity and threat-perception as the 19th century gave way to the 20th.
Patterns of interaction that obtained in South America among neighbors were of a
distinctively different nature than those between these and Mexico or other Central
American or Caribbean nations.
Finally, it is also important to explicitly state the reasons why the four chapters deal
with “wars,” while the larger interest of the study is in explaining a “long peace.” The
objective of each chapter is not to explore the military aspects of these conflicts per se, but
to focus on them as parts of a larger regional diplomatic interaction, and to evaluate their
impact on the construction and further consolidation of states (internally), as well as of a
society of states (regionally), in the context of a larger explanation for the region’s long
peace. In this sense, each war is studied in conjunction with the difficult, but parallel,
efforts at cooperation and peaceful resolution of each crisis, both practiced by the
belligerents themselves as much as by those regional neighbors not directly involved in the
conflict. The emphasis put here on such “double efforts” at negotiation and peace during
such difficult times for regional order offers a unique opportunity to contrast and study in
proper depth how war and peace, as inextricably linked phenomena, interact as part of a
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single dynamic process affecting order-formation and consolidation at the regional level.
Additionally, and perhaps most crucially, the case studies trace and compare the “dialogue”
and “action” of the main statesmen and decision-makers at the time, from belligerents and
neutral countries alike. This facilitates the testing of a sense of “awareness” of common
interests and the potential for “strategic learning” by political elites regarding the longerterm national interests towards a well-ordered and peaceful regional neighborhood.

Organization of the Study
The four cases studied in this dissertation represent the largest and most impactful wars in
the history of South America. Their selection offers “stress tests” for the competing
hypotheses presented in Chapter 1—and a remarkably strong test for the international
society argument in particular. It is in these critical moments of extreme danger, when
newly independent nations faced the open-ended phenomenon of war, that national
survival is most at stake. For South American nations in the 19th century, only a handful
of decades in existence after de facto independence from the Spanish and Portuguese
empires, the three major wars of the 19th century represented decisive challenges for
popular sentiments of “American brotherhood” and sense of belonging to a region of
autonomous republican states. If there was any sense of membership in an international
society (or society of states) at the time, as hypothesized in this study, then its effects should
be particularly observable in such difficult instances of war.
At the same time, these instances of heightened risk offer a fair test for Realist
hypotheses, which can be said to be at their best in such circumstances, given their focus
on survival, security and power as driving motivations for states. Liberal hypotheses are
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equally tested in their focus on regime type, for republicanism played an important role in
the framing of international relations in the region. Wars among similar regime types are
not expected, nor are alliances between monarchies and republics. The Liberal argument is
also tested in their focus on the “pacifying” effects of economic inter-dependence, for many
conflicts involved disputes over resource-rich areas. Constructivist approaches find also
important tests in these four cases, for a strong cultural, linguistic and “Americanist”
identitary congruence has always been present in the region, yet integration levels remain
very low—both politically as well as economically. If regional peace responds to how a
whole society (including its leaders and decision-makers) changes its identity, then the
external-peace–internal-peace paradox presents a hard empirical challenge that contradicts
the core logic of the Constructivist argument.
In this context, the first two cases are particularly informative for at least two main
reasons. First, because they occurred almost simultaneously in the mid-1860s; and second,
because the so-called “Guano War” confronted the alliance of Chile, Peru, Ecuador and
Bolivia against the former Motherland, Spain. Pre-existing sentiments of regional
belonging or membership were thus tested among South American nations in a
confrontation with an extra-regional, European monarchy. Spain was seen as threatening
not only the independence of one South American nation (Peru), given the Spanish seizure
of the Chincha Islands, but also the very independence, autonomy and republicanism—if
not the regional order—of the entire American continent. Chile, Bolivia and Ecuador
entered the war in a solidarist move to protect Peru from Spanish aggression, when the
latter seized three Peruvian islands rich in guano deposits. Since at the time there was no
formal treaty between Peru and Spain ratifying the former’s independence, this potentially
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represented a major threat to Peru’s own existence as a sovereign state. In sum, the Guano
War, which is the main focus of attention of Chapter 2, is a good test for corroborating
sentiments of intra-region “solidarity,” as well as moderation and restraint in the use of
force during a situation of “life and death” for these young republics. Peru, after all, had
been a terrible neighbor for Chile and Ecuador during the previous four decades. The
convocation of a regional diplomatic Congress in Lima, in January 1864—four months
prior to the Spanish aggression—offered a perfect opportunity to try to articulate “a
common front” once the dispute with the Spanish Armada broke out.
In parallel, while the Quadruple Alliance (Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru)
successfully fended off Spain in the South Pacific region, in the River Plate area, on the
eastern side of the sub-continent, Paraguay and the Triple Alliance (composed of
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay) waged the most destructive international war in the history
of the Americas.93 This war, which is the focus of Chapter 3, entailed what was seen at the
time as an incompatible or “unnatural” alliance between Argentina, a republic, and the
Brazilian Empire, a monarchy. This alliance, moreover, was formed against Paraguay: a
“sister republic.”
The contrast between both wars, one in the South Pacific and the other in the
Atlantic area, offers a multiplicity of opportunities for testing several of the propositions
advanced by the international society approach and by many alternative theories. Not only
was the War of the Triple Alliance against Paraguay (1864–1870), for example, seen as a
major offense by the other nations of the region to their shared sense of “Americanism”—
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in particular, by the nations of the South Pacific—but also by the major powers of the
world, such as Great Britain and the United States. Both great powers tried to offer their
mediation at several instances during the war, trying to put an end to a conflict that was
negatively affecting their commercial and strategic interests in the River Plate area.
Moreover, the War of the Triple Alliance could have easily meant the end of Paraguay as
an independent nation. It was, both to its leaders as much as the Paraguayan people, a “total
war” for survival. Paradoxically, however, it also showcases an important test for the idea
of “restraint” on the part of the allies, for despite Paraguay’s monumental human losses,
its existence as a sovereign nation was ultimately preserved after the war by the very own
countries that had waged a brutal war against her for over five years. Its territorial loses,
for example, affected only areas formerly under dispute—and not yet established as
Paraguayan territory—and in a scale inferior to the pre-war demands made by both
Argentina and the Brazilian Empire. The war-debt, as well, was ultimately pardoned by the
allies after the war.
The simultaneous development of these two conflicts also offers the possibility of
testing two case studies that were influenced by similar global developments and trends, as
well as by each other. These include, for example, European imperialism and colonialism
(in Asia and Africa), the problematic impact of the Civil War on the United States’ foreign
policy in the 1860s, and the wider effects of technological transformations in war-fighting,
telecommunications, medicine, resource-extraction, finance, and trade during the second
half of the 19th century. Unfortunately, the study of the interaction of these two conflicts
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inter se has been tried only rarely and in a limited manner.94 However, the proper study of
their mutual effects is a crucial component of the present study, for it uncovers dynamics
of South America’s international relations previously overlooked or understudied, but of
great importance.
Chapter 4 focuses on the 1879–1884 war between Chile and the Peru–Bolivia
alliance over the control of the Atacama and Tarapacá desserts area in the South Pacific.
This conflict is relevant for the integrated history of the region because, among other
things, it confronted three states that had been allies less than a decade before. That is, it
offers a “hard test” for the international society argument, given the rather rapid change of
these countries’ alignments from close allies to enemies. Moreover, it offers an interesting
test for the Realist argument, for Argentina made use of Chile’s war with her northern
neighbors to secure its control over the Patagonia region—a dispute that nevertheless
remained open from a Chilean perspective until the early years of the 20th century. Unable
to fight on two fronts, Chile negotiated with Argentina an “abandonment” of her claims to
that region in order to focus exclusively on the conflict with Bolivia and Peru to the north.
At first sight, this “opportunistic” behavior by Argentina corroborates the Realist
argument; however, upon closer inspection, Argentina’s moderation and restraint in how
she handled the affair, using only diplomatic channels and remaining strictly neutral in the
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War of the Pacific, also gives a strong support for the international society argument.
Argentina used its diplomatic assets carefully and with a sense of responsibility, for having
accepted the Peru-Bolivian repeated requests to join their alliance against Chile would have
most certainly meant the extinction of Chile as an independent nation—and thus
profoundly altered the regional order.
The last historical chapter focuses on the Chaco War, between Bolivia and
Paraguay. This war, waged between 1932 and 1935, presents all the ingredients for a strong
test among all the rival hypotheses. Starting rather informally in 1928, with minor clashes
between patrol units in the Chaco area, the dispute continued until 1938, when the final
peace treaty was signed—and ultimately ratified the following year. Both Bolivia and
Paraguay, as defeated powers in their previous major wars, were deeply affected by those
two conflicts. In an important sense, their own war was made possible, and profoundly
shaped by, the way in which the War of the Triple Alliance and the War of the Pacific had
been resolved. Bolivia lost all its territorial possessions abutting the Pacific Ocean, thus
becoming in 1884 a de facto land-locked country with no fluvial access to world markets
other than a potential outlet to the Atlantic Ocean via the Paraguay River. Paraguay, for
her part, devastated by the previous war against the Triple Alliance, was forced to abandon
all her claims to a number of disputed territories, including the area of Misiones to the east,
the region between the rivers Pilcomayo and Bermejo to the south, and a small area to the
north adjoning Brazil, as well as other parts of the “Gran Chaco” region to the west. In the
Chaco War, two of the poorest nations of the sub-continent confronted one another for
control of a poorly demarcated area, suspected to contain oil deposits and fertile grasslands
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for raising cattle, but most importantly providing a strategic geopolitical bridge between
the western and eastern regions of South America.
The Chaco War is iconic for the present study, for it represents the most illustrative
case of American “solidarism” by key neighboring states, such as Argentina, Chile and
Brazil—with the early involvement of extra-regional actors, like the League of Nations and
the United States itself. The continuous offers of mediation and arbitration, and other
pacification efforts by the rest of the American states between 1935 and 1938,
paradoxically lasted longer than the actual fighting itself (1932–1935). That is, the
negotiation of peace took more years than the fighting itself. Normally considered by the
specialized literature as “the lowest point” of the Pan-Americanist movement in the
Western Hemisphere, the process of war and peace in the Chaco can however also be seen
as a triumph of international society. Although war could not be prevented, it was
effectively moderated, restrained and de-escalated by the action of neighboring states who
were deeply concerned with the wider implications of the confrontation for the region’s
order and stability. Although economic and financial interests were essentially involved,
such as the well-known Argentine “patronage” over Paraguay or Chilean and Brazilian
efforts to influence Bolivia, these interconnections far from demonstrating intra-regional
imperialism, or a rapaciously opportunistic behavior, actually show the effects of a strong
awareness of common interests in the protection of regional order. A regional awareness,
that is, premised on very real and logical common interests—and not on some idealized
version of hermandad or community sentiments, in the abstract.
Apart from these historical components, the dissertation benefits from a theoretical
framework previously unapplied to the study of South America’s international relations.
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By adopting the international society approach, the dissertation aims to provide a coherent,
consistent and systematic set of working definitions and methodological tools with which
to study the origins and dynamic evolution of South America as a social system of states,
progressively learning from its experiences to value regional order and stability. This
methodological approach is not typically followed by other studies of the region. Not all
studies of South American international relations advance and test competing hypotheses,
nor pay proper attention to the 19th century. Historians, for example, despite their attention
to the Society and War perspective, have produced national histories of each respective
war, but no efforts have been done to inter-connect these wars to the regional and global
level of analysis. The Society and War perspective has focused on the domestic effects of
each war for the society as a whole, but in particular for the women, the families of soldiers,
and for ethnic and socio-economic social cleavages, as well as the war’s legacy in the
educational system and the collective memories of the nation, creating myths and narratives
of heroes and martyrs, etc. For all the positive attributes of this perspective, particularly
regarding the impact of war on state-formation and consolidation, little or no attention is
normally paid to the interaction between the “domestic” and the “regional” (or external)
levels produced by these wars. In other words, not just how war affected the internal
dynamics of the state, but also how it affected the outward-oriented interactions among
states. Each national process of state-formation and consolidation, in conclusion, took
place not in isolation but in specific regional and global circumstances which are too often
neglected even by the best historical studies.
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CHAPTER 1

EXPLAINING THE “LONG PEACE”:
CONTENDING APPROACHES

This chapter has three main objectives. First, it contextualizes the academic debate on the
long South American peace by placing it in the ongoing larger theoretical discussions about
war and peace in IR. Second, it defines a series of key concepts that despite giving shape
to the academic debate on the long peace in South America, remain either contested or
underdeveloped. A third section introduces the main contending explanations in this study
and operationalizes them as formal and generalizable causal mechanisms. This final section
is of critical importance for the correct application of the process-tracing method in the
subsequent case-study Chapters 2–5. In this context, for each of the contending approaches,
this chapter lays out their general conceptual propositions and theoretical expectations, and
assesses their concrete empirical form when applied to the historical cases.

The South American “Long Peace” in Context
South America is usually characterized by students of regional security as one of the most
peaceful regions in the world. This popular view is premised on two main assumptions.
The first assumption is the acknowledgment of the fact that war among states is a recurrent
phenomenon of world politics. In this sense, when certain groups of states remain at peace
for prolonged periods, the conventional knowledge in IR is challenged and a need for new
and better explanations grows. It is important to note that the main issue is not the mere
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occurrence of peace (understood, at least minimally, as the absence of war), but the
sustainability of peace over very long periods. Similarly, although the academic debate
focuses mainly on the recurrence of war, the sole occurrence of peace does not necessarily
contradict IR’s main disciplinary assumptions. As David McIntyre put it, “[a]fter all, the
South American peace is anomalous because neo-realism predicts that warfare should be a
recurrent phenomenon.”95 In fact, “moments” of peace are required among “moments” of
war to be able to claim that war is a recurrent, rather than an uninterrupted, phenomenon.
In this context, peace must also be understood as a recurrent phenomenon in its own right.
A second assumption is the recognition that different patterns of war and peace
obtain when contrasting different regions of the world. Although war may be a recurrent
feature of international life, it is not equally recurrent or frequent everywhere at the same
time or intensity. It is in such a context that South America stands out with a record of
inter-state war that is markedly lower in frequency and intensity than any other region—
especially during the 20th century. War and other forms of organized violence among
human collectivities (e.g., empires, tribes, nations, city-states, etc.) have always been a
recurrent aspect of international relations. Peace, however, as historian Michael Howard
argues, seems to be a modern invention.96
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Although the idea of war as a recurrent phenomenon was already implicit in
Thucydides’ work, who wrote his story “as a possession for all time,” it was Kenneth N.
Waltz who first problematize the recurrence of war itself. According to Waltz, it is the
“anarchic” context of politics among human collectivities trying to survive what best
explains the continuous resurgence of armed conflict in international relations.97 In Theory
of International Politics, one of the discipline’s most canonical texts, Waltz argues that
“[w]hether in the family, the community, or the world at large contact without at least
occasional conflict is inconceivable; and the hope that in the absence of an agent to manage
or to manipulate conflicting parties the use of force will always be avoided cannot be
realistically entertained. Among men as among states, anarchy […] is associated with the
occurrence of violence.”98 Yet, as he later clarified, “[t]he recurrence of war is explained
by the structure of the international system. Theorists explain what historians know: War
is normal.”99
In this context, given that the traditional knowledge in the discipline of IR
“normalizes” both the occurrence and recurrence of war, while making the maintenance of
peace for prolonged periods of time “exceptional,” the case of South America acquires a
central importance for the study of war and peace in a general sense. If the South American
case reveals itself as more than a mere “absence of war” for a handful of decades, it could
be of great value for the study of the same phenomenon in other regions of the world. But
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if war returned to South America, then it would also be considered as a return to
“normalcy,” and any lessons learned from the study of its collapsing peace would lose
some of its potency; faith in its wider applicability would certainly diminish.
Although the study of war and peace has always been at the heart of the discipline
of IR, it has been far more common to focus on war rather than peace. As William T. R.
Fox famously put it, “[w]hat makes wars end (‘the causes of peace’) and what makes wars
from ending (‘the conditions of war’) has been much less studied than what makes wars
start (‘the causes of war’) and what keeps wars from starting (‘the conditions of peace’).”100
This generalized war-bias in the academic study of international relations has profoundly
shaped how traditional approaches to security have treated war and peace as noncomplimentary and discrete phenomena.101 During the Cold War, for instance, to study
security almost unequivocally meant to focus on nuclear deterrence and the balance of
power among the great powers—particularly among the Soviet Union and the United
States—in detriment to other aspects, like the environment, human security, gender, or
issues not directly related to the survival of the state itself, or its type of regime.102 Towards
the end of the 20th century, however, new issues and “sectors” gained ground in the
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international security agenda over the more traditional systemic approaches.
Simultaneously, the so-called “new agenda” gave way to a more regionally-minded
perspective in the study of international security.103
The study of distinct patterns of war and peace through the regional lens has grown
exponentially since the end of the Cold War, becoming today the most established way of
framing global security studies. One of the important innovations of this approach has been
the focus on “Regional Security Complexes” (RSC), which are characterized by the role of
key regional states (such as “buffer” or “pivotal” states), the particularities of their
geopolitical outlook, and the security dynamics of each region after the Cold War. 104
Viewed in this light, all sorts of distinctive regional aspects were identified, leading to the
analysis of regions strictly in terms of “zones of peace” or “zones of conflict,” depending
on which patterns seemed to prevail.105 One of the positive aspects of this approach was
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that it generated an immense growth in comparative case-study research around the world.
In the case of South America, the region has attracted mostly the interest of scholars of
security studies and IR, but also that of international historians, sociologists, and
comparativist political scientists. Yet, given the strong anti-theory bias of most of these
contributors to the study of Latin America in general, it should not come as a surprise the
rather unsystematic and presentist nature of their studies of South America’s long peace.106
These usually take the form of succinct chapters or journal articles, which rarely give way
to a sustained debate or serious academic exchanges among the scholars studying South
America’s long peace. For most of the Cold War, therefore, South-American studies lagged
behind more systemic or “global” phenomena, focused on nuclear proliferation, deterrence
and their impact on European regional stability. With the end of the bipolar confrontation
between the Soviet Union and the United States, however, the study of South America
went through an “academic re-discovery.” In the 1990s, the region attracted the attention
of multiple IR scholars interested in the region’s “puzzling” pattern of prolonged inter-state
peace amid high levels of intra-state violence, giving shape for the very first time to a more
serious engagement with the paradoxical nature of the region’s prolonged peace.
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For a general overview of these problematic aspects, see Arlene B. Tickner and Mônica Herz, “No Place
for Theory? Security Studies in Latin America,” in Thinking International Relations Differently, ed. by
Arlene B. Tickner and David L. Blaney (Routledge, 2012), pp. 92–114; Tickner, “Latin America: Still
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The traditional study of peace and war on simultaneous, but separate, tracks
however has deepened the inability of major IR approaches to account for the region’s
relative absence of major war among states, and has created the need for a careful
qualification of the popular idea depicting South America as “the most peaceful region.”
Understanding peace as the absence of war, for example, becomes problematic—or at least
insufficient—when trying to assess the long-peace phenomenon in South America.
Although several works have paid close attention to this “paradoxical” aspect of the region,
a general consensus over the main explanations and the central concepts of the debate
remains elusive, showing a series of other important weaknesses.
Regional studies, for example, usually acknowledge the “anomalous” nature of
South America’s international relations, but rarely revise the assumptions on which those
theories rest. Put differently, they take for granted the “normal” state of affairs on which
the main IR theories are based. This particular take on the issue both normalizes the
recurrence of war and rarifies even the mere occurrence of peace. While war, therefore,
has received much more attention than peace, it is uncritically accepted as a “natural” and
expected phenomenon. Peace, on the other hand, is made exceptional, fragile, and
ultimately presumed incapable of long life. It is only under such a way of framing the
problem that it becomes possible for scholars to argue—as most do—that a regional long
peace, such as the one in South America, is an “anomaly.”107 Critical discussions about
these important assumptions, however, are almost non-existent in the literature.
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The “Normal” State of Affairs
In order to understand the partial and segmented accounts of South America’s “anomalous”
international relations, it is necessary to uncover and discuss a particular set of underlying
assumptions in the literature regarding what is the “normal” states of affairs in IR. If South
America’s long peace constitutes an anomaly, then it is essential to assess what is to be
considered the standard. The argument advanced in this dissertation is that the main works
on South America’s long peace showcase a heavy reliance on two core assumptions
imported to IR theory directly from the field of political philosophy, but which are rarely
questioned, problematized, or adapted to the subject matter in question.
In this sense, traditional approaches in IR converge on two important assumptions
which a priori frame the entire debate. The first assumption is the belief that the anarchical
condition of interstate relations resembles a “state of nature,” as famously portrayed by
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). The absence of a central government, as the English
philosopher argued in 1651, constitutes a fundamental obstacle to orderly, peaceful and
enduring productive social relations.108 In this view, therefore, the state is portrayed as
preceding society, for without a Leviathan all aspects commonly associated to community,
society and orderly relations cannot take hold, and soon wither away. As Hobbes famously
put it:
In such condition [i.e., the state of nature], there is no place for Industry; because the fruit
thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of
108
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the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments
of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of
the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all,
continual fear, and danger of violent death; And the life of man solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short.109

In the case of the relations among sovereign states, a comparable condition of anarchy is
widely recognized by most contemporary students of IR as the “permissive cause” of war,
generating the expectation that states will not be able to avoid violent conflict and war
among one another for too long a period. Such an expectation, as pointed out above,
“cannot be realistically entertained.”110
A second assumption is the widely held belief in a concrete set of factors expected
to “tame” the international state of nature. Put differently, anarchy is seen as a problematic
condition that breeds conflict and works against any meaningful cooperation or trust among
states; anarchy, therefore, is seen as something states should work against, mitigate, or
curb. While Constructivism, for example, highlights shared inter-subjective identities (like
culture, language, ideology, or religion) as anarchy-taming variables, other approaches
(e.g., Realism) focus more on the momentarily pacifying effects of fighting against a
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common enemy, or the automatic operation of a balance-of-power dynamic, the mitigation
of the security dilemma, and the role of geopolitics. Liberalism, for its part, tends to
emphasize the intervening role of (Liberal) international institutions and values (like
democracy, republicanism, economic interdependence and the free-market economy) in
incentivizing cooperation, peace, trust, and economic prosperity among states.111 For many
different reasons, therefore, several approaches to IR can logically accommodate a limited
prolongation of peace among states through the mitigation anarchy. But in endorsing such
perspectives, each of the approaches standardizes Hobbes’ idea of the state of nature as the
normal condition of all political life under anarchy. These diverse approaches, moreover,
differ only in degree, for they are cast against the same basic Hobbesian canvas identified
above. In short, although a “long peace” is possible in theory, it is often viewed as
exceptional and studied with profound suspicion.
From these initial assumptions, traditional IR theories typically derive two other
important interrelated generalizations that profoundly affect how scholars frame the study
of regional order. On the one hand, they tend to “normalize” war and “rarefy” peace. That
is, they create the expectation of much more conflict in anarchical political systems than in
centralized ones. War is presented, therefore, as a historical recurrence that can be
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explained by the nature of international relations itself.112 On the other hand, since in the
Hobbesian view the state “precedes” society, traditional IR theories treat anarchy and order
as problematic bedfellows. They expect stable and long-lasting order only in societies with
a centralized government or authority, but not in anarchical ones. The South American
case, given its condition of stable order “despite” anarchy, emerges as a direct theoretical
and empirical challenge to the established literature in IR, for it forms an “ordered anarchy”
in the sense discussed by classical political anthropologists.113 Since the way in which
scholars frame the discussion plays such a relevant role in how they go about looking for
an explanation of the South American peace, it is important to focus on the terminology
employed and the distinct interpretations that are often adopted. The next section reviews
some of the main concepts used in the South American long peace debate and critically
assesses the main problems with adopting traditional, yet insufficient, definitions.

Concepts and Definitions
Apart from the underlying assumptions framing the debate, there is a second layer of
disagreement among students of South America concerning the definition of key concepts.
Some of these disagreements are fundamental, for adopting a specific definition can set the
analysis and framing the study of the long South American peace on different (often times
incompatible) epistemological, ontological or methodological paths. For these reasons,
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attention is paid in this section to four main concepts: “war,” “limited war,” “peace,” and
“long peace,” given their relevance for the existing academic debate as well as for the
present study. Each concept is assessed according to the most common uses employed in
the specialized literature, with the intention of highlighting the often implicit analytical
“trade-offs” incurred by scholars when taking different theoretical stances.

War
The first important concept to consider is war. Most scholars involved in the study of the
South American long peace commonly follow the well-known Correlates of War Project’s
(COW) definition. In doing so, however, certain problems arise. For example, scholars
typically end up adopting a definition of war that is too quantitative or “materialist,”
focusing on the number of casualties and the duration of an armed conflict in order to
consider it as a “war.” Similarly, the reliance on these two factors, although attracting the
attention of many researchers around the world interested in “solving” the “no-war” puzzle
in South America, also puts too much emphasis on the frequency of war and disregards
other equally important factors. According to this view, for instance, war is a declared
armed conflict between two or more neighboring states (if not sharing a common border,
at least located in the same region) that produces at least 1,000 battle-related casualties
(including civilians) in the span of at least a year.114 Although this dataset is one of the
most well-known and widely-used resources by contemporary students of regional
security, reflected in the adoption of its categories by the vast majority of the contributions
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to the study of the “long peace,” it presents a number of additional difficulties to the ones
highlighted above when employed too uncritically.
One of these difficulties arises from the rather arbitrary threshold of 1,000 battlerelated casualties. This often leads scholars to develop an exaggerated sense of
“peacefulness” in a region that is otherwise plagued by a plethora of civil wars and limited
border disputes—an aspect that lingers even in the early decades of the 21st century, with
a regional preponderance of democratic rule. Similarly, a misleading impression is
commonly created regarding the periodization of this regional long peace. Following the
COW

Project’s criterion, for example, only the Chaco War (1932–1935) between Bolivia

and Paraguay can count as a “war” in South America in the entire 20th century—separated
by its most immediate antecedent, the War of the Pacific of 1879–1884, by almost fifty
years. On one hand, other armed conflicts, like those between Peru and Colombia in the
1930s or between Peru and Ecuador in the 1940s (with approximately 860 and 550
casualties, respectively), are simply lost for the analysis of the region’s security dynamics.
And on the other hand, most scholars problematically assume that between 1884 and 1932
the region experienced a fundamentally “peaceful” period. This is showcased by the
general disinterest in the study of the decades between the War of the Pacific and the Chaco
War, or in the popular view of the Chaco War as an “exception.”
These problems are most clearly visible, for example, in the work of one of the
main contributors to the “long peace” debate, Arie M. Kacowicz, who marks the beginning
of the South American long peace in the year 1883—instead of 1935 or even 1941. This is
a problematic choice that Kacowicz has nevertheless reiterated in all his studies on South
America. In a peculiarly worded manner, Kacowicz consistently refers to the long South
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American peace as a period spanning from 1883 to the present “with the exception of two
international wars.”115 The point becomes problematic when those “exceptions” are the
rather important Chaco War (1932–1935) and the Zarumilla–Marañón dispute (1941). The
first case left between 80,000 and 90,000 casualties, being the most impactful war of the
entire Western Hemisphere in the 20th century, whereas the second fell short of the 1,000casualty threshold of the COW Project, but only by a small margin. Equally surprising is the
lack of proper consideration for the Leticia dispute of 1932, which also left an important
(although “statistically insignificant”) number of casualties, but which at least constituted
a “near miss” in the COW dataset for major wars. In this view, it counts only as a Militarized
Interstate Dispute (MID).
Despite these methodological and historical quibbles, the majority of scholars
commonly marks the beginning of the regional peace in 1935—when the last major war
ended (according to the COW Project), or in 1941, when the Peru–Ecuador dispute ended
(according to the MID dataset).116 By insisting upon this arbitrary date, Kacowicz and those
following him unnecessarily exaggerate the duration of the South American long peace in
two specific ways: First, by artificially adding almost fifty years to the period of peace; and
secondly, by dismissing the Chaco War, the Leticia and the Zarumilla–Marañón disputes,
considering them only as “exceptions.” The South American long peace is thus premised
as running from 1883 to the present—although the official end of the War of the Pacific is
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in 1884, not 1883. Kacowicz’s defense of the “impact” of international norms on regional
peace seems to lead him to adopt this questionable proposition in order to pair his analysis
with the deeper involvement of the United States in hemispheric relations vis-à-vis the
creation of the Pan-American Conferences (and later the OAS), and its rise to great-power
status after the war with Spain over Puerto Rico, Cuba, Guam and the Philippines in 1898—
thus substantiating a role for the United States and the OAS as one of the main propellers
of international norms of peace and security on a hemispheric level.117
In this context, the works by McIntyre, Mares, and Domínguez have criticized the
use of the COW dataset as the main criterion for the study of the region. Their claim is that
it usually leads scholars to an unnecessary exaggeration of the duration and intensity of the
“long peace” in South America. Lowering the threshold to 500, for example, as Mares and
Domínguez have suggested, can make more visible the continued willingness to use force
by South American decision-makers throughout the entire 20th century—despite
ultimately not escalating to the level of war. This leads Mares to conclude that scholars
need to be alert of the pros and cons of the statistical criteria employed before jumping to
conclusions that might be too optimistic regarding the region’s condition of, or potential
for, stable peace.118 McIntyre, for his part, is even more categorical about it:
South America is not especially peaceful if one uses a broader definition of “war.” South
American states occasionally fought low-level hostilities, but they did not attempt to
conquer an adversary. Their objective was generally to occupy a piece of the defender’s
territory before the defender could offer resistance. South America is “peaceful” because
their border conflicts often did not result in sufficient casualties to qualify as a “war.” […]
South America’s tranquility is in part an artifact of the definition of “war.” […] Using the
COW definition, South America is peaceful in its international relations. [However] The
117
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threshold of 1,000 is completely arbitrary; alternative thresholds of 5,000 or 999 or 100 are
equally defensible. If the cutoff point were lowered, South America might become almost
as war-prone as other regions in the world. Unfortunately, [a] lower number of low-level
conflicts is [still] undocumented.119

For all the above reasons, other works have tried to employ a more qualitative definition
of war, less dependent on its material effects (casualty rates and duration) and defined in
terms of the types of political objectives behind the decisions to use of force against a
neighboring state. The problem with a strictly typological approach to war, however, is that
in South America almost the totality of armed conflicts has been characterized by a rather
homogeneous type of objective: namely, territorial and border disputes, involving in certain
instances the additional incentive of securing some strategic resource (like guano, nitrates,
or access to strategic waterways). Since there is no relevant variance in the type of war in
South America, the typological approach which was popular in the 1980s has now been
almost entirely abandoned for analyzing the region.
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Although many of these

contributions had generated an unjustified sense of pessimism regarding the decaying
character of the regional peace in the 1980s and early 1990s, the return to democracy and
the new wave of cooperative arrangements in South America in the 1990s (like, for
example, via MERCOSUR) clearly showed the deficiencies of those pessimistic assessments.
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Other scholars, however, marked the advent and consolidation of democratic regimes in
the region as a “deepening” or “upgrading” factor for the regional peace.121
Given the multiple and important limitations of these approaches to war, a different
qualitative perspective has been suggested more recently by sociologist Miguel Centeno.
He argues that “[w]ar is not simply acts of military violence or banditry (Latin America
has had more than enough of both). Rather, it is a special form of organized violence with
clear political goals.” In this sense, Centeno adds, “war is ‘a substantial armed conflict
between the organized military forces of independent political units’ […] and is different
from other violence acts in that it involves the ‘existence, the creation, or the elimination
of states’.”122 Although this definition builds off the example of political anthropology in
the 1960s, and can be critiqued for its implicit built-in statism—potentially not allowing,
for example, for civil wars—it resonates well with more contemporary anthropological and
sociological understandings of “war” as, by nevessity, a phenomenon among organized
political groups (such as the state, although not exclusively limited to it). Other, less
organized and smaller political units are simply not capable to produce the type of
organized political violence commonly associated with large-scale war.123
Historian Lawrence Freedman points out that, its original form, “war is about a
miserable condition and that is how it is still commonly and understandably viewed. But it
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is a condition which is often knowingly entered because not doing so carries its own
miseries and dangers.”124 In this view, war is about both “a purposive activity, geared to
the demands of personal, group, and national security,” as well as the grim consequences
of conflict itself. “War is a bad thing to happen but, at least on occasion, a good thing to
do. States continue to prepare for war while professing to wish to legislate it out of
existence, promising only to fight for the most righteous of reasons, as a last resort, and in
the most civilized manner.”125
This alternative perspective helps one to move away from the simple “counting” of
wars to qualify the “peacefulness” of a region, drawing inferences only from the study of
the frequency of war in a particular period of time. It centers the discussion back on the
political, sociological and institutional factors concerning the organization for violence and
the capacity for the execution of political and strategic plans to that effect. At the same
time, it illuminates the fact that the levels of intensity during war (measured by more than
simply the number of casualties) equally matter. Rather than serve as an arbitrary threshold
to discard from a statistical list those conflicts that fall below a given threshold, the
consideration of different levels of intensity can help identify better the progressive decline
in war-fighting ferocity in South America from the 19th to the 20th centuries126 [see infra
TABLE 2].
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TABLE 2 –– Major Inter-State Wars in South America (19th and 20th Centuries)
Duration

Name

Belligerents

Motives

Casualties*

1825–1828

“Cisplatine War”

Argentina
Brazilian Empire

8,500

1836–1851

“River Plate War”
(or “Guerra Grande”)

1836–1839

“War of the Confederation”

Territorial

8,000

1841

“Peru-Bolivian War”

Territorial

2,000

1863

“Ecuador-Colombian War”

Territorial

1,500

1864–1866

“The Chincha Islands War”
(or “Guano War”)

Territorial + Resources
(Guano)

1,000

1864–1870

“War of the Triple Alliance”
(or “Paraguayan War”)

Territorial
(River Plate estuary)

420,000

1879–1884

“War of the Pacific”

Territorial + Resources
(Nitrates and Guano)

55,000

1932–1935

“Chaco War”
“Leticia Dispute”

Territorial
(Chaco Boreal Region)
Territorial

90,000

1932–1933
1941

Territorial

550

1981

“Zarumilla–Marañón
Dispute”
“Paquisha Dispute”

Territorial

150

1982

“Malvinas/Falklands War”

Territorial

900

1995

“Cenepa Dispute”

Argentina,
Banda Oriental
Brazilian Empire
GREAT BRITAIN
FRANCE
Bolivia
Chile
Peru
Bolivia
Peru
Colombia
Ecuador
Bolivia
Chile
Ecuador
Peru
SPAIN
Argentina,
Uruguay
Brazilian Empire
Paraguay
Bolivia
Chile
Peru
Bolivia
Paraguay
Colombia
Peru
Ecuador
Peru
Ecuador
Peru
Argentina,
GREAT BRITAIN
Ecuador
Peru

Territorial
(River Plate’s Eastern
Bank)
Territorial
(River Plate’s Eastern
Bank)

Territorial

150

10,000

860

Sources: Table based on Centeno, Blood and Debt, p. 44; Mares, Violent Peace, pp. 33–34, 45–46; Little, “International Conflict in
Latin America,” p. 592; McIntyre, “The Longest Peace,” pp. 173–174; Child, “Interstate Relations in Latin America,” p. 383; David
F. Marley, Wars of the Americas: A Chronology of Armed Conflicts in the New World Since 1492 to the Present (A.B.C.–CLIO,
1998); Sater, Andean Tragedy, pp. 348–349; Thomas L. Whigham and Barbara Potthast, “The Paraguayan Rosetta Stone: New
Insights into the Demographics of the Paraguayan War, 1864–1870,” Latin American Research Review, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1999), pp.
174–186; and Zook, The Conduct of the Chaco War.
References: (*): Approximate total casualties—including civilians. (SMALL CAPS): Extra-regional powers.
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In this specific sense, South America is in relative harmony with ongoing global trends
regarding the progressive decline in the number, as well as intensity, of inter-state wars
around the world.127
Contrary to the prevailing view, which tends to emphasize the absence of war (or
“negative peace”) among states, Andrew Hurrell adds an important nuance: “[W]hat is
most interesting about the use of force in the region,” he argues, “is not its frequency or
infrequency, but rather its particular character.” 128 If anything, it is the world that is
becoming increasingly more like South America, rather than the other way around. The
“anomaly” is thus quickly revealing itself as the new norm.
Centeno is the only contributor to the “long peace” debate to have elaborated further
on this point, and thus it is important to carefully consider his argument in more depth:
The type of war appears to make an insignificant difference on its effects. […] All major
Latin American wars may be characterized as involving territorial swaps motivated by
fairly simple geopolitical competition. While the territorial adjustments made to the
colonial map have been relatively small, the acquisition and defense of territory has been
the dominant historical trope. […] No countries have fought one another as representatives
of an ideology or a religious faith. […] The wars have also been relatively short and with
simple linear narratives. Most have been settled by one or two decisive battles […]. Not
surprisingly, by contemporary standards, the wars involved relatively few men and minimal
equipment. […] It often appears as if participants and observers had already accepted the
marginality of their actions.129
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In this context, as Hurrell concludes, “we need to look beyond positivist correlations across
a large number of cases and examine the quality and internal constitution of a particular
relationship and the causal mechanisms that may explain the emergence of stable peace.”130
To focus on these aspects, however, means that closer attention must be paid to the related
concept of “limited war,” which is central to the notion of war-as-institution in the
international society approach—followed in the present study—and which by definition
re-incorporates the role of the historical context in which war takes place—so often
neglected in so-called “scientific” approaches to war through statistical correlation and
large-n studies.131

Limited War
If war is to be studied as a phenomenon that is inextricably linked to peace, one must
necessarily embrace a broader qualitative understanding of both concepts, as Centeno,
Freedman, Hurrell, and others, suggest. This understanding, however, must be based not
on arbitrary methodological criteria, useful perhaps for a specific dataset, but on a more
widely-applicable sociological criterion that pays attention not just to the frequency of war
but also to the related issues of intensity and type. This criterion must also clarify those
aspects of war that make it susceptible to be studied as an “institution”—and not just as an
uncontrollable torrent of collective violence.132 The study of was-as-institution, therefore,
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builds upon the classical Clausewitzian understanding of war-as-politics and becomes a
crucial component of any discussion of the role of restraint in war (either legal,
organizational, or moral). If war is a political phenomenon, it has to be approached also as
an institution with its own customs, standards and cultural practices, and not in virtual
isolation or trans-historically.133
As Freedman argues, the major weakness of the so-called “scientific” approaches
(like the COW Project) is that their search for correlations between facts and events is carried
out by ignoring the historical context and the presence of other factors which may explain
the character of war in specific regions. Ultimately, “[w]hether a particular war occurs will
still depend on the decisions of individuals, which may depend as much on factors of
personality, cognition, and group dynamics as underlying ‘causes’.”134 Given that most
armed conflicts in South America have been of the limited type, in the sense outlined
above, it is important to define more specifically what is meant by “limited war” in the
context of the present study.
Following Centeno, Holsti, and Clark, limited wars are understood as armed
conflicts between states, or other similarly organized political groups, that have a short
duration overall and that may be characterized by isolated moments of ferocity, although
these moments will take place mostly at the individual level, although not at the collective
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one. One of its main components is that the belligerents share a background cultural–
ideological profile that can emanate from a common historical experience, such as a shared
colonial past, or from other factors, such as language, customs or religion. These types of
war, as Centeno argues, can only lead to limited conflicts over contained agendas, such as
economic resources or frontier clashes, but will not (or only rarely) escalate to all-out or
“total” wars. Contrary to these, limited wars involve only a portion of the population, either
by implicating a small section of the professional army or by producing limited effects—
specifically in terms of civilians being negatively affected by the conflict. In this sense, the
mobilization of the population for war remains minimal or is severely restricted.135
Any proper understanding of “limited war,” however, must also take into account
the institutional aspects of war as a political activity carried out by individual decisionmakers in the name of their respective states. Following Machiavelli and Clausewitz, Ian
Clark distinguishes the crucial role that political objectives play in limiting war, setting it
apart from other conceptions, such as the “Just War” tradition. 136 Thus, wars are not
marked by an initial “big-bang” dynamic of violence, that once unleashed cannot be
contained or controlled by political objectives. On the contrary, wars are typically curbed
by the political leaders directing them. “War,” as Clark argues, “is located in a real political
universe, and is shaped both by its original causes as well as by its continuing goals.”137
War is thus a purposive activity that carries wider social implications than simply the
unabashed killing, destroying, or maiming of an opponent—or in Holsti’s more graphic
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terms, “orgies of uncontrolled violence.”138 Even in contemporary political anthropology,
the idea of war as caused by a biological “urge” or “pulsion” towards aggression has been
widely rejected and abandoned. Earlier works on so-called “primitive war” as a ritualized
sport-like activity have been equally discredited in favor of a more accurate view of war as
a collective, complex social institution with multifaceted purposes.
The sociological approach highlights that war is more than simply a force of
material destruction, as it also provides creative or constructive social functions. “Limited
war” contains a duality that is often either forgotten, or only mentioned in passing by most
students of war in Latin America, without much careful consideration.139 The duality of
war points out, beyond its “destructive” aspects, its more constructive potentials.140 This
tension between the tragic and the purposive sides of war, as Lawrence Freedman argues,
“is evident in the persistent efforts to acknowledge war’s political function as the ultimate
arbiter of disputes while containing it as a social institution and mitigating its harmful
effects.”141 One of the key components of limited war is, therefore, the restraining role that
political, normative and institutional frameworks play in erecting barriers to the eventual
resort to war and in setting up standards for its conduct. While these barriers cannot entirely
erase some of the most brutal aspects of war, such as the actual killing of people and the
psychological trauma suffered by those engaged in war, they can have a meaningful impact
in terms of its political and material effects by narrowing the scope and type of the political
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objectives for which a war can be legitimately invoked and carried out—with important
effects for the control of the frequency and intensity of war overall.142
But limited war is also a form of conversation.143 Through the institutionalization
of war as a political activity, states agree on common standards of proper or accepted
behavior, and thus narrow the scope of objectives for which the use of force can be
legitimately invoked.144 The legitimacy of the situation, as well as the process of mutual
recognition as “belligerents,” establishes a conversational dynamic by which parties can
signal one another not only a set range for their objectives, but also an acceptance of the
implicit “rules of the game” and its boundaries. As Hedley Bull eloquently put it: “War is
not simply a clash of forces; it is a clash between the agents of political groups who are
able to recognize one another as such and to direct their force at one another only because
of the rules that they understand and apply.” 145 War, therefore, cannot happen in the
absence of a social milieu giving both sides a sense of meaning and common understanding
upon which customs and standards of restraint (apart from war itself) can develop. It is
only within this framework that belligerents can come to understand, through a process of
reciprocity and proportionality, the advantages of practicing self-restraint in war. Charles
Jones nicely illustrates the point:
Faced with overwhelming military superiority, the insurgent forces resort to sabotage and
assassination. The occupiers respond by interspersing non-combatants in their convoys as
a human shield or killing them at some arbitrary tariff, perhaps two for every one of their
142
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troops killed. It seems that one breach of the war convention has led to a second, and that
the abyss beckons. Yet as often as not the display of calculated abnormality is a way for
the two belligerents to signal to each other the mutual advantage of a return to compliance
with tacit norms. Alternatively, a step too far by one’s opponent may be exploited to
strategic effect: “See, the true face of the enemy!” Writ large, war is a field of expression
and representation as well as an exercise of violence, just as politics may provide a field of
enmity and compulsion in the absence of violence.146

In the study of South America’s long peace, apart from the few exceptions pointed out
above, war is only given a superficial attention as part of a broader statistical collection of
“data-points.” Experts on South America’s security often do not express much
consideration for discussions over the main causes, characteristics, and the politicoeconomic and diplomatic effects of each major South American war. In the rare occasions
when these wars are considered, the analysis is often painfully superficial, brief, and
stereotypical, demonstrating sometimes a lack of accurate information about these wars
and the historiographical debates surrounding them. Such studies also show a larger
disinterest in the role that war has played—and continues to play—in South America’s
international relations.147
A more qualitative approach to war is also rarely seen, as the analysis often focuses
exclusively on the material and human effects, relying on the frequency of war, rather than
also considering the overall “limited” character of armed conflicts in South America. Wars
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like the Chaco War, or the War of the Triple Alliance, for example, are categorized as
major wars mostly on the basis of the large amount of material and human destruction that
they produced (more than 80,000 deaths in the first case, and over 400,000 in the second).
Much less attention (if any) is given to the many efforts towards peace before, during and
after these major armed conflicts; and barely any careful consideration is given to the
specific ways in which war was actually waged according to political and cultural standards
and practices of the time. More often what occurs is that contemporary students superimpose modern terminology and ideologies on 19th-century conflicts, qualifying these as
“genocides” or “holocausts,” and to pass judgment and dispense accusations and
responsibilities on specific contemporary actors, personalities, or groups.148
David Mares, one of the strongest advocates against the idea of considering the
region as a “zone of peace,” while correct in pointing out the persistence of many territorial
disputes in 20th century and beyond, pays less attention to the factors surrounding the
limited character of those conflicts that keep afflicting the region. Put simply, Mares
challenges the very existence of a “long peace” in South America by highlighting that
although war may have declined, the willingness to use of force has not.149 Yet, no truly
satisfactory explanation is provided for why those lingering rivalries and border disputes
have not ultimately escalated to full-scale inter-state war. Mares’ contribution is a healthy
reminder of the limitations of existing explanations, but a poor substitute as to the reasons
why war in South America has consistently declined both in frequency as well as in
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intensity since the mid-19th century. His exclusive attention to the second-half of the 20th
century—and to the Peru–Ecuador conflict in particular—further blinds him to the more
profound trend of peace in the region, characterizing South America’s international
relations since at least the mid-19th century.

Peace
A second concept in contention is that of peace itself. In relation to the prior discussion,
scholars have commonly approached the concept of peace merely as the absence of war.
Realist approaches to peace, for example, see it as an interval or truce between moments
of war. Peace is characterized, at best, as the unintended balance of power resulting from
great power competition. As Arnold Wolfers put it, “[a]lthough no state is interested in a
mere balance of power, the efforts of all states to maximize power may lead to equilibrium.
If and when that happens, there is ‘peace’ or, more exactly, a condition of stalemate or
truce. Under the conditions described here, this balancing of power process is the only
available ‘peace’ strategy.”150 In Realist terms, therefore, peace is better understood as the
absence of war, or as a “non-event.” 151 A considerable number of studies about South
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America conceptualizes peace in precisely these terms, irrespective of it being framed as
the starting point of the analysis, or as the permanent (“normal”) condition of the region.152
In reaction to this minimalist view of peace, prevalent in mainstream IR theory, a
group of scholars from the 1990s and early 2000s developed a typology of peace that ranges
from “cold” to “warm” to “hot”—or from “negative” to “positive”—peace, in an attempt
to capture different gradations in the levels of stability of the regional (inter-state) peace.
In this view, peace acquires an identity in and of itself, implying a qualitative change in
how actors come to understand “violence” in general, and “war” in particular, as a social
construction that should be eradicated from social interactions. As Emanuel Adler has
explains, “peace as the absence of war is an oxymoron; we cannot positively define
something as the opposite of something else.”153 Thus “enemies” can become “friends,”
and formerly bitter rivals can come to learn to trust one another and live peacefully.154 The
construction of this social mentalities can, in turn, lead to qualitatively different types of
stable relations—so stable, in fact, that war can become “unimaginable” among “friends.”
In these so-called “security communities,” states stop perceiving one another as threats and,
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instead, collectively project their fears, uncertainties and security concerns outwardly.
Short of fusing together into a larger supranational unit or regional state, a security
community would typically remain within the boundaries of a “pluralistic” security
community.155
Since the early 1990s, the majority of studies on South America’s “long peace” has
represented the evolution of the region in terms of steps or stages, ranging on one end of
the spectrum from an early period of recurrent conflict, unstable balances of power, and
intense security competition (1810s–1880s), to a condition called “positive” or “stable”
peace, where war is eradicated from regional politics and meaningful cooperation between
neighboring states is reaffirmed (post-1980s), at the very end of the spectrum. These stages,
however, vary in degree and characteristics depending on the author, with various inbetween stages, types of peace, and periodizations that merit a closer and comparative view
(see TABLE 3 infra).
In this general view, studies tend to generically clump together the entire 19th
century as a conflictual or violent period, categorizing it as an unproblematic stage,
unworthy of more serious consideration.156 The focus is put, instead, on the 20th century
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where “positive peace” is identified as taking hold in the early 1990s. The consolidation of
several democratic governments throughout the entire region at this time is also seen in the
literature as a most welcome, positive enhancement for this “stable peace.”157

TABLE 3 –– Making Peace in South America

Miller
Kacowicz
Holsti

“Negative Peace”

“Positive Peace”

“War is normal”
(19th century)

“War is unthinkable”
(20th century)

“Cold War”

“Cold Peace”

“H o t

(“Normal Peace”
“Negative Peace”

“Stable Peace”
(Southern Cone)

P e a c e”
“High-Level Peace”)
“Pluralistic Security Community”

“Hobbesian Floor”

“Kantian Ceiling”
(“Zone of No-War”)

( “Zone of Peace”)

Buzan and Wæver

“Conflict Formation”

“Security Community”

Hurrell

“Zone of Conflict”

“Pluralistic Security Community”

Oelsner
Kupchan

“Fragile Peace”

“Unstable Peace”

“Cold Peace”

“Hobbesian/Lockean International Politics”

“Stable Peace”

“Pluralistic Security Community”

“Zone of (Stable) Peace”
(“Rapprochement”–“Security Community”–“Union”)

Sources: Miller, States, Nations, and the Great Powers; Kacowicz, Zones of Peace in the Third World; Holsti, War, the State, and the
State of War; Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers; Hurrell, “An Emerging Security Community in South America?”; Oelsner,
“(De)Securitisation Theory and Regional Peace”; and Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends.
References: (Red text) indicates the position of South America in relation to the Security Dilemma, according to each author.

According to Buzan and Wæver, for instance, “South America has traditionally been […]
a conflict formation for most of its history.”158 In similar fashion, Miller argues that 19century South America “was an area of chronic war and armed intervention […]. More
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precisely, six postcolonial wars took place between 1825 and 1883, in addition to some
undeclared confrontations.”159 For Kacowicz, “in its formative period South America was
a typical zone of conflict, characterized by international and civil wars, military
interventions, political instability, changing alliances, struggles for subparamountcy in the
Atlantic and River Plate basin that involved two wars and the creation of Uruguay, and a
parallel struggle in the South Pacific area among Chile, Bolivia, and Peru, leading to the
Chilean hegemony there following the Pacific War of 1879–83.”160
Partly in reaction to the limitations of studying regional order solely through the
prism of war, many of the new contributions have approached South America’s puzzle
influenced by the classical studies of Kenneth Boulding, Alexander George, and Karl
Deutsch. These new studies have tried to solve the mystery of South America’s prolonged
interstate peace by looking not at the duration of the peace, defined minimally as an
enduring absence of war, but at the evolution of the “quality” of peace in the region since
the consolidation of democracy in the 1990s. 161 It is important to point out that this
newfound interest in peace came right after a decade where most regional experts were
expecting a return to “normalcy”—that is, a return to traditional power-political
competition, rivalries, and intra-regional war in a 19th-century style.162 It is for this reason
that the new peace-studies literature was also infused with a fresh air of triumphalism and
159
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optimism that added further impetus to some of their main claims, although now in
retrospect they may sound somewhat exaggerated or overstated.
The attention, however, has been put not just on the elaboration of “types of peace,”
as illustrated above, but also on the interconnexion between peace and democracy. The
connection with the return of democratic rule in the region is potentially important as it
happened during the rapid changes in the institutional and normative contexts of the
Western Hemisphere towards the end of the Cold War, in favor of the peaceful resolution
of conflicts and the protection of human rights in general. In sum, the literature offers a
reconstruction of the many stages of peace in a lineal path of progress through which South
American states are seen as moving from a period of chronic conflict and war, to a period
of “stable peace,” with several intermediary phases. The argument that Liberal democracies
“do not fight one another,” however, is one of the most contested hypothesis in IR theory.
At best, the proposition points to a correlation between democracies and international peace
inter se—although an actual explanation is still to be provided.
Buzan and Wæver, for instance, argue that “the security community in the Southern
Cone can hardly be seen as an instance of ‘democratic peace’. It was not solid democracies
that generated peace. It was the potential loss of democracy that motivated security
measures.” 163 Holsti, for his part, also agrees that “[t]he growth of democracy fails to
explain the change from a classical anarchical system of international politics to a no-war
system. Most governments in South America during the period up to the 1980s were not
democracies. And, as we have seen, the incidence of crises and wars does not correlate
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with type of regime.”164 David McIntyre offers a similar view on the issue: “[a]lthough no
one has argued that the [inter-democratic peace] theory explains the South American ‘long
peace’, many authors have recently used the theory to predict that the democratization will
make Latin American relations less conflictual.”165
Despite these limitations, many contributors to the study of South America’s long
peace maintain that the return and consolidation of democratic regimes in the region after
the 1980s is a key component to explain the “deepening” of the type of peace.166 Different
authors disagree about what is the stage at which the region is located at present (these
positions are marked in red in TABLE 3), whether it is closer to “positive peace” or not—
and thus, whether war has been finally eradicated. As a general point, the so-called “return
to democracy” of the late 1980s is commonly considered as a qualitative “upgrade” for
the region, but this implies an acceptance of the Liberal proposition in IR connecting
republican democracy with peaceful international effects via a process of “spill-over” that
remains theoretically contested in IR. Beyond the many attributes that a democratic type
of government can have for the welfare, freedom and security of its citizens, when
compared to other types of regime, this position implies a claim about “outward effects”
that are not yet backed-up by the empirical record.167
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In conclusion, this evolutionary view of South America towards stable or positive
peace is premised on a typology that runs from an early “pre-peace” stage, characterized
by recurrent conflict and war (typically, 1810–1935), to an initial condition of fragile or
unstable peace, where war remained a constant possibility, although states did not initiate
one (between 1935 and 1982). This second stage of minimal peace (as a “no-war” period)
can nevertheless regress at any moment back into chronic war—that is why many scholars
refer to it as a “fragile” or “unstable” peace. Only when this negative peace is maintained
for longer and other contingent factors come into play—so the argument goes—can
“higher” stages of peace develop. Among those contingent factors, scholars often point out
the potentially supporting role of extra-regional powers when they refrain from intervening
(or avoid incentivizing further conflict) in the region. Another factor commonly mentioned
is the presence of regional or global multilateral organizations helping to resolve through
peaceful means pending legal or territorial disputes among states.168
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This alternative “qualitative” approach to peace in South America, however, runs
into an additional set of important limitations. One issue with this approach is the suggested
link between interstate peace and democracy. As highlighted above, this runs in the face of
very sharp criticisms about the spuriousness of the correlation, as well as the lack of an
effective way to truly test the specific hypothesis—particularly across longer periods of
time when the actors’ own understanding of “democracy” changes.169 The tendency, for
example, to dismiss the Peru–Ecuador confrontations during the 20th century for being
conflicts between two “not-democratic-enough” states, raises problems for the effective
applicability of the Liberal hypothesis to concrete historical circumstances.170 A related
problem is the fact that democracy has only been a stable factor of domestic politics in
Latin America since the late 1980s and early 1990s. Since 1935, when the last major war
ended in South America, democratic and authoritarian regimes have alternated power—
with a clear predominance of the latter.171 This leaves almost the entirety of the “long
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peace” period in need of an explanation, and raises concerns regarding the real explanatory
power and validity of the democratic peace hypothesis as a main approach for the study of
the region.
If, as Kacowicz and others have argued, democracy must be given only
complementary status—as an “upgrading” or “deepening” factor of stable peace—then the
more encompassing explanation must also be provided a priori. In short, without a central
explanation, what is it that democracy is “upgrading” in the first place? What exact
theoretical mechanisms and causes of peace is democracy actually enhancing? The answers
to these questions have failed to contribute a truly encompassing solution (both
geographically as well as temporally), for some apply only to post-1980s South America,
while others do so to the Southern Cone in particular—and not to South America as a
whole.172
Another problem with the qualitative peace approach is that it is usually unclear in
its separation of causes and effects. That is, it often leads to teleological, linear
reconstructions of the history of South America that run the risk of escaping true
explanation, and that at best provide mere historical description. The distinction is crucial.
Authors like Kacowicz, Kupchan, Hurrell, Holsti, and Oelsner, for example, tend to think
about regional peace in stages that are usually little more than thick descriptions of the state
or condition of the region at different moments in its history. These authors, however,
rarely (or only with great difficulty) address the issue of causes or “driving factors” that
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are said to propel the region from one stage to the next. These “explanations” are never
presented in ways that clearly distinguish the empirical reality described from the specific
factors said to be “causing” that reality in the first place. Early stages of peace, for example,
are typically described as chaotic, violent, or unstable. Several characteristics are thus
pointed out—such as “war remains a valid instrument of policy”—but no theoretical
explanation is provided, or empirical tested, for why the region may have “transitioned” to
the next stage of “no-war.” Whereas an account of what happened is by itself insufficient,
a detailed description of how it happened is only half the story. A fuller account must
ultimately also try to address the why question. Otherwise, the concept of “negative peace”
is merely implied from the historical fact of a decline of war in the region, but since the
absence of war cannot be its own cause, then a teleological argument leads to a tautological
explanation—and thus the South American puzzle remains unresolved.
With this assessment in mind, existing explanations based on a qualitative approach
to peace must therefore provide more than simple rationalizations and a “black-boxing” of
stages and types of peace according to what the historical record already shows. They must
offer a theoretical explanation to give meaning and direction to the historical information
presented.173 Perhaps the best attempts at overcoming this problem have come from works
adopting the theoretical framework of “security communities,” as initially developed by
Deutsch and later refined by Adler and Barnett, and the so-called Copenhagen School of
IR.174
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Although these studies fill in the theoretical void identified above with the wellknown concept of the security community, they run against two additional challenges.
First, the region has “failed” to integrate further, either politically or economically, beyond
rather superficial levels, and thus it has failed to finally transition even to a “pluralistic
security community” (the first of the two hypothesized conditions in the security
communities literature). During the 1990s, the case of MERCOSUR was often invoked as a
strong indication that the sub-region of the Southern Cone was finally transitioning towards
a true stable peace—where war among states would be “unthinkable.” These high hopes
for the Southern Cone, although still alive in some recent studies, have become more
moderate and at times even turned pessimistic after decades of “underperformance” by this
and other similar regional trading blocs—both economically and politically.175 A second
challenge for the security-community literature has been its inability to explain why South
American states have maintained separate national armies and developed no meaningful
regional framework to tackle threats common to the region as a whole. As a logical
component of any advanced security community, members are expected to develop in time
a common understanding of the types of threats to their shared security and elaborate
common institutions and organizations with which to face those challenges together, as an
“amalgamated security community” (the second condition in the literature). In a security
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community, a region so culturally homogeneous as South America would be expected to
develop a rather easy and expedient pooling of sovereignty given that war among member
states is said to be “unthinkable” and threats would emanate only from outside the region.
Put differently, member states should project force outwards, not internally. The historical
record in South America has demonstrated the limits of this explanation, even when cast
as a mere description of the current condition of South America’s security architecture.176
Attempts at explaining South America’s long peace as an instance of a “higher”
peace, overall, have thus failed to elicit a convincing theoretical argument beyond mere
historical description. Efforts in framing the explanation in terms of a security community,
for their part, although filling in (in principle) part of the explanatory deficiency of the
contributions from peace studies, still remain problematic when confronted with an
empirical historical reality that does not conform to most of the framework’s key
expectations. Quite tellingly, South American states remain at peace with one another,
while the individual citizen lives violently in almost all of the capitals and metropolitan
cities of the region.
Contrary to these approaches, a more pragmatic view of the interconnection
between war and peace can be articulated from the international society perspective by
shifting the discussion from one about “war” or “peace” to another based on “order.” A
perspective centered around the notion of (regional) order can more easily accommodate
concerns about war and peace without pitting one as the direct opposite of the other.
Following the contributions by Hedley Bull and others to the international society
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approach, a focus on order can help the researcher avoid the twin problems of either
“counting” wars as a mark of a region’s peaceful character, as well as the arbitrary
construction of types of peace that may describe, yet not explain, the driving forces behind
the South American case across time.
Conjoining the discussions over war and peace in a larger framework focused on
the issue of “order” can also illuminate areas of research previously overlooked—such as
the role that war can play in creating, sustaining, or challenging a certain regional order; or
the role that peace can play in creating incentives to employ force in defense of values,
norms and legitimate standards. These issues may appear counterintuitive at first, or
outright unimaginable, for scholars committed to the existing theoretical frameworks as
they apply to South America. While a concern with order does not avoid discussions about
the role of war in maintaining peace, the otherwise “mixed” or contested empirical record
faced by traditional approaches can be productively accommodated in a larger theoretical
framework that helps explain the intricate interconnection between war and peace as a
social institution.
Until now, the literature discussed has tried to tackle the South American puzzle
either from the quantitative study of war, or the qualitative study of peace—with only rare
exceptions acknowledging the possible permutations between these two phenomena. In the
following section, the chapter looks at one final concept that, despite being the centerpiece
of the whole debate, remains deeply contested.
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Long Peace
The fourth, and final, concept to consider is that of the “long peace” itself. The prior
discussions about the contrasting quanti- and qualitative understandings of war and peace
in the literature serve as an excellent background to comprehend why those who have
studied in detail the long South American peace still disagree over so fundamental a
concept as that of the “long peace.”
There are three main positions regarding South America’s long peace. On one hand,
scholars like Centeno, Jones, or Buzan and Wæver, maintain that its duration extends for a
period of roughly two-hundred years, since the achievement of independence against the
Spanish Empire.177 As Centeno put it: “Since independence in the early nineteenth century,
Latin America has been relatively free of major international conflict. In the twentieth
century, the record is truly remarkable, especially in light of the experience of other regions
of the world.” And he continues:
[…] There is no question that Latin Americans have tried to kill each other. There are too
many examples of brutal and bloody conflicts for this to be denied. […] Yet in general,
Latin America has experienced low levels of militarization, the organization and
mobilization of human and material resources for potential use in warfare. Latin Americans
have frequently tried to kill one another, but they have generally not attempted to organize
their societies with such a goal in mind. […] Latin American states have only rarely fought
one another.178
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A second group of scholars, on the other hand, holds a truncated view of South America’s
long period of peace as a theoretical “anomaly,” marked by a pivotal change somewhere
between the turn of the century and the ending of the Chaco War in 1935.179 As Domínguez
put it, “Latin America has seen war relatively infrequently since the late nineteenth century,
although wars had been common before then.”180 Similarly, Little opines that, in historical
perspective, “the striking fact about post-independence Latin America is the frequency and
intensity of conflict in the sixty years up to 1880 and its relative peacefulness thereafter.”181
Finally, Holsti adds that looking at 19th-century South America, “one can identify
certain patterns of peace and war marked by intervention, territorial predation, alliances,
arms-racing, and power-balancing quite similar to those found in eighteenth-century
Europe.” He concludes:
[T]he international politics of South America have changed substantially since the late
nineteenth century. […] South America clearly is not yet a zone of peace, much less a
pluralistic security community. Nevertheless, it has been a no-war zone in which the
probabilities of armed conflict are substantially lower than they were in the nineteenth
century […]. For South America, then, the twentieth century has been an era of relative
peace.182

Independent from their disagreements about the periodization of the long peace in South
America, there is a consensus over the theoretical status of the region as a whole. That is,
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there is a wider agreement about its “anomalous,” or exceptional, condition which also
touches on the assumptions identified at the beginning of the present chapter.183 David
McIntyre, for example, argues that South America is especially anomalous because
according to the common wisdom of IR theory, the internal characteristic of South
American states should have made them prone to war. The states should have been warprone because they had low levels of economic interdependence; were generally
undemocratic; had unstable regimes; and had a lack of civilian control over their
militaries.184

Miller, for his part, adds an important distinction: “Alternative explanations for the
peacefulness of South America in the twentieth century are undermined because the causal
factors that supposedly produced peace according to these explanations were also present
in the nineteenth century; yet these factors did not succeed in preventing the frequent wars
in that period and in producing peace.”185 Whereas for Holsti, the region is anomalous
because of its unique pattern of no-war among states amid relatively high intra-state levels
of violence. “Looking at the nineteenth-century South America,” he concludes,
[t]his region would thus lend support to neorealist, structural characterizations of
international politics as a game of conflict, war struggle, and survival. […] Overall, then,
the international politics of twentieth-century South America fit poorly with neo-realist
characterizations and predictions. Waltz’s famous recurrent outcomes of an anarchic
system (war, balancing, absence of relative gains) do not apply to this area.186
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Given these aspects of the region, Holsti argues that South America is “[c]ompletely at
odds with other areas, [since] there has been no war between […] states since 1941. South
America is an intriguing anomaly.”187
Charles Jones contributes two additional aspects to the distinctiveness of the region
in comparison with the rest of the world. In his view, the region is a “microcosm”
characterized by its own historical path and experiences188 that, apart from its sharp decline
in the incidence of war among states and the relative low level of intensity of the conflicts
that actually took place throughout its history, also showcases a tendency (a) not to form
balances of power, and (b) to have reached a continental or hemispheric “unipolarity”
(under the United States’ hegemony) much earlier than the rest of the world. “[O]ne may
conclude,” Jones argues, “that the history of relations between American states is
distinctive in a number of ways, and that Europeans may gain from studying what may be
past history for the Western hemisphere, but is now current reality for a wider world”189
A third, and final, group does not think much of the idea of South America either
as a “zone of peace” or as a “security community.” This smaller group, in fact, argues that
a long peace does not really exist in South America. According to Mares, the idea of Latin
America as a region of stable peace is a problematic proposition, both theoretically as well
as pragmatically, given the particularly arbitrary ways in which the definitions of “war,”
“peace,” or “democracy” are commonly employed in the debate. Empirically, Mares
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argues, the use of force in the region has suffered from a war-bias which has blinded the
analysis of the multiple instances of uses of force (or the threat of use) throughout the 20th
century in all of Latin America. Analytically, the heavy reliance on the

COW

Project’s

definition of war, as well as the focus only on South—instead of Latin—America, lead
Mares to conclude that the idea of the region as a “zone of peace” is but an illusion based
on capricious conceptual and methodological commitments.190
Mares believes that Latin America “represents a theoretical puzzle for the study of
international relations” and that IR analysts “are usually attracted to the region because of
its purported ‘long peace’.” However, a detailed examination of the empirical record—he
adds—“indicates that there has not been a long peace in the region, whether one defines
peace as the absence of ‘war’ (defined by at least 1,000 battlefield-related deaths), or the
absence of serious military confrontations. [T]he use of violence across national boundaries
has been a consistent trait of Latin America’s international politics. In fact, violence in the
region escalates to war in much the same proportion as in the rest of the world, with the
exception of the Middle East.”191 For Mares, Latin America is nevertheless a “microcosm”
although for different reasons: not because of its pattern of infrequent war, but because of
the limited character of the region’s armed conflicts, which almost never escalate to war.
Mares suggests that the explanation for such a limited character has to be based on the
reform of the character of the region’s security institutions and the many multilateral and
legal regional mechanisms for building mutual trust, confidence, and stable civil-military
relations at the domestic level. This institutional architecture, he concludes, cannot

190

See Mares, Violent Peace, and Mares, Latin America and the Illusion of Peace.

191

Mares, Violent Peace, pp. 3, 28.

107

continue to rely on the assumption that democracies will not fight one another, of that
“satisfied” states will not threaten or use force as a legitimate tool of statecraft.192
Although both Mares 193 and McIntyre 194 maintain that the long peace in South
America obtains only when the arbitrary threshold of casualties is kept high, at the 1,000
mark, and when the analysis if confined solely to South America, their argument also
suffers from some serious limitations. First, the idea that by simply lowering the threshold,
say to 500 as in the

MID

dataset, the “peaceful” condition of the region disappears, is

contradicted by these authors own recognition of the fact that countries in South America
(yet not so in Central America) have managed to maintain crises, rivalries, and minor
armed disputes limited, avoiding escalation into a major war. This contradiction in how
both authors portray the theoretical problem simultaneously as a puzzle in need of
explanation and as a “normal” condition, is most evident in the way in which Mares and
McIntyre struggle to make their own contributions to the debate relevant or meaningful.
Critics could easily revert their argument on its head and dismiss Mares’ and McIntyre’s
contributions by pointing out that too-low a threshold can run the mirror problem of
“counting” almost every minor border dispute as a relevant security event—and thus, create
an equally distorted or biased image of the region as more violent than what other experts
would agree. But this also leads to a related set of problems.
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Second, therefore, the extension of the analysis from South to Latin America
amplifies the geographical scope of the analysis at the expense of clumping together the
security dynamics of two, largely different, sub-regions of the American continent.
Analyzing the “long peace” as a hemispheric phenomenon not only blurs the important
geographical distinctions between two distinct regions (i.e., South and Central America),
but also superimposes trends and dynamics of one of them onto those of the other. Central
America’s extremely high levels of civil violent conflict, for example, which is a distinctive
aspect of most of its history, is mixed with the relatively more peaceful condition of South
America’s civilian populations. Similarly, the inter-state stability of South America is
superimposed on the Central American armed conflicts during the Cold War, further
confusing trends of different regions as if one. This problematic approach leads to the
exaggeration of the level of violence, as essentially localized Central American trends are
attributed as a problem of the whole, instead of just of one of its parts. Additionally, this
also leads to the exaggeration of the “external-peace–internal-violence paradox,” which
characterizes most of South America, but not Central America where both intra- and interstate violence remain the norm.195
In the following, and concluding, section of this chapter, the main contending
approaches to the long peace are grouped into sets of theoretical arguments and are then
presented in a more formal theoretical and testable form.
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Explaining the “Long Peace”: Seven Contending Approaches
Many of the explanations of South America’s long period of inter-state peace have been
presented by not just by IR theorists and political scientists, but also by historians,
sociologists, and other regional experts. In this dissertation, their different explanations are
grouped in seven contending approaches and are then operationalized and discussed
according to their empirical implications—given both their relevance and their popularity
in contemporary discussions. The main approach for this study is (H1) the international
society argument, already presented in the Introduction, but formally operationalized here.
The rest of the contending approaches focus on (H2) the role of the United States as a
hegemonic stabilizer; (H3) a regional balance of power; (H4) the unique geopolitical
features of South America; (H5) the role of common culture, extra-regional threats and
imperialism in fostering regional peace; (H6) the level of state-strength; and (H7) the
interplay between the type of regime and economic interdependence with a set of common
institutions and norms.
Most of these explanations correspond in large extent with some of the main
theoretical approaches to IR, such as Realism or Constructivism, although that is not the
main selection criteria followed. Other explanations are based on well-known hypotheses
advanced by historians, sociologists and students of the region that follow no explicit
theoretical approach. These explanations, for their part, can nevertheless be easily grouped
into one of the identified sets according to the type of argument implied, although this
requires a personal level of interpretation of the argument which may be open to
interpretation. The criterion employed here is that even when not formally stated, all
arguments carry an implicit theoretical or abstract understanding about “causes” and
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“outcomes” that can be, more or less, formalized and associated with some of the existing
theoretical approaches in IR.
This section of the chapter, therefore, introduces each group of explanations,
identifies its main arguments, and further operationalizes the formal explanations and
variables at play in each instance. More importantly, it elaborates on the precise application
of each set to the specific case-studies and distills from these a concrete set of predictions
or expectations for each of the within-cases. These theoretical expectations are relevant
because they will be contrasted with the historical record in each case-study chapter, as
well as against each other, by way of the process-tracing method.

(H1) South America as a “Society of States”
The main hypothesis of this study is that the South American states formed over the course
of the mid-19th and early 20th centuries a regional “society of states” (or international
society), and that this, in turn, had a direct and positive impact upon the emergence and
endurance of a regional order that underpins a “long peace” among South American states.
The hypothesized “impact” of South America’s international society on the quality of the
international relations in the region generates a series of theoretical and concrete practical
expectations. On the theoretical side, this study focuses on three key processes: the
progressive limitation (or taming) of war; the growing number and importance of the
regional institutions and multilateral organizations; and the pragmatic character of the
region’s inter-state solidarism when the regional order is threatened or disturbed from
within or without. Expressed in a more formal or theoretical language, the international
society argument identifies the “society of states” as the independent variable (IV)
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explaining the South American long interstate peace (DV). This relationship, however, is
associated through three particular mechanisms identified above as (a) limited war, (b) the
institutionalization of order, and (c) the prevalence of a pragmatic solidarism among states.
Of great importance for this study is the fact that these are processes or mechanisms that
are not exclusively hypothesized only in the international society approach, but are also
part of the arguments in all of the competing approaches.
When applied to the South American case, therefore, the society of states can take
several values in a continuum based on “strength” or “maturity.” That is, a society of states
can be seen as “strong” (thick), or “weak” (thin), in relation to the level of identifications
experienced by states (via key decision-makers and elites) with a sense of strategic
awareness regarding the interconnectivity between the individual national interests and the
general interests of the regional system as a whole. This level of awareness and sense of
belonging to a “society” of states is identified here with the emergence of a raison de
système—as opposed to the traditional raison d’état—in how states carry out their mutual
diplomatic relations. But for simplicity, the continuum can be reduced to the mere presence
of absence of a society of states. Similarly, the level of awareness and the element of a
raison de système can be simplified as the “background conditions” of the approach (see
infra FIGURE 1).
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FIGURE 1: The International Society Argument
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References: “Bold Arrows” indicate direct inferences; “Shaded Arrows” indicate (secondary) inferences; “Shaded Boxes” indicate what
is actually being traced; “Golden Boxes” indicate the empirical “facts” of the historical case.

When a society of states is present, the incidence of war (both frequency and intensity)
declines among members of the same society of states. Regional international relations also
take on a more institutionalized manner, giving way to both formal and informal
institutions to maintain and reassure the regional order. As members thus come to regard
the survival, security and fate of each fellow member as intimately connected to their
own’s, a particular sense of pragmatism leads states to exercise solidarity with fellow
members when their own fate and survival threatens the securities and stabilities of all.
Thus, neutrality, indifference and predatory behaviors give way to a sense of “pragmatic
solidarism” premised not on selfless altruism, but on the notion of erecting “common
fronts” against common threats to regional order.
In FIGURE 1, the argument of the international society approach is schematized
according to the process-tracing method, considering two concrete dimensions: the
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theoretical and empirical levels. On the first level, located on the top, the theoretical
argument is represented in shaded boxes connecting the IV (“society of states”) to the DV
(“order”) through three particular causal mechanisms (“limited war,” “institutionalization,”
and “pragmatic solidarity”). Although in practice these three mechanisms could appear as
temporally interchangeable or susceptible to alternation without any particular order in the
chain of mechanisms identified, in truth they do entail a particular sequence that can only
become visible when each mechanism is defined and properly linked analytically with one
another. In this sense, when a society of states forms, the first concern in how states (i.e.,
states leaders) come to embrace a raison de système is how to “tame” or limit war among
themselves and in their regional system as a whole. Without a proper consensus over this
initial aspect, no meaningful discussion about how to institutionalize those arrangements
that make up the consensus over common interests and values can realistically emerge.
That is, until the use of force is not “legitimized” according to a set of standards and rules
that states voluntarily uphold, the second hypothesized mechanism of institutionalization
cannot logically develop.
In turn, the second mechanism reinforces the minimal elements of order that
limiting war has created and further structure how the agreed set of “rules of the game”
will govern the relations among member states and become institutionalized in formal
organizations where collective problems are resolved in a legitimate manner. The third
mechanism, therefore, concerns the sense of orientation that security collaboration, mutual
assistance, and alliance (of both formal and informal nature) adopt in protection of the
regional order. In order for any type of “solidarity” to develop, a minimal control over the
content and nature of war and its institutionalization and control must be already in place
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among members. This solidarity will unequivocally take a “pragmatic” character in a
society of states where members remain jealous of their autonomy and security, and
actively work against any delegation of sovereignty to a central power—both intra- or
extra-regional in nature. In this context, the long peace emerges out of the accumulated
long-term effects of the first, second, and third mechanisms, as their effects can only be
seen across a relatively long period of time. The study of 20th-century peace in South
America, therefore, cannot remain “block-boxed” in that century; it must unavoidably
entail an investigation of its underpinnings and causes located in the 19th century.
On the lower level, the empirical components of the argument are introduced
according to the historical case studies. Thus, the concrete empirical level represents a
process that moves from the inferred existence of a South America’s society of states (IV)
hypothesized as leading to regional “long peace” (DV) via three concrete processes or
mechanisms taking the following historical form: First, the progressive limitation of the
frequency and intensity of armed conflict in the region through the narrowing of the scope
of the legitimate reasons to declare and engage in war (ad bellum), and the effort to behave
according to what actors’ own perceptions dictate as “civilized” and restrained behavior
(in bello). These efforts in limitation of the frequency and intensity of war among South
American states can be reflected in many empirical manifestations. For the purposes of this
study, only some of the most relevant manifestations will be traced more systematically—
although reference to other equally valid manifestations can be pointed out on the side,
according to the specifics of each case study. These are, first, the actors’ effort at justifying
and explaining their actions as “legitimate,” trying to win the support not only of their own
civilian populations and the public opinion, but also that of other extra-regional actors,
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such as the European great powers and the United States, which could tilt with their moral
and legal support the outcome of a conflict towards a particular national cause—and away
from its rivals. Second, the limitation of war can also be traced in the way in which legal
and moral/civilizational principles are systematically respected (or violated) among the
belligerents. Included in this second manifestation must be the treatment of prisoners of
war, the respect of international and regional standards of “civilized” conduct, such as the
respect of legal rights conferred to civilians and other non-combatants, and the respect of
the rights of neutrals.
Second, the successful limitation of war assists in the transition from a system to a
society of states, and thus helps develop a professional diplomacy that emerges on the
empirical level as a set of semi-permanent congresses, conferences, and other multilateral
organisms that regulate and reinforce regional order. As the society of states “strengthens,”
that is as it moves from the first to the second mechanism, these informal institutions such
as congresses and conferences are replaced by more formal and permanent regional
organizations—as in the case of the

OAS

(1948). The difference in practice between

“institutions” and “organizations,” as they are used in this study, are not simply a matter of
degree of formality or informality, but also of substance: while institutions are particular
patterned practices created and maintained by states, organizations are bureaucraticspecific multilateral actors that have a separate existence from its component units (states),
yet remain fundamentally bound by their membership, interests and power. In 19th-century
South America, it was a recurrent feature of regional international relations to form
congresses (“congresos americanos”) to deal with security threats and common problems,
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as well as to develop a legal set of norms and rules to govern regional diplomatic and
political relations.196
Contrary to the Portuguese case, the legacies of the former Spanish rule over most
of the region had left almost no institutional “know-how” at the level of the elites now in
charge of domestic and foreign affairs in each independent country. These Congresses
ranged from the early 1820s, with the famous Panama Congress convoked by Simón
Bolívar, and the two congresses in Lima (1840s and 1860s), and in Santiago (1850s).
Towards the end of the century, these congresses changed both their format, scope and
ambition with the forceful introduction of the United States to the rank of great-power
status after the defeat of Spain in the Caribbean and the Philippines. The presence of the
United States, and its newfound active role in the American continent as a whole, opened
the door to regional conferences (“conferencias panamericanas”), which established a
more regular schedule for the meetings and counted on the moral prestige and material
support of the United States to create—for the first time—a permanent organizational
framework to regulate peace and security in the continent, and to foster economic exchange
and commerce among American countries.
Third, when members of the society of states go through a qualitative change in
how they come to perceive the interconnectedness of their own individual national interests
and the interests of the regional system/society, they also develop a sensibility towards the
limitation of their behavior (inter se) through the progressive abandonment of policies of
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Since this study covers only the origins and evolution of South America’s international society, it only
covers a portion of the history of South America’s long peace, and thus does not come to study the role that
the OAS has played, and continues to play, in the maintenance of regional order. The study of these and
other factors will have to wait a future second volume to complete the history of the “origins” and
“evolution” with its “consolidation.”
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“strict neutrality” and detachment when regional instances of war or foreign invasion, or
other types of regional threats, disturb their shared regional order. Typical predatory
behavior, such as the ones exercised in Europe (Nazi Germany) and East Asia (Imperial
Japan) in the first half of the 20th century, which are normal in a system of states, is replaced
in a society of states by “pragmatic solidarism.” That is: a sense of solidarity towards other
members of the same society of states that is based not on altruistic, ideological, cultural,
or selfless behavior, but on a pragmatic view of the longer-term interests and values of each
individual country in relation to the whole—that is, by the appreciation of the
interconnections between the logics of raison d’état and of raison of système.
In the case studies presented in Chapters 2–5, the argument is tested against the
empirical record during the four largest armed conflicts ever to take place in the region, as
well as against a set of competing hypotheses and causal mechanisms. It is important that
proper attention is paid to how these other approaches present alternative possibilities for
achieving the same outcome: regional “long peace.” It is necessary to look into at these
approaches both in general and in concrete form in South America through potentially
similar paths and causal mechanisms that each of them hypothesizes. This is also relevant
to control for the twin dangers of equifinality and confirmation-bias present in any
historical argument analyzed through the process-tracing method.
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(H2) The United States as a Hegemonic Stabilizer
The idea that peace and stability can be produced by the presence of a preponderant power
is a well-known argument in the fields of IR and political science. 197 In the field of
international economics,198 so-called Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) became widely
applied to the study of international order in world politics towards the late 1970s and early
1980s, as the United States’ own hegemony was faced also with the prospects of its own
eventual decline.199 Its main argument is premised on the Hobbesian idea that “anarchy”
creates severe obstacles to meaningful and long-lasting cooperation among self-interested
actors, such as states, who just like Rousseau’s stag hunters, face conflicting incentives that
push them away from achieving meaningful cooperation towards common and mutually
beneficial goals. Facing such obstacles, cooperation under conditions of anarchy is
considered weak and feeble, and is expected to have a rather short life.200
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In the presence of a central hegemonic power, however, international cooperation
both in economic and security terms is expected to thrive as the hegemon can take up the
role of “leader.” A hegemon or leader can thus provide certain key services and fulfill
specific roles and functions that no other individual state has either the capacity or the right
incentives to serve otherwise.201 In sum, a hegemonic leader can create peace and stability
by helping overcome the “free-rider” and the “collective action” problems, while also
acting as “lender of last resort” in cases where the financial system is at risk of collapsing.
As David Lake clarifies, “Kindleberger’s contribution is merely to extend these functions
to the international economy and to remind us that none of the attributes of international
stability exist naturally or of their own accord. Rather, they must be created and actively
maintained.”202
Although theories of hegemonic stability come in different colors and sizes, ranging
from Realist to Liberal interpretations and applications to international politics, at the very
core they all uphold at least two basic ideas: first, that a stable and open international
system is best served by the active presence of a hegemon; and second, that once

World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1981); Gilpin, The Political Economy of International
Relations (Princeton University Press, 1987); Stephen D. Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of
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In concrete terms, there are four functions that need to be served by a hegemon to perform a stabilizing
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maintain a rediscount mechanism for providing liquidity when the monetary system freezes in panic; and to
provide a degree of coordination of domestic monetary policies.
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Tattered Monarch with Potential?” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4 (December, 1993), pp.
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established, the decline of the hegemon will generate systemic instability, increase
economic fragmentation and heightened security competition. When applied to the field of
IR, the HST argument becomes also a logical framework to understand periods of so-called
“hegemonic power-transitions,” in which the existing hegemon may be in decline in
relation to one or a set of rising challengers. These periods are typically characterized by
great tension and instability, and are often seen as the prelude to a major or systemic war.203
When applied to the regional level, and in particular to South America, the idea of
a hegemonic stabilizer finds powerful resonance in the historic place that the United States
has occupied in the Western Hemisphere. Since its independence in 1776, the United States
has always cast a very large shadow over its sister American republics to the south—and
in particular, over those in the Caribbean and Central America. Its federal constitution and
Republican type of government influenced since early age how other Latin American
governments framed their own legal and political systems. In the early 19th century,
moreover, exactly as the wave of revolutionary wars was coming to a successful end in
most of the continent, the United States announced specific foreign policy doctrines—such
as the Monroe Doctrine—that further earned the admiration and respect of the different
governments looking not just for international legal recognition—which the United States
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was quick to grant—but also a sense of protection from expected European monarchical
encroachments on their newly acquired sovereign status.204
The hegemonic-stabilizer argument, therefore, can generate important predictions
and insights into the potential role of the United States as a “leader” in the Americas, which
by wielding its preponderant power can secure order and peace in the continent. The
premise is that it can intervene, pressure, or even coerce militarily its weaker neighbors to
the south whenever they threaten one another, the regional system itself, or the entire
hemispheric balance. Equally, a hegemon can “inoculate” the entire region from foreign
intervention and imperialism, removing additional sources of instability and threat for each
individual regional state. The precise ways in which this “pacification from above” can
occur range from mere diplomatic pressure and de-legitimization of certain actors, to the
offering of mediation and “good offices” (buenos oficios) to conflicting parties. It can even
further use (or threaten to use) force against one or all of the conflicting parties in order to
catalyze a final solution to a dispute. The interests of a hegemon for peace, however, as
could well be the case of the United States in the Americas, cannot be always taken for
granted.
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Although there are powerful incentives for a preponderant power to keep its own
regional neighborhood in order, as laid out by the HST proposition, it is important to note
that at times hegemons can also become more detached, or simply come to think they can
benefit from not acting as a referee of last resort in the provision of order. When, for
whatever reasons—be they domestic politics, ideological, or otherwise—a hegemon acts
in a detached and isolated way, then the predictions derived from the argument are that
conflict will rise in the region, leading potentially to more wars which may undermine any
sense of “long peace” or stability among states. In such situations, both the frequency of
war, as well as the intensity of the rivalries and the actual fighting, are expected to grow.205
In this context, it is expected that in moments of strategic retrenchment by the United States
from the international relations of the continent, South American inter-state power
competition will intensify, leading to diplomatic and territorial disputes, and potentially
more frequent and intense war.
In light of the main argument offered here, about the positive impact of a regional
society of states in South America, the hegemonic-stabilizer argument offers a powerful
alternative for understanding whether the taming of war, the growth in institutionalization,
and the eventual pragmatic solidarity among states correlate better with the idea of a society
of states in the region, or whether these emanate from the overseeing presence of the United
States as an arbiter and regulator of conflict in the region. Firstly, limited war in South
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America could (in theory) also be the result of the pressure exercised by the United States
over the South American governments—this is particularly important, for example, for the
periods when military rule was the norm in the region (particularly post-1930s). Secondly,
the rise in institutionalization transcends the scope of South America alone, as became a
feature of the entire continent after 1948. The United States has played a crucial role in
further formalizing into multilateral organizations (like the OAS) the multiple pre-existing
institutions that had governed and given a sense of stability to South American international
relations during most of the 19th century.206
After the isolationist hiatus produced by the Civil War in the 1860s, the United
States embarked on a new, more active, foreign policy towards the Americas.207 In the
course of the second-half of the 19th century, therefore, the United States offered its
mediation and tried to be actively involved in the peaceful resolution of every major armed
conflict and diplomatic dispute in the continent—and particularly, in South America, where
the major wars happened. Although it never participated in any of the “American
congresses”—in part because its participation was largely unwanted by the South
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American states—the United States tried to foster economic, cultural, and socio-political
ties with the South American nations, and was always an advocate of creating an
“American system” addressing law, security, and economic aspects of inter-American
relations.
It was during the 1860s, while the Civil War impeded a unified and coherent foreign
policy towards the continent, that the French invasion and later occupation of Mexico
occurred. It was also in this decade that two important conflicts erupted in South
America—and the subject of Chapters 2 and 3—while the Spanish Empire briefly occupied
the Dominican Republic after a short pro-Spanish domestic revolution took control over
the country. This rise of conflictivity in the continent while the United States was going
through its civil war contrast with the mark decline in conflictivity of later decades,
particularly after the U.S. victory in its war against Spain in 1898. Between the 1890s and
1930s, however, it was the United States itself who became the center of criticism for its
imperialistic foreign policy towards the Caribbean, Central America, and East Asia. With
the changing of course in the 1930s, characterized by the “Good Neighbor Policy,” a mix
record emerged. While the United States was now willing to play a more active role in
defense of hemispheric order, it could not prevent or stop three armed conflicts in the
region: the Chaco War (1932–1935), and the Leticia (1932) and the Zarumilla-Marañón
(1941) disputes.208
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In each of the case studies (Chapters 2–5), the hegemonic-stabilizing role of the
United States is contrasted with the international society approach to uncover the actual
way in which the causal mechanisms identified in FIGURE 1 are connected to one another,
moving the argument forward towards the outcome of a “long peace.”

(H3) A Regional “Balance of Power”
An alternative approach is the exact opposite of the hegemonic-stabilizer argument. The
idea of a regional “balance of power” suggests that a long peace can be produced “from
below.” Although the term balance of power has been used to explain many different
situations, and has therefore adopted multiple meanings over time, the most common use
in IR, political science, and history is that of “a rough equilibrium of forces.”209 In this
context, the concept stipulates that order and stability are better served when there is an
equilibrium of forces between competing states—and not when one of them is
preponderant. It is important to distinguish, however, between two main understandings
that are often present in the literature, and which are critically important for the present
study.
One is the Neorealist conception of balance of power as an “outcome,” which is the
unintended result of the competing actors’ relentless search for security and power.210 This
is the view commonly identified with Kenneth Waltz and his classical study Theory of
International Politics, and later extended by John J. Mearsheimer in The Tragedy of Great
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Power Politics. The balance of power, in the Neorealist view, is a fragile mechanism by
which the great powers can maintain a semblance of order based on the protection of each
other’s autonomy and independence. This notion of the balance of power, however, should
not be confused with the notion of “concert.”211 Peace, in this view, is only a secondary
concern, since oftentimes the balance of power requires the use of force by one or several
powers to counter-balance the effects of a rising threatening state. Given that this is viewed
as a semi-automatic mechanism, Neorealists expect a balance of power (or equilibrium) to
emerge overtime independently of the actors’ intentions, designs, ideology, or internal
arrangements. It is the international structure of power which will eventually “push and
shove” states to conform to a pattern of behavior that will diffuse any concentration of
power inter se, and thus perpetuate the anarchical condition of international politics.212 The
process is commonly described as one in which relatively weaker powers will either
coalesce against a common threatening power, or develop enough internal capabilities to
shorten the power gap between them and the threatening power/s.213
Another way of conceptualizing the balance of power, however, is to treat it not as
an outcome, but as an “idea.” Contrary to the Neorealist interpretation, the idea of the
balance of power can only have concrete observable effects when those individuals who
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make decisions in the name of the state, or other political groups, think in terms of the
balance of power.214 This implies that the achievement of a rough equilibrium of power
among states can (or cannot) form depending on whether the decision-makers hold some
notion of the balance of power in their heads. In this view, balances of powers may fail to
form (i.e., to become “outcomes”) not because of military or strategic underperformance,
or the failure to perceive a common threat,215 but simply because the idea of a balance of
power may not have played a role at all in how states conceived their strategic options in a
given environment.216
The international society approach holds a view of the balance of power closer to
the latter interpretation and, therefore, treats the notion of a balance of power not only as
an idea but also as an institution (that is, as a patterned and sustained practice). From this
vantage point, a balance of power can be expected to form only when states share common
notions, principles and values conducive to the practice and perpetuation of a balance or
equilibrium of power among one another. Hedley Bull, for example, identifies two main
contrasting views of the balance of power which roughly correspond with the distinction
made above: one which sees it as a “fortuitous,” and another which sees it as a “contrived,”
institution. A fortuitous balance of power “arises without any conscious effort on the part
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of either of the parties to bring it into being.” A contrived one, on the other hand, “owes its
existence at least partly to the conscious policies of one or both sides.”217
In the context of the South America experience after independence, the present
study evaluates the first notion of the balance of power (as an “outcome”) as an alternative
argument, given that the second notion is already contemplated within the international
society approach as part of the central hypothesis (H1). The contrast between these two
contending conceptions of the balance of power, however, is extremely important for the
empirical tests and the final evaluation of the strength and validity of each separate
competing argument in the historical case studies. In the Neorealist view, states are
expected to clash with one another over access and control of scarce resources, as well as
over security and power considerations. Although more or less offensively inclined,
depending on whether the state vies for “security” (Waltz) or “power” (Mearsheimer), the
common expectation is for power politics to develop according to distinctively fierce
competitive and largely opportunistic behavior. As part of this “mechanistic” and
“automatic” understanding of the balance of power as an outcome, moreover, states will
engage in strategic alliances only when in need of confronting a common threatening
power. Since this type of behavior also bears resemblance to the “pragmatic solidarity”
identified in the international society approach, a clarification is in order.
The main difference between a Neorealist understanding of alliances and the
international society approach’s understanding of solidarism is that alliances are
expressions of military solidarity that are premised on immediate security threats, and
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which will end as soon as the “common enemy” is placated or defeated.218 In this logic, as
well, military alliances are merely tactical associations that are short-lived, fluent and
dynamic by definition. On the contrary, the international society interpretation alludes to a
type of solidarism that goes beyond the mere military realm, touching on the issue of
legitimacy, institutionalization and regional identity. In this other view, therefore, states’
“pragmatic solidarity” cannot be short-lived because geography plays an important
constraining role framing regional dynamics within a confined (regional) geopolitical
space. In short, unlike in multilateral alliances which can form among diverse actors and
across different regions of the world, the type of pragmatic solidarisms expected among
members of a regional “society of states” has a distinctively limited and rigid dynamic,
shaped by proximity, and shared interests and value considerations. The regional factor,
and the actors’ strategic awareness of it, thus plays a crucial role in the creation of rather
stable patterns of limited rivalry and competition along predictable lines over time. In the
international society perspective, although these rivalries and patterns cannot be
mechanically predicted a priori, once historically set in motion they can be assessed
according to the region’s own dynamics.

(H4) South American Geopolitics
An alternative hypothesis points to the distinctive role of geopolitics in South America and
its impact upon patterns of war and peace in the region. In this view, extremely popular
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between the 1890s and the early 1980s, the peculiarities of the region’s topography are the
main reasons behind the South American “long peace.” As David McIntyre concluded in
his doctoral dissertation, “South America has been so peaceful because its geography deters
war. The states do not seek to conquer one another because geographic factors of terrain,
transportation, and depth discourage attempts to conquer other states.”219 Philip Kelly, for
his part, also attributes the “peaceful” nature of the region to its insulated and
compartmentalized geopolitics:
Checkerboards and shatterbelts have formed the basic structure of South American
geopolitics since colonial times […]. The predominant checkerboard kept the continent’s
geopolitics largely focused inwardly on frontiers, resources and development, and the
prevention of two-front wars and an escalation of conflict. There are no longer any
shatterbelts in South America, but they have left [it] divided, isolated, and dependent on
foreign resources and technology.220

For Jack Child, who has studied the geopolitics of the region as well as the “geopolitical
thinking” of the South American militaries, there are other factors beyond the mere
topography (i.e., its vast territories, strategically unsurmountable obstacles like the Andes,
the Amazon jungle, or scorching deserts) that play a role in explaining the region’s peculiar
international relations. Other factors, such as the colonial legacy of the placement of the
capital cities—far away from territorial borders and sources of dispute—and the type of
socio-economic models of development geared towards resource-extraction and
exportation to world markets, also help explain the peaceful disposition of the South
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American states inter se. 221 Child’s list of factors nevertheless remains within the
“hardware” type of explanations, centered on material state capacities and tangible
geographic obstacles preventing or limiting conflict.
In this competing hypothesis, the main theoretical expectation is to find that states
in 19th-century South America, after trying to wage European-style war on each other,
over time found it strategically unsound and counterproductive, if not outright impossible,
to sustain. The progressive “taming” of war, therefore, would be expected to come not from
the formation of a raison de système and the consolidation of a regional “society of states”
over time, but from the material incapacity to overcome real physical and space-related
obstacles. War, in this view, would be impractical and thus its decline in frequency and
intensity would a logical conclusion for states and its decision-makers.
The factor of the institutionalization of order would also be expected to emerge as
a result of the common necessity to redefine, consolidate and police the vast spaces
separating each individual state, together with their extended large borders. Absence the
traditional option of war as an instrument to solve disputes, as in most of the European
history, South American states—presumably—would have no other real choice but to play
out their differences in institutional and organizational-bureaucratic fora. This would help
explain, at least in part, the record-high number of instances of arbitration and mediation
to solve disputes in a region famous for its otherwise peaceful international relations.222
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Lastly, the factor of pragmatic solidarity would be explained through two main
developments. On one hand, the geopolitical argument suggests the necessity to maintain
stable intra-regional relations in order to be able to perform well on the external commercial
front—as producers of strategic primacy products to Europe, the United States and (later)
Asia. On the other hand, since this is a shared condition of all the South American
countries, competition for markets abroad would make more sense than costly inter-state
war in the region. Viewed in this framework, therefore, the long South American peace
would be the product of the type of geopolitical outlook of the region and its related way
of development under the aegis (or tyranny?) of a logic of world markets that creates
further incentives not to fight wars among neighbors, but to collectively focus on internal
peace through an embryonic model of export-oriented development.
Unlike other trade-related hypotheses—some of them analyze below—the
geopolitical argument is carries severe deterministic overtones that cannot be ignored.
Contrary to similar-sounding arguments, the geopolitical thesis finds in the unique
topographical outlook of the region the main source of both the patterns of (no-)war and
peace in the region, as well as the nature of South America’s economic and commercial
place in a larger world market. The main problem with such deterministic and linear
arguments is that other factors, such as technology, which can dramatically alter the ways
in which geography affects politico-economic relations among states, is never given due
attention in this debate. The clearest example of the a priori limitations of this perspective
can be seen when trying to account for the decline in war and its intensity before and after
the 1930s. If the South American geography has remained essentially the same over several
millennia, then what explains the rapid change towards peace? Absence supplementary
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factors like technology, or knowledge/information, the strictly geopolitical arguments can
offer limited assistance in solving the South American puzzle.

(H5) A Common Culture of Anti-Imperialism
One of the most popular views regarding the history of Latin America is the idea that all
its “nations” formed a “family of nations” which was subsequently fragmented by the
workings of foreign interests and ideologies.223 In this view, the struggles for independence
gave birth to one single Latin-American nation that shared similar Americanist interests
and formed a collective identity. This identity is thus premised on the fact that most peoples
in the continent have always had similar ideological aspirations—such as freedom and
equality—as well as a strong sense of belonging to the “New World.” This general
perspective early on also included the United States, whose foreign policy doctrines and
Republican type of government were either praised, admired or imitated throughout the
continent in the 19th century. Most importantly, a common history of emancipation from
the Spanish and Portuguese empires left cultural legacies that shaped how Latin Americans
came to perceive and define their own collective identity and place in the world. Some of
these legacies, for example, relate to a common—or similar—language, religion, ethnic,
and socio-economic associations.
Exploited by foreign capital, so the argument goes, armed conflicts (both civil and
international) are explained mainly by the interference of extra-regional interests who, like
Machiavelli advised to his prince, were taken advantage though classical divide et imperia
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tactics. In this light, therefore, the war against Spain after its seizure of the Peruvian
Chincha islands showcases the last attempt by the former “Motherland” to recuperate
prestige and effective possessions in the American continent. The solidarity displayed by
Chile, Ecuador and Bolivia towards Peru, in this case, responds to the power of those
primordial sentiments of Americanism first sparked by the process of emancipation in
1810. An underlying, and pre-existing, common culture—and not merely tactical selfinterested power calculations—are said to explain why states “ally” with one another
against the “imperialism” of great powers, such as Spain, France, England, or even the
United States.
The War of the Triple Alliance, which took place almost simultaneously with the
war against Spain, also showcases the interplay between a common regional culture and
the workings of imperialism. In this case, the argument is that collaborating elites can also
replicate regionally—and do the “dirty work” for the extra-regional powers—the same
patterns of imperialism practiced abroad by European powers. Thus, advocates of this
view, see in the war against Paraguay a form of intra-peripherical imperialism carried out
by the Brazilian Empire, with the connivance of Argentina and the Banda Oriental (modern
day Uruguay).224
In the case of the War of the Pacific, a similar argument is presented. The foreign
commercial interests of the European great powers, such as England and France, are seen
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as part of a larger semi-conspiracy towards war in the South Pacific—pitting Chile against
Peru and Bolivia over the resource-rich areas of the Atacama and Antofagasta deserts,
where guano, salt peter, and other strategic minerals were spread across the shared borders
of these three nations.225 On the Chaco War, the argument specifically points fingers at two
international oil companies: the Standard Oil Co. (U.S.A.), and the Schell Co. (The
Netherlands). These companies, so the argument goes, pushed the respective governments
of Bolivia and Paraguay to consider the Chaco Boreal region as a potentially oil-rich area
of exploitation. Continuing with the colonial, and then post-independence, narrative of a
dependent relationship between servile export-oriented economies and foreign powers,
authors like Chiavenatto and Ortega see the Chaco War as only the latest example of the
armed violence in South America that is provoked by the forces of imperialism—and intraperipheral imperialism.226
In each of these important conflicts, the common-culture/anti-imperialism
hypothesis expects all cases of solidarism, collaboration, or alliances, to come from a
feeling of (Latin) Americanism among the “peoples” of the continent against the extra-
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regional forces of imperialism and economic domination. The cases of competition and
strife, on the contrary, are blamed on the intermittent success of those anti-American
forces, which instill mistrust, enmity, and push towards intra-regional competition among
the otherwise peacefully-inclined nations of the continent. This particular type of
“solidarism” emanating from feelings of common-culture, when triumphant, would
logically lead to deepening levels of institutionalization and organization on a regional
scale.
Lastly, the issue of war, in this view, however, is not simply to “tame” or curb
collective violence, but to eradicate it as a whole. Contrary to the international society
approach, therefore, which treats the use of limited force as an instrument for the
preservation of order, the common-culture/anti-imperialism approach would interpret the
three causal mechanisms identified in FIGURE 1 as spitting stones towards a further
integration of the Latin American countries into a whole continental “nation”—as it is said
it was in the very beginning.

(H6) State-Strength and State-Weakness
One of the strongest alternative hypotheses suggested for the long South American peace
is that related to the relative (in)capacity of the state to fight large-scale wars. There two
central views on this issue: The first position, associates the “strength” of a state to its level
of autonomy vis-à-vis its own society. That is, it focuses on the level of elite cohesion and
their capacity to make decisions relatively “free” from political, economic and ideological
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constraints from the society over which they preside.227 The second position, and the one
that has made the largest contribution to the long peace debate, measures the “strength” or
“weakness” of a state by its capacity to extract resources from its society, mobilize its
population, and reorganize its internal institutions in light of external threats, challenges,
or concrete strategic objectives presented by the regional or international environment.228
Given their contrasting focuses, the arguments from the two positions regarding the
potential for long peace in the region generate different expectations.229 Proponents of the
first view, like Holsti, expect that it in the presence of “weak” states the region will become
more prone to (inter-state) war. The inability of governments to contain internal conflicts
would inevitably lead to “spill-over” effects that would drag in neighboring or even extraregional actors into the internal conflict. This, in time, acts “by contagion” making what
was originally a localized and limited armed conflict into a regional, generalized war.230
When applied to South America, this view seems to perform well when trying to explain
the prevalence of international conflict in the 19th century, when states were at their
weakest. The argument, however, is less clear when applied to the 20th century, given that
the extent of the state “strength” is contested by regional experts.
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Proponents of the second view, on the contrary, defend the opposite argument. It is
when states are stronger that a region becomes more stable and war declines in both
frequency and intensity. For scholars like Centeno, for example, the weakness of the Latin
American state helps account for all the “paradoxes” of the long peace. First, it explains
the prevalence of limited war in general—including the limited character of most 19th
century wars. Second, the continued weakness of the state in the 20th century also helps
understand the endurance of the region’s long peace.231 While scholars like Holsti would
expect less conflict in South America, as the region moves from the 19th to the 20th
century—under the assumption that the state became stronger—in Centeno’s view, the
state has remained fundamentally weak vis-à-vis the technological changes affecting the
capacities and efficiency of the modern Latin American state.
A related perspective, offered by Benjamin Miller, overlaps on this issue. For
Miller, the key factor explaining the relative war- or peace-proneness of a region is what
he calls the “state-to-nation balance.”232 This balance is defined as the level of congruence
between a state’s territory and its ethno-national identity. In this view, a state is strong
when there is high congruence in the state-to-nation ratio, and weak when this balance is
out of phase. When an entire region is populated by “strong” states in this sense, then stable
peace ensues. When it is not, then chronic conflict and armed violence become the norm.233
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The general perspective on the levels of state “strength” or “weakness,” therefore,
creates three specific expectations regarding the causal mechanisms identified by the
international society approach. The limitation or “taming” of war would respond not to the
evolution of a “societal” perspective among states, but to the institutional and bureaucratic
incapacity of the state to wage and sustain a large-scale war against another state. In
Centeno’s view, the limited capacity of the typical Latin American state is one of the main
factors that explain its limited capacity to engage in wars of the type experienced in Europe
during its own state-formation period. In sum, all sources of restraint emanate from
structural and institutional problems, yet not credit is given to other sources—such as the
ones identified by the international society argument.
A second related expectation is that the progressive institutionalization of the region
would be the result of the need of structurally weak—and indebted—peripheral states to
compensate or scaffold their many deficiencies. In this view, South America’s record-high
level of multilateral agreements and regional organizations could be explained very well
as an external legal-institutional architecture created and maintained to supplement the
fragile regional peace created by the weakness of its states.
Finally, another expectation is that related to the prevalence of some form of
solidarism among South American states. A logical conclusion from this competing
argument is that “weak” states, when faced with a constraining international environment
or context, will coalesce in semi-stable alliances, as well as in regional and international
multilateral organizations, as a common protection for their shared condition. No
“ideational” or “cultural” component is necessary in this explanation, as the focus remains
centered on the (shared) condition of weakness of the region’s state. Explanations such as
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these, for example, can help account for the cooperation among democracies (post-1980s)
as much as that among authoritarian regimes (1930s–1980s) in Latin America.234

(H7) A “Liberal Peace”
A final contending approach is one most commonly known as the Kantian “triangulation
of peace.”235 In this view, three factors converge to produce stable or enduring peace. First,
the presence of republican-democratic regimes in a region.236 Second, the prevalence of
higher levels of economic interdependence, marked by free-trade economics and Liberal
values.237 And third, the creation of multilateral institutions, regimes, or organisms, that
promote and defend the first and second factors. 238 The central argument put forth by
Russett and Oneal integrates the traditional three hypotheses from the Liberal approach to
IR, and further claims that these produce peace only when seen in interaction with one
another—yet not separately. This “virtuous circle” between democracy, interdependence
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and institutions can thus be applied to the study of regional “zones of peace,” where war
becomes “unthinkable.”239
When applied to the South American case, this integrated Liberal approach picks
up and develops Immanuel Kant’s framework, formulated more than two centuries ago,
and argues that a regional stable peace can be expected when there is an interaction of a
similar type of regime and Liberal values (such as democracy and republicanism), the
growth of economic interdependence (free-trade), and the creation of regimes and
institutions (such as political and economic multilateral organizations) on a regional scale.
The first factor, has been a relevant issue since the early post-independence years for most
South American nations. The elites who came to predominate in the newly independent
states in the Americas soon established the republican type of government as the norm—
even if tolerating neighboring countries still governed by the monarchical type: i.e., the
Brazilian Empire from 1822 to 1889. Although authoritarian regimes were established
across the region during most of the 20th century, peace prevailed. This period, however,
created a stronger sense of commitment and appreciation for the virtues of Liberal values,
like democracy, republican government, and wider social freedoms. Although these
authoritarian regimes trumped several Liberal principles during their rule, it is worth
mentioning that in many instances South American dictators and military juntas selfjustified their involvements in politics as a “protection” of the very Liberal and democratic
values they were assaulting. Moreover, during their rule, authoritarian regimes were

239
See Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, pp. 9–42, 197–238; Kacowicz, Zones of Peace in the Third
World, pp. 1–65, 177–207; and Kacowicz, Stable Peace Among Nations.

142

fanatical adherents to the free-trade, or “capitalist,” doctrine of international economic
relations.
The second factor, that of economic interdependence, has always been a
problematic proposition in Latin America. All Latin American nations, and particularly
those of Central America and the Caribbean, have traditionally been net exporters of
primary products with low levels of added value and industrialization. Most of these, in
fact, being producers and exporters of one, or a limited few, strategic resources, like oil,
gas or minerals. 240 This situation has also characterized South America, although this
region has had a somewhat more flexible set of options, with territorially larger countries
with more diverse trade portfolios. But countries like Argentina, Brazil, or Uruguay, for
example, have also had to face a common condition to all Latin American countries in the
form of competition for markets abroad. Being the producers of relatively similar products
for the most advanced industrial economies of the world, economic inter-dependence has
been relatively low throughout most of the region’s history. Put differently, foreign
markets—not their neighbors—have been historically more important for commercial,
financial, and developmental reasons.
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In this particular context, the economic

interdependence side of the Liberal “triangle of peace” seems to be a priori affected by the
proverbial peripheral and dependent integration of Latin America as a whole to the global
dynamics of trade, growth and development—raising doubts about the validity or
applicability of the Liberal argument to the case.
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The third factor, that of the role of international institutions and organizations,
appears prima facie to have a sounder basis in South America’s historical trajectory. This
is due to two aspects: First, because the region stands high in the world rankings regarding
the recourse to arbitration and mediation, as well as the creation, membership and regular
use of international legal and institutional agreements to coordinate economic-, politicaland security-related policies.242 And second, specifically in the area of regional security,
South American nations have developed since their very early existence as independent
nations in the early 1800s a set of then innovative practices—such as continental
congresses and conferences—to face common problems of war and peace. In this process,
South Americans became pioneers in several important areas, such as international law,
institutional (regional) governance, and peaceful solution of disputes.243 These institutions,
as Jorge Domínguez put it, developed through s process of “slow accretion,” lacking “a
crafting moment or a master architect.”244
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The “Liberal peace” argument, therefore, holds several promising areas for the
South American long peace case. Its distinctive relation with multilateral regimes and
institutions, together with the early association with republican and Liberal values, places
the region in an ideal position to be analyzed through this approach. It is only the second
“leg” of the triangle which raises some doubts and requires further elaboration. That is, the
economic inter-dependence side of the argument is more problematic than what the Liberal
argument seems to maintain. The peripheral condition of South America affects the relation
neighboring states have towards one another—leading to more competition, rather than
cooperation—as well as with the wider world—leading to similarly embryonic and
dependent forms of externally-oriented development strategies. In the 19th century, in
particular, the struggles for the consolidation of a centralized “national” government, and
thus also a state, translated in a rise in internal violence and civil war, as diverging visions
of socio-economic development clashed inter se: one Liberal, mercantile and
“modernizing”; the other more conservative, aristocratic and federalist. Although Russett
and Oneal maintain that the “triangulation” of these three factors leads to stable peace, and
not the separate logics in isolation, this study will nevertheless test the applicability of the
whole approach versus the historical case studies. In part, this is justified because several
historians and regional experts continue to employ these arguments to study the regional
peace, but also because the a priori applicability of two of the three factors of the triangle
of peace seem to be very high in light of the history of the region.
Contrary to the international society argument, therefore, the Liberal approach to
South America’s long peace raises a series of distinctive expectations. One of them is that
the “taming” of war would emanate not from the construction of a “society of states” in the
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region, but from the states’ democratic and republican identities. These types of regimes—
and only this ones—will be expected to create a “democratic” society of states that will
self-identify with the Liberal values so strongly that inter se will cancel all armed or violent
forms of solving disputes. In this framework, war is expected to vanish and wither away,
instead of simply remain limited or “tamed.” The overlap with the common-culture
argument, as with the international society one, are only apparent, however. In the first
case, the common-culture argument goes beyond the mere similarities in regime type—
touching on “deeper” issues of culture, language, and collective social identity. In this
view, as well, any type of regime—as long as the region is populated with the same one—
can produce meaningful cooperation and stable peace. The argument would also apply to
other entities and social groups beyond simply “states.” In the Liberal approach, however,
stable peace can only form among republican democratic regimes, who will also further
their institutional (international) political and economic relations through the protection of
a free-trade international regime and Liberal multilateral organizations.
In the second case, beyond the already mentioned contrasts in regard to limited war
and type of government, the international society approach envisions a society of states
that in principle can form among a plurality of regimes—and not necessarily among
democratic ones. While the Liberal view will tend towards the creation of a “zone of peace”
in South America, and the common-culture/identity one towards a “security community,”
the international society argument holds a more practically minded and “realistic” view of
an anarchical society where threats remain multidirectional and the use of force is limited
yet never eradicated. Another distinctive difference is that in the international society
approach, countries of different regime type can enter and maintain alliances and display
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pragmatic solidarity towards one another—such as in the case of Argentina and Uruguay
with the Empire of Brazil during their war against Paraguay (1864–1870).
The progressive institutionalization of regional international relations, in turn, are
expected to develop according to the Liberal criterion seeing “institutions” as facilitators
of information, transparency, and thus also of meaningful cooperation among states. In this
view, the 19th century remains somewhat of a puzzle, since only informal and nonpermanent forms of institutional cooperation took place. The argument, however, seems to
gather strength when looking at the mid-20th century, when under the direction of a more
assertive United States the region developed more permanent and regular meetings, which
eventually led to the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948. It was
only in the late 20th century (1990s onwards) that other economic and trade-related
regional projects materialized and the democratic type of regime became enshrined in the
respective carta magna of every international institutional organizations.245 Part of the
interesting challenge of studying 19th-century South America is, indeed, that the limitation
of war, the institutionalization of order, and a sense of pragmatic solidarity developed in
the absence of an overarching regional institutional architecture, such as that of the OAS.
To summarize the competing arguments, TABLE 4 offers a comparison of the main
explanations according to: the main hypothesis proposed (why), the background conditions
(when and whether), and the suggested causal mechanisms (how).
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TABLE 4 –– Comparison of Core Arguments

Explanation

Why?
(cause)

Whether?
(background)

When?
(trigger)

(H1)
Society
of States

Common Interest
in Order
 “Long Peace”

Far-sighted elites
(raison de système)

Strategic
Awakening

(H2)
Hegemonic
Stability

Hegemony
 “Long Peace”

Preponderance
of Power

Hegemonic
Willingness to
Lead

(H3)
Balance
of Power

(Unintended)
Equilibrium
 “Long Peace”

Short-sighted elites
(raison d’état)

Threats to State
Survival

(H4)
Geopolitics

Fixed or
Unchanging
Geography
 “Long Peace”

Topographic
Constraints

War Costs
Outweigh
Technology

(H5)
Common
Culture

Security
Community
 “Long Peace”

Common Legacy of
Anti-Imperialism

Extra-regional
Intervention

(H6)
State-Strength/
Weakness

State-Incapacity
 “Long Peace”

Domestic
Constraints

Mutual Security
Externalities

Liberal values
 “Long Peace”

Republican
Democracy, Freetrade, and Liberal
Institutions

Convergence of
Liberal Interests
and Values

(H7)
Liberal Peace

How?
(mechanisms)
1. Taming of War
2. Institutionalization
3. Pragmatic Solidarity
1. Suppression of War
2. Institutional Tutelage
3. Solidarity with the Hegemon
1. War as Regulating Mech.
2. Mutual Fear
3. Dynamic Alliances
1. Impossibility of War
2. Institutions as Coping Mech.
3. Shatterbelts / Checkerboards
1. Eradication of War
2. Re-unification
3. Ideological Solidarity
1. Incapacity for Major War
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2. Institutions as Supplements
3. Avoidance of Externalities
1. Eradication of War
2. Liberal Institutionalization
3. Inter-Democratic Solidarity

CHAPTER 2

THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE:
WAR AND PEACE WITH THE MOTHERLAND, 1864–1871

“Los hermanos sean unidos,
porque esa es la ley primera;
tengan unión verdadera
en cualquier tiempo que sea,
porque si entre ellos pelean
los devoran los de ajuera.”246

In the morning of April 14, 1864, a Spanish squadron commanded by Admiral Luis
Hernández Pinzón seized three small islands off the coast of Peru known for their vast
guano deposits—a mineral produced by the sedimented excrement of seabirds and bats
with applications both as a fertilizer and in the making of gunpowder. These islands, known
as the Chinchas, had been the main source of public revenue in Peru since at least the
1840s, when the deposits were discovered and a market boom erupted around the
exportation of guano. In 1864, Peru’s revenue from the exportation of guano represented
more than two-thirds of the government’s budget. For these reasons, the Chincha Islands
soon became coveted objectives of European imperialism during the second-half of the
19th century. The Spanish act of aggression generated, therefore, not only a political and
financial crisis in Peru, but also a diplomatic one that rapidly escalated into a military
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conflict between Spain and a quadruple alliance formed by Peru, Chile, Ecuador, and
Bolivia.
Given the great political importance of this conflict both for Spain and the newlyindependent South American states, the so-called “Guano War” occupies a special place in
the history of the international relations of the region. “The War with Spain,” as it was
known in the allied nations,247 marked the beginning of the end of European interventions,
covert aggressions, and gunboat diplomacy in the Americas. Spain’s 19th-century “foreign
policy of prestige,” in particular, received a knock-out blow from which it never fully
recovered.248 The final collapse of Spain’s colonial presence in the continent came in 1898
as a result of the war with the United States. But the Guano War also showed the limits of
the Monroe Doctrine itself, for the United States’ civil war (1861–1865) critically impaired
the implementation of this hemispheric policy during the 1860s, when a series of new
European interventions in the Americas occurred.
For Peru, the war with Spain created such a profound internal convulsion that a
political revolution soon erupted, deposing the conciliatory Juan A. Pezet administration
and replacing it with the more resolute of Mariano I. Prado’s dictatorship, who later
declared war on Spain by joining the Quadruple Alliance with Chile (a former enemy
during the war of 1836–1839), Ecuador (a troubling “buffer state” between Peru and
Colombia), and Bolivia (a traditional ally of Peru, but with strained relations with Chile
after the collapse of the Peru-Bolivian Confederation in 1839). At the time of the Spanish
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seizure of the Chincha Islands, Peru and Spain had no formal treaty recognizing Peru’s
independence, and bilateral diplomatic relations were at a historic low since the late 1820s,
when the very last Spanish troops were forced out of Lima—once the proudest possession
of the Spanish empire in the Americas. This aspect aggravated the diplomatic crisis because
the unclear legal status of the Spanish aggression had the potential of becoming accepted
by other great powers and neighboring states as a legitimate act of “revindication” by the
Spanish monarchy over one of its former colonial territories.
In this context, the main objective of this chapter is to study the diplomatic and
military conflict between Spain and the Quadruple Alliance through the lens of the
international society approach. In particular, the chapter presents an analysis of three key
aspects of the conflict that go beyond the traditional (mostly military) accounts of the war.
First, the chapter explores the role of diplomatic standards of conduct prevalent at the time
and assesses their importance for the control, minimization, and progressive de-escalation
of the war. Secondly, it presents an analysis of the role of rules and formal channels for
conducting more stable and professional diplomatic relations. The establishment of the
Lima Congress (1864–1865), for example, which was invoked by Peru in January of 1864,
became active during the crisis between Peru and Spain and played an important role in
opening alternative diplomatic channels of communication with the Spanish Admiral
during the initial stages of the conflict.
Lastly, the chapter offers an analysis of the process by which South American states
attempted to erect a “common front” against Spain, the former Motherland. This was a
relevant development because Spain had maintained strong socio-cultural, political, and
economic connections with most South American nations after their independence. The
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Quadruple Alliance is analyzed, therefore, in its two main facets: that is, both as a type of
“pragmatic solidarism” between Peru and its allies against the Spanish aggression, but also
in its external aspect, as it attempted to erect a continental diplomatic bulwark against all
types of European aggressions throughout the Americas, beyond a merely ad hoc alliance
against Spain alone. In this same sense, and quite importantly, the Quadruple Alliance tried
to mediate in the War of the Triple Alliance (Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay versus
Paraguay), which was unfolding simultaneously in the Platine region on the other side of
the continent. These efforts by the Quadruple Alliance to intervene diplomatically and stop
the war against Paraguay offer a unique opportunity to evaluate the impact of international
society on the self-perception of elites and decision-makers at the time, who viewed the
Spanish aggression as more than simply a bilateral affair between Peru and Spain, and
instead insisted on framing the conflict as an “American question” affecting not just Peru’s
national interest but the region’s common interest as a whole.
The chapter contains four sections. In the introductory section, the Guano War is
placed in a historical context, highlighting the most immediate antecedents, and the general
aspects of Spain’s foreign policy at the time. In the second section, the chapter applies the
international society framework to understand the evolution of the conflict by emphasizing
the three factors identified above. In the third section, the chapter explores a number of
process-tracing “tests” to evaluate the relative strength of the competing hypotheses vis-àvis the international society argument. A final section summarizes the main findings and
offers a set of preliminary conclusions regarding the role of international society in
explaining the case.
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MAP 1 –– South America circa 1864.

Source: Hendrick Kraay and Thomas L. Whigham, eds., I Die with My Country: Perspectives on the
Paraguayan War, 1864–1870 (University of Nebraska Press, 2004), p. 3.
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The Guano War in Historical Context
After the achievement of independence, South America emerged to an international context
of unique characteristics. With the end of Spanish and Portuguese colonialism, which had
extended from 1492 to the late 1820s, the new independent political entities of South
America grappled with a multiplicity of problems emanating both from within and without.
Internally, the first forty years of independence were characterized by a series of
violent political and military confrontations over the formation of central “national”
governments. These disputes tried to establish which local power or caudillo would direct
the process of creation and expansion of the new central authority. Other related issues
were the protracted discussions over the type of government or regime, the forms of tax
collection, placement of the capital city, access to strategic ports, waterways, and canals,
as well as the distribution of state resources and its population, and the control over
commercial revenues, among other contentious issues. Therefore, between the late 1820s,
when the wars of independence were coming to a close, and the early 1860s, when the
general process of state-formation ended, South America was in a state of violent flux that
was marked by high levels of internal political contestation and violence. This “anarchy”
that came to predominate in early South American countries also constituted an important
impediment for the establishment of well-organized and stable international relations in the
region.
Externally, therefore, the decades preceding the 1860s were also remarkably
dynamic. The United States, for example, self-proclaimed protector of the free republics
of the Western Hemisphere against the imperialist ambitions of European powers, entered
in the 1860s into a fierce civil war which temporarily opened a window of opportunity for

154

Spain, England and France to intervene in the continent to regain former colonial
possessions, or as in the cases of the Netherlands, Italy, and Prussia, to establish new ones.
Technologically, the international context of the early decades after independence was
marked by rapid change, an exponential number of innovations and transformative
applications to the productive sectors of the economy, and to faster and more reliable types
of communication, navigation, and scientific discoveries. When applied to statecraft, these
had an enormous impact on the capacity and effectiveness of the South American states to
govern the vast territories inherited from the collapse of the Spanish colonies, to create a
more professional state bureaucracy, to provide an increasing number of social services,
and most crucially to consolidate a regular, standing military.

The Critical 1860s
Contemporary historians agree on the fact that the 1860s represent a tipping point in the
history of the Western Hemisphere in general, and of South America in particular.249 The
first, and perhaps most distinctive, aspect of the 1860s is the end of the period of internal
“anarchy” that so characterized the preceding decades. Although some historical cases took
longer than others, by 1862 most countries in South America were already consolidated as
distinct national political entities.250 Except for Brazil, which attained independence in
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1822 and remained a monarchy until 1889, all other South American states self-identified
as “republics.” 251 A second aspect of the 1860s is that, with the final consolidation of
central governments, regional diplomatic relations became possible on a scale, level of
regularity, and intensity unimaginable until then.252 The achievement of internal order,
coupled with the rapid technological changes of the time, also created favorable conditions
for the development of a regional system of states characterized by practices and standards
largely imported from Europe’s own regional experience. 253 For South American
countries, following the European example of diplomacy and international relations played
an important role in securing international recognition as legitimate and autonomous
“civilized” sovereign nations.254 Once achieved, recognition by the established powers of
Europe and the United States offered an opportunity to access world markets and acquire
financial loans with which to further each national “modernization” project involving
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capital-intensive investments, such as the extension of railways or the professionalization
of the armed forces.
A related aspect of “the critical 1860s” is that technological advancements soon
gave way to a fast-paced revolution in warfare and the conduct of military affairs. New
types of weaponry, modes of transportation, and tactics, coupled with a rapid growth in
population size and composition in most South American nations, made inter-state war
possible on a scale never-before-seen in the history of the continent. The civil war in the
United States, for example, where the latest technological innovations were more
systematically introduced, remains a gruesome but important reminder of the new realities
created by “modern” warfare in the 19th century.255 Since technological advancements in
other areas, such as battle medicine, were progressing more slowly than those in the
weaponry sector, the number of casualties grew exponentially during this century, quickly
becoming the new norm.256 Importantly, this also put a stress on how statesmanship and
diplomacy could accommodate the use of force and war as part of receding paradigm of
tradition “power politics” á-la Europe. In this context, moreover, pandemics and other
health-related problems soon became established as one of the main drivers of death in
war—often accounting for two-thirds of the total number of casualties in most 19-century
wars. Such was the case, for example, of the Crimean War and the U.S. civil war, as well
as the two major armed conflicts of South America: The War of the Triple Alliance and
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the War of the Pacific. However, although they were important features of 19th-century
war, other factors (like thirst, hunger and pandemics) continued to be important even in the
early decades of the 20th century, as the Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia amply
demonstrated.
A final, yet equally relevant, aspect of the 1860s was the progressive rejection of
offensive war and armed violence as the main form of solving political disputes. It was a
global phenomenon from which South America was not exempted. The creation of the Red
Cross in 1864 is, perhaps, one of the most iconic developments in this regard. In South
America, where even domestic politics since independence was commonly characterized
by violence against political opponents, a growing intolerance for war progressively
translated into a slow process of attrition through which civilian governments partially
displaced military leaders and caudillos from politics, as they began to share power more
evenly. In 1860s South America, as Juan B. Alberdi famously proclaimed, war was quickly
becoming “a crime” that all civilized nations worthy of that title should come to control,
reject, and eventually eradicate.257

European Interventionism in the Americas
In this context, the 1860s presented for many European powers a unique opportunity to
gain control over portions of a vast territory from which most of them had been largely
excluded during Spanish and Portuguese rule. On two concrete occasions in the early
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1860s, in fact, European monarchies partially succeeded in establishing new dominions in
the Americas: one in Santo Domingo; the other in Mexico.
The reincorporation of Santo Domingo to the Spanish crown occurred towards the
end of 1860. Local political elites, using as a pretext a potential aggression by neighboring
Haiti, forged in connivance with Madrid the annexation of Santo Domingo to the Spanish
Empire. The president of the country, Pedro Santana, with the support of other promonarchical political leaders and aristocratic families, was one of the most visible
promoters of the reincorporation. The opposition, however, did not remain idle and quickly
mobilized to depose Santana and thwart his plans. In a manifest signed by “A Thousand
Patriots,” the people of Santo Domingo were called to arms against Santana and his
“criminal partners.”258 By March 1861, nevertheless, the annexation had triumphed, and
Santo Domingo proclaimed as part of the Spanish Empire. Less than a month later, Spanish
troops disembarked on Dominican soil giving way to a reactionary war of national
liberation. The civil war lasted four years under the leadership of several generals (such as
Rojas, Cabral, Manzueta, Pimentel, and Luperón), and victory against Spain was finally
attained in April 1865.259
From the very beginning of the intervention, the South American nations did not
remain indifferent to the aggression. The Peruvian government, for example, through its
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Foreign Minister, José F. Melgar, issued an official protest against the “reconquest” of
Santo Domingo, calling it an “attack on the independence of one of the hispano-american
republics” and a direct affront on the sovereignty of all others. It was essential, according
to Melgar, for South American nations to embark on a “solidaristic defense” of Santo
Domingo. 260 The occupation of Santo Domingo, said Melgar in his Circular Note, has
pushed “my government, faithful to the honorable tradition of liberty and consequently
also the policy of cooperation with the rest of the states of the continent each time that
America has faced a common threat or its independence has been endangered, to issue a
protest, after a mature deliberation by the Ministers of the Cabinet, against the
reincorporation of the Republic of Santo Domingo to the Spanish Crown.” He continued:
“Consequently, Peru does not recognize the legitimacy of this act; solemnly protests
against it, and condemns the damaged intentions that make possible to suppose are held by
Madrid towards the republican America.” 261 Despite the claims made by the Peruvian
minister, a sense of alarm remained high in the region, no effective project for collective
defense ever materialized in support of Santo Domingo.262
The second case of European interventionism was significantly more serious and
involved a joint operation in 1861 by France, England, and Spain during the Mexican civil
war. Compared to the intervention in Santo Domingo or the Spanish seizure of the Chincha
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islands and the subsequent war against the four allied countries of the South Pacific, the
intervention in Mexico is a case of much more global strategic importance, for it entailed
the establishment of a European monarchy on American soil and the creation of a “Mexican
Empire” under the protection of Napoleon III of France. Influenced by controversial plans
to construct an interoceanic canal in Nicaragua, as well as other factors, such as ideology,
religion and economic interests in Mexico itself, the invasion of Mexico was part of a larger
plan to erect a double barrier: first, against the expansion of the United States towards
Central America; and second, against Spain itself.263 The simultaneous development of the
war of secession in the United States and the civil war in Mexico offered the right
opportunity for such an ambitious plan. As in Santo Domingo, moreover, there were local
political factions in Mexico eager to assist the French in the establishment of an American
monarchy, which many thought would offer better prospects for long-term stability and
security in Mexico—a country chronically affected by crippling external debt and
protracted civil war.
Initially, the joint intervention was supported by France, England, and Spain as a
coercive measure against Mexico for the non-payment of its external financial obligations.
However, when two of the intervening powers backed-down after securing promises of
repayment, France continued alone with a military occupation of the country.264 After an
initial confrontation with Mexican forces in 1863, between 1864 and 1867 Mexico was
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ruled by Ferdinand Maximilian, Archduke of Austria (Habsburg), who was proclaimed
Emperor of Mexico. Throughout his troubled reign, Maximilian I of Mexico grappled with
the relentless armed resistance of Benito Juárez’s forces, which refused to recognize the
legitimacy of any monarchical rule in Mexico. In June 1867, the liberation forces led by
Juárez were finally victorious; Maximilian was captured and executed; and the republic
was soon reestablished.
During the early stages of the joint intervention in Mexico, Peru—once again—
placed itself at the forefront of an “Americanist” effort to showcase solidarity with
Mexico’s cause. With this objective in mind, in March 1862 Peru sent J. Nicolás Corpancho
to Mexico as chargé d’affaires. 265 President Juárez overlooked diplomatic protocol by
attending the ceremony of reception of the Peruvian diplomat—thus sending a clear signal
of appreciation for the Peruvian attempts at breaking the increasing isolation of Mexico
imposed by France and other European monarchies. But despite this gesture of interAmerican solidarity, Peru failed to organize a coalition of South American countries to
come to the aid of Mexico during the period of French invasion.266 Before 1863, many
countries, such as Argentina and Uruguay, were still involved in internal conflicts over the
formation of a central state, and were thus practically unable to exert any meaningful role
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in the Mexican question.267 The South American nations, however, despite their ongoing
troubles, were not entirely indifferent to the French intervention, doing what was within
their means at the time. Setting an important precedent, they collectively refused to
recognize Maximilian

I

as the legitimate ruler of Mexico. Only Argentina and Chile,

believing Mexico’s independence was not truly at risk, initially held Mexico responsible
for its difficulties.268 In time, however, most South American nations broke all diplomatic
relations with the Mexican Empire and never ceased to express their profound discontent
and concern for the occupation of Mexico and the establishment of a European monarchy
on American soil. It was not until the civil war in the United States ended that a more
effective pressure by the United States was able to convince France to desist and withdraw
all support for Maximilian, leading to his eventual downfall.269
Apart from these two well-known cases in Central America and the Caribbean,
South America itself had in previous decades been the subject of similar monarchical plots.
During the late 1840s, for example, similar developments in Ecuador raised the alarm of
the republics of the continent regarding the still fragile and insecure condition of their
mutual independence. Sectors of the Ecuadorean political elite saw in the reincorporation
of Ecuador to the Spanish empire a safer route to protect the survival of the state against
the recurrent invasions and hostilities from neighboring Peru and Colombia. Although
courting on several occasions with the idea of a Spanish-supported invasion, all plans were

267

See Guillermo Palacios and Ana Covarrubias, Historia de las relaciones internacionales de México,
1821–2010. Vol. 4: América del Sur (México DF: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 2011), pp. 67–99.
268

See Frazer, “Latin-American Projects to Aid Mexico,” pp. 378–379.

269

See Marcela Terrazas, “¿Dónde quedó la Doctrine Monroe? Estados Unidos ante la intervención
francesa en México,” in El poder y la sangre, pp. 367–393; Wagner de Reyna, La intervención de las
potencias europeas, pp. 52–53; and Cortada, “España y Estados Unidos ante la cuestión mexicana.”

163

eventually thwarted in time and never came to fruition. But on two occasions, however,
pro-monarchical forces in Ecuador came really close to achieving their goals. In 1846, Juan
J. Flores, an Ecuadorean General who had been deposed as president the previous year,
received the tacit support of the Queen of Spain and organized a military expedition to
establish the monarchical type of government in his own country. 270 Several South
American countries—but particularly neighboring Peru, Chile and Colombia—reacted
immediately by publicly denouncing Flores’ plans, dispensing financial and military
support to Ecuador, and even drafting plans to resist the foreign-backed invasion, if it ever
materialized. Thanks to these concerted efforts, Flores’ vessels, weapons and troops never
left British ports thanks to the collaboration of England in delaying and ultimately
undermining the projected invasion.
A second attempt occurred only some years later. In 1859, Gabriel García Moreno,
then president of Ecuador, arranged the support of Spain and France in an attempt at
securing its political survival against his internal opposition. Although it was not one of
the main conditions of the support offered, García Moreno had contemplated changing
Ecuador’s status to that of a “protectorate,” and even to adopt the monarchical type of
government if necessary. Neighboring Peru, through its Foreign Minister, asked the
Ecuadorean government for explanations on the issue, considering the rumors of potential
projects to “surrender the autonomy of Ecuador” to European monarchies as an affront on
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the autonomy of all others in the Americas.271 Although García Moreno denied all charges
and dismissed all accusations, his attitude during the French invasion of Mexico showcases
a level of ambivalence not seen in other South American countries at the time. That is,
although Ecuador withdrew their chargé d’affaires from Mexico, just like many other
South American nations did, García Moreno avoided any demonstration of antipathy
against France and did not partake in the public condemnation of the invasion itself.272
During the early decades after independence, therefore, domestic and intra-regional
dynamics of political competition characterized most of South America’s international
relations. These, in turn, allowed European monarchies to play individual countries, and
their caudillos, against one another and to implement ambitious plans of neo-colonial or
subordinate rule in the Americas. Such was the international political context of the 1860s,
where prominent and dangerous antecedents, such as those of Mexico, Santo Domingo and
the failed attempts in Ecuador, had created a regional sense of profound insecurity among
the newly-independent South American republics. Not only the continuity of the republican
type of government seemed at risk, but also their very survival as autonomous political
units was at stake. It was under these conditions that news of a Spanish “Scientific
Expedition” to the Pacific reached the continent and soon raised the alarm of all South
American nations—and of Peru in particular, given its diplomatic anti-European activism
and the still non-recognition by Spain of its independence.
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Spain in the 19th Century
The 1860s found Spain in political and financial turmoil. The reign of Queen Isabel II had
been grappling with the perennial problems of administering Spain’s long-term
international decline. 273 This decline was first ignited by Napoleon’s invasion of the
country and the removal of Fernando

VII,

which in turn led to the loss of the Spanish

colonies in the New Continent. For several decades since the early 19th century, therefore,
the Spanish Crown had been virtually excluded from money markets and was thus heavily
indebted. The economy was quickly de-industrializing and its people was on the verge of
social revolt.274 During the late 1850s and early 1860s, Spain tried to implement a new
foreign policy which would put Spain back among the first-rate powers of the world. This
thus-called “foreign policy of prestige” was shared by the two main political parties at the
time: the Unión Liberal, led by Leopoldo O’Donnell, and the Partido Moderado, led by
Ramón M. Narváez. These parties alternated power in the cabinet of Isabel II and put into
place a series of innovations to reactivate the economy and boost productivity, as well as
other administrative reforms. Among the most prominent of these was the reform of the
Royal Navy. Spain’s foreign policy was thus reset to serve the more immediate domestic
interests of the Crown.275
In the course of the 1860s, however, the search for an actively interventionist
foreign policy based on regaining a sense of “lost prestige” did not produce much benefit—
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neither in terms of economic gain, nor in prestige itself. The series of interventions carried
out by Spain abroad, in fact, damaged rather than solidified Spain’s image oversees and
served more as a temporary distraction for the general public and the popular media than a
real solution to the monarchy’s crippling troubles.276 Whereas in 1859 the Spanish invasion
of Morocco lasted for six months, cost Spain nearly 7,000 lives (two-thirds of them lost to
cholera), and produced no long-term strategic gains for the Crown, the ill-fated intervention
in Santo Domingo (1861–1865) cost Spain 10,000 lives and created an enormous burden
on an already meager treasury—without counting the immense disrepute to its international
image as a would-be first-rate European power.277
It was in this pressing context that a sector within the administration, implicated in
the restructuring of the Spanish Navy, decided in March 1860 to put together a “Scientific
Expedition” to South America. The launch of the expedition, however, suffered from a
two-year delay due to multiple internal problems in the implementation of such an
ambitious project during so difficult a time. In August 1862, the squadron finally left Spain.
It consisted of two frigates: the flagship Resolución and the Triunfo—both of 42 cannons.
Upon arrival at the River Plate, other vessels joined up, such as the schooners Covadonga
and Vencedora—of three cannon each. After the diplomatic crisis with Peru had already
taken place (April 1864), other powerful ships came to reinforce the naval expedition in
December of that year, coming from the Spanish naval station in the Caribbean: these were
the frigates Berenguela, Blanca and Villa de Madrid. The objectives of the so-called
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“peaceful expedition” were to take a small number of Spanish naturalists to the Americas
to gather specimens, fossils, samples and all sorts of artifacts to reinvigorate the study of
the sciences in Spain upon their return.278 The composition of the naval squadron, however,
suggests that other—more political—objectives were equally, if not more, important.279
Given the peculiar composition of the squadron sent by Spain, made of mainly
heavily-armed military vessels, and the most recent adventures abroad in Morocco,
Cochinchina, Santo Domingo and Mexico, the “real” objectives behind Spain’s
expeditionary force to the Pacific seemed less peaceful than what was at the time
proclaimed. First, the main aim of Isabel’s cabinet was to display Spain’s military might
in an area of the world where the Spanish flag had been lately associated with colonial
oppression and war. Spain’s presence in the region would thus serve as a reminder of the
renewed standing and prestige of Spain in the world. Second, the expedition itself was led
by a military officer, Admiral Pinzón,280 and not by any of the members of the scientific
commission sent to the Americas. A closer attention to the “confidential” instructions given
to Pinzón, moreover, shows that the main objective was—after all—to re-ascertain a
foreign policy of prestige for Spain. The “scientific” aspect of the expedition was, at the
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very best, of secondary concern. According to these instructions, the squadron was to
represent Spain diplomatically in each of the countries visited during the expedition and to
establish good diplomatic relations with the republics of South America, paying special
attention to the resolution of all pending legal, criminal, and financial issues involving
subjects of the Crown living on the continent.281
Although there was a profound sense of opportunism implicit in the confidential
instructions to Pinzón, there was no real or explicit plan of invasion or “re-conquest”
against any of the South American countries. In the majority of works on this war written
by Latin American historians, however, the “Scientific Expedition” is often portrayed as
part of a well-conceived, almost conspiratorial, plan to seize the Peruvian islands and
establish a new Spanish control in the region.282 The controversy over the confidential
instructions emanates from the open-ended and at times contradictory objectives, leaving
ample room for interpretation in controversial cases, such as Peru, where a final treaty of
independence had not been signed.
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Fighting the Motherland: The First Trial of South America’s Society of States
The war between Spain and the Quadruple Alliance had its most immediate origins in a
domestic incident, occurred in August 1863, in a northern Peruvian estate called Talambo.
As the result of a pressing labor dispute between the owner of the hacienda and a group of
Basques who had migrated to Peru in 1859 to work in the cotton fields, a series of
intimidations and threats between the Basques workers and the owner of the estate
escalated to an open-ended brawl in which handguns were involved, several people were
wounded, and two individuals died. One a Peruvian, the other a Basque.283
News of the Talambo incident reached Pinzón when the Spanish squadron was
making its way back from San Francisco (see MAP 2 infra). Pinzón had already received
new instructions from Madrid to move the squadron to Cuba to reinforce the naval station
in the Caribbean. After hearing about the Talambo incident and in particular about the slow
and inefficient way in which the Peruvian Judiciary system was handling the affair, Pinzón
decided to postpone his new instructions and instead station the squadron in the Peruvian
port of Callao in order to offer diplomatic representation and assistance to the Spanish
citizens involved in the affair. 284 On the way to Callao, however, Eusebio Salazar y
Mazarredo—a special emissary sent by the Spanish Crown to Peru to re-establish
diplomatic relations—joined the squadron. Upon arrival at the Peruvian port, Pinzón
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received protests from a certain group of influential Spanish agents residing in Peru, such
as the Count of San Isidro, who together with Salazar y Mazarredo instigated Pinzón to do
something drastic and exemplary to protect the Her Catholic Majesty’s subjects. 285
Surrounded by such influential opinions, Pinzón was introduced to a final and more
definitive piece of information which convinced him of seizing the Chincha Islands as a
way of exemplary punishment (or extorsion) of the Peruvian government. Salazar y
Mazarredo, who had joined the squadron in Panama, carried two sets of instructions: one
regular, which he immediately showed to Pinzón, and another “confidential,” which he
concealed from the Admiral. Salazar y Mazarredo first claimed he had misplaced the
second instructions, without even indicating their “confidential” status.
Only after Pinzón’s insistent requests, Salazar y Mazarredo conveyed the content
of those instructions verbally—which Pinzón, lacking any other option, was forced to take
at face value. The confidential instructions were later found by Pinzón on his desk, mixed
with his own private papers, inside a book that Pinzón had announced to Salazar y
Mazarredo that he was going to read next. This suggested to him that Salazar y Mazarredo
had carefully placed them there before returning to Madrid, and that he had also mocked
and manipulated him all along.286
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MAP 2 –– Spain’s “Scientific Expedition” to the Pacific (1862–1866).

Source: López-Ocón, “La comisión científica del Pacífico: De la ciencia imperial a la ciencia federativa,” Bulletin de
l’Institut Français d’Études Andines, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2003), p. 495.
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Months later, this episode evolved into a bitter dispute between the two Spanish
representatives once both were back in Madrid, which eventually led to a special
investigation by the Naval Admiralty over the incident, given its crucial importance for
clarifying who exactly made the fateful decision to seize the Chincha Islands in the first
place. Given Salazar y Mazarredo’s powerful political connections in the cabinet and his
extended professional experience in the Chancellery, it is not surprising that the Admiralty
found Pinzón as solely responsible for igniting the diplomatic crisis. Despite the Navy’s
final decision, a closer reading of Pinzón’s own log side by side with the important
revelations offered by Salazar y Mazarredo’s personal secretary, Mr. Fidelo E. Cerruti,
reveal that it was Salazar y Mazarredo who designed, plotted, and even at times publicly
boasted about the seizure of the islands as his plan. Despite the strong evidence concerning
Salazar y Mazarredo’s responsibility, some historians have recently insisted that it was
Pinzón who solely decided the occupation of the islands.287
The first instructions brought by Salazar y Mazarredo directly from Madrid
conveyed the effective, and “true,” role he was sent to play: as “Special Commissary” to
Peru. For several weeks before his official meeting with the Peruvian government, Salazar
y Mazarredo had been in Peru in secrecy and under a pseudonym, as a spy trying to incite
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anti-Peruvian sentiments among Spanish communities living in Peru.288 According to his
instructions, he was expected to present his credentials to the Pezet administration “at a
convenient time” and, upon acceptance, begin to work on the reestablishing of peaceful
and harmonious diplomatic relations between Spain and Peru. The second (“confidential”)
instructions were directed at Pinzón and indicated the objectives and priorities of the
Admiral’s mission: he was to support Salazar y Mazarredo in his diplomatic negotiations.
Most importantly, he was reminded that his mission was above all “a peaceful one.” The
confidential instructions to Pinzón were so detailed and extensive that they even
contemplated potential future scenarios where the need to employ force to protect the
Spanish citizens’ interests could emerge—although this option was reliant on the attitude
adopted by the Peruvian government. Only if such an extreme case materialized was
Pinzón to present an ultimatum “days in advance,” as well as to consider using force only
after that first step had been taken, “at his own discretion.”289 The idea of momentarily
seizing the islands was not on the table—although the instructions did mention the potential
bombardment of a South American port, if needed, as an intimidating display of force.
Since Pinzón still seemed disinclined to use force, a new reason (or excuse) was
concocted by Salazar y Mazarredo to convince the Admiral of the importance of taking
immediate control of the Guano-producing islands as the most valid measure of protecting
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Spain’s honor and prestige. This opportunity finally came when the “Special Commissary”
presented his credentials to the Peruvian government. After the main protocolary customs
had been honored, the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Juan A. Ribeyro, made the
passing clarification that, given the uncommon title of “Special Commissary,” which was
not accepted by international treaties and conventions at the time, the Peruvian government
would recognize him as “Confidential Agent” instead. The title “Commissary” was
particularly problematic because it was a remnant of previous colonial titles in the
Americas, such as “Royal Commissary” (or Comisario Regio), as it was commonly used
by the Spanish authorities to negotiate with the local tribes and communities in the
Americas. The use of such title could therefore be seen as a veiled, and quite insulting,
diplomatic provocation. To avoid any embarrassments or potential misunderstandings,
Ribeyro remarked, Salazar y Mazarredo could maintain his title as it was on paper but
added the important caveat that “by ‘Special Commissary’ the Peruvian government
understands ‘Confidential Agent’.”290
The fact that Salazar y Mazarredo purposefully hid these second instructions to
Pinzón and “delivered” them only after the capture of the Chincha Islands had already been
decided by the Admiral upon his suggestion, indicates several potential reasons behind the
initiation of the diplomatic conflict. First, as most historians agree, this shows that Salazar
y Mazarredo was actively looking for an issue of enough importance to “justifiably” trigger
a crisis that could work as a pretext for the seizure of the Peruvian islands. In a private

290

The most accurate analysis of the problem with the credentials and title of Salazar y Mazarredo is
offered by Wagner de Reyna, La intervención de las potencias europeas, pp. 90–107. In subsequent
correspondence with the Peruvian authorities, Salazar y Mazarredo also added the term “Extraordinary” to
the already controversial “Special Commissary” title, despite the absence of that word in his official letter
of credential.

175

correspondence to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joaquín Pacheco, penned two
days before the occupation of the islands, Salazar y Mazarredo had already laid out his
entire plan. In it, for example, he confessed his long-held dream of purchasing back the
Rock of Gibraltar from England. This could be achieved—he thought—with the enormous
revenue generated by the guano islands off the coast of Peru. To accomplish such a
fantastical plan, Salazar y Mazarredo had been planning for the longest time the “isolation
of Peru from America and the separation of its government, blaming it for every hostile act
against Spain, and proposing the execution of a military plan to Pinzón and his officers.”291
Salazar y Mazarredo was a Spanish citizen who had been born in Lima, and whose
obsession with these guano-producing islands was only matched by his disdain of the
Peruvian people, culture and government. He considered Peru unworthy of such riches,
and the main responsible for the squandering of the guano as a strategic resource.292
After his meeting with Ribeyro, Salazar y Mazarredo summoned Pinzón—who was
at the time in Valparaíso, Chile—to rendezvous near the Chincha Islands. To hide his
intentions, Salazar y Mazarredo left Callao that same night with a north-bound trajectory.
However, some minutes later, after losing sight of the port, his vessel turned immediately
south towards the Chincha Islands, where he had planned to meet Pinzón beforehand. Once
both had reached the islands, Salazar y Mazarredo put up a simulation which few could at
first entirely believe. As his boat was approaching the Resolución, he was already trying to
loudly inform Pinzón of the Peruvian government’s “refusal to meet him.” As one of the
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linguists on board of the Resolución, who later became Salazar y Mazarredo’s personal
secretary during his return trip to Spain, details:
On the 14th of April, at 10:30 am, the fleet being at the time within six miles of the Chincha
Islands, we sighted the Spanish sloop of war “Covadonga,” having on board Señor Salazar
y Mazarredo. On drawing nearer, a boat was lowered from the latter vessel into which the
envoy descended, and who was so childishly anxious to communicate the intelligence with
which he was busting, that he stood up in the gig as it approached the flag-ship, and shouted
to those on board to go and tell the Admiral that “they had refused to receive him.” Two
minutes afterwards, he came up the side and in an excited manner explained to the Admiral
that the Peruvians had refused to grant him an audience. The result of their conversation
was an order to have the vessels prepared for action!293

Salazar y Mazarredo was not, however, an isolated instigator. He was, together with local
Spanish agents in Peru and other private individuals, largely instrumental to Spain’s
“foreign policy of prestige.” A closer scrutiny of Salazar y Mazarredo’s writings, memoirs,
official and personal correspondence, as well as his actions, show that they were in
harmony with the popular opinion in Madrid, as disclosed by the printed press and vividly
discussed in the Spanish Courts at the time. 294 This relative, yet uncoordinated,
convergence between diplomats and military officers “on the ground” and Spain’s cabinet
back in Madrid is most evident by the ambiguous official position taken by Spain regarding
the seizure of the islands by the Admiral of the “peaceful” Scientific Expedition to the
Pacific.295 Although Spain’s initial reaction was to publicly regret the decision to seize the
islands, the official return of the islands was never issued by Madrid, who tried to leverage
293
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its momentary possession of the guano-producing islands to negotiate a favorable treaty
with Peru over pending issues since the Peru’s de facto declaration of independence in
1826. This hesitant position by Madrid played an important role early on in the conflict,
for several South American nations—including Chile, Argentina, and Ecuador—initially
refused to come to Peru’s aid against Spain, speculating that Spain would eventually
discredit the royal agents’ decision, return the islands, and then reestablish normal
diplomatic relations.

Legitimacy and Restraint in the War against Spain
The Spanish occupation of the Chincha Islands on April 14, 1864 made a profound
impression on the rest of the South American nations. The unexpected nature of it, coupled
with the outrageous reasons invoked by the Spanish agents and the illegality of the form of
the occupation itself (and perhaps also the geographical proximity of the incident), made
possible what past European interventions in other areas of the American continent had
not: the formation of a common front of South American nations against an extra-regional
power. Peru, which had been at the forefront of past official protestations against Spain for
its occupation of Santo Domingo, the surreptitious attempts in Ecuador, and its role in the
Mexican case, was now at the receiving end of Spain’s overseas policy of prestige and
intimidation. Peru tried, therefore, to present the Spanish aggression as a continental issue
in the hope that the involvement of the other South American nations would exert pressure
on Spain’s ambitions and induce some restraint on its foreign policy.
Despite a prominent history of rivalry between Chile and Peru over the hegemonic
control of the South Pacific region, after the seizure of the guano islands major popular
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expressions of outrage against Spain and of solidary towards Peru erupted in Chile, Bolivia,
and other countries, including parts of Argentina and Ecuador. Initial suspicions had been
focused on Peru itself for its own irresponsibility in not having properly clarified its
relations with Spain after independence and for the poor condition of its governmental
budget and finances.296 These critiques, however, soon turned into unabashed expressions
of popular support and official offers of mediation and assistance for the “sister republic”
of Peru. For all the problematic aspects of Peru as a neighbor, none compared with its being
taken advantage by Spain when it captured the heart of Peru’s source of revenue and future
prosperity.297
Between April and August 1864, the Pezet administration in Peru was thus caught
in a complicated web of overlapping interests. Pressured by crippling financial difficulties,
which were hard to explain to its own population given the bonanza of the guano market,
it was also threatened by a relentless political opposition organized around both chambers
of Congress. Pezet tried to simultaneously negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict with
Spain while also avoiding appearing weak or unpatriotic to Peruvian public opinion and
political opposition. The Peruvian people demanded war against Spain, and so did
Congress, who authorized the Executive by law to declare war. But Pezet was well aware
of the relative weakness of the Peruvian “navy”—which at the time consisted only of a
handful of wooden vessels that were no match for the Spanish squadron in the Pacific. Two
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modern ships had been commissioned in Europe by the previous administration but waiting
for their completion was not a viable option.298
In this early stage of the conflict, therefore, an important source of restraint came
from Peru itself given its incapacity to employ force effectively against the Spanish
squadron. This incapacity, however, was not only material in the form of limited warfighting assets, but also immaterial in the form of political capital. Both the Peruvian
Congress’s pressure and public opinion, incensed and clamoring war in the streets of Lima,
would have made it relatively easy for Pezet to declare war on Spain and put into practice
some type of diversionary war. This would have at the same time distracted the domestic
audiences from well-known corruption scandals and pressing financial debacle, as well as
forced the hand of neighboring Chile and Ecuador into coming to Peru’s aid. The political
decision, however, was made by Pezet not to employ force against the Spanish vessels in
the hope of negotiating diplomatically a peaceful resolution to the crisis. With this in mind,
Pezet redoubled the administration’s efforts to arrange a meeting in Madrid to nullify and
redress the occupation, and to secure the safe return of the islands to Peru through
diplomatic channels only. These negotiations, however, soon failed after the intransigence
and dilatory tactics of the Spanish government.299
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A related problem for Pezet was, therefore, the need to balance a peace with Spain,
which he attempted on a bilateral basis through several Peruvian agents in Europe, with
the successful framing of the occupation of the islands as an “American issue.”300 On this
important matter, Chile was the first of Peru’s neighbors to come to its aid. Its support,
however, came out not of “fraternal love” among both nations, but merely from the
recognition by a group of clear-eyed Chilean politicians of the unacceptable precedent that
the Spanish occupation would establish in the region. 301 Through its diplomatic
representative in Lima, J. Nicolás Hurtado, Chile tried to act as a chief mediator via the
Diplomatic Corps in Lima between Admiral Pinzón and the Pezet administration.302
This effectively involved, at least initially, the representatives of other great
powers, such as England, the United States, and France, in the ongoing diplomatic crisis.
The Diplomatic Corps in Lima was led by Cristopher Robinson (U.S.), Thomas R. Elredge
(Hawaii), W. M. Stafford Terringham (Great Britain), and J. Nicolás Hurtado (Chile). The
representative of France, Ferdinand M. de Lesseps, however, given the absence of a
Spanish representative, had a double role also as a representative of Her Catholic Majesty
until an official Spanish representative was finally accredited in Lima. For this reason, de
Lesseps voluntarily stayed aside from all the negotiations initiated by the Diplomatic Corps
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with the two Spanish agents. During the first months after the occupation, therefore, Pezet
was technically unable to use effective force against Spain and remained heavily dependent
for political survival and domestic stability upon the rapidly deteriorating “public image”
of his administration. The intervention of the Diplomatic Corps represented, in this context,
an important lifeline after the unsuccessful attempts at negotiations in Europe and Madrid.
Accordingly, Peru’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Juan A. Ribeyro, sent a letter to the
Diplomatic Corps on April 16, 1864, protesting the Spanish occupation and requesting their
involvement and support.303
After the occupation of the islands, Pinzón and Salazar y Mazarredo issued a
memorandum to offer an explanation for their sudden and unannounced move. This
statement was delivered on April 16 (two days after the occupation) by the chargé
d’affaires of France acting as a momentary representative of Spain. The memorandum
surprised everyone because in an important passage it claimed that the seizure of the
Chincha Islands had been done as an “act of revindication” of former Spanish territory,
given the current state of “truce” between both nations, and had been decided as a more
peaceful alternative to what their instructions contemplated initially (the bombardment of
Peruvian ports).304 The Diplomatic Corps rejected the claim of revindication and further
indicated that their respective governments would continue to regard the islands as
Peruvian territory.305 Notes of sympathy were sent by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia,
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Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.306 The
general reaction indicated that all South American states expected Madrid to disavow the
occupation, recall its agents and the squadron, and establish formal relations with Peru after
the return of the islands.
Taking advantage of this generalized sentiment, Ribeyro wrote directly to Pinzón
on April 16, demanding explanations for the unprovoked aggression and expressing the
administration’s concern for the claim of revindication issued in the memorandum. Ribeyro
further raised the issue that the Peruvian government could not realistically entertain the
fact the Madrid could have approved a priori, or even reaffirm later, the seizure of the
islands under any legal form or excuse. Ribeyro closed his letter by saying:
Whatever be henceforward your conduct, you may safely trust that the Spanish subjects
which today reside in Peru will continue enjoying the most complete security in their
persons without any danger of being insulted while they follow peaceably and honestly
their own business. Sufficient advance in civilization has been made by Peru through the
independence from what once was her mother country, to render unnecessary the taking of
hostages as a security against her; it was reserved for you to revive a warlike custom which
terminated with the times of barbarism and which is far from honoring the chief of the
squadron of a nation pretending to be civilized.307

In this context, a second source of restraint came in the form of the web of legal and
diplomatic entanglements to which Spain and its agents in the region were forced to
confront. Both Peru and its allies, in great part due to their military weakness, employed
international law and diplomacy, as well as claims about the “higher duties of all civilized
nations” and international reputation, as alternative tools to try to restraint, contain, and
306
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eventually repel Spain’s interventionist foreign policy—short of declaring open war. At
this early stage, the main channel for the implementation of this strategy was the set of
negotiations conducted by the Diplomatic Corps in Lima, and incentivized by the Chilean
representative in Lima, Nicolás Hurtado. But given de Lesseps’s double diplomatic role,
he soon distanced himself from all communications issued by the Diplomatic Corps itself.
The representatives of the United States and of Great Britain, while expressing their
support for the mediatory role adopted by the Diplomatic Corps, warned that their
respective countries would not be ready to exert any further pressure on the matter. With
them, all hopes for getting any of these great powers involved into the conflict dissipated.308
After receiving Ribeyro’s note, the Diplomatic Corps met and soon agreed (upon
Hurtado’s insistence) to issue a collective statement aimed at the Spanish agents in
repudiation of their occupation of the islands, which, according to the note, had been done
in violation of international law principles. The importance of the Diplomatic Corps’ note
was that, unlike Ribeyro’s first letter of protest to Pinzón, it focused on the truly substantive
issue of the “revindication” of the islands, as initially claimed by Pinzón and Salazar y
Mazarredo. As Wagner de Reyna correctly points out, “if Spain revindicated a part of the
territory that once belonged to the monarchy, it could then invoke this same argument
against any other; thus, all of South America would be threatened.”309 The issue of the
occupation of the Chincha Islands was, therefore, formally widened in scope as a regional
concern, instead of being merely a bilateral one. With this move, as well, the Diplomatic
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Corps involved other considerations related to the violation of the Monroe Doctrine by
Spain—in an attempt of interesting also the United States in the dispute.
The intervention of the Diplomatic Corps had, at least, two additional effects. First,
it forced Pinzón and Salazar y Mazarredo to abandon their initial claim of “revindication”
and issue a correction indicating that what they had actually meant was “reprisal.” 310
Second, this relative success in forcing the Spanish agents to redact and tone down their
claims had a more problematic indirect effect for Peru. The change in the Spanish agents’
justifications unintendedly weakened Peru’s efforts in presenting the occupation of the
islands as an American issue. The change from revindication to reprisal, in other words,
turned the issue back to a bilateral nature, as it was intended all along by Pinzón and Salazar
y Mazarredo. For this reason, Ribeyro was forced to disavow the efforts by the Diplomatic
Corps and distance the Peruvian government from their otherwise valuable negotiation
efforts. With this, as well, Peru lost the potential for involving foreign great powers into
the affair as an indirect way of constraining Spain’s aspirations.
The neighboring countries, for their part, did not have any interest in risking a war
with Spain who, in spite of being considered a second-rate power by most of them, was
nevertheless a formidable opponent for the poorly-armed “navies” of South America. Not
even the prospects of a combined naval force between Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and
Argentina could seriously present a challenge to the relatively modern vessels of the
Spanish squadron deployed in the Pacific. 311 These vessels could also at any time be
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reinforced with more frigates from the Caribbean station in Cuba. The only hope now
rested in the avoidance of war altogether.
With this in mind, a plan was first conceived by Chile as a strategy of denial of
access to all Spanish vessels to the main ports on the continent.312 The main idea was to
isolate the squadron from all sources of fuel, food, water, and other resources, like coal and
powder. But for this plan to be effective all South American states would have to come to
understand that a defense of Peru’s interest was also in South America’s common interests
as a region. Although Chile’s plan for a regional alliance against Spain was only partially
successful in recruiting South American states for the cause (only Ecuador and Bolivia
joined in), it was ultimately a sufficient and effective way to present a “common front”
against Spain and its foreign policy ambitions in the South Pacific region. All four allies,
including Bolivia at the time, had ports on the Pacific Ocean, and could thus offer a
concerted front in the most immediate area of the conflict forcing the Spanish squadron to
rethink its own strategy. This championing of the South American regional interest,
however, would also cost Chile dearly, for it eventually dragged the country into a direct
confrontation with Spain the following year, with the subsequent bombardment and
destruction of its main commercial port in the city of Valparaíso in March 1866 as a reprisal
for its sustained diplomatic and material support to Peru.313
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The Chilean popular fervor was so strong in support for Peru’s cause that, despite
issuing a declaration “to all governments of America,” Minister of Foreign Affairs, Manuel
A. Tocornal, was forced to step down in early May, 1864, for not taking a resolute enough
stance against the Spanish aggression. 314 Álvaro Covarrubias, who’s “Americanist”
credentials were impeccable, was immediately sworn in as the new foreign minister. As
part of a more invigorated diplomatic action, Covarrubias re-appropriated for South
America the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, originally proclaimed unilaterally by the
United States four decades earlier. In this sense, it proclaimed “[South] America for
Americans.”315
In early May, therefore, a new attempt at mediation by the Diplomatic Corps, this
time led by Jerningham, pressured the Spanish agents for the immediate return of the
islands, the exchange of salutes to the Peruvian and Spanish flags, the designation of new
representatives in Lima and Madrid, and the re-establishment of formal diplomatic
relations between both countries. This second diplomatic intervention had the important
(yet unintended) effect of creating a split between Pinzón from Salazar y Mazarredo.
Although initially both took responsibility for the act of occupation, Pinzón soon realized
the manipulation to which Salazar y Mazarredo had subjected him in order to seize the
islands in contravention of his (written) “confidential” instructions—hidden from him by
Salazar y Mazarredo until the latter sailed back to Madrid. After all, from the vantage point

314

See M. Tocornal, “Circular a los gobiernos de América,” Santiago, May 4, 1864, in Chile, Ministerio de
Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile (1864), pp. 69–72; Davis,
The Last Conquistadores, pp. 68ff; and Alberto Wagner de Reyna, “La misión Martínez ante el gobierno de
Pezet (mayo–octubre de 1865),” Revista Histórica [Lima], Vol. 20 (1953), pp. 326–338.
315

Chile, Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile (1864), pp. 5–29.

187

of the cabinet in Madrid, Pinzón had decided to ignore his last instructions to move the
squadron to Cuba. With the promise of helping explain his decisions upon his return to
Madrid, Salazar y Mazarredo resigned his post and immediately sailed back to Spain to
report in person about events. Pinzón, aware of his predicament, asked Madrid on repeated
occasions to remove him from his post. He even threatened to resign himself before the
Courts in Madrid had reached any decision—so as to facilitate Spain’s diplomatic
negotiations.316 Although Pinzón’s wishes were fulfilled as soon as Salazar y Mazarredo
reached Spain, the diplomatic crisis with Peru (and potentially its neighbors) was still
active with little prospect of resolution any time soon. Moreover, diplomatic negotiations
would get more complicated for Spain as the Diplomatic Corps soon gave way to the
opening of sessions of the regional Congress, in Lima.

Institutionalizing Order: Diplomacy and the Lima Congress of 1864
One of the most remarkable developments of the 1860s in South America was the extent
and frequency with which regional powers tried to formalize their diplomatic relations.
Since the early decades after independence, and beginning with the first Congress of
Panama in 1826, South American nations tried on several occasions to institutionalize their
diplomatic relations, further regulating the use of force and war, as well as developing legal
arrangements to coordinate common defense efforts against internal or external
aggressions.317 Facing a rise in foreign interventions in the 1840s and 1850s in the form of
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filibustering expeditions in Central America and parts of the South Pacific region, South
American states met for a second time in Lima, in 1847–1848, and then again in Santiago
in 1856, with the main objective of articulating a common regional front, developing new
legal principles to that effect, and in securing the popular “American” feeling of solidarity
among the newly free nations of the continent.318
With this important precedent in mind, in early 1864, Peru issued a convocation for
a second Lima Congress, to meet later that year, to concretize a regional institutional
scheme of common defense. This can be interpreted both as a “natural” development for
the region, in continuation of past meetings, but also a far-sighted move on the part of Peru
in anticipation of the arrival of the Spanish “scientific expedition.” The main objectives of
the meeting, according to Ribeyro, were “to declare that all American nations […] form a
single family linked by the same principles and identical interests,” which are: “to sustain
their independence, their rights to autonomy, and national existence.”319
Although most American governments were formally invited, the Empire of Brazil
was excluded. Ribeyro’s note also avoided Central and North American nations. Argentina,
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for its part, participated with a delegate, Domingo F. Sarmiento, but delayed giving him
full powers. Sarmiento, therefore, although present in the deliberations, had no vote in the
assembly. Thus, with the exception of Brazil, all South American nations invited reacted
positively to Peru’s note of convocation. 320 According to the Peruvian chancellor, the
invited countries shared a sense of “proximity” and “common interests” that were lacking
between other states.321 In the case of Brazil, a lingering suspicion dating as far back as the
first Congress of Panama regarding the only monarchical government in the region,
poisoned the diplomatic waters between Peru and Brazil in the 1850s.322 The outbreak of
the war against Paraguay in December 1864 further strained these bilateral relations in the
1860s and 1870s. In the midst of the Spanish aggression, for example, relations deteriorated
so rapidly that Brazil’s declared neutrality in the war with Spain would eventually lead to
a break in diplomatic relations between Brazil and Peru over the final demarcation of their
common border in the Amazon region.323
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Although the Spanish occupation occurred in mid-April of 1864, and the Lima
Congress would not formally meet until November, during the in-between months the
presence of distinguished personalities arriving from neighboring countries in Lima for the
Congress created a second opportunity for Pezet’s administration to channel the Chincha
Islands question as a regional, instead of merely a bilateral, issue. Contrary to the
Diplomatic Corps’ early interventions, however, this time Peru would be an integral
member of the delegations in the regional Congress and, thus, also a part in the negotiations
themselves.324 The delegates to the Lima Congress were experienced and well-respected
personalities from neighboring countries. Most prominently among them were Manuel
Montt from Chile, Domingo F. Sarmiento from Argentina, Juan de la Cruz Benavente from
Bolivia, Justo Arosemena from Colombia, Vicente Piedrahíta from Ecuador, Pedro
Alcántara Herrán representing El Salvador, Antonio L. Guzmán from Venezuela, and José
G. Paz Soldán from the host country. The Congress was invoked with a larger and more
encompassing agenda than the resolution of the Spanish occupation, including
telecommunications, international arbitration, border or limit agreements, postal
conventions, among other issues. The main concerns, however, were common defense,
regional identity, and the peaceful resolution of disputes inter se. The Lima Congress,
however, saw itself as legally and political competent to intervene diplomatically in the
issue of the Spanish occupation of the Peruvian islands. Between the months of November,
1864, and January of the following year, in fact, the “Spanish question” absorbed almost
all the attention of the delegates.325
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The first, and perhaps most relevant, consequence of the involvement of the Lima
Congress in the Chincha Islands issue was the legitimation of the Peruvian claim of the
incident as an American affair.326 This important diplomatic “victory” for Peru, however,
ran against an unexpected move by Madrid. While the rest of the South American nations
waited for a direct and unambiguous disavowal of the Spanish agents’ fateful decision
before deciding on which foreign policy strategy to adopt towards Peru, the dismissal order
was never issued. Coinciding with the formal establishment of the Lima Congress in
November 2, 1864, Spain finally decided to recall Pinzón and replace him with Vice
Admiral José M. Pareja. This signaled that Isabel II’s cabinet was redoubling its efforts and
taking the Chincha Islands incident more seriously. With Pinzón and Salazar y Mazarredo
out of the picture, Pareja took control not only of the Spanish squadron but the legal
representation of Spain in the entire Pacific region as well. That is, his instructions gave
him ample powers that surpassed even the diplomatic missions of other representatives,
such as San Salvador de Tavira, chargé d’affaires in Santiago since 1848.327 Pareja was, in
other words, a super-representative of Spain with wide margins of decision in situ, given
the vast distances and the time-sensitivity of many diplomatic negotiations expected to take
place. This had been, after all, one of Salazar y Mazarredo’s excuses in Madrid, claiming
that the vast distances and their impact on communications had forced him and Pinzón to
make expedient and resolute decisions on the ground. In this context, however, Spain was
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sending with Pareja an even more hard-liner agent than the preceding ones, to defend and
extend Spain’s prestige abroad.
The arrival of the new naval commander, therefore, acted as a bulwark against the
renewed diplomatic efforts by the groups of South American delegates gathered in the
Lima Congress. Unlike Pinzón, for example, Pareja showed the most inflexible diplomatic
stances, re-focusing on the importance for Spain of receiving a 21-gun salute to the Spanish
flag before accepting to seat down to negotiate the devolution of the islands to Peru. Peru,
as it was expected, refused to this article, explaining that Spain should first recreate the
status quo ante before initiating negotiations. The bilateral negotiations, unsurprisingly,
stalled once again. Thus, although the Lima Congress was successful in consolidating the
Spanish occupation as an aggression against the autonomy and interest of all South
American nations, little else was possible—short of using force against the squadron. The
opportunity for this presented itself on November 25, 1864, when one of the main vessels,
the Triunfo, accidentally caught fire during the night and was destroyed. The Spanish
squadron’s lost with it half of its fire capacity. Extensive debates over whether to initiate
an attack or not against the weakened Spanish squadron at the heart of the Lima Congress
were finally inconclusive, and soon the window of opportunity for any kind of bold action
passed. With this, as well, the Congress passed the buck and the full weight of the
negotiations with Pareja returned, once again, to Pezet’s administration.
Facing an increasingly ardent and war-mongering citizenry, on which the
opposition in the Peruvian Congress tried to capitalize, Pezet decided to close the
legislative body and incarcerate several opposition political leaders. Attacks by the printed
press accused the administration of treason and a number of conspiratory claims inflamed
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the political climate in Lima. Pressured by the situation, Pezet decided to change his entire
cabinet in an attempt to alleviate the popular pressure on his government, which was utterly
impotent in the face of the Spanish squadron. After replacing J. Ribeyro with Toribio
Pacheco, in a sudden attempt at recovering the islands—something he had promised one
night after a popular uprising outside the government palace demanding war—Pezet
commissioned General Vivanco, a long-time personal friend and an experienced political
ally with a positive image in Madrid, to negotiate with Pareja a final treaty to resolve the
incident peacefully once and for all.
Pressed between a tumultuous domestic scenario and an optionless international
front, Pezet tried to involve neighboring states and present the issue as an American affair.
Yet, the speculative diplomatic stance of Pezet’s administration of avoiding bilateralism
while simultaneously trying to avoid the use of force to cut a deal with Spain directly,
ultimately damaged Peru’s relations with Argentina, Ecuador, Chile, and Uruguay. In this
context, the Vivanco–Pareja Treaty, signed on January 27, 1865, while it secured the return
of the islands (effective on February 3), it also accepted multiple clauses that the Peruvian
newspapers and public opinion in general considered offensive, derogatory, and infamous
to Peru’s national honor. One of the most controversial “demands” by Pareja was the
payment of 3 million pesos (pesos fuertes españoles). The popular outcry in Lima and
elsewhere was so severe that a political revolution immediately ensued and in a matter of
months the Pezet administration was violently removed from power by a civil-military
coalition formed in the southern regions of the country and led by Manuel I. Prado. By the
end of 1865, once Prado had secured a victory, the Vivanco–Pareja Treaty was declared
null and void, and all other articles included in the agreement were rejected. Not soon after,
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Spain was forced to declare war on Peru for the violation of the treaty, while insinuating
that a re-occupation of the islands could take place.328 But before any decisive action was
agreed against Peru, Spain refocused its attention on Chile.
Given the open-ended nature of the revolution, Spain decided not to engage with
Peru first to avoid getting dragged into an unfolding civil war for which it was not prepared
logistically nor diplomatically. While Pareja, with a keen strategic eye for the situation,
chose to wait for most of the second half of 1865 for Prado to consolidate his power, Chile
became his new center of attention. During the early months of the occupation, Tocornal’s
rather timid circular note to all the South American nations denouncing the seizure of the
islands as an act of aggression with no basis in international law, and an affront to all
civilized nations, had nevertheless created a negative image of Chile in Madrid. The fatal
error of Tocornal’s note, which cost him his post due to the animosity of the Chilean public
opinion, was that it was not stern and committed enough. The circular was, in fact, an offer
of mediation rather than an implied ultimatum to Spain and a “call to arms,” as the Chilean
people demanded.329 After Tocornal’s removal, the more combative and “Americanist”
Covarrubias reaffirmed Chile’s overall critical tone regarding Spain’s actions in the Pacific
while abandoning any pretensions (or hopes) of maintaining intact Chile’s relations with
Spain.330
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With the change in the Foreign Ministry in Chile, Pareja considered that the more
conciliatory efforts by Spain’s representative in Santiago also needed to change. With this
in mind, Tavira was asked to contact Covarrubias to ask for a detailed set of explanations
for Chile’s foreign policy behavior during the Chincha Islands question. Pareja wanted to
hold Chile accountable for the formally “neutral,” yet informally partial, diplomatic
position towards Spain during the crisis with Peru. Apart from Tocornal’s circular note and
Covarrubias’ subsequent efforts in championing a regional alliance against Spain in the
Pacific, Chile had also declared coal and other food products as “war contraband” items.
Hiding behind such a partial “neutrality,” Pareja believed, Chile was specifically hurting
Spain, since Peru had no proper navy to fuel nor sailors to feed.331

The Quadruple Alliance: South America’s Pragmatic Solidarity
Although Chile’s traditional foreign policy since the 1830s had been the prevention of the
interference of extra-regional powers in South American affairs (and particularly in the
South Pacific), 332 the animosity against Spain had played a crucial role in its overall
diplomatic initiative of closing off all Pacific ports to the Spanish squadron. As part of this
strategy, Chile’s declaration of the trading of coal and food as contraband—that is, as warsensitive materials, was a direct provocation to Pareja. This, as well, coming from a
“neutral” state, had two immediate implications. First, it implied that for Chile the Spanish
occupation of the islands equated to “a war” between Spain and Peru. Second, despite
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Chile’s claims to “neutrality,” Spain could not consider its foreign policy as truly neutral,
but as antagonistic. Behind Pareja’s demands for explanations, therefore, was a veiled
effort at intimidation to further isolate Peru from any regional network of support. This was
increasingly important if Pareja wanted to re-negotiate with Prado a new treaty, and to
avoid a new occupation of the guano islands.
Salvador de Tavira, Spain’s representative in Santiago, in an attempt to prevent a
war between Chile and Spain, came to an agreement with Covarrubias, which was officially
signed on May 13, 1865. Despite his multiple positive notes sent to Madrid trying to ease
the diplomatic tension, Pareja’s instructions had given him power to override Tavira, if so
needed. Set on extricating an official apology from Chile itself, Pareja rejected the Tavira–
Covarrubias agreement and directed the squadron south. On behalf of the Vice Admiral,
Tavira was then recalled to Madrid, leaving no other intermediary between the squadron
and Chile than Pareja himself. 333 By early September, 1865, the Spanish vessels were
already outside Valparaíso. Pareja decided to lay anchor in front of the Chilean port
precisely on the 17th, a day of national festivities in Chile, as the country celebrated its
independence from Spain(!). Upon arrival, and mediating no other communication
beforehand, Pareja sent Covarrubias an ultimatum on September 18, in which he reviewed
all the acts of animosity towards Spain over the previous year, and closed with a pretentious
demand for an official apology and a 21-gun salute to the Spanish flag. After a heated
exchange of notes with Pareja, in which the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs outright
rejected all such demands and intimidation tactics, Covarrubias followed through with a
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sudden declaration of war on the 24th of that month. “Chile,” said Covarrubias, “will never
purchase peace at the cost of her dignity and her rights.”334 In over a year after the Spanish
occupation of the Chincha Islands, Chile was now engaged in a declared international war
with the former Motherland, Spain, even before Peru itself, where the whole crisis had
originally begun. Since Prado’s administration had counted on Chile’s support during the
uprising that deposed Pezet from power, the worst scenario imagined by Pareja was now
coming to fruition: Peru and Chile had become natural allies. By early 1866, Peru issued
its own declaration of war against Spain and a defensive military alliance between both
countries was finally established.
In order to erect a truly effective “common front” against Spain, however, Chile
and Peru needed to secure at the very least the support of Bolivia and Ecuador, the other
two other countries with ports on the Pacific coastline. With this objective, Chile put in
motion an aggressive multipronged diplomatic initiative that included the entire
hemisphere. Covarrubias’ first move was to stall Pareja, to delay for as long as possible the
squadron from taking military action—given Chile’s military powerlessness. Covarrubias
tried to gain time, for example, by involving the Diplomatic Corps in Santiago, and U.S.
representative Thomas H. Nelson in particular. Faced with a sudden war that few diplomats
in Santiago foresaw or imagined, the Diplomatic Corps tried to encourage their own
respective governments to intervene directly with Madrid in order to refrain Pareja from
taking any military action.335 These dilatory tactics were ultimately successful, for Pareja’s
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deadline was crossed without any violent act on behalf of the Spanish squadron until March
1866. Although these negotiations eventually failed, Covarrubias gained important extra
time for the creation of a second front. This alterative front involved the active deployment
of a set of Chilean diplomatic missions to all the countries in the region, and including the
United States, in an attempt to secure their support, if not their outright addition to the
Chile–Peru alliance.
Special envoys were sent out, first to Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador, but
then also to Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. The Chilean mission to Venezuela was
important because of the country’s ports on the northern part of the region, which could
play an important role in harassing Spanish vessels in the Caribbean and in delaying them
from coming to reinforce the squadron in the Pacific. 336 Although Manuel A. Matta’s
mission to Caracas failed to secure Venezuela’s official alliance, it managed to undermine
Spain’s image in that country and rattle up the public opinion in Caracas in favor of the
American allies, reflected in the printed press, cultural events, and in other displays of
public opinion.337
The Chilean mission to Peru had the objective to further coordinate with the Prado
administration the combination of both countries’ navies.338 The mission was ultimately a
success, for a coordination with Peru’s forces was achieved and by early 1866 both
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countries officially declared war on Spain. Peru’s contribution was crucial for Chile
because the combined navies could present a more viable military plan of resistance against
the Spanish squadron than either of them in isolation.339 Domingo Santa María, Chile’s
special envoy, met with Pacheco, Peru’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new Prado
administration, and an Offensive and Defensive Treaty of Alliance was signed on
December 5, 1865 (and ratified the very next month by both governments).340
The Chilean missions to Ecuador and Bolivia, for their part, secured their
incorporation to the alliance during the early months of 1866.341 With the joining of these
two Pacific countries, Chile achieved a strategic, as well as a symbolic, victory. It was
strategic because with their collaboration now all major ports on the Pacific coastline could
be denied to the Spanish squadron, which would have to utilize distant bases to remain
operational—this also meant that supply lines could be harassed by the much smaller allied
fleet without having to engage directly with the powerful Spanish frigates. But it was also
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a symbolic victory because, although neither Ecuador nor Bolivia had an effective navy or
army to increase the allied military capacity, both contributed with supplies and military
equipment useful for combined navies of Chile and Peru. Ecuadorean forces even
participated in the defense of the Peruvian port of Callao later that year. 342 With this
participation, therefore, the Quadruple Alliance was formed and the war against Spain was
now formally declared.343
The Chilean mission to the River Plate countries, unlike the preceding ones, was
headed by only one individual, José V. Lastarria. His mission was to reach out to Argentina,
Uruguay, and Brazil, and try to secure their collaboration in the allies’ war effort, if not
join them altogether. This was, perhaps, the most important and ambitious mission for
Chile, for Argentina and Uruguay were being used as alternative ports by Pareja to bypass
the closing of all ports in the Pacific. 344 But these three countries, as well, had been
involved in a war with Paraguay since December 1864; and no clear end was in sight at the
time. Lastarria had, thus, a tremendously important mission on his hands, for securing a
coalition of countries against Spain on both sides of the region, the Pacific as well as the
Atlantic, would have certainly accelerated the end of Spain’s plans and forced the squadron
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to return to Spanish waters. A related aspect of Lastarria’s mission was to get approval by
the Argentine and Uruguayan authorities for Chile’s issuing of letters of marque in the
Atlantic, in order to extend the harassment tactics against Spanish supply vessels beyond
the South Pacific region and into the South Atlantic—and possibly into the Caribbean as
well. 345 Despite Chile’s participation in the Declaration of Paris of 1856, where
privateering had been outlawed, the official authorities in Santiago deemed it necessary to
begin issuing letters of marque as a justified (legal) strategic option, given the allies’ virtual
incapacity to wage naval warfare against the Spanish squadron. Explaining Chile’s
position, Covarrubias argued that since Spain was not a party to the Paris declaration,
privateering was still a valid tactic against Spanish vessels.346
Lastarria’s mission to the River Plate countries met with a complex scenario in that
region of South America, as the Argentina–Uruguay–Brazil alliance was entering a middle
phase in its bitter war with Paraguay, and each of the allies had stable relations with Spain
at the time. Argentina, for example, had just finished negotiating a treaty in Madrid not
only reassuring its independence, but also the legal status and rights of Spaniards born on
Argentine soil. 347 During their initial voyage towards Chile and Peru, the Spanish
“Scientific Expedition” had made stops in Brazilian, Uruguayan, and Argentine ports, in
which Pinzón had been received with full honors and wide approval by the printed press
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and the general public.348 During the stage of open war between Spain and the Quadruple
Alliance, the River Plate allies were accused on several occasions of providing assistance
to supply vessels under non-Spanish flag but which were known to be assisting Pareja’s
squadron in the Pacific. In Uruguay, for its part, Lastarria was caught in a diplomatic crossfire between his Foreign Ministry in Santiago and Montevideo over the issue of privateers
in the River Plate area. After a confusing exchange of accusations and denials, Uruguay
revoked Lastarria’s credentials and his diplomatic mission in that country was thus bluntly
interrupted.349 Coupled with their refusal to accept Chile’s issuing of letters of marque and
the practice of privateering in the Atlantic area, the mission entrusted to Lastarria cannot
be categorized as anything but a total disaster for the cause of the allies in the Pacific.
One of Chile’s most ambitious diplomatic missions was the one sent to the United
States itself, and led by Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna. The objectives of the mission were
to have a positive impact on the printed press and help reinforce an already pro-Chilean
public opinion in order to excerpt pressure on the U.S. Department of State and thus
precipitate the involvement of the U.S. and the invocation of the Monroe Doctrine against
Spain. A secondary objective was to help fund and radicalize private individuals eager to

348

Cerda Catalán, “La guerra entre España y las repúblicas del Pacífico,” (abril), pp. 1–48; Miguel Á. De
Marco, La armada española en el Plata (1845–1900) (Rosario: Universidad Católica Argentina, 1981); and
Emilio Esteban-Infantes y Marín, Expediciones españolas: Siglo XIX (Madrid: Instituto de Cultura
Hispánica, 1949).

349

For the exchanges between Uruguay and Chile, leading to the expulsion of the Chilean Minister from
Montevideo, see Uruguay, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Negociaciones entre el gobierno oriental
del Uruguay i el ministro diplomático de Chile sobre el consulado chileno en Montevideo y la venta de
presas (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de Buenos Aires, 1866); J. G. Courcelle Seneuil, La guerra entre España i
Chile: Los neutrales i el derecho de jentes (Santiago: Imprenta de la República, 1866); and Larraín de
Castro, La misión Lastarria, 1865–1866. See also Uruguay, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores,
Publicación oficial del negociado entre el Ministerio de Relaciones Esteriores y el Sr. Enviado
Estraordinario y Ministro Plenipotenciario de la República de Chile, con motivo de su pretensión sobre
venta de presas que las fuerzas navales chilenas pudieran hacer a la España (Montevideo: La Tribuna,
1865).

203

organize rebellions in Cuba against the Spanish rule on the island. Mackenna’s mission
was doomed to failure the moment that the U.S. government arrested him for espionage
and released him months later under Chile’s claim that he was, after all, acting in official
capacity as a diplomatic envoy to the U.S.—despite not having been declared as such from
the beginning. The failure of Mackenna’s mission left Chile with the only option of
redoubling its efforts in re-stating the principles contained in the Monroe Doctrine and
make them an intricate component of a foreign policy of regional cooperation against
Spain.350
After Pareja’s ultimatum to Chile and the formal declaration of war, a new phase in
the Guano War began. The combined navies of Chile and Peru, while avoiding direct
confrontation with the Spanish vessels, managed to open a military front previously
unimagined by Pareja. The Spanish squadron, in order to make their demands more
credible, instituted a blockade of all the Pacific ports—but particularly Valparaíso. This
decision, however, was a grave mistake. In practical terms, it divided the squadron into
smaller groupings of ships in charge of blockading each individual port along an extensive
4,000-mile coastal line stretching from Chile to Ecuador. This opened up an opportunity
for the less numerous allied vessels to harass each group of Spanish ships individually and
on a more even basis. In one such encounter, the allied “navy” managed to capture the
schooner Covadonga, which was immediately added to the allied forces. After this
important turn of events, Spain was reduced to a total of 217 guns, while the allied navy
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was upgraded to 130 guns. The Covadonga was the second vessel lost since the beginning
of the expedition in 1863, after the fire accident on board the Triunfo. Faced with this new
reality, Pareja felt so deeply embarrassed and humiliated—an embarrassment, one must
add, bolstered by his own sense of cultural superiority—that, upon receiving news of the
loss of the Covadonga, he decided to take his own life on board of the flagship Villa de
Madrid on November 28, 1865, while stationed in front of the port of Valparaíso.351
Casto Méndez Núñez, captain of the Numancia, replaced Pareja as commander of
the squadron. Compelled by the situation and the need to re-establish Spain’s honor after
such unfortunate blows to the squadron (both moral and material), Méndez Núñez decided
to carry on with Pareja’s earlier ultimatum and after a hiatus of several months, on March
31, 1866, he decided to bombard and destroy Valparaíso—an unarmed, civilian,
commercial port.352 The act was so outrageous according to the legal standards of the time
that not only other South American nations outside the formal Quadruple Alliance, which
had been ambiguously “neutral” (like Argentina and Brazil) and even antagonistic (like
Uruguay), announced their public indignation at the bombardment and the most adamant
condemnation of such a “barbarous act.” 353 Argentina’s Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Rufino de Elizalde, issued a harsh letter of protest claiming that Argentina would break
their friendly relations if the Spanish squadron persisted in using force against civilian
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towns and ports.354 In Bolivia and Ecuador, spontaneous popular manifestations broke out
in the streets against Spain and its citizens, and in “Americanist” solidary with Chile, thus
turning the tables in favor of Bolivia’s expedient entry into the alliance.355 Lastly, Brazil
maintained a cautious neutrality which privileged its ongoing war with Paraguay and its
good relations with fellow monarchical Spain. Its chargé d’affaires in Santiago, Francisco
Adolfo Varnhagen, however, created a little controversy by joining the Diplomatic Corps
in Chile in its expressions of condemnation for the bombardment of Valparaíso. After
recalling Varnhagen back to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil signaled a much more restrained
approach to the incident. This cold, yet not opportunistic, foreign policy would cost Brazil
dearly in terms of damaged relations with Chile for at least a decade, and a much more
problematic relation with Peru, who broke relations with Brazil after the war.356
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Also other European great powers, and even the United States itself, issued harsh
criticisms of Spain’s actions and questioned its activities in the region.357 The end of the
civil war in the United States several months before the bombardment of Valparaíso helped
fuel a sense of urgency on the part of Spain in solving its ongoing conflict with the republics
of the Pacific in an attempt to suppress the need for the U.S. to invoke the Monroe Doctrine
unilaterally and exert diplomatic pressure in Madrid to end the war.358 As historian William
Davis points out, the U.S. adopted a slightly more active attitude after the Spanish debacle
in Valparaíso, and quite importantly stopped signaling its neutrality to Madrid, as in
previous decades. Still, the U.S. remained unwilling to assume the role of mediator until
the conflict had practically ended.359
Faced with international outcry and public condemnation, Méndez Núñez decided
to change his strategy. The blockading of ports ceased and the squadron now only
concentrated on Valparaíso. But after two months, he decided to bring the same kind of
retribution to Peru’s port of Callao, which was well-fortified. In May 2, 1866, a battle
ensued at Callao involving all the vessels of the Spanish squadron against a set of batteries
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emplaced by Prado’s administration and reinforced with several civilian volunteers from
Lima, Quito and Santiago.360 The Battle of Callao, or the Battle of May 2 as it is popularly
known in Peru, represented the last significant episode of the war. 361 Suggestively, its
ending had no clear military victor; it was a political and diplomatic “victory” for the South
American allies, in so far as the squadron—severely damaged after the day-long combat—
abandoned the Pacific for good. But it was celebrated as a victory also in Madrid when the
“Scientific Expedition” squadron finally returned to Spain. For several years, until a final
armistice was signed in 1871 in Washington, fears and rumors of commissioned “corsair”
vessels arranged by Chile and Peru wreaked havoc in the minds of Spanish commanders
in the Caribbean and the Atlantic.362 No new confrontation or crisis, however, erupted after
Callao. Following the end of Isabel’s reign in Spain, in 1868, a new and more conciliatory
policy towards the South American nations managed not only to secure the final armistice
but also to formalize relations with Peru.363
The outbreak of the war with Spain, therefore, was a crucial moment for the region.
It helped forge a sense of regional awareness among the political elites and decision-makers
in charge of the foreign policy of each Pacific state. This sense of awareness of was largely
imposed on the reality of South America’s international relations by the necessity to
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coordinate their foreign policies against an arrogant and belligerent foreign power. This
incipient emergence of a raison de système, however, was only partially successful, for
Lastarria’s mission to the River Plate countries failed to lock-in key geopolitical members
into a “continental” alliance. Thus, only half of the region—propelled in part by a sense of
common danger but also by a strong sense of regional community and common interest in
order—managed to create a common front in the Pacific to defend the region’s “common
interest” in resisting and fending off one last time the incursions of the former Motherland.
Confronting this extreme situation, four countries allied to repel Spain’s aggression (Peru,
Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia), bypassing important short-term strategic interests and risking
open war with a European power. Ecuador, for example, by joining the alliance, declared
war on its prime consumer of cacao—the main product for export from Ecuador at the
time. 364 Similarly, Ecuador was coming to the aid of Peru, a persistently antagonistic
neighbor which had supported insurgencies and military expeditions prepared by
Ecuadorean caudillos sheltered in Peruvian territories. Bolivia, for its part, in order to come
to Peru’s aid rushed the conclusion of a border treaty with Chile, in 1866, creating a
“generous” arrangement—known as medianería—by which both countries would share a
strip of land as the limit between both nations, instead of a single line. Inside this strip or
zone, both countries would enjoy the revenues and profits from the mineral resources
located there. This controversial, and never-before-seen, treaty was going to play a
fundamental role in the 1879–1884 war between Chile, Bolivia and Peru.365
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Testing Alternative Explanations
The case of the Guano War offers the chance to evaluate many of the hypotheses identified
in Chapter 1. In relation to the three mechanisms associated with the international society
approach (H1), namely: “tamed war,” “institutionalization,” and “pragmatic solidarity,”
the six competing approaches (H2–H7) offer important alternative interpretations of related
causes and chained-mechanisms that could also lead to the progressive reduction of conflict
and consolidation of regional order in South America but through alternative causal-chain
mechanisms. Although not all of them pass the initial, and most basic, test (the “smokinggun test”), an exploration of the contrast between each hypothesis’ expected patterns of
state-behavior (or case-specific “predictions”) and the historical record is necessary to
evaluate the strength or weakness of the competing arguments.

H2: The U.S. as a Regional Hegemonic Stabilizer
The first alternative hypothesis (H2), concerned with the role of the United States in
limiting war and institutionalizing regional peace, fails to pass the first (“smoking gun”)
test. The experience of the U.S. civil war (1861–1865) practically “removed” the hegemon
from regional or hemispheric strategic picture for almost a decade. In fact, its absence could
help explain the outbreak of conflict—rather than peace. Even the “return” of the U.S. once
the civil war was over does not correlate neatly with the decline in conflictivity in the South
Pacific area and the end of the military operations between Spain and the Pacific allies. On
the contrary, although the U.S. civil war had effectively ended by mid-May 1865, it was
precisely in that year that the diplomatic relations between Spain and the Chile–Peru
alliance deteriorated sharply. U.S. diplomacy was unable to exert any serious influence on
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Spain’s foreign policy during the immediate post-war period (1865–1866), the year when
actual military confrontation between Spain and the allies intensified. The U.S.
representative in Valparaíso, Thomas H. Nelson, could not even interest the U.S.
Department of State in invoking the Monroe Doctrine principle to prevent the
bombardment of Valparaíso, announced well in advance, nor to intercept, let alone deter
the Spanish vessels from using force against the unfortified Chilean port. The same applies
in the case of Peru some months after the bombardment of Valparaíso, during the battle of
Callao (May 2, 1866).
Some historians, such as Davis or Heredia, do find some relevance in the form of a
reestablished U.S. international image after the end of the civil war. However, as they also
notice, the U.S. made no real effort in acting as mediator during the Guano War. The
conflict resolved itself by dissipating into a delicate armistice in 1871 that eventually found
its way towards a set of separate treaties of peace with Spain during crucial moments of
extreme duress during the War of the Pacific between the former allied Pacific nations.
Failing this first test is critically damning because it technically disqualifies the core
premise of this hypothesis for testing this specific case-study. In short, if the U.S. was not
exercising any international role as a regional or hemispheric “hegemonic stabilizer,”
regardless of whether it did not intend to or was incapable of doing so, then the hegemonic
stabilizer argument cannot be properly evaluated against the case of the Guano War.

H3: A South American “Balance of Power”
The second alternative hypothesis, concerned with the balance of power (H3) as understood
in power-political terms, also runs into some initial difficulties. Although it passes the basic
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“smoking-gun” test, for South American nations were certainly interested in maintaining a
regional balance of power inter se by protecting their respective independence and
autonomy, this aspect is not unique to this hypothesis. That is, it transforms into a “hoop
test” (low uniqueness and low certitude). That is, this characteristic is shared, at least in
principle, with the H1 (international society) and H4 (geopolitics) hypotheses. To
distinguish between these interpretations, it is critical to clarify what is expected in each
case and what are the precise background conditions and triggers that differentiate one
interpretation of the balance of power dynamic from the other.
In the first instance, the balance-of-power approach (H3) generates three precise
expectations: First, that war will serve as a regulating mechanism (via deterrence) to reduce
the overall level of conflictivity in the region. Second, that the regional balance of power
created out of this dynamic will be based on mutual fear and suspicion, and would therefore
not translate into stable institutional arrangements (that is, it only minimally maintain a
fear-based balance of power). And third, that the nature of regional alliances would be
dynamic and multifaceted, changing at any time and according to short-term strategic
calculations of power-maximization and opportunism. In other words, there would be no
rigid or static sets of alliances and patterns of enmity/friendship identifiable over time.
With this in mind, these predictions are expected to raise in prominence as certain
background conditions also grow in importance historically. The main background
condition for H3 is the fact that states are will engage more firmly in such balance-ofpower behavior when their survival is at stake. This leads to elites and decision-makers
who cannot afford to develop far-sighted views about the regional system they inhabit. In

212

sum, raison d’état reigns supreme and the “national interest” is understood by the historical
actors narrowly, and in short-term, material or survival-specific considerations.
When applied to the Guano War case, several important factors come to the fore.
First, the Spanish intervention in Peru happened at a critical moment in Peru’s life as a
sovereign nation. Without a formal treaty with Spain recognizing its independence, Peru’s
survival was truly on the line. Chile and Argentina, as well as Ecuador and other neighbors,
had already signed, or were on the verge of signing, treaties with the ex-Motherland and
thus had their formal independence well-established and secure. Despite this important
factor, Pezet’s administration did not behave according to a short-sighted view of the
national interest, according to which it would have been expected of Peru to ally
immediately with regional allies (the weaker side) to confront Spain (the stronger side)
militarily in every opportunity available. According to the H3 hypothesis, as well, Peru
should have tried to involve as many European powers as possible to the balancing effort
against Spain—including, perhaps, the U.S. In practice, however, Pezet avoided the use of
force at every turn possible. Peru’s diplomatic efforts in European courts were limited only
to influencing Madrid to disavow the Spanish agents’ actions in the Pacific, but little more.
No solicitation for assistance, or “protection,” nor even a military alliance, was seriously
considered.
Suggestively, it was Chile, and not Peru, who led a region-wide campaign to erect
a common front against Spain—an effort that eventually dragged the country into the war
itself. Contrary to the H3 expectations, Pezet tried to peacefully negotiate an agreement in
Madrid and only when that option collapsed did he try to rely on the intermediary role of
two diplomatic bodies: the Diplomatic Corps in Lima and the Lima Congress of 1864. The
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first, however, although influential in creating a rift between the Spanish agents, Pinzón
and Salazar y Mazarredo, ultimately backfired as it undermined Peru’s efforts in presenting
the affair as an American or regional one. The second body, although important in
institutionalizing a regional interest in order, not only by incorporating Peru in the
negotiations but also by implicating Argentina (which had been reticent throughout to
antagonize with Spain), was unable to crack the hard shell of the new commander, Vice
Admiral Pareja, nor induce any change in the Spanish demands. It was not until the
bombardment of Valparaíso and the specter of similar action at Callao weeks after, that
Argentina, a key strategic power in the Atlantic, hardened its position against Spain.
Interesting, as well, is to observe the behavior of Chile in this affair. It was, in
principle, easier for Chile to let Spain exert some pressure on Peru, its historical rival in
the South Pacific region since the end of the wars of independence in the 1820s. The power
competition between Peru and Chile not only erupted into a major war between 1836 and
1839, in which Chile defeated the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, but also had implications
for the border disputes with Bolivia over the southern frontier of the Atacama Desert. It
was in Chile’s most immediate interest, therefore, to have Peru suffer at the hands of the
Spanish squadron, for this would have allowed Chile to pressure Bolivia more
effectively—a traditional ally of Peru—and with the potential control of the nitrate and
mineral rich area obtained from Bolivia’s medianería agreement, outperform Peru in
economic and military terms. On the contrary, however, Chile not only disregarded these
short-sighted calculations regarding Bolivia and Peru, but actually embarked on a
multidirectional diplomatic campaign (that involved even the United States) to create a
common front against any European encroachment on the continent, like the one Spain was
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exercising in the Chincha Islands. This also dragged Chile and Peru to reach out to the
Atlantic powers, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, to mediate in and bring to an end their
ongoing war with Paraguay. Although this diplomatic initiative ultimately failed, it shows
how much Chile was prepared to put aside diplomatically (and even territorially) to protect
a sense of regional order and autonomy against Spain’s ambitions. These Chilean
concessions included a partial relaxation of its claims over the disputed territories with
Argentina over the Andean frontier and the ownership of Patagonia to the south—which
the Lastarria mission to Buenos Aires was also instructed to negotiate.
Bolivia, for its part, failed to follow the expected patterns of traditional balance-ofpower politics. The pre-existing rivalry with Chile was so intense than when Bolivia
effectively entered the Quadruple Alliance in June, 1866, it made little sense from a purely
power-political vantage point. Bolivia, according to this view, should have played one
neighbor against the other, allowing Spain to coerce Peru while also containing Chile from
coming to Peru’s aid, while also negotiating an anti-Chilean alliance with Argentina. This
was the pattern that Bolivia tried to follow during the 1836–1839 war of the Peru-Bolivian
confederation, led by Bolivian caudillo Andrés de Santa Cruz. Achieving such strategy in
the 1860s could have helped tilt the balance in Bolivia’s favor over the demarcation of its
shared border in the Atacama Desert (with Chile) and the Andean region to the south (with
Argentina). Instead, Bolivia, led by caudillo Melgarejo, and out of a distinctive
“Americanist” fervor and solidarity towards all South American nations, rushed to an
agreement with Chile over their southern border—thus creating an unprecedented, shared
medianería frontier—that was excessively generous to Chile, but which recorded little
gains for Bolivia. Furthermore, this unique agreement cleared the way for both countries
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to join Ecuador in aiding Peru against Spain by way of closing all ports on the Pacific to
the Spanish squadron, and by effectively resolving (if only momentarily) a critical pending
dispute between neighbors.
Lastly, Ecuador was the third country to join the alliance. Emanating from its
condition as a buffer-state between Peru and Colombia, Ecuador had suffered historically
the interference of its neighbors in its internal affairs, supporting factions and caudillos,
destabilizing the internal order, and delaying its chances to play a more mature regional
role. Peru’s strategy of disturbing Ecuador’s domestic and international politics was well
known at the time. An armed confrontation between both countries, in fact, had just been
resolved less than a decade prior to the Spanish intervention in the Peruvian islands. For
these reasons, Ecuador, and not only Chile or Bolivia, had profound short-term security
interests in seeing Peru suffer at the hands of the Spanish squadron. The Chincha Islands
question represented a unique opportunity for Ecuador to take advantage of Peru’s
weakening international status and take revenge for all the constant antagonizing over the
years. But apart from an initial declaration of “strict neutrality,” however, Ecuador did not
take advantage of Peru’s troubles in an opportunistic way, and instead joined the Quadruple
Alliance championed by Chilean diplomacy—thus countervailing all “logical”
expectations derived solely from a balance-of-power approach. This is also a particularly
important case because Ecuador had a history of pro-monarchical conservative political
elites and leaders, such as Flores and García Moreno, who in the 1840s and 1850s had
attempted to transform the Republic of Ecuador into a protectorate of the Spanish and
French crowns. By declaring war on Spain, as well, Ecuador was forgoing other
commercial interests related to its cacao exports—of which Spain was the prime consumer.
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The Lima Congress of 1864, as well, makes little sense when seen through the H3
perspective. Although cotemporaneous with the Spanish intervention, it had been invoked
to deal with larger, more regional, interests related to general patterns of European
interventions across the continent seen in the preceding decades, as well as intra-regional
political and commercial affairs. Although mainly concerned with regional security, the
Lima Congress of 1864 was conceived more in line with a regional tradition of multilateral
congresses than with mere balancing arrangements inter se. In sum, far from constituting
an unintended, almost spontaneous, “equilibrium” of forces in South America against
Spain, the repeated efforts at diplomatic coordination and the principles invoked in each
specific congress show a more conscious and political intended effort (even if only partially
successful in the end) in linking the national interests of each participating state with those
of the region as a whole in a stable manner and according to commonly-agreed principles
of diplomatic conduct. A region characterized by a mere balance-of-power dynamic based
on mutual fear and suspicion would have found no utility in such diplomatic arrangements
in the short as well as in the long term.

H4: South American Geopolitics
The geopolitical hypothesis expects a rather unchanging set of patterns to evolve in South
America as long as the geography does not vary. Although the geography in itself has not
changed, the discovery of guano deposits in the 1840s certainly played an important role
in stimulating intra-regional rivalries and power competition for strategic resources among
neighbors. The contested border between Bolivia and Chile, as much as the strategic
relevance of the Chincha Islands, for example, cannot be disentangled from the role of
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guano as a key resource between the 1840s and the 1870s. The precise expectations derived
from this hypothesis, therefore, would be that: First any regional peace would have to
derive from the material and geopolitical impossibility of war due to topographical
obstacles or a lack of any resources to fight about. Second, that institutions—if any actually
develop—would act only as coping mechanisms created by states to help overcome
unsurmountable geopolitical obstacles to cooperation. And finally, the idea of fixed
patterns of interaction—“shatterbelts” and “checkerboards”—would eventually stabilize
due to the rather static nature of geography in the region.
Regarding the first prediction, it is certainly relevant that Peru was guano-rich in
the 1860s, yet fiscally and thus materially incapable of waging war with Spain. It is also
important to note that Chile’s conflicting relations with Bolivia were based on disputes
over areas where minerals and nitrates were abundant and accessible. The role of the
congresses in South American diplomacy, including the second one in Lima (1864), could
be interpreted as coping mechanisms to countervail these rather deterministic geopolitical
features; that is, as concerted efforts to overcome the rigid topographical obstacles to
deeper interaction in the region. As was shown before, the Lima Congress of 1864 also
included agreements over areas aimed at improving the communication and
interconnectivity among member states. It was these agreements, in fact, and not the
security agreements for a common front against European aggressions, which received
widespread congressional ratification in the respective members in the years after.
However, the expected pattern of historical regional dynamics fails to corroborate the
geopolitical hypothesis.
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According to the geopolitical hypothesis (H4), Peru and Chile should have
continued with some form of reiteration of their past rivalry patterns, rooted in the flat and
desert-like territories between them, as well as the open Pacific Ocean, which acted as
conduits or “arenas” for their power competition. These shared spaces had not changed
since independence or the end of the Peru-Bolivian Confederation War in the 1830s.
Determined by the vast distances and the static factor of the Andes, Peru and Bolivia should
have been allies (together with Argentina) aiming to curtail any Chilean plans for regional
hegemony. Chile, for its part, should have allied with Brazil against this triple coalition of
neighbors, lest their success over Chile could be turned against the Empire later on. But in
practice, it was Chile who championed a regional defense of Peru’s and South America’s
interests against Spain’s ambitions. It was Chile who first reached out to Argentina, its
other historic rival after Peru, to erect a common South American front against their former
Motherland. Argentina failed to enter the alliance, and focused instead on combatting
Paraguay—as part of an “uncommon” alliance with Brazil, a monarchical regime and a
traditional rival of Argentina in the region.
In short, the Guano War represents a case-study that runs contrary to the main
expectations of the geopolitical approach (H3) regarding potential sources of reduction in
war and the use of force, as well as in potential patterns of institutionalization, or
“crisscrossed” geopolitical balance-of-power relations. Most crucially, the expectation of
a geographically determined set of alliance patterns in terms of shatterbelts and
checkerboards did not form in the 1860s. The alliances in the South American region
happened not according to two axes: one made by Chile–Brazil–Ecuador, and the other
made by Peru–Bolivia–Argentina, for example, but according to other considerations
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related to a regional identification with “South America” as a bulwark against the Spanish
(or any European) aggression. While the topographic aspects of the region may help
illuminate some aspects of the more historic patterns of conflictivity in the region, these
same dynamics seem to have had no significant effect during the Guano War in reducing
conflictivity, generating processes of institutionalization, nor in shaping patterns of
regional association, alliance, or solidarity in the face of common threats.

H5: Common Culture
This hypothesis is, perhaps, the most challenging of the alternative arguments. In part, this
is because of its superficial similarity with the international society argument, but also
because of its popularity as part of the historical “Americanist” sentiment among thinkers
and historians, as well as historical figures and politicians at the time. The main premise of
the H5 when applied to the South American case is that a “security community” formed
out of a common history of anti-imperialist struggles in the region. This peculiar legacy is
said to have fueled anti-imperialist sentiments that overshadow any other strategic
consideration when foreign powers, like Spain, employ force against one of the community
members (Peru or Chile). Facing this common threat, the H5 expects an association among
South American states that effectively eradicates war inter se, and which redirects the (now
collective) use of force outwards, against extra-regional powers, such as Spain (or France
during the Mexican occupation). This elimination of war among community members, in
turn, leads to a second expectation of progressive supranational unification that is based on
common institutions and regional organizations. This is premised on the functional
necessities of more efficient mechanisms for maintaining and protecting the security
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community for external threats. In essence, South America is interpreted as a security
community forged in common cultural, linguistic, religious, and even ideological “unity”
that was initially shattered by foreign imperialistic forces but which Latin American
countries have been piecing back together since day one after independence.
In the South American case, the strong sentiments of “American unity” have always
played a role in politics since the achievement of independence. With the death of Simón
Bolívar in 1830, the first champion of the “Americanist” cause, this collective popular
sentiment became associated most directly with Bolívar’s name and political project.
During the Guano War, this sentiment played a crucial role as it was very much alive in
the Chilean political elite that propelled the country towards war with Spain over the
occupation of three Peruvian islands. President Joaquín Pérez in Chile, as well as
Tocornal’s replacement, Covarrubias, and many other important figures during the Guano
War—including leading diplomats Lastarria, Mackenna, Matta, Hurtado and others—were
members of the political association called Unión Liberal, which defended the
integrationist dreams of continental unification threatened by foreign powers and
imperialism. This highly unique and certain prediction, in the correspondence with facts of
the Chilean case, makes the H5 hypothesis a very powerful explanation a priori. After all,
the Guano War represents the most ideal case-study for this approach, given than a foreign,
European power, Spain, which happened to be the former colonial ruler of the region,
initiated a direct aggression against a former colonial territory in demands of
“revindication” first, and then of “reprisals” for past and present offenses.
In this context, and contrary to the H1 argument, the common culture hypothesis
expects international institutional agreements, such as the Lima Congress of 1864, to be a
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platform for unification and solidarity based, not on common interests (H1), but on shared
ideology. The Lima Congress can certainly be interpreted as an institutional extension of
the Americanist “dream” held by so many Chilean public officials and other political
figures of the 1860s, including Domingo F. Sarmiento, Juan B. Alberdi, Justo Arosemena,
among many others. It was, as historians now agree, also the last such attempt in South
America for the Americanist ideals. Although a new continental congress was invoked in
the early 1880s by Colombia, it never came to fruition.366 The Lima Congress of 1864
represented an effort in supranational unification in matters of security, with plans for a
regional executive body which would take full control of the armed forces of member states
in cases of external aggression. The crucial point in this development is, however, that the
treaties on this aspect were never ratified by the respective legislative bodies of each
member state. That is, the Lima Congress was more an aspiration towards those higher
ideals than a practical reality. From a historical vantage point it is important to ask why
those ideals, arguably so influential in motivating a regional defense against Spain, failed
so miserably to institutionalize during such a critical period in the history of the region.
Failing to pass this highly-certain, but shared, prediction regarding South America during
the Guano War (that is, a “hoop test”), limits the strength of the H5 when compared to the
empirical record. Similarly, the H5 hypothesis shares with the “Liberal Peace” argument
(H7), discussed below, the highly distinctive expectation of the “eradication” of war,
instead of just its suppression, amelioration, “taming,” or impossibility/impracticability.
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As the other case-studies in the present dissertation show, “war” did not disappear from
the region’s international relations, although important changes in its execution have
certainly changed over time.
A potential answer from proponents of the H5 hypothesis is that imperialism was
ultimately triumphant in maintaining South America’s fragmentation, in true
Machiavellian spirit. Historically, however, other factors seem to have played a more
important role. In Chile, for example, the effects of the country’s involvement in the war
and the bombardment of the port of Valparaíso left a political cost that was soon paid in
terms of electoral defeat by the “Americanists” at the hands of more conservative political
forces. In Peru and Bolivia, successive domestic political convulsions created other
priorities than a supranational unification; while in Argentina, the end of the war against
Paraguay also removed from power the Liberal coalition led by Bartolomé Mitre, who had
initially agreed to participate in the Lima Congress of 1864 and coordinate foreign policy
decisions with Chile against Spain, but later grew more skeptical about Argentina’s
involvement in the war.
The hypothesis of common culture also seems to partially hold when interpreting
the type of solidarity followed by the American states during the Guano War. In the H5
argument, states are expected to be “solidaristic” towards one another on the basis of a
“common culture” created by a shared past of fighting against imperialist European
powers. It is, in short, an ideological solidarity that runs across identitary lines, more than
mere interests and short-term cost-benefit calculations. This expectation, although it may
fit well the motivations behind the foreign policies of Chile and Bolivia during the 1860s,
cannot fully account for the behavior of other important states. Ecuador, for example,
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which was led by ultra-conservative political forces at the time, joined the Quadruple
Alliance and thus put several security and commercial interests on the line. Similarly, the
prediction runs into difficulties when trying to account for the non–solidarity of Argentina,
Venezuela, and Uruguay, which did not join the Quadruple Alliance against Spain. These
countries, and in particular Argentina and Venezuela, not only represent important strategic
players in the South American region, but also carry a symbolic importance for being the
birthplace of the two revolutionary movements that through epic military campaigns went
on to liberate the rest of the continent from Spanish rule.367 Despite this, neither Bolívar’s
Venezuela, nor San Martín’s Buenos Aires, joined the Quadruple Alliance in antiimperialist fervor against the former Motherland, Spain. The fact that one of the most
conservative states joined the alliance, while the two states most closely associated with
“Americanism” ideals did not, opens a serious wound at the heart of the “common culture”
argument for explaining the progressive stabilization of regional order in South America.

H6: State-Strength, State-Weakness
The argument in H6 is that patterns of regional peace in South America are driven mainly
by state-strength/weakness considerations. When states go through severe domestic
constraints, for example in the form of armed political opposition and caudillo infighting,
then the main source of potential regional peace comes from the fact that war—particularly
major war—becomes impossible to practice or sustain over long periods of time. The point
is that weak states can only employ minimal force (at beast) against one another. When

367
See, e.g., Edmundo A. Heredia, “Primeras relaciones entre Venezuela y Argentina,” Todo es Historia,
No. 205 (mayo, 1984), pp. 8–28.

224

faced with a crisis situation, such as the one created by the seizure of the Chincha Islands
by Spain in 1864, then weak states generate externalities inter se which can only be tackled
as a group, coordinating common policies through some form of institutional arrangements
as a supplement to their institutional/organizational deficiencies. The background
conditions are clearly present, as well, given that Latin American states in general fit well
with the notion of weak-states during most of the 19th century. This state-weakness, well
studied by state-formation students of the region, also highlight the “porous” nature of
borders, leading in turn to transnational externalities that reinforce each state’s domestic
frailties and so-called “anarchy.”368
The aim of this concerted effort, therefore, is not a unification into a supranational
government or the eradication of war altogether (as in H5), but simply the more limited
objective of avoiding security externalities and threats. In this context, the H6 argument
makes three important predictions regarding the Guano War. First, given the extremely
weak government of the Pezet administration in Peru, it would have been logical for Peru
to try to present the Spanish aggression as a potential problem for the rest of the South
American neighboring states. Appealing to the neighbors’ own interests in avoiding the
externalities from the Peruvian incident, the Pezet administration would have been
expected to seek regional support through institutional multilateral means. This expectation
can be said to have been amply fulfilled as, in fact, something close to it occurred during
the first year of the diplomatic crisis. Moreover, it was Peru’s own domestic political and
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financial crises what first ignited the Talambo incident, which was then used by Salazar y
Mazarredo to convince Pinzón (and thus also Madrid) of the “necessity” of occupying the
islands as a reprisal for the offenses committed against Spanish citizens on Peruvian soil.
A second prediction of the H6 argument relates to the role of the Lima Congress of
1864 as an institutional supplement for other neighboring states to “contain” the Peruvian
problem. It was because of Peru’s own weakness that a European power was now
marauding the Pacific waters of South America after all. The attitudes of the Peruvian
delegates to the Congress, as much as those of Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Argentina,
seem to confirm the view that one of the main objectives of the South American states was
to limit the implications, or externalities, emanating from the Chincha Islands affair. Put
differently, in their “defense” of Peru’s interests they took great care in not giving Peru a
diplomatic “blank check” or a free-pass for its own responsibilities in the crisis. But the
Lima Congress, however, also had higher aspirations beyond mere mitigation of security
externalities. As advanced by the H5 and H1 arguments, larger regional considerations
were invoked in the summoning and functioning of the Lima Congress which cast a shadow
over the idea that this institutional gathering was a mere “empty shell” for dealing with
Peru as much as with Spain. As highlighted before, collective and regional ideals were a
crucial ingredient that played a role by, first, re-appropriating the U.S. Monroe Doctrine
principle as a foreign-policy objective of the region as a whole, and second, by creating a
common front or bulwark against European interventions in general—and not simply
against Spain. That is, the Chincha Islands occupation was regionally recast as an
“American” issue that transcended purely Peruvian problems and interests. Far from an
“empty shell” used for tactical purposes of quarantining Peru’s problem with Spain, the
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Lima Congress was a centerpiece of long-held tradition by American states to handle their
own affairs autonomously.
The avoidance of externalities, nevertheless, seems to help explain quite well the
behavior of the Atlantic powers in South America: Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.
Occupied with their own major confrontation with Paraguay, the allies could not
realistically entertain a potential simultaneous confrontation with Spain. This incapacity
was also premised on their own state-weaknesses (as the next chapter in the dissertation
shows). Paraguay, a geographically small but militarily strong country, offered for more
than five years a stubborn resistance to the combined forces of the three allies, and became
a major reason why the ideal “common front” imagined by Chilean officials could not
come to fruition by incorporating the Atlantic powers in the Quadruple Alliance.
Lastly, the H6 argument can be said to illuminate quite well the unexpected
behavior of Chile in taking the initiative in coordinating a diplomatic regional front against
Spain. Chile had, since at least the late 1830s, a well-organized domestic political system.
Apart from the Brazilian Empire itself, Chile was the most stable and well-consolidated
South American country by the mid-1860s. This allowed Chile to play a more active
diplomatic role in the region, developing an understanding of the intricate connections
between its own (short-term) “national interest” and the region’s (long-term) “common
interests.”369 Seen in this light, the H6 argument contributes another possible explanation
for the proactive Chilean diplomacy of the mid-19th century in general—and its
multidirectional offensive with regards to the Chincha Islands occupation by Spain in
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particular. Its relative strength vis-à-vis its neighbors (Peru and Bolivia specially) made
possible for Chile to put into practice ingenious and creative strategies to fend off the
Spanish squadron, both by closing off all Pacific ports, but also by instigating “corsairstyle” harassment tactics against all Spanish ships in the Pacific and the Atlantic, issuing
letters of marque and waging all kinds of anti-Spanish propaganda campaigns abroad. The
H6 argument can explain Chile’s remarkably unique behavior, while also help understand
the incapacity of Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and other South American nations to follow
through with Chile’s more grandiose schemes. In short, they could not perform
diplomatically as well as Chile did due, in great part, to their relatively more unstable and
insecure domestic fronts.

H7: A “Liberal Peace” in South America?
The final alternative argument articulates three elements: the republican and democratic
type of regime, the adherence to free-trade principles, and the creation of Liberal
institutions. These factors are expected to reinforce one another and together lead likeminded and like-structured states to a separate peace inter se. The background conditions,
therefore, allude to the presence of such regime types, economic policy ideals, and
institutional arrangements during the 1860s in Latin America. A crucial component, as
well, is the convergence of these factors in order for the expectations to be tested fairly. If
and when these conditions are met, then three clear expectations emerge: first, that war
would disappear among states; second, that institutional arrangements will be Liberal in
nature (that is, they will protect and advance political and economic Liberal values, such
as market freedom and political liberty); and third, that among states organized around
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these factors an “inter-democratic” solidarity will form, based on Liberal values and ideals,
and excluding war among members.
When applied to the Guano War case, the H7 argument applies only partially.
Firstly, the idea that 1860s South American states were “democratic” can be questioned on
several fronts. It was not until the mid-20th century, for example, that women and the
broader working masses were allowed to vote. Between 1820 and 1910, most Latin
American countries self-identified with the republican type of government. However, these
same states were strongly aristocratic and exclusionary of several groups, classes, and
social strata, on the basis of property ownership, education, and socio-ethnic backgrounds.
With this caveat, it is possible however to sustain the argument that republican/democratic
values played a role in how elites and decision-makers presiding over their societies
evaluated and conducted foreign relations on ideological and value-laden considerations.
The issue of type of regime, for example, was a popular one in the confrontation
with Spain. Aside from the illegality of the occupation in itself, the aggressor state was a
monarchy. This was an important factor in arousing the wider population and unnerving
the printed press in Peru, Bolivia, and particularly in Chile. The citizens gathered in bars,
cafés, and plazas, to demand from their respective governments “action” against Spain.
Pezet confronted such pressures at the very doorsteps of the Governmental Palace in Lima,
while Chilean authorities had to contain the mob from lynching Spanish citizens in
Santiago’s streets after the bombardment of Valparaíso. In Bolivia, as well, the
spontaneous popular manifestations of solidarity towards Peru and Spain convinced the
government of joining the Quadruple Alliance at once, forgoing important legal
concessions and past animosities with both Chile and Peru. But although the “republican
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factor” played a role at the popular level, it certainly can’t be said to have been a major
element at the diplomatic one. Neither Pezet, not any of the allied governments, based the
argument against Spain on merely ideological (republics versus monarchies) terms.
While part of the discourse at times, both official protests and negotiations were
conducted on the basis of the illegality and illegitimacy of the occupation itself. That is,
South American republics limited themselves to the commonly-agreed diplomatic
standards of the time and never fully exploited the “regime type” angle to any significant
extent. This includes, for example, their initial appeals to the U.S. potential for intervention
in the affair. The Monroe Doctrine itself does not specify “monarchies” as the real threat
to the American continent, but European powers in general. Lastly, and quite revealingly,
in its attempt at incorporating the members of the Triple Alliance to join the Quadruple
Alliance, Chile was also signaling that Brazil’s monarchical type of government was in no
way going to be an impediment for an alliance against Spain—another monarchy. Lastarria
was charged with a tripartite mission to Argentina, Uruguay and Rio de Janeiro. In fact, it
was Brazil’s collaboration that Chile wanted the most, for its navy was by far the strongest
and most professional of the entire continent—perhaps, only slightly behind that of the
U.S., which had been modernized after the Civil War.
On the issue of free-trade principles, a more compelling picture can be painted in
favor of the H7 argument. In the Triple Alliance war against Paraguay, Mitre’s Argentina
allied with Brazil despite the regime-type divergences, which suggests that other
considerations were at play beyond the issue of the type of government. The sharing of a
common socio-economic state-building “vision” seems to have been a much more
important factor in South America in the 1860s. As part of that vision, the Liberal economic
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principles of “Order and Progress”—engraved to this day in Brazil’s national flag—served
as a glue for common interests forged in the defense of similar values of “civilization”
(represented by Liberalism) versus the forces of “barbarism” (represented by conservatism
and federalist political projects). In the Guano War case, the association with such
economic and political values, although present in the public discourse of the times, does
not seem to have had a direct impact in the patterns of association, alliance, and displays
of solidarity among South American states. At no point, for example, South American
decisionmakers considered Spain more of a threat because of its “illiberalism” because, in
fact, it was a monarchy that had a special domestic political arrangement that
accommodated and alternated in power political forces of the Unión Liberal. If anything,
“imperialistic” emanated from Spain’s foreign policy, it was paradoxically coming from
its own Liberal view of the world and its attempt at reestablishing itself back into the higher
ranks among the great powers of Europe.
Finally, the Lima Congress of 1864 cannot be easily interpreted as an expression of
Liberal institutionalization on the regional level. In part, this is because the values and
principles invoked alluded more to the “protection” of their common independence and
autonomy than to the advancement of Liberal values. Although the Brazilian empire was
not officially invited to the Lima Congress, this was part of a long-held suspicion on the
part of Bolívar and his followers back in the 1820s against the true intentions of
monarchical Brazil. By the 1860s, Brazil had already made an important shift in its foreign
policy approach to the region, towards a less interventionist and more moderating or
stabilizing force. The ongoing war against Paraguay, which was preceded by an
intervention in Uruguay in support of one of the rival factions in that country, reawakened
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Bolivarian fears of a more expansionistic Brazil. Peru, both during the Pezet but also the
Prado administrations, was at the forefront of these fears and suspicions, which reflected
in large part in the Lima Congress negotiations. Apart from this fact, however, the Lima
Congress represented more strongly “Americanist” ideals of continental unity than Liberal
ideals of free-trade among republican democracies.

Some Preliminary Conclusions
The Guano War offers certain key preliminary points of reference that are worth reiterating
before presenting the next case-study. First, it is important to consider that it was a major
war that involved a European power, Spain. Second, this was not “any” European power,
but the former colonial ruler, or Motherland. For South American nations, therefore, this
represented both symbolically and strategically their last war for independence. It marked
the end and ruin of Isabel’s “foreign policy of prestige” abroad, and opened a new stage
for the Americas that saw a sharp decline in European interventions thereafter.
Additionally, a third point worth considering is the fact that the relative compatibility of
this case study for the popular “Americanist” proposition of a united continent fragmented
by foreign imperialism—a view that remains extremely popular today370—the countries of
the region did not automatically flock to Peru’s aid in what many would have expected to
be a continental “common front” against Spain. As some of the alternative approaches
show, other type of considerations played a more consistent role in explaining the partial
and highly pragmatic type of “solidarity” seen in this case.
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Fourth, and finally, the multifaceted nature of the Quadruple Alliance, championed
by Chile, is a highly unique development in South America. This alliance not only
succeeded in fending off Spain’s vastly superior squadron, with little more than well-timed
tactics and diplomatic activism, but also went further than the mere coordination for war.
In an effort to incorporate the River Plate countries to the alliance, the Quadruple Alliance
made persistent attempts to mediate in the Paraguayan War, in order to bring it to a peaceful
end, and to refocus those military efforts to serve more regional, or collective, common
interests. This war, and the subsequent effort at creating a bi-oceanic alliance, marked one
of the most important developments in the international relations of South America in the
19th century. It bridged, to paraphrase Robert Burr, the two sub-systems of the region into
one, now mutually interdependent, regional system. In doing so, it also inaugurated the
first step to the consolidation of a regional society of states, with shared common interests
and regional institutions.
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CHAPTER 3

THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUILIBRIUM:
WAR AND PEACE IN THE RIVER PLATE AREA, 1864–1875

“Al que es amigo, jamás
lo dejen en la estacada,
pero no le pidan nada
ni lo aguarden todo de él.
Siempre el amigo más fiel
es una conduta honrada.”371

The War of the Triple Alliance, or Paraguayan War, 372 was the longest and most
destructive international armed conflict in the history of the Americas.373 In global terms,
it was the longest and one of the bloodiest interstate wars of the entire 19th century, apart
from the Crimean War (1854–1856). 374 Experts have debated over decades the total
amount of casualties produced in the war of the Triple Alliance against Paraguay, but due
to the lack of sufficient documentation to establish the Paraguayan losses, the total
estimates usually range from 200,000 to 800,000.375 According to the most accurate of
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these estimates, the war left approximately 420,000 casualties in the span of more than five
years (from December 1864 to March 1870). 376 Paraguay, defeated in the war, was
devastated demographically, losing two-thirds of its population and more than 80 percent
of its male population above the age of 10 due to death in battle, imprisonment, or forced
migration after the end of the war. Paraguayan casualties represented almost two-thirds of
the total casualties in the war.377
To understand the origins of this conflict, it is imperative to contextualize the
history of the River Plate area as a whole, for although the war itself confronted Paraguay
with the Argentina–Brazil–Uruguay alliance, it had deeper roots in the traditional rivalry
between the Portuguese and Spanish empires over the control of the Eastern Bank (Banda
Oriental—modern-day Uruguay) of the Río de la Plata. Most historians associate the
beginning of the war to the inherited inter-imperial rivalry between Portugal and Spain; a
rivalry that was transferred to Argentina and the Brazilian Empire after their achievement
of independence.
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This “underlying” cause 378 of the conflict helps explain, at least in part, the
Argentine–Brazilian competition over political and economic influence in Uruguay during
the first half of the 19th century, in which two wars occurred. The first one happened
between 1825 and 1828, and is commonly known as the “Cisplatine War.” The second war
took place in the 1836–1851 period, and is popularly called the “River Plate War” (or
Guerra Grande, in Uruguay). The first conflict faced the Argentine Confederation with the
Brazilian Empire over the control of the Banda Oriental. The strategic importance of this
territory was given by the need to secure access to the interior rivers of the River Plate
estuary—leading all the way up north to Bolivia and the northern Amazon region near
Peru, while also cutting across Paraguay’s territory. Whomever controlled both banks of
the River Plate would hold a grip over the entire interior and its waterways, with the
potential option of shutting down all access between the Atlantic Ocean and the hinterland
of South America. For Brazil, securing the free and open navigation of the interior rivers
was crucial for accessing its most remote province of Mato Grosso, located to the north of
Asunción, but accessible only via the Paraguay river [see infra Map 3]. With the end of the
Cisplatine War, made possible by the arbitration of Great Britain, the Banda Oriental
became the Republic of Uruguay: a neutralized “buffer-state.” Uruguay’s independence
was reassured by a treaty signed by Argentina and Brazil, with the commitment of Great
Britain as the guarantor of Uruguay’s independence.379
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MAP 3 –– Main battles in the War of the Triple Alliance (1864–1870).

Source: Hendrick Kraay and Thomas L. Whigham, eds., I Die with My Country: Perspectives on the Paraguayan
War, 1864–1870 (University of Nebraska Press, 2004), p. 8.
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The second of these conflicts, however, showed both the instability of the prior peace
agreement over the Eastern Bank and the continuing ambitions of Brazil over the area. It
also showed the commitment of Great Britain in reassuring the survival of Uruguay as an
independent country. This war, which was an uncontained Uruguayan civil war,
represented a strategic loss for the two South American powers. Brazil, for example, lost
direct control over the Eastern Bank area and had to content itself with not having direct
access along the northeastern River Plate. This problem, however, was compensated by
Argentina’s own losses. By remaining independent, Uruguay’s “neutral” existence meant
that Argentina would not control both banks of the river either. Since Great Britain had
become the legal guarantor of this River Plate balance, by the mid-1850s Argentina and
Brazil resigned themselves to accept Uruguay’s de facto and de jure independence, or
otherwise risk war with one of the main European powers. This meant an important change
in Brazilian and Argentine foreign policy approaches towards the entire region.380
Paraguay, located upriver, acted as a default buffer-state but without any of the
legal reassurances that Uruguay had already gained for itself. Considered as a “rogue
province” by most Argentine political figures at the time, Paraguay understood well her
fragile geopolitical situation and thus confined herself to pursuing a largely isolationist
foreign policy for most of the 19th century.381 In this context, from 1811 to 1862, Paraguay
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followed a cautious foreign policy of internal growth and modernization, based on the
production of yerba mate, quebracho wood, and other basic agricultural products, while
relying on foreign-capital investments (particularly British) for its technological
modernization.382
After a failed Argentine military campaign led by Manuel Belgrano to “retake”
Asunción in 1811, the country reaffirmed itself as a de facto independent nation—although
the memory of a hostile Buenos Aires was never fully forgotten in Paraguay. This de facto
independence, however, and the country’s consequent isolation from most Platine affairs,
left it highly vulnerable to political developments in Buenos Aires and Montevideo in
relation to the export of its agricultural products to European markets. Similarly,
Paraguay’s borders with Argentina and Brazil remained undefined without formal
negotiations or a treaty. In anticipation of potential diplomatic troubles, and even a war,
Paraguay had been militarizing for decades prior to the outbreak of the war.383
In this context, this chapter has three main objectives. First, an initial section offers
a historical overview of the main developments related to the War of the Triple Alliance.
Within this general overview, it traces specific historical factors relevant for the three
causal-mechanisms identified by the international society approach. In this sense, the war
382
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of the Triple Alliance against Paraguay presents prima facie a challenging case-study for
this particular approach, given the war’s extreme effects in terms of casualties, duration,
and geopolitical importance for the region as a whole. In a second section, the chapter turns
to the competing arguments (H2–H7) to explore their relative explanatory power vis-à-vis
the main hypothesis (H1) proposed in this dissertation. A third, and final, section offers a
set of preliminary conclusions.

The War of the Triple Alliance: A Fight to the Death?
The war that for more than five years confronted Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay with
Paraguay raises a series of relevant points of analysis for evaluating the strength of the
international society approach in explaining the evolution of order in South America. One
of the most important of these is the discussion about its causes. The most well-regarded
explanation points to the complexity of the River Plate area and the interaction between a
colonial legacy, marked by the Luso-Spanish inter-imperial competition, and the South
American states’ own process of state-building and national consolidation after
independence. For the proponents of this argument, the War of the Triple Alliance was a
tragic and largely unintended phenomenon, produced by the interplay of historical forces
of both domestic and international nature. In sum, the emphasis for explaining the outbreak
of the war is put on the region’s own complex dynamics.384
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A second explanation points to the role of foreign imperialism, and to Great Britain
in particular, as the main culprit. In this view, British capital created a situation of intraregional competition for markets and products that pitted neighbor against neighbor. The
main responsibility, therefore, lies “abroad” while the central players of this bloody drama
(the Argentine, Brazilian, and Uruguayan elites) are seen as mere pawns or marionettes in
the indirect service of British interests and imperialism.385 Other popular explanations,
such as the intricacies of the Uruguayan civil war, the role of diplomatic intrigue and
strategic misperceptions; or the aggressiveness and megalomania of Paraguay’s leader,
Francisco S. López, among other hypotheses, have either been convincingly discredited by
recent historiography, or fit quite neatly in one of the two main explanations identified
above.386
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These discussions over the main causes of the war are important for the
international society approach discussed here, because they can help clarify the issue of
restraint as it pertains to the narrowing of the range of political options for practicing war
legitimately. If the war was justified by its main protagonists by appealing to the legal,
diplomatic, and political standards of the time, then the factor of international society can
be studied more directly. If, on the other hand, actors behaved according to merely
imperialistic or self-aggrandizing motivations, then some of the competing hypotheses can
grow in prominence as explanations for the actual development of the war.
Another important point of analysis is the simultaneity of the Paraguayan War with
the Spanish intervention in the South Pacific, which provoked the Guano War. The analysis
of these two wars as part of a mutually influential regional context is something only rarely
seen in the current historiography. 387 However, the simultaneous development of both
conflicts is of crucial importance for understanding some of the constraints and concerns
experienced by key decision-makers on both sides of the region. It is for these reasons that
the diplomatic efforts by the Quadruple Alliance to mediate in the War of the Triple
Alliance to bring the Paraguayan War to an end, become relevant in the exploration of the
factor of “pragmatic solidarity” in the 1860s. This “bridge that two wars built,” to borrow
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Burr’s own phrase, has great value in the consideration of a potential sense of “strategic
awakening,” as hypothesized in the international society approach.388
A third point of analysis concerns the prominence of diplomacy in the outbreak,
conduct, and resolution of the war itself. Most of the historiographical works on the
Paraguayan War focus on reconstructing “national histories” and conveying “war
experiences.” 389 Yet even when collecting the histories and experiences of each
participating state and producing competent narratives of the war, these works tend to
overlook or underestimate the factor of diplomacy per se. This is not to say that there are
no diplomatic histories of the war—in fact, these are one of the most traditional types of
studies of this war. The point is that even when reconstructing the war from a “diplomatic”
vantage point, no International Relations perspective is systematically employed.390 This
absence of an “IR approach,” for example, has led to an over-concentration on the brutality
and ferocity of the war, illustrated quite graphically in studies about the soldiers’ personal
accounts of the atrocities of war, the psychological traumas endured, the miseries of forced
recruitment and military life, etc. All diplomatic efforts related to the prevention,
mitigation, and taming of the war, apart from other more concrete efforts to bring it to an
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end after its outbreak, are persistently neglected in most historical accounts. Understanding
the Paraguayan War through an IR lens, however, can help illuminate many instances of
restraint even during the war, which are otherwise lost from perspectives that, at times,
obsess over the most gruesome aspects of a “total war.” It is precisely in this area that the
international society argument holds the most potential for a contribution.
Lastly, the War of the Triple Alliance offers a unique opportunity to explore how
the South American states involved in the war struggled with a “double dilemma”
composed, on one hand, by the need to consolidate a violently contested domestic order
with, on the other hand, the impositions of an international war of unprecedented scale and
consequences. In this framework, the role that elit -considerations about “order,”
“equilibrium,” “civilized behavior,” and “war” played in the unfolding of this drama hint
at important clues about how the development of common interests can help forge a
regional international society despite the intrinsic horrors of war itself. In so far as the role
of international society can be said to have had any relevant impact on the course of the
war itself, then elements of restraint and self-limitation in the use of force, the progressive
institutionalization of order, and the practice of “pragmatic solidarity” in defense of
regional common interests, are rescued from more popular representations of the
Paraguayan War as a pure “orgy of violence” or “total war” unleashed by three powerful
allies upon an isolated and relatively weaker, fellow South American republic.

Self-Restraint in a “Total War”
To explore the element of restraint in a war such as the one waged by the Triple Alliance
and Paraguay, given the unprecedented number of casualties and the devastating
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demographical effects on at least one of its participants, may sound prima facie as a strange,
or even futile, endeavor. After all, as a number of historians have established over the years,
the Paraguayan War can be considered as the first case of “total war” in the Americas—
second only to the U.S. Civil War.391 This idea has been amplified even more by revisionist
historians, who often characterize the war as an “American holocaust,” a “war of
extermination,” or even as “the war of the triple infamy,” accusing the British Empire of
being the main instigator behind the formation of the Triple Alliance and its so-called
“genocide” of the Paraguayan people.392
There are many factors, however, that upon closer scrutiny point to a different, less
categorical, conclusion. One of the main elements to consider is the fact that, of the total
number of casualties produced by the war, at least two-thirds were caused by non-battlerelated factors. For all the episodes of brutality and horror experienced by the soldiers “on
foot,” most of their deaths were ultimately related to the incidence of other factors beyond
direct “face-to-face” engagement with the enemy in battle. As historians agree, infectious
diseases and pandemics, such as cholera, yellow fever, and diphtheria, as well as other
health-related problems like thirst and trench-foot disease, were the main factors behind
the high number of casualties produced by the War of the Triple Alliance.393 This was,
391

See, .e.g., Capdevila, Una guerra total; Reber, “A Case of Total War”; Ricardo Salles, Guerra do
Paraguai: Escravidão e cidadania na formação do exército (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1990), p. 8;
Doratioto, Maldita guerra, pp. 195, 477; and John H. Williams, “A Swamp of Blood: The Battle of
Tuyutí,” Military History, Vol. 17, No. 1 (April, 2000), pp. 58–64.

392
See Chiavenatto, Genocídio americano; Pomer, La guerra del Paraguay; Galeano, Las venas abiertas
de América Latina; Fornos Peñalba, “The Fourth Ally”; and Silvânia De Queiróz, Revisando a revisão:
“Genocídio americano: a guerra do Paraguai” (Porto Alegre: FCM editora, 2014). Cf. Alfredo Da Mota
Menezes, A guerra é nossa: A Inglaterra não provocou a Guerra do Paraguai (São Paulo: Contexto,
2012); Doratioto, Maldita guerra; and Bethell, “The Paraguayan War,” pp. 15–27.
393

See Miguel Á. De Marco, “La sanidad militar argentina en la guerra con el Paraguay (1865–1870),”
Revista Histórica [Buenos Aires], Vol. 3, No. 9 (julio–diciembre, 1981), pp. 55–86; De Marco, La guerra
del Paraguay (Buenos Aires: Booket, 2nd ed., [1995] 2013), pp. 180–224; Yolanda C. Stewart Sellitti,

245

after all, a common feature of most wars in the 19th century—such as the Napoleonic Wars,
the Crimean War, the wars of German and Italian unification, and most prominently the
U.S. Civil War.394 It is only in more recent times that technological advancements have
been able to produce a change in this pattern. As Tanisha Fazal put it, “four key
improvements in military medicine have driven up wounded-to-killed ratios since the
nineteenth century: advances in preventive medicine; advances in battlefield medicine;
improved evacuation times; and better protective armor for military personnel.”395
Despite its popular characterization as a “total war,” the study of the War of the
Triple Alliance can, in fact, accommodate some elements of restraint and limitation in the
use of force. Although every human death can be seen as unfortunate, most acts of extreme
violence, brutality, and ferocity in this war came only from isolated battle engagements
with the enemy. The tactical development of the war itself shows that it was waged
according to separate “bursts” of violence, as each battle took place within several months
of separation between one another, over a five-year period.396 This, in turn, also indicates
that the most horrendous facets of the war were distributed across several years of
intermittent warfare, and that interpersonal violence was relatively contained within those

Memorias del doctor Guillermo Stewart: Jefe de la Sanidad Militar durante la guerra del ‘70 (Asunción:
Intercontinental, 2015); and Luiz de Castro de Souza, “A medicina na guerra de Paraguai: Mato-Grosso (IV),” Revista de História, Vol. 37, No. 75 (1968), pp. 145–173; Vol. 38, No. 78 (1969), pp. 383–414; Vol.
40, No. 81 (1970), pp. 113–136; Vol. 41, No. 83 (1970), pp. 111–136; Vol. 42, No. 85 (1971), pp. 129–
146.
394

See Clara E. Councell, “War and Infectious Disease,” Public Health Reports, Vol. 56, No. 12 (March,
1941), pp. 547–573; Charles E. Rosenberg, The Cholera Years: The United States in 1832, 1849 and 1866
(The University of Chicago Press, 1987); and James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War
Era (Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 487–489.

395

Tanisha N. Fazal, “Dead Wrong? Battle Deaths, Military Medicine, and Exaggerated Reports of War’s
Demise,” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Summer, 2014), p. 97.

396

See Bethell, “The Paraguayan War”; and Scheina, Latin America’s Wars, Vol. 1.

246

episodes. Unlike contemporary notions of “total war,” which imply the involvement of
entire societies, and not just the use of military troops, or the constant and sustained
condition of battle, the War of the Triple Alliance was in this regard remarkably contained
within established cultural parameters of the time regarding notions of “civilized” conduct
in war.
One of the main factors that made the war so costly, difficult, and protracted,
however, was the uncharted terrain on which it unfolded. Before the war, little was known
by the allies about Paraguay’s unique topography. Surrounded by inhospitable tropical
marshes, infested with mosquitos and other natural hazards, the terrain played an important
role in support of Paraguay’s stubborn resistance throughout the war. The eminent
Paraguayan historian, Efraím Cardozo, argues that Francisco S. López actually considered
this factor in his decision, not only to precipitate the war with Brazil, and then with
Argentina, but also for refusing some of the diplomatic offers of support extended by
Bolivia and the United States after the war had taken a clear turn in favor of the allies.397
Decision-makers in Buenos Aires and Río de Janeiro had no reliable maps or detailed
guides to the area with which to properly plan a military campaign to Asunción.398 Since
the initial diplomatic imbroglio that sparked the war involved Uruguay and its ongoing
397
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civil war between Colorados and Blancos, none of the allies thought necessary at the time
to procure such relevant information in the first place. Paraguay, after all, was not seriously
in any Argentine or Brazilian plan for war in the early 1860s. They still were a more
pressing threat to each other than a realistic danger to Paraguay, as erroneously immagined
by Francisco S. López at the time.
One of the biggest ironies of the “Paraguayan” War is that in the beginning it did
not contemplate Paraguay at all. The crisis that led to the war started in Uruguay, where
the two main political factions reignited the civil war of earlier decades. The Blancos
represented conservative and federalist ideals, and defended a decentralized national
government in which the interior provinces would distribute power more equally with the
capital city-port of Montevideo, where most of the customs revenue originated. When the
Blancos established themselves in power in the early 1860s, the Colorados, representing
centralist and Liberal values, were forced into exile in neighboring Argentina, where the
Liberal party of Bartolomé Mitre offered sanctuary and turned a blind eye to Colorado
political intrigue and military preparation. The leader of the Colorados, Venancio Flores,
was a veteran of Argentina’s own internecine wars, where he fought for Mitre’s side,
helping him consolidate power in a series of confrontations against the powerful caudillo
from Entre Ríos, Justo J. de Urquiza. Given the particular context in which Uruguay was
born as an independent republic, many of the political leaders on both sides of the River
Plate shared political and ideological allegiances that played a central role in the
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transnational movement of forces that came to determine the fate of Uruguay’s civil war
in the mid-1860s.399
In this crisscrossed set of allegiances, the Unitarios of Argentina, led by President
Mitre, supported the cause of the Colorados in Uruguay, led by Flores. But the opposite
was also true. The Blancos in Uruguay, led by President Bernardo P. Berro, supported the
cause of the multiple rebellious caudillos of northern Argentina—including Entre Ríos—
and presented a constant threat to Mitre’s porteño centralizing project. Since the provincial
caudillos in the north and north-east of Argentina remained defiant and, on occasion, turned
to open armed revolt against Buenos Aires, the tension between the two Argentine factions
was amplified by their mutual suspicions and accusations of invoking “external” (Blanco
or Colorado) support.400 In this scenario, the bilateral relations between Argentina and
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Uruguay were at a low point in the early 1860s, prior to Flores’ military invasion of
Uruguay in April, 1863.
Despite Paraguay’s policy of self-imposed isolation between 1811 and 1862, when
dictator Carlos A. López died, it played an active role in Platine affairs on at least two
separate occasions. First, in the late 1850s, when Paraguay acted as a mediator in the civil
war between the Confederated Provinces of Argentina, led by Urquiza, and Buenos Aires,
led by Mitre. Paraguay’s second deviation from its traditional policy came in 1864, in
reaction to the Brazilian and Argentine involvement in Uruguay’s civil war. This second
Paraguayan activism in the region, however, would trigger the biggest military
conflagration the region would ever come to experience.
In this complex web of transnational allegiances in the Plata region, Paraguay was
not only considered by many in Buenos Aires as a “rogue” Argentine province, but was
also suspected of providing support to the rebel caudillos in the interior provinces of
Argentina—whose territories shared borders, customs and values with Paraguay. In the
eyes of porteño elites, Paraguay represented a source of inspiration for the remaining
caudillos in their federalist quest for more economic and political autonomy—if not
outright de facto independence. Although Urquiza had moderated his political ambitions
after his military defeat against Mitre in 1861, in the Battle of Pavón, other strong caudillos
from the interior provinces were becoming impatient with Urquiza’s more restrained
approach. A younger generation of regional caudillos was increasingly organizing armed
rebellions against Mitre and the Buenos Aires-led political project of central
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government. 401 To complicate the panorama even further, a number of prominent
Paraguayan exiles, declared enemies of Francisco S. López, found in Buenos Aires a
hospitable place to plot the reconstruction of a more “Liberal” Paraguay after the downfall
of the López pseudo-dynastic rule.402 Such was the fragile political scenario in the River
Plate area before the War of the Triple Alliance erupted.
In this general context, it is important to explore in some detail three key diplomatic
missions that preceded the war. These missions exemplify a concerted effort in trying to
solve the crisis in Uruguay—and thus to avoid war. The ulterior failure of these missions,
however, precipitated the involvement of Paraguay into the diplomatic crisis by declaring
war on Brazil and Argentina for their violation of Uruguay’s sovereignty. As the
Paraguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs put it, their intervention in the Uruguayan civil war
“disturbed the balance of power” in the Platine region, and Paraguay could not remain
indifferent.403
The first two missions were sent by Argentina in mid-1863. One was led by José
Mármol, and the other by the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs himself, Rufino de
Elizalde. These missions had the objective of establishing channels of communication
401
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between the ruling Blanco party—practically besieged in Montevideo—and the Colorados,
led by Flores, who were in open revolt against the Berro administration and in control of
large areas of the rural interior of the country. A third effort was a Brazilian mission, sent
to Montevideo in mid-1863, and led by José A. Saraiva. This was a last and desperate
attempt to contain the Uruguayan civil war and put an end to a number of serious security
and economic externalities that had been disturbing the state of Rio Grande do Sul, in
southern Brazil, since at least 1852, but which remained problematically unresolved.404
Given the delicate nature of Argentina’s relations with Uruguay over the unofficial
porteño support to Flores, Mitre felt it was more sensitive to first send Mármol to Río de
Janeiro to reach a common understanding with the Brazilian Empire in order to avoid
letting the Uruguayan crisis drag both powers into a conflict with each other.405 According
to his instructions, Mármol’s mission had to secure the final treaty of the Convention of
1828 concerning Uruguay’s independence and territorial integrity. To achieve these goals,
Mármol had to remove all possible sources of misunderstanding between Brazil and
Argentina regarding their respective policies towards the ongoing civil war in Uruguay. In
a critical passage of the instructions, Elizalde said to Mármol that his ulterior objective was
“to reach an agreement with the Brazilian government to implement a joint action aimed
at putting an end to the prevalent disorder in Uruguay through their influence and, if
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necessary, the use of force.”406 In a communication with Edward Thornton, the British
representative in Buenos Aires, Elizalde revealed that he had instructed Mármol to
enquire of the Government of the Emperor how long they would deem it expedient to allow
the continuance of the present intestine commotions in the Republic of the Uruguay by
which the interests of the numerous Argentines and Brazilians resident in that country as
well as the general commerce of the other two countries were so seriously prejudiced, and,
if possible to come to an arrangement with the Brazilian Government for a joint
intervention for the purpose of putting an end to the existing disorder in the Republic of the
Uruguay, by the exertion of their influence, or if necessary, of force.407

Elizalde had a clear plan for the region. The success of Mármol’s mission in securing the
independence of Uruguay depended on an agreement that if either Argentina or Brazil had
to use armed force in Uruguay, its territory would not be curtailed in any way. This part of
Elizalde’s plan, however, was not clearly transcribed to Mármol in the official instructions.
This became evident when an opportunity opened up in Montevideo, but no positive result
materialized. On its way to Río de Janeiro, Mármol had a brief stay in the Uruguayan
capital. This opportunity was seized by William G. Lettsom, the British chargé d’affaires
in Uruguay, to arrange an informal meeting over dinner between him, Mármol, and
Uruguay’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Juan J. de Herrera. After five hours, little progress
was made. The Argentine and Uruguayan diplomats compared accusations and denials of
involvement in the civil war, and most suggestions for peace ended vaguely with promises
of redacting new basis for future negotiation, but no concrete peace plan.408
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With the failure of this impromptu negotiation, Mármol continued his journey to
Río de Janeiro, where he arrived on April 6, 1864. Months prior to his arrival, the Chamber
of Deputies in Brazil, led by a Liberal coalition, had pushed Brazilian Chancellor, João P.
Dias Vieira, to adopt a harsher stance on the Uruguayan crisis.409 The Liberal party in
Brazil was now voicing some of the concerns brought up by the Riograndenses towards
finding an actual solution the Uruguayan civil war once and for all. This meant that the
timing of Mármol’s arrival was quite unfortunate, for the new political situation was not
contemplated in his written instructions—although it was an option considered in
Elizalde’s overall plan, as it was conveyed to Thornton. The lack of clear communication
between Elizalde and Mármol created a situation in which the Argentine representative in
Río de Janeiro limited himself to merely signal that the Mitre administration would not
view it with suspicion if Brazil felt it necessary to intervene in Uruguay to bring its
domestic anarchy to a resolute end. In this first rapprochement with Brazil, although part
of the original plan was attained, it generated a new danger, for now Brazil interpreted
Mármol’s mission as a “green light” to use force unilaterally as long as it did not alter
Uruguay’s territorial integrity.
With this important antecedent, the Brazilian Empire instituted a plan of increasing
pressure on Montevideo, which was combined with open support for Flores’ troops. There
was a clear potential threat of an armed intervention if the chaos and disorder in Uruguay—
particularly in the northern region—did not stop or the Berro administration did not offer
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credible guarantees for the future. A long list of crimes and violations against Brazilian
citizens and their property in northern Uruguay had gone unanswered for over a decade.
Brazil’s foreign policy was thus, in large part, over-reacting to the pressures of the powerful
political and military leaders from the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul. This region had
always had a history of contestation and intermittent uprisings against the monarchy, which
on occasion had led to armed rebellions and intimations of civil war. The troubled
relationship between Rio Grande do Sul and Uruguay, for its part, rested on the
externalities generated from the ongoing civil war, which often resulted in the violation of
Brazilian private property in estates and farms in the Uruguayan countryside, as well as the
periodic loss of life, forced recruitment, and abuse of Brazilian run-away slaves caught in
between the rivaling factions.410
To preempt Brazil’s unilateral intervention in Uruguay, Elizalde personally
embarked on a “confidential” mission to Montevideo in a desperate attempt at diffusing all
animosities between Flores and Atanasio Aguirre, the new interim Uruguayan president.411
In order to render Brazil’s intervention unnecessary, Elizalde took a risk by entering
Uruguay incognito, traversing several miles on horseback through the rough country side.
He was entering as a private citizen since diplomatic relations between Argentina and
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Uruguay had deteriorated to the point of interruption after Mármol’s failed negotiation.
Elizalde would later look back upon this effort in preventing the war through such
unconventional ways by humorously referring to it as “Diplomacia Pampa.”412
Elizalde’s mission was quite successful at the beginning. Upon arrival in
Montevideo on June 16, 1864, he officially announced his presence, which was very much
welcomed by the press. He then met with Herrera, with whom he confided that his
motivation for helping Uruguay reach internal peace had been amplified by the aggression
of the Spanish Admiral Pinzón in the Pacific.413 Similarly, in successive communications
sent to the Argentine representative in Paris, Mariano Balcarce, Elizalde made clear his
preoccupation with the Spanish aggression towards Peru in the Chincha Islands. With this
in mind, he instructed Balcarce to inquiry about the true intentions of Spain in the Pacific,
and to reach out to other powers, such as France and England, to contain Spanish ambitions
in the region.414 This created the further necessity of putting out the fires in the Plata region
in the face of a potential common danger. But Elizalde’s mission came as a surprise for the
Brazilian Chancellor, Dias Vieira, who had just commissioned some weeks earlier
Conselheiro Saraiva to go to Montevideo to obtain the security guarantees from the Blanco
government, or otherwise deliver an ultimatum in case of rejection. These two overlapping

412

Caillet-Bois, “1864, un año crítico en la política exterior de la presidencia de Mitre,” p. 60.

413

From R. de Elizalde to B. Mitre, Montevideo, June 6, 1864, in Argentina, Museo Mitre, Archivo del
General Mitre, Vol. 27: pp. 165–166.

414

See Mario Belgrano, “España y el conflicto del Pacífico, 1864–1867,” in Contribuciones para el estudio
de la historia de América: Homenaje al Doctor Emilio Ravigniani (Buenos Aires: Peuser, 1941), pp. 515–
549. Several of the confidential letters between Elizalde and Balcarce were accessed through Argentina,
Documentos del Dr. Rufino de Elizalde, Instituto Ravignani, Buenos Aires, section “Año 1863:
Correspondencia del exterior—Correspondencia de Mariano Balcarce con Rufino de Elizalde.”

256

missions, therefore, created some rifts between Elizalde and Saraiva, as one had come to
put out fires, while the other was carrying a concealed threat.
After a number of failed attempts at avoiding Elizalde, the two diplomats finally
met. Saraiva was not convinced by Elizalde’s framing of the regional panorama—thus
minimizing Pinzón’s threat for the River Plate area. However, Elizalde had more success
in convincing the Brazilian representative of another threat, much closer and immediate.
In an attempt at interesting Saraiva in coming to a joint understanding in favor of the
necessity to prioritize order in the Plata region, the Argentine Minister showed Saraiva a
series of letters and private documentation proving that the Paraguayan agent in Buenos
Aires had been sending copious amounts of money to European capitals for the
procurement of armaments and other war materiel. Furthermore, Mitre had received
reliable information about a letter penned by the Paraguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs,
José Berges, in which he pointed out Paraguay’s eagerness and expectant opportunism to
initiate a war with Brazil.415 It was clear to Elizalde, as he tried to convey to Saraiva, that
although a Brazilian armed intervention in Uruguay would be treated by Argentina as a
necessary development in order to “pacify” that country, it would most certainly also
trigger a Paraguayan reaction that could engulf the entire region in an international war.
Although Elizalde’s diplomatic effort in opening a channel for negotiation between
Flores and Aguirre did not succeed in physically bringing both leaders to the same room
or shaking hands with one another, at least it made both parties agree on a joint mediation
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facilitated by Elizalde, Thornton, and Saraiva.416 The objectives of this tripartite mediation
were initially quite successful, thanks to an improvised solution proposed by Elizalde. The
parties met, in true “pampa diplomacy” style, in a commonly agreed location in the country
side, near Flores’ camp. The intermediaries would separately talk to Flores and the two
Blanco envoys, and draft a series of concrete propositions that both parties would likely
come to see favorably. After several rounds, the mediators managed to get the two
otherwise stubborn and bitter rivals to agree on the fact that the Blanco administration
would incorporate into a new cabinet more moderate Blanco co-religionaries, in
replacement of the current party fanatics and exaltés occupying all the key Ministries. In
return, Flores would stand down his forces and agree to an end of the civil war in the hope
that, in the incoming electoral cycle (set for February 1864), the Colorados would be
allowed to participate in Congress and vie for ministerial positions. This would have been
a fantastic result for Elizalde’s diplomatic mission and overall plan to pacify the Platine
region. Upon return to Montevideo, however, the two Blanco negotiators found that
Aguirre had succumbed to the pressure from of the hardliner members of the party, who
forced him to back-track on all his earlier commitments to Flores. The situation
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deteriorated rapidly, which opened the door for Brazil, with the good will of Mitre, to
pressure Montevideo one last time, before issuing an ultimatum.417
The failure of the tripartite mediation made Brazil’s position uncomfortable.
Saraiva, originally sent to Montevideo to put diplomatic pressure on the Blanco
government, had been dragged in by Elizalde’s clever and timely intervention to turn a
unilateral mission of diplomatic pressure into a joint mission of peace. With the change in
tone and the subsequent failure of the mediation, Herrera adopted a more dogmatic stance,
invoking Uruguayan principles of independence and national honor, and flatly dismissed
all of Saraiva’s requests for reassurance on the northern question. Thus, Herrera brought
both countries to the brink of war. 418 A growing tension and set of reprimands soon
followed between Saraiva and Dias Vieira, which provoked Saraiva’s reassignment to
Buenos Aires. The Brazilian Council of State wanted to leave the Elizalde–Saraiva
connection open to reassure the good will of the Mitre administration in case of an
intervention. Saraiva’s replacement in Montevideo, José M. da Silva Paranhos (Viscount
of Rio Branco), would further Brazil’s plans of intervention by formally securing the
Empire’s support for Flores and his Colorado faction in the Uruguayan civil war. Unlike
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the Blancos in Montevideo, Flores promised the Brazilian Empire that upon assuming
office he would put an end to the civil war and solve all the sources of diplomatic trouble
between both countries regarding the “anarchy” of the northern frontier.419
While these three missions tried to prevent the deepening of the Uruguayan civil
war, the Blanco administration had not remained idle. Between the last months of the Berro
administration and the interim presidency of Aguirre, the Uruguayan Minister, Herrera,
had initiated a diplomatic “charm offensive” in Paraguay trying to secure an intimate
alliance between both countries. Herrera sent a series of special missions to Asunción
during the last months of 1863 and throughout 1864 in a desperate attempt to convince
Francisco S. López and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Berges, of the strategic
necessity of forging an offensive-and-defensive alliance. Herrera appealed to López’s own
sensibilities with regards to the “balance of power” in the region, which he claimed would
be negatively affected by a Brazil–Argentina coordination in support of Flores.420
In early 1863, almost a month before Flores’ military invasion, Octavio Lapido’s
mission to Asunción set in motion Herrera’s strategy. Arriving after the recent death of
Carlos A. López, Francisco S. López’s father and former ruler of Paraguay, the Lapido
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mission shows the extent of Herrera’s far-sightedness and strategic awareness of the
common interests linking Uruguay and Paraguay in the Platine region as “buffer states”
deeply affected by the spill-over effects of party in-fighting across borders.421 Francisco S.
López’s recent experience in Europe in a diplomatic mission to procure engineers, military
experts, and weaponry for Paraguay, had introduced him to the intricacies of European
principles of diplomacy—the balance of power, in particular.422 Lapido, under Herrera’s
instruction, appealed to the strategic sensibility of the Paraguayan leader in order to form
an alliance between both countries. Although Lapido’s negotiations with Berges failed in
the end to concretize such an alliance, they certainly resonated with López’s well-known
megalomaniac personality and his vision of a more prestigious Paraguay, called upon by
history to play a central role in the Platine balance of power.423
Numerous letters exchanged between Herrera and Lapido confirm that Herrera
himself also shared a similar sensibility towards the (European) principle of the balance of
power. The invocation of this principle, therefore, cannot be easily interpreted as a tactic
or an attempt at manipulation of the Paraguayan leader to secure his military support
against Flores and his allies. It seems more plausible that both leaders shared a sincere
appreciation of its applicability to their countries’ similar geopolitical positions and
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common interests.424 The extent to which this first mission to Asunción played a central
role in involving López in the War of the Triple Alliance is still unclear. Lapido’s mission,
however, was at least instrumental in either igniting or reinforcing López’s framing of the
Platine affairs in terms of a balance of power with interlocking common interests.
During the following year, two additional missions to Asunción made sure that a
constant pressure was maintained on Paraguay’s decision-makers through an insistent
enticing of Paraguay to forge “a mutually beneficial alliance.” Commissioned by
Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Vásquez Sagastume and Antonio de las
Carreras, two card-carrying Blancos, intrigued and conspired with López and Berges to
obtain any type of commitment, verbal or otherwise, to make Paraguay intervene in the
civil war on the side of the Blancos. While Lapido’s activities in Asunción had at least
created an atmosphere of suspicion against Argentina, suggesting at times ambitious plans
of a military alliance with the Argentine provinces that opposed Buenos Aires, the roles of
Vásquez Sagastume and De las Carreras raised the bet even further. The Uruguayan agents
were so desperate in trying to secure Paraguay’s military assistance that, when faced with
López’s stern reluctance, they began to spin increasingly wilder conspiracies of a “common
threat” in an Argentine–Brazilian secret plan to coordinate a military invasion against both
countries. Uruguay was not being “pacified,” but erased. And Paraguay was next.425
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In the course of two years, Paraguay had been implored by successive Uruguayan
diplomats to officialize a military alliance with Uruguay with a promise of reciprocity, in
the case of Paraguay being the one attacked by its neighbors. From Herrera (in 1862) and
Lapido (in 1863), to Vásquez Sagastume and De las Carreras (in 1864), all possible excuses
were tried out: from principled appeals to balance-of-power considerations, to now more
concrete accusations of mutual extermination by their neighbors. Helping Uruguay was
presented, therefore, not only as in Paraguay’s best interest, but also as an issue of national
survival. Both countries, according to Herrera, were going to be invaded and territorially
partitioned by Argentina and Brazil. Unbeknownst to López, however, Herrera was
simultaneously negotiating an agreement with Elizalde, officially accepting the Argentine
explanation of its policy of “strict neutrality” in Uruguay’s civil war.426
In reaction to these requests and the absence of any evidence to support such
accusations, Francisco S. López took a problematic decision that would eventually damage
Paraguay’s bilateral relations with Argentina, and soon plunge Paraguay into war. In a
blunt attempt at “consulting” the Argentine government about the accusations made by
Uruguayan officials, López wrote to Mitre to explore the possibility—suggested months
before by Herrera—of acting as an arbiter or mediator in the ongoing civil war in Uruguay.
López envisioned himself as a key strategic actor in the Platine equilibrium which, just like
in Europe, would earn him and his country enormous amounts of prestige and decidedly
break with decades of Paraguayan isolation. 427 Although the tone of the conversation
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between both leaders was candid and polite, Mitre ultimately rejected López’s role as a
mediator. This prompted López to instruct his Minister of Foreign Affairs to communicate
in parallel with Elizalde to ask for explanations regarding the accusations raised by
Uruguay’s agents. In a stunning decision that would shock both the Uruguayans as much
as the Argentines, Berges shared with Elizalde all the correspondence between the
Uruguayan agents in Asunción and his government.
This was problematic for several reasons. First, because it betrayed the confidence
of a potential ally by exposing Uruguay’s rebellious plans, damaging accusations, and
duplicity towards Mitre. Second, because neither Mitre nor Elizalde were entirely aware at
the time of the real magnitude of Uruguay’s diplomacy of intrigue and hostility against
Argentina. And lastly, because in the face of this new information, Mitre’s policy of
rapprochement towards Brazil became the most reliable option to counteract such a
potential transnational alliance between Uruguay, Paraguay, and the rogue federal
caudillos of northern Argentina. If these plans were true, Uruguayan diplomacy presented
a conspiracy against Argentina’s territorial integrity as well.428
The correspondence exchanged between Berges and Elizalde on this issue also
demonstrates the extent of the damage done by Paraguay’s diplomatic blunder. In what
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Berges thought to be a display of trust towards Buenos Aires, Elizalde saw an attempt at
intimidation and Paraguayan involvement in “strictly Platine affairs,” in which Paraguay
was expected to play no meaningful role. 429 Upon Berges’ insistent requests for
explanations regarding the veracity of the Uruguayan accusations, Elizalde stalled with
promises of future letters that would clarify the whole affair. The demands for explanation
were so outrageous that Elizalde had no intentions of ever providing any clarifications. In
reaction to Argentina’s policy of contempt, therefore, López instructed Berges to forgo all
requests for explanation and brusquely declare that from then on Paraguay would follow a
policy according only to its own national interest.430
By mid-1864, Blanco diplomacy in Asunción had triumphed in creating intrigue
and mistrust between Paraguay and its neighbors. Although no formal military alliance had
been signed, Paraguay damaged its relations with Argentina by demanding explanations
about the Uruguayan intervention, while ipso facto also revealing that it was not a reliable
confidante, nor a restrained strategic player. With the failure of the Argentine and Brazilian
missions, therefore, the scenario deteriorated even further when Brazil’s ultimatum expired
and intervention soon followed. In anticipation of the use of force by Brazil, Paraguay
unilaterally declared on August 30, 1864, that if any military aggression against Uruguay’s
territorial integrity were to take place, it would elicit a similar reaction by Paraguay against
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the aggressor. “The alternative of the ultimatum has left a painful impression in the opinion
of [my] government,” wrote Berges to César S. Vianna de Lima, the Brazilian Minister in
Asunción. “No less painful […] has been the rejection by H. E. Counsellor Saraiva to the
proposition of arbitration […].” And then added:
The Government of the Paraguayan Republic profoundly deplores that Yours had thought
opportune to depart in this occasion from the policy of moderation in which it should have
trusted now more than ever, after signing the Congress of Paris, but cannot look upon this
matter with indifference, nor consent that, in execution of the […] ultimatum, the Imperial
armed forces of Brazil either through land or sea occupy part of the territory of the
Uruguayan Republic either temporarily or permanently […]. The Government of the
Republic of Paraguay will consider any occupation of Uruguayan territory by Imperial
forces […] as injurious to the equilibrium of the Platine states, which is of interest to the
Republic of Paraguay as a guarantee of its security, peace, and prosperity; and that it
protests in the most solemn manner against such act, freeing itself from all responsibility
regarding the ulterior consequences of the present declaration.431

On the very same day, Berges wrote a notably long letter to Vásquez Sagastume, the
Uruguayan representative in Asunción, explaining the reasons why Paraguay had decided
not to insist on a proposal for mediation or arbitration, given Mitre’s earlier rejection. More
importantly, Berges expressed a profound disappointed in the duplicity of Uruguay’s
diplomacy after receiving confirmation (partly through Mitre’s correspondence with
López) of Montevideo’s parallel negotiations of peace with Buenos Aires. With this letter,
therefore, Paraguay was declaring that it was willing to intervene militarily in defense of
its own interests and principles affected by the foreign intervention in Uruguay, but without
forging an alliance with Montevideo.432
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After the collapse of the negotiations between Silva Paranhos and the Blanco
government in Montevideo, Brazil proceeded with a military intervention in support of
Flores. After the joint forces invaded from the north, and the major coastal cities on the
River Uruguay were attacked with the assistance of the Brazilian navy, Paraguay declared
war on the Empire. The first Paraguayan reaction was the seizure of the Marquês de Olinda,
a Brazilian steamer passing through Asunción on its way to the northern Brazilian province
of Mato Grosso, on November 13, 1864. This vessel was carrying the new governor of that
province, which amplified the effects of the Paraguayan reaction, for it also involved the
imprisonment of a Brazilian high official.433
The taking of the steamer and the declaration of war closed the period of diplomatic
intrigue and negotiation, and set in motion the purely military phase of the war. In its early
stage, the War of the Triple Alliance confronted Paraguay with Brazil—allied with Flores’
Colorado faction. It was, in this regard, characterized by a Paraguayan offensive against
Brazil. After receiving the confirmation of the intervention in Uruguay, López took
advantage of the military buildup which he had so laboriously presided over several years
before taking office. In accordance to what he and his Ministers had communicated to
Argentina and Uruguay before the outbreak of the war, his first strategic decisions were
taken according to Paraguay’s own self-interest—and not in support of an ally. This
became evident when the first Paraguayan offensive was directed north, to Mato Grosso,
and not south-east, towards Uruguay to aid the Blancos fend off the invaders. Mato Grosso
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was an isolated Brazilian province that was practically unreachable via land due to the thick
vegetation and swampy terrain connecting that province with the rest of Brazil. The only
effective way of reaching Mato Gross was via navigation of the River Paraguay, cutting
across Paraguay from south to north [see infra Map 4]. Although the province offered no
real military threat, López opened his military campaign with a signature move, more
symbolic than strategically sound—as it later became quite evident.434
With little resistance, Paraguay was able to capture important military materiel and
assets with which to initiate a second campaign towards Uruguay. During this part of the
offensive, which developed all throughout 1865, several key strategic and tactical mistakes
left Paraguay technically defeated by the end of that year—despite a short series of early
battle victories. On two key land operations, however, officers failed to follow López’s
instructions directed at maintaining the occupied cities, instead of continuing south with
the offensive. The officers, emboldened by the earlier victories, nevertheless embarked on
rushed and improvised attacks that eventually cost Paraguay the majority of its best regular
divisions. Another fateful example was the disastrous naval attacks on the allies’ ships
located to the south, near the Riachuelo River, to the south of Entre Ríos. The Battle of
Riachuelo would leave Paraguay without any naval capacity from there on. Before the end
of the first year of the war, therefore, Paraguay was technically already defeated
militarily.435 With no naval forces left, and his best troops either killed or captured during
the disastrous campaign, López had only two choices: either to surrender, or to continue
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fighting rather irregularly a defensive war of attrition inside Paraguay’s own territory with
the remaining army of recruits and conscripts brought from the farming lands of Paraguay’s
countryside.
The geography of the region, although on López’s side in a potential defensive war,
was unfavorable for an offensive war of his own. Geographical factors also played an
important role in precipitating the entry of Argentina to the war. On its eastward expansion,
for example, López underestimated two aspects: first, that the peculiar geography of the
area would be an obstacle for any offensive campaign—not just that of Paraguay’s
enemies; and second, that the political geography offered an ever more complicated
obstacle, for Paraguay and Uruguay shared no common border. In order to march to
Uruguay to face the Brazilian troops, therefore, the Paraguayan army had to across the
Argentine province of Corrientes in order to be able to invade Uruguay via the Brazilian
state of Rio Grande do Sul [see infra Map 4]. The earlier invasion of Mato Grosso,
combined with the geographical obstacles mentioned above, severely delayed the march of
López’s army towards Uruguay by several months.436 This was a fatal delay which allowed
Flores to defeat the Blancos and assume power before the Paraguayan eastern offensive
was fully in motion.
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MAP 4 –– Paraguay’s borders, circa 1870.

Source: Gabriele Esposito, Armies of the War of the Triple Alliance, 1864–70 (Oxford: Osprey, 2015), p. 4.
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To overcome this political barrier, therefore, Berges wrote to Elizalde requesting
permission to cross Argentine territory—exclusively through Corrientes.437 The Argentine
Minister replied three weeks later with a refusal based on a policy of “strict neutrality”
followed by Mitre.438 Confronted with this problem, López summoned the Paraguayan
Congress and, after a long speech praising the Paraguayan people and its involvement in
the war against Brazil, obtained a declaration of war on Argentina. The official declaration
of war was dispatched immediately, but the Paraguayan troops began to invade Corrientes
days before Buenos Aires received the official letter. This scenario had been only
hypothetically contemplated by Mitre and Elizalde, who thought López was bluffing and
would never plunge his country into a war against both Brazil and Argentina. News of the
invasion of Corrientes and the belated formal declaration of war, therefore, took Buenos
Aires by complete surprise. Evidence of this is the absolute lack of Argentina’s military
and economic preparation before the war, or any reinforcement of the army and navy
capabilities. To offer even a modicum of resistance in Corrientes, Mitre had to assemble
an improvised militia in the matter of days.439
The fact that López requested permission to cross Argentine territory shows that he
tried to avoid making an enemy of Argentina despite the suspicions implanted by Blanco
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agents that Argentina and Brazil were secretly allied. This supports a view of the
Paraguayan leader as an autonomous strategist (not entirely “fooled” by the Blancos) with
some appreciation for the principle of the balance of power, and respect for international
law and diplomatic standards. If the ultimate goal was to break with Paraguay’s traditional
isolation and re-introduce it to regional politics, to earn prestige and elicit international
admiration for Paraguay and himself, then a calculated respect for the norms, rules and
principles of “civilized” international affairs had to be a central piece of that foreign policy
strategy.
Several decades of diplomatic isolation, however, had rendered Paraguay too selfenclosed within its own political and domestic affairs. A poor network of diplomatic
relations abroad and a strictly personalistic system of governance at home had hindered
Paraguayan leader’s ability to “read” the strategic context with more clarity. In this context,
Paraguay’s 1811 fears of an Argentine invasion to reclaim a rogue or lost province were
still vivid in 1865. And Brazil’s aggressive foreign policy towards the Banda Oriental in
the first half of the 19th century was still perceived as active in 1865, despite important
changes to the contrary after 1852. Since the most intense diplomatic rapprochement came
from the desperate Blancos in Uruguay during the years preceding the war, the Paraguayan
leadership had a severely skewed interpretation of the regional dynamics and its
neighboring powers’ true intentions.
After the defeat of the Blancos and the establishment of Flores as the head of
government in Uruguay, Paraguay faced a new situation that had not been contemplated
when it declared war on the Brazilian Empire. In an attempt at preventing the Empire’s
intervention in Uruguay, the country had come to declare war on Brazil, Argentina, and
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now also on Colorado-ruled Uruguay. Since López showed no signs of backing down, in
March 1865 Brazil sent Francisco Octaviano de Almeida Rosa to replace Silva Paranhos
as the special representative in Buenos Aires, to establish a formal alliance with Argentina
against the new Paraguayan threat. The leaders of the three threatened countries signed a
Treaty of Alliance on May 1, 1865, formalizing the Triple Alliance and consolidating the
prior efforts at coordination between Argentina and Brazil, initiated by Elizalde and
Saraiva in Montevideo. It was agreed that the articles and provisions of the Treaty would
remain “secret”—a common practice in the 19th century—until the war was over.440
The Treaty declared that the war was not against Paraguay, as a nation, but against
its government and its leader, Francisco S. López. The allies made a commitment to
continue the war and maintain their military cooperation until López was effectively
removed from power. A highly controversial article stipulated that after Paraguay’s defeat,
the allies would preside over all pending territorial disputes and resolve them in their favor.
This meant that Paraguay’s borders with Argentina to the south would be not on the
Bermejo River, but on the Pilcomayo River. To the south-east, a portion of the province of
Misiones that was disputed by Paraguay, would be consolidated as Argentine. To the north,
Paraguay would concede to Brazil all disputed territories and agreed to a final demarcation
line [see supra Map 4]. These provisions were not known at all by the rest of the
international community.
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Despite the disastrous unfolding of the war for Paraguay, several factors allowed
López to delay his capitulation and redouble Paraguay’s efforts to fight to the bitter end.
The war was not only technically and tactically lost by early 1866, but López’s
commitment not to surrender clashed with the allies’ determination to remove him from
power at all costs, and the war soon turned into a collective massacre with little room for a
peaceful settlement. As the war grew longer and bloodier, López began to crack down on
his own population, including officers, politicians, diplomats, and even members of his
own family, whom he accused of conspiracy and treason.441 Towards the end of the war,
López’s army was making use of children and the elderly, and implementing all kinds of
irregular desperate tactics in defense of Paraguay’s territory.442
Two additional factors that help illuminate additional episodes of restraint took
place when the war was becoming obviously ruinous for Paraguay, towards the end of the
year 1865 and the beginning of 1866. One important factor was the inability of the allies
to achieve a swift and decisive military victory against López. Battles were becoming
increasingly more sporadic, gruesome, and intense. As the Paraguayan offensive of 1864–
1865 turned into a defensive action by mid-1866, after losing its naval power, the allied
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forces commanded by Mitre brought the war to Paraguay’s own territory—eventually
capturing the capital, Asunción, in 1869. However, the long forced marches and brutal
battles on Paraguay’s hostile and largely uncharted terrain gave López multiple
opportunities to exploit strategic and political factors in Paraguay’s favor. This, however,
only helped prolong the inevitable. From mid-1866 until the very end of the conflict in
March 1870, the war transformed into a sequence of intense battles separated by severalmonths-long pauses in between them. The allies kept on making military progress, but only
at the expense of enormous material and human costs both in terms of domestic
recruitment, military provisions, as well as economic and logistical issues. The increasingly
oppressive recruitment tactics, in particular, sparked a growing domestic opposition to the
war in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, and created severe public-opinion pressure to end
the war by whatever means possible.443
In this second stage of the war (1866–1870), the Paraguayan offensive turned into
a desperate war of survival. Of the multiple military milestones of this period, three stand
out for the study of restraint and international society proposed here. The first element
refers to a failed attempt at negotiating a peace agreement between López and the allies in
September 1866. The second element points to the treatment of prisoners as the war grew
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in intensity and ferocity. A last element is the allies’ occupation of the Paraguayan capital,
Asunción, and the effects generated by the sacking of the city by Brazilian troops.
In relation to the first element, in mid-September 1866, a new opportunity for
dialogue and peace became possible after a major battle in Curuzú, where the allies had
achieved an important victory but failed to press home their advantage. The next battle was
going to be an assault on the Paraguayan fortified outpost of Curupaity. In order to gain
time for the engineers to finish the construction of a trench and prepare the field, López
wrote a letter to Mitre asking for a personal meeting. News about this meeting filled the
allied camp with hopes of a potential Paraguayan surrender. However, the private
conference between the two Generals was met with suspicion by Flores and the other
Brazilian commanders who put little faith in López’s true intentions to negotiate. The
conference gave an opportunity for both leaders to exchange formal compliments and
expressions of a shared desire to bring the war to an expedient end. They also discussed
the treatment of each side’s prisoners. “My presence here,” said López, “is explained by
the events and duties that the situation imposes on those who lead the destinies of people
and are responsible for their fate.” And then added:
I have made war with Brazil because I did not believe that that nation would stop after its
domination of Uruguay, and that it was a threat to us all. […] I have made war with the
government of Argentina because I considered it tied to the Brazilian one in the Uruguayan
question. I believe that the blood spilled so far is enough to consider easing the offense by
which each one of the belligerents thought itself offended and I consider that this terrible
war can be brought to an end, establishing the conditions for a solid, enduring, and
honorable, peace for all.444

444
Quoted in Julio C. Cháves, La conferencia de Yataity–Corá (Buenos Aires: Biblioteca Histórica
Paraguaya de Cultura Popular, Vol. 2, 1958), p. 22.

276

Mitre’s reply highlighted similar hopes for a prompt end to the war, but also reminded
López that the provisions of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance made it sine qua non that he
was removed from office in order for them to consider the war finished. This point forced
López to declare that the conditions of that treaty of alliance were “unacceptable” to him.445
This historic meeting between the two leaders ended with Mitre’s reassurance that he
would consult with the other members of the Triple Alliance, for he could not take final
decisions on such an important matter on his own. Mitre told López that, while this
consultation takes place, “military actions will continue in full force.” The allied
consultation took place between Mitre, the Brazilian generals, and Flores, who had refused
to meet with López, but Mitre’s reply was delayed for a day. Then, heavy rain postponed
military operations for three more days, giving López the exact extra time needed to finish
the trenches.446 The stipulations of the Treaty prohibited any single ally to negotiate peace
with Paraguay separately, so Mitre’s hands were tied due to Brazil’s adamant refusal to
engage in any dialogue with López.447 In this unfortunate manner, the only serious attempt
by López to negotiate a peaceful negotiated end to the war—which was about to turn brutal
for Paraguay—was wasted by the stubborn resistance of Brazil and Uruguay.
The second element concerns the treatment of prisoners of war. Considering the
high number of casualties produced during the war, it is important to explore other aspects
that escape the merely diplomatic level, but which are still linked to how each side in the
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war conceived of the boundaries between “civilization” and “barbarism,” on one hand, and
the realities of war itself, on the other. The question of the treatment of prisoners during
the War of the Triple Alliance offers a partial window into this important phenomenon.
In 1860s South America, the relation between politics and violence was rapidly
changing. At the same time as the war against Paraguay was in full swing, important new
sensibilities about interpersonal and political violence were beginning to develop in
society, forcing through literary critique, the printed press, and increasing popular
involvement in political affairs, a corresponding change in how countries behaved towards
one another during war.448
One of the main factors propelling this change was the rapid rate of technological
innovation during the second half of the 19th century. The amplified range of brutality,
suffering, and pain that technological weaponry made possible, amplified the always
gruesome components of large-scale war. While some technological improvements were
prima facie more inert, such as Brazil’s test of observation balloons or Paraguay’s
incorporation of the telegraph, others had a much more direct impact.449 The inclusion of
modern artillery, high-caliber rounds of munition, and the implementation of steampowered vessels and engines, among other innovations applied to warfare, created killing
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fields of unprecedented magnitude, never-before experienced by political and military
leaders forged in the smaller-scale civil and frontier wars against caudillos and indigenous
populations. Important for communication across vast distances and large contingencies of
soldiers, the combination of the printed press and the telegraph played a key role as a
battleground of its own between the leading elites and their critics over the influence of the
public discourse and opinion. By incorporating the newest technological innovations, the
press became an important legitimizing force of official narratives that praised or opposed
the development of the war and those conducting it. This, as well, made the horrors of the
frontline more palpable and real for the civilians in the main urban centers of each
belligerent country, and beyond.450
A related factor behind the change in sensibilities in the 1860s was the advent of
three international developments: the Lieber Code, signed by the President Abraham
Lincoln in 1863 as a set of regulations for the soldiers of the United States to respect during
combat; the creation of the Red Cross in Europe; and the celebration of the first Geneva
Convention of 1864, which created new standards for the amelioration of the condition and
treatment of the wounded on the field. Given the simultaneity of these developments, they
did not have a serious impact on the conduct of the War of the Triple Alliance itself.
Regarding the treatment of prisoners, however, individual leaders and officers on the
battlefield did adjust their behavior on multiple occasions to adhere to self-imposed
standards of conduct in situations of enemy surrender or capture. Despite the presence of
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these incipient global standards, South American states loosely invoked or interpreted these
norms on a case-by-case basis, in reference to a generic concept of “the laws of war” that
was believed to separate “civilized” behavior from “barbarism.”451 Most of these criteria
were not entirely adopted until much later in the 19th century. In Argentina, for example,
the Red Cross was created in 1880, during a short-lived civil war in Buenos Aires. This
was its first appearance in the entire region.452
Although the issue of the treatment of prisoners of war is one of the most underexplored aspects of the Paraguayan War, the few existing studies that address the issue
offer brief or partial accounts that focus only on the most brutal or inhumane episodes of
the treatment of prisoners.453 For the standards of the time, however, where only a few and
incipient global international frames of legal reference existed and no relevant internal
army regulations or codes of conduct were available, there were certain remarkable
displays of self-restraint. Although manifested on an ad hoc basis, the type of treatment of
the prisoners of war usually relied on the personal and professional criterion of the officer
in command at the time. It was also important whether the prisoners had surrendered or
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had been captured after a bitter confrontation.454 A large number of prisoners, moreover,
were often faced with the difficult choice presented by the Allies: either to remain in chains
and be relocated to prisons back in Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, or Montevideo; or join
the ranks of the Allies and earn their freedom by fighting against López. 455 The most
infamous case of this type of “forced re-enlistment” was that of the Uruguayan commander,
León de Palleja, although the Brazilian generals were also known for refilling their ranks
with prisoners of war, who were treated like slaves.456 The Argentine army, unlike any of
the other allies, had among its divisions a “Paraguayan Legion” formed by Paraguayan
citizens exiled in Buenos Aires who, despite Mitre’s reluctance, wanted to be part of the
war against López. According to them, it was not a war against their own country, but
against a brutal dictator and a tyrant. In this context, Mitre had a clear policy of accepting
re-enlistments only for those who volunteered to join the Paraguayan division and fight
alongside their fellow nationals.
Perhaps the most revealing aspect of the treatment of prisoners was the way in
which the belligerents treated the wounded. This was a salient aspect that the participants
themselves saw as “civilized” behavior. Although Brazil was a slaving Empire and
Argentina practiced forced enlistment tactics in its interior provinces—well characterized
in José Hernández’s gaucho epic457—the Paraguay of López also exercised brutal tactics
454
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against anyone who was even minimally suspected of opposing López’s rule.458 In the
course of the war, however, Mitre and López frequently exchanged letters on the issue of
the treatment of prisoners and the wounded that shed further light on the matter. In a
confidential correspondence with Mitre, for example, Elizalde was clear about the
importance of behaving according to all considerations of law on the subject of prisoners
and their optional re-enlistment.459 And in conversation with Juan A. Gelly y Obes, the
acting Vice-President, Mitre expressed his personal refusal to use prisoners to fight against
their own motherland, given that, apart from violating principles of common laws of
nations, the desertion rates would be enormous. Brazil, for its part, was well-known for
“stealing” prisoners, officers, and runaway slaves, and reusing them in their offensives
against the enemy. On the contrary, Mitre saw with great enthusiasm the reincorporation
of the Paraguayan prisoners to suburban life in Buenos Aires where, he thought, they
would make excellent citizens who, after enjoying the advantages of progress, would
voluntarily remain in Buenos Aires after the war.460
On November 20, 1865, on the eve of the allied attack on the Paraguayan fortress
of Humaitá, López and Mitre exchanged an important set of letters about the need to
“regularize” and ameliorate “the evils of war.” López wrote demanding Mitre’s reciprocity
in these matters towards the Paraguayan prisoners of war and the wounded, or otherwise
he would not extend the same privileges and rights to the allied prisoners under his control:
In the unavoidable necessity in which nations and their governments find themselves,
sometimes, to settle by force of arms the questions that affect their vital interests, war has
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broken out between this Republic and the states whose armies you command. In such cases,
it is of general and practical use among civilized nations to attenuate the evils of war by
our own laws, stripping it of the acts of cruelty and barbarism that disgrace Humanity, and
that stigmatize like an indelible stain the leaders who order, authorize, protect or tolerate
them […]. Thus informed, and in conscience of such duties, one of my first concerns was
to order the observance of all considerations with which the prisoners of any class
whatsoever were treated and kept with respect in line with their ranks; and in effect they
have enjoyed of all possible commodities and even the relative freedom of their position
and conduct. […] I would like to believe, in this first international war, as Your Excellency
would notify to your subordinates, that a prisoner of war does not cease to be a citizen of
his own nation […] and that, in surrendering, he stops being an enemy.461

Mitre replied five days later, agreeing on the main premises regarding the necessity of
regulating war, but also pointing out that López’s impression about how the Allies treated
the prisoners of war was an exaggeration. After denouncing Paraguay’s assault on
Argentine territory without a proper declaration of war as an act of “piracy,” Mitre
enumerated a long list of “atrocities” and “barbaric acts” performed by the Paraguayan
troops after invading Corrientes. Mitre documented these claims by referencing the
personal diary of the Paraguayan Commander Estigarribia himself, acquired after his
capture. Far from treating the Paraguayan prisoners with cruelty and inhumanity, Mitre
argued, the prisoners and the wounded were treated with benevolence and pity, given their
poor physical condition and military equipment provided by the government of
Paraguay.462
These written jousts between Mitre and López, however, stopped once the course
of the war became more protracted and costlier. Since the end of 1865, until the very end
of the conflict, the war grew in intensity and ferocity, and all respect for “civilized” and
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honorable behavior became increasingly more difficult to maintain by the officers on the
battlefield. The bloodier the battle, the harsher the treatment of the wounded and the
prisoners became. Towards the end of the war, in effect, the troops of all the belligerents
made a routine out of killing the wounded laying on the fields of battle.
One last aspect of this progressive tension between exercising restraint in an
increasingly “total war” became evident when the allied troops finally overcame the
Fortress of Humaitá. Besieged by the Allies on November 2, 1865, and surrendered on July
25, 1868, the road to Asunción was then open. Since the crumbling Paraguayan army
followed López to the mountains in the north-west of the country, where they made their
very last stand, the capital city was abandoned without any resistance. The occupation of
Asunción, however, showed one of the ugliest sides of the war yet, as Brazilian troops
ransacked and pillaged the city, stealing furniture and other private items of value, and
harassing the few remaining citizens (mostly women) who had been left behind. The
Brazilian troops, given the rushed abandonment of the city by López’s troops, were able to
capture the entire official archives and libraries, which were kept as trophies of war until
1982, when part of the surviving original documentation was returned.
Previewing such a grotesque spectacle, the leader of the Argentine forces, Emilio
Mitre, 463 decided not to be part of the offensive that captured the Paraguayan capital,
leaving this “honor” solely to the Brazilian troops. This far-sightedness earned the young
Argentine commander the congratulations of the new President, Domingo F. Sarmiento. In
a private letter to him, Sarmiento said: “I very much applaud your extremely prudent
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determination of not entering Asunción, leaving it to the Brazilian soldiery to pillage at
will. It is not against the law of nations for the victor to take the abandoned property of the
enemy. Civilization, however, condemns such barbarities. This war will take colossal
proportions in history and it is good that our name remains clean of all reproach.”464

Institutionalizing a “Civilized” South American Order
The concern of leaders, such as Sarmiento, with the future judgement of history was not
entirely rhetorical, but also based on real political consequences. During the war, for
example, the signing of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance (May 1, 1865) laid out a set of
clear objectives for the allies which, at the time, were kept secret. Public knowledge about
these objectives would not only have damaged their strategic achievement by providing
López some crucial information about the enemy’s intentions, but would have also opened
up the content of the Treaty objectives for discussion by other interested states, such as the
four allies in the Pacific, or even the United States. It is for these reasons that the Triple
Alliance was only interested in communicating some, but not all, of their war aims. The
idea of making war against Paraguay’s government, yet not against its people, was just one
of those objectives widely and proudly publicized in Buenos Aires, Río de Janeiro, and
Montevideo. It was important for the legitimacy of the allies’ cause to secure the approval
of the entire world, supported by the general impression that this was a war fought
reluctantly by the allies.
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On one occasion, the British chargé d’affaires in Montevideo, William G. Lettsom,
asked Carlos de Castro, the Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs, about the veracity of
the rumors saying that the allies were going to partition Paraguay territorially after the war
“like a South American Poland.” To assuage Lettsom’s curiosity, Castro showed him a
copy of the treaty. When Lettsom sent a transcript to Lord John Russell, the British Prime
Minister in the Chamber of Commons, he asked him to honor the trust deposited on him
by Castro by not making the Treaty public. 465 Lord Russell, in a calculated act of
indiscretion that deeply offended the allies, decided to publish the entire text of the Treaty
in one of the internal Parliamentary “Blue Books” in March 1866—almost exactly a year
after the signing of the Treaty. A London newspaper picked it up soon afterwards, and a
copy of the bulletin found its way back to Bueno Aires, where it was published by a proParaguay newspaper in May. The international public opinion expressed its outcry and
condemnation, for up to that point the allies were commonly seen as the aggrieved parties,
reacting to the Paraguayan “tyrant” and his armed invasion of the allies’ territories. The
Treaty’s articles dealing with Paraguay’s post-war territorial arrangement, in particular,
opened up a serious criticism of the ulterior objectives of Brazil and Argentina regarding
the integrity and autonomy of Paraguay as a sovereign nation.466 This also triggered the
members of the Quadruple Alliance to write Buenos Aires, Río de Janeiro, and
Montevideo, demanding explanations for the content of those articles.467
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The revelation of the treaty provisions not only turned domestic and international
public opinion drastically against the leaders of the three allied powers, but also showed an
unexpected diplomatic move by Great Britain, which up to that point had only been
interested in joint mediations and the protection of the status quo in the River Plate area
favorable to its commercial interests in the region. With this move, the British Empire
severely damaged the image and reputation of the three allies and made their achievement
of victory even more difficult. The Paraguayan citizens, and the troops in particular, found
renewed impetus to keep fighting, offering a stubborn—quasi suicidal—resistance.468 This
also showed to the leaders of the allied powers that acting according to the “civilized”
standards of the time was not only relevant for what future historians and observers would
eventually think of the war and the conduct of those who fought it, but it also carried real
and more palpable consequences for their more immediate context. In other words, it was
in the short-, as well as in the long-term interest of each state to act under a legitimizing
framework that was accepted by everyone—including the enemy.
The consequences of winning the war, therefore, became doubly important for the
allies. In Brazil, the protracted conflict demonstrated all the cracks in the social and
political structure of the Empire, which still rested on slavery. The impact of the war was
most strongly felt in the lower social strata, who either semi-voluntarily or by force,
participated in the long campaign against López.469 After Francisco S. López’s death in
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Cerro Corá on March 1, 1870, the Brazilian army began to play a central role in the
progressive anti-slavery Liberalization of the Brazilian society as a whole, which soon
translated in popular uprisings and a political crisis that eventually toppled the Monarchy
in 1889.470
In Argentina, the Liberal party fractured. The faction led by Mitre faced severe
criticism from the press and the society in general as the war grew more and more
unpopular and costly. In the 1868 presidential elections, the political formula led by
Elizalde lost to Sarmiento, who assumed the presidency for the remainder of the war. This
demonstrated a split inside the Liberal porteño leadership between the old guard of former
moderate caudillos, led by Mitre, and a newer generation of rising middle-class
businessmen, lawyers and doctors who wanted to bring the war to an end as quickly as
possible. Mitre and Elizalde, although victorious on the battlefield, lost their powerbase at
home due to the widespread unpopularity of the war and the public condemnation of the
treaty provisions regarding post-war Paraguay.471 Part of the outrage against the Mitre–
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Elizalde faction was motivated by a disapproval of Elizalde’s “friendship with the Empire.”
Unlike the case of Brazil, Mitre’s war efforts at least helped professionalize the army,
initiated a modernization of the navy, and helped forge a “national” image and identity
previously hindered by petty “party politics” and parochial caudillo mentality.472
During the course of the war, therefore, South American political elites and
decision-makers had to grapple with a multifaceted set of challenges that interconnected
the external and internal fronts with their countries’ political-party and Congressional
dynamics. These were new challenges that Brazilian and Argentine elites handled with
difficulty, achieving success in some areas, while being flatly defeated in others.
Particularly on the international front, South American states were able to make substantial
progress in the 1860s, advancing on their cooperation in projects such as the Congress of
Lima of 1864, and successfully repelling the encroachments of Spain and other European
powers in the 1850s and 1860s. The main common source of regional trouble, however,
continued to be the “domestic front.” This was the case in Chile, but most notably in
Bolivia, Uruguay, Peru, Venezuela and Colombia. In the case of Brazil and Argentina, the
Paraguayan War created a new set of priorities which also elevated their policy to a higher
strategic plane.473 Having substantially “pacified” their domestic fronts after the war, and
with a change in leadership in Argentina, their traditional strategic rivalry soon resumed
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over the application of the provisions of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance and the
arrangement of a new government in post-war Paraguay. Lacking regional, or even
hemispheric, formal institutional frameworks for doing so, the two countries had no other
realistic option but to rely on the now widely unpopular ad hoc agreement signed in May
1, 1865.
Prior to assuming the presidency in Argentina, Sarmiento had accepted a diplomatic
mission to the United States late in 1863. Since Sarmiento would pass through Chile and
Peru on his way to Washington, Mitre and Elizalde planned to have him remain in Santiago
and Lima for some months as a special representative, and to participate “as an observer”
in the Lima Congress of 1864. For several decades, Argentina had no permanent diplomatic
representative in any country on the Pacific, which made Sarmiento’s mission to these two
countries important for establishing a good communication between both sides of the
region. Upon arrival in Santiago, Sarmiento was caught by surprise by the news of Pinzón’s
seizure of the Chincha Islands, as his mission was then substantially altered by this act of
aggression against Peru.474
Since the occupation occurred on April 14, 1864, Mitre and Elizalde were still
hopeful about the peaceful resolution of the Uruguayan crisis. With this in mind, they
instructed Sarmiento not to intervene in the Lima Congress as a plenipotentiary, and act
simply as an observer—denying him the official credentials to be accepted as a delegate in
the Lima Congress. Elizalde wanted to maintain Mitre’s firm conviction in a foreign policy
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of “strict neutrality” in all regional affairs while the Argentine domestic front remained
convulsed. Mitre’s strategy tried to solve the domestic front first before implicating the
country in any regional affair or association—and much less one that could potentially lead
to a war with Spain(!).475
A polemic then emerged between Sarmiento, an unabashed “Americanist” who
wanted to participate more actively in the Lima Congress, and the more prudent Mitre–
Elizalde approach.476 This also created an important rift in Argentina’s foreign policy that
sent mixed signals to the countries in the Pacific. Despite Elizalde’s constraining
instructions, Sarmiento gave public speeches and made personal declarations in Santiago
and Lima which complicated Elizalde’s “pampa diplomacy” in the River Plate area. After
receiving an official admonishment by Elizalde, Sarmiento did tone down his Americanist
rhetoric, but nevertheless continued advocating for a more “solidaristic” role for Argentina
than the one originally intended by Mitre.477
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Given Brazil’s monarchical regime, neither Chile nor Peru held much hopes for a
serious Brazilian commitment in favor of the Pacific republics or against a fellow
monarchy, Spain. 478 Their more serious aspirations, therefore, sought Argentina’s
adherence to the Quadruple Alliance and a full participation in the Lima Congress. Mitre,
however, consistently refused to involve Argentina in the Spanish question and proposed,
instead, to help Chile and Peru solve the affair on their own. Mitre’s policy was, at first,
misunderstood by the Chilean and Peruvian elite as a betrayal of “the American cause” by
not only refusing to join the fight against Spain, but also allying with the Brazilian Empire
against a fellow republic. To quell similar criticisms by the Argentine Congress itself, Mitre
justified his policy by famously proclaiming: “Argentine first and foremost, my
government will not stop being American and a good neighbor.”479
It is important to point out that, although the Lima Congress was invoked in early
1864 by Peru, and began its functions later that year, neither the Uruguayan nor the
Argentine leadership saw in it an opportunity to seek regional or international support of
any kind. Unlike Peru, which tried to use this regional congress to institutionalize a
principle of “Americanist solidarity” against European encroachment, the countries of the
Atlantic developed a different perspective which, from a purely “Americanist” standpoint,
would come to be seen as “defeatist,” subservient to foreign imperialism, and antiAmerican. With time, however, the principles of foreign policy so consistently pursued by
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Mitre and brilliantly executed by Elizalde would come to be accepted all across the
American continent, before the end of the century, as the standard for sustaining a regional
society of states based on a mutual respect for each other’s autonomy and independence.
In this sense, the more utopian aspirations of unity and “brotherhood” of Americanists like
Sarmiento, Lastarria, Alberdi, Covarrubias, or Vicuña Mackenna, who for most of the 19th
century propelled congress-styled diplomatic collaboration among South American states,
would give way to more pragmatic multilateral conferences from 1889 to 1942.480 In 1948,
the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS) would finally crown this second
perspective as the most accepted continental institutional framework in the Americas.
Mitre’s foreign policy was the epitome of a restrained, responsible, and measured
strategy. Quite understandably, it was a frustrating strategy for the Americanists, for in
their eyes it represented the death of a glorious post-colonial potential of continental unity.
However, unlike Francisco S. López, who plunged Paraguay into an unnecessary war with
all of its neighbors, or Joaquín Pérez and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Covarrubias, who
recklessly dragged Chile into a war with a European power without even a basic navy or
military preparations, and which led to the bombardment of its main commercial port of
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Valparaíso, Mitre’s prudent policy of “strict neutrality” tied the pacification of Argentina’s
chronically unstable domestic front with the avoidance of costly commitments on the
external front. As Eduardo Cavieres eloquently put it, amidst an uncertain climate of
apparent generalized conflict in the region, and a war with Paraguay, “the Argentine
government […] rested on a guessing game and on strategies considered effective for
maintaining multiple balances with the rest of the states that were not involved in the
war.”481 In conclusion, the policy of Argentina in the 1860s, and in different measure also
those of Uruguay and Brazil, generated not just a powerful wear-and-tear effect to the
Americanist thought of a “Latin-American solidarity,” then led by Chile, but also destroyed
and fractured it for good.482
The reaction that the Argentine government gave to the Peruvian request in 1862
to join the Continental Treaty of 1856,483 for example, perfectly illustrates the coherence
and substance of a policy of “pragmatic solidarity” properly understood and practiced by
Mitre and Elizalde, as well as by the Brazilian Empire under the prudent diplomatic hand
of the Barão do Rio Branco. In the 1850s, for example, a wave of aggressions by foreign
powers had put all Latin American states on alert.484 Before the Lima Congress of 1864,
therefore, a Continental Congress was summoned in Santiago de Chile to coordinate a
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common reaction by the countries of the South Pacific.485 Unlike the previous meetings in
1826 (Panama) and 1848 (Lima), or even the Lima Congress of 1864 itself, the Santiago
congress contemplated a unique anti-monarchical clause in its main provisions, which also
intended to exclude the United States.
In reaction to the Peruvian invitation, Elizalde brilliantly summarized the core
principles that would govern Argentina’s policy for decades. After rejecting the invitation,
Elizalde explained that the Argentine Government did not have reasons to admit the
existence of a general threat to America’s independence, after the events of Santo Domingo
and Mexico, that would justify the unification of the policies and principles of all the
republics of the continent. Moreover, Elizalde doubted that the means suggested to fend
off such a threat were not sufficient. “Independent America,” he added, “is a political entity
that does not exist, nor is it possible to construct it by diplomatic combination. America
contains independent nations, with needs and means of self-government, that can never
form a single political entity.” And then concluded: “Nature and events have divided it and
the efforts of diplomacy are sterile to countervene the existence of those nationalities, with
all the forced consequences that derive from them.486
In reaction to the issue of the monarchical type of government and the threat of
foreign powers on the continent, moreover, Elizalde counterargued that the European
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monarchies were linked commercially and culturally, by bonds of blood, that constituted
the economic basis of their power. In this context, the only potential threat that could ever
come from them was in the form of a League of Monarchies, which in any case would not
be able to oppose the entire American continent. “If the nations of Europe ever intended
any injustice against the American governments, these were isolated events that do not
constitute a policy, and the American governments, if they have been subjected to them
[the injustices], it has always been because of the state in which they were due to their own
civil wars. […] There is no antagonist European element of an American element.”487

The Consolidation of South America’s Pragmatic Solidarity
When analyzing the element of “solidarity” in the 1860s, therefore, it is important to
consider two key factors. One factor is the role that the War of the Triple Alliance played
in incentivizing a peculiar type of collaboration and understanding between Brazil and
Argentina that overcame more traditional concerns with regime type, past rivalry
dynamics, and pure power-political competition. This “strategic awakening” to the
unavoidability of interlocking common interests in the River Plate area came to the fore
most visibly in the post-war negotiations between Argentina and Brazil over defeated
Paraguay. A second factor is the role that the United States played towards the end of the
conflict, particularly through its diplomatic agents in Asunción and Buenos Aires. Unlike
in the Guano War, the United States tried to officially mediate in the war motivated, not
only by purely commercial interests, but also by a concern for reasserting “republican
values” in the continent (i.e., in defense of Paraguay). A third, and extremely relevant
487
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factor, was the diplomatic efforts by the members of the Quadruple Alliance in the Pacific
to intervene diplomatically to stop the war and add the politico-military assets of the Triple
Alliance to the “common front” erected against Spain in the Pacific. The relative success
of the first factor, and the resounding failure of the other two, helps illustrate the strength
of the “pragmatic” component of inter-state solidarity in South America’s incipient society
of states in the mid-1860s.
After the defeat of López, the provisions of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance entered
into effect. Since Brazil had been at the center of the last stage of the war effort, taking
Asunción and eliminating López’s last pockets of resistance, it had a more favorable
position over Argentina in influencing post-war developments in Paraguay. Between 1869
and 1871, therefore, negotiations between the victorious powers began with an almost
insignificant role for Uruguay, which would eventually support Brazil’s position. Brazil
commissioned its most experienced diplomat, Silva Paranhos, who faced a new cabinet in
Argentina in the Sarmiento administration.488 The new government in Argentina made a
series of strategic mistakes which empowered Brazil’s grip over the new Paraguayan
Liberal elites.
First, Sarmiento designated a young and relatively inexperienced Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Mariano Varela, who adopted a principled position that claimed “victory
does not grant rights.” The idea behind this diplomatic maxim was to turn Sarmiento’s
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congratulatory note for Emilio Mitre on the sacking of Asunción into a full foreign policy
strategy. If successful, Sarmiento would have created a new set of costs for Brazil—costs
of a “moral” nature—which in turn would have made Brazil’s occupation of Paraguay
unbearable. According to Bartolomé Mitre and Rufino de Elizalde, who became active
critics of this new foreign policy approach, the “Varela Doctrine” meant that all the blood
and treasure spent by Argentina to win the war would now be wasted away, enhancing,
instead of constraining, Brazil’s freedom of maneuver in Paraguay.489
The new Argentine policy facilitated Silva Paranhos job in Asunción.490 With the
support of Uruguay, Brazil proceeded to negotiate separately a series of treaties with
Paraguay, which gave way to the formation of a new government. This raised serious
concerns in Buenos Aires about the violation of one of the Treaty articles regarding the
impossibility of negotiating separately with the enemy. Varela naively thought that by
accepting the composition of the new Paraguayan government while postponing a
discussion with Brazil about the conditions for peace, he would save the spirit of the
alliance with Brazil. However, with the ensuing wave of internal criticism in Argentina,
Varela was soon forced to step down, being replaced by Carlos Tejedor.491
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With a new reality consolidated in Paraguay, Tejedor tried to mend the strategic
blunders of his predecessor by negotiating with Paraguay the issue of common borders.
But instead of negotiating these matter with Brazil directly, as originally stipulated in the
Treaty, Argentina would now have to negotiate with a newly formed Paraguayan
government that worked under the influence of Brazil. Although not entirely a “puppet”
regime, the Paraguayan government would, at least, be able to maintain a stronger
opposition to any Argentine demands due to Brazil’s underlying support.
The tensions between Brazil and Argentina, therefore, led to a momentary breakup
of the Triple Alliance in 1871, which was propelled in part by Tejedor’s insistence in
claiming the entire western area of Chaco in Paraguay. The rumors of a severe
confrontation, and possibly war, between Argentina and the Empire prompted Sarmiento
to reconsider his radical departure from Mitre’s foreign policy of “strict neutrality” and
pragmatic rapprochement with Brazil. Accepting his predecessor’s view on the matter,
Sarmiento reversed back to Mitre’s original strategy and commissioned him personally in
a “special mission” to Asunción and Río de Janeiro to help recompose the relation with
Brazil and negotiate a new treaty for Paraguay’s new borders with Argentina.492
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Apart from the intricacies of the negotiations themselves, two other elements stand
out in this period. First, Paraguay survived as an independent state after the war, for its
territory was not “partitioned,” as many had interpreted from the Treaty’s text. As the
defeated side in the war, Paraguay did suffer some territorial losses. These were, however,
“disputed” territories that had never been consistently under Paraguayan control before.
On this matter, therefore, it is quite revealing that despite the catastrophic defeat in the war
against the Triple Alliance, Paraguay was not obliterated from the map. The allies never
made “a South American Poland” of it, as many critics had feared. While Argentina and
Brazil managed to settle (in their favor) all their border and territorial issues with Paraguay,
one region remained open to future contention: the Chaco Boreal region between Paraguay
and Bolivia. The persistent lack of solution for this question later became a core source of
controversy that led to the last major armed conflict in the Americas: the Chaco War (1932–
1935) between Paraguay and Bolivia.
A second element worthy of attention is the fact that both occupying countries in
time pardoned Paraguay’s war reparations and debts, thus easing Paraguay’s financial
burdens in its post-war reconstruction. This was an important gesture of self-restraint by
the allies who, motivated by a common interest in pacifying the area, needed the new
Paraguay to establish a stable domestic order that would put an end to the original causes
of the war. For Paraguay, now led by a new generation of politicians that had been in exile
for long periods of time, the country presented a very complex scenario. Severely depopulated, militarily occupied, and with a barren economy, the tensions between Argentina
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and Brazil were used instrumentally in their favor, pitting one power against the other, and
gaining concessions from both. The very fact of Paraguay’s survival after the war as an
independent country, however, shows the extent of the allies’ policy of self-restraint in
victory.
In so far as the intended participation by the United States as a mediator during the
last phases of the war, it is quite telling that not only the diplomatic effort by the U.S. failed,
but most importantly that it was flatly rejected by the South American leaders—including
Francisco S. López(!). The details of how the offer of mediation was extended, and of how
it was rebuffed, points towards the role of a regional understanding, shared by all South
American leaders, who proposed “South American solutions” for “South American
problems.” The existence of this common sentiment regarding the illegitimacy of the
United States’ involvement in the region—even when advocating peace—shows
something eminently distinctive about the presence of a consolidating regional society of
states at the time.
The involvement of the U.S. in the war, as in the late and incipient mediation efforts
during the Guano War, took place in a problematic domestic context marked by the end of
its civil war. Despite this important domestic constraint on the conduct of its foreign affairs,
the U.S. showed a remarkable interest in bringing about peace in this southern, and rather
remote, region of the continent. The Lincoln administration was not yet ready for a full
engagement in the form of a mediation, but nevertheless instructed the Secretary of State
to engage in subtle diplomacy, rather than exert an overt or forceful persuasion for the
achievement of a peaceful resolution of the war. Under these instructions, Secretary of
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State, William H. Seward, conceived a type of posture that would guarantee the U.S. a
position of “stewardship” rather than “guardianship” over the continent.493
In this context, the official policy of the U.S. towards the War of the Triple Alliance
was one of strict neutrality for almost the entire duration of the conflict. In several
communications with the U.S. Minister in Asunción, Charles A. Washburn, Seward
insisted that although the Paraguayan defeat could be anticipated, the war was an
unfortunate event from which the U.S. should remain detached but vigilant.494 But as the
war progressed, and Paraguay entered into a purely defensive mode, the pressures to
present a U.S. mediation became stronger—mainly due to the increasingly impatient
reports from ministers Washburn and Webb in Paraguay and Brazil, respectively. The
diplomats commissioned to the River Plate, unlike cabinet members located in
Washington, had a more intimate knowledge of the events and were urging the Department
of State to adopt a more engaged policy before other powers, such as France or Great
Britain, could step in and act as peace brokers. In other words, the war was quickly
becoming not only an issue of intra-regional order and peace, but also a matter of principle
for the reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine itself after the end of the U.S. civil war.
To reconcile these complex interests, Seward decided to adopt two main policies.
First, he instructed ministers Washburn (in Paraguay), J. Watson Webb (in Brazil), and
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Alexander Asboth (in Argentina) “to insist” on the acceptance of a U.S. mediation.495 And
second, Seward approached Brazil by offering the U.S.’ unconditional support in the war
in exchange for the acceptance and application of several foreign-policy principles aligned
with the U.S. This clever double-play was later also extended to Argentina, with whom the
U.S. indicated the value of a regional protection of all republican governments. In this
intricate diplomatic approach, therefore, the U.S. tried to entice all the parties on the basis
of different interests and values, with the ulterior objective of bringing about an end to the
war. In communication with Seward, the American representative in Brazil stated:
If the United States do not intervene by the offer of mediation, England and France most
assuredly will from necessity do so. And against such friendly interference by them we of
course could not object. Under existing circumstances, then, and where the “Monroe
doctrine” has been virtually admitted by the withdrawal of the French troops from Mexico,
it does appear to me that the United States, without setting up any claim in the premises,
should indirectly assume that it is her right to interpose in all international conflicts on this
continent to the full extent that interposition from other powers is admissible. We should
impress all the American governments with a conviction that it is alike their interest and
their duty to look to the United States for protection and advice; protection from European
interference, and friendly council and advice in regard to difficulties with their neighbors.
I therefore earnestly recommend that at the earliest possible moment I be authorized to
tender to Brazil and her lies, the republics of Argentine and Uruguay, our good offices and
friendly interposition in the settlement of all pending questions between them and
Paraguay.496

Despite this initial rapprochement, Seward’s strategy ultimately fell apart as the South
American nations felt manipulated and unduly pressured, and thus resented the U.S.
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involvement on otherwise “strictly South American matters.”497 Apart from the two core
principles of reasserting the Monroe Doctrine and reestablishing regional order and peace,
South American nations came to resent a third implicit principle of U.S. diplomacy after
the end of its civil war: its search for prestige and leadership.498 The tension was now
evident, between a unilateral interpretation and application of the Monroe Doctrine by the
U.S., and a more multilateral and shared interpretation by the more assertive South
American nations, like Chile, Argentina, or Brazil.
The critical break occurred when the U.S. insisted that the members of the Triple
Alliance accept its mediation took a rather “undiplomatic” turn, escalating into bitter
exchanges between the U.S. ministers and different South American ministers of foreign
affairs. 499 Paraguay itself, under López’s rule, was also unimpressed by U.S. offers of
mediation, rejecting every opportunity presented by Washburn and his successor, Martin
T. McMahon, who arrived in Asunción in November, 1868.500 According to López, the
U.S. had historically done nothing truly substantial to aid Paraguay. 501 However, the
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overall official position was to consider the U.S. as “a friend” of Paraguay. McMahon,
deepened even further these superficial expressions of friendship given the Minister’s Irish
background and his fervent defense of republicanism—a system of government that López
claimed as a characteristic of his rule. During the very last years of fanatical resistance by
Paraguay, the U.S. minister was the only foreign diplomat still present in Asunción. This
angered the allies, who rejected all efforts at mediation coming from Washington.
Although the South American allies tried to maintain good relations with the U.S., they
made Washburn’s efforts at acting as a channel of communication between López and the
allies almost impossible, to the point that on one occasion, after Washburn’s travelled back
to Paraguay following a short visit to the U.S., his return to Asunción was effectively
delayed for several months.502
In December 1866, the U.S. suggested that a conference be held in Washington to
broker a final peace treaty. But although several newspapers in the allied countries showed
initial interest in this proposal, the governments consistently avoided a final answer. As
Harold Peterson argues, the allies “hoped to delay consideration of the proposition until
the subjugation of Paraguay made mediation unnecessary.”503 Final refusals were issued
on March 30 (by Argentina), March 31 (by Uruguay), and April 26 (by Brazil), in 1867.

Ynsfrán, La expedición norteamericana contra el Paraguay, 1858–1859 (Buenos Aires: Guarania, 1954);
Ynsfrán, “Sam Ward’s Bargain with President Lopez of Paraguay,” The Hispanic American Historical
Review, Vol. 34, No. 3 (August, 1954), pp. 313–331; and Thomas O. Flickema, “The Settlement of the
Paraguayan–American Controversy of 1859: A Reappraisal,” The Americas, Vol. 25, No. 1 (July, 1968),
pp. 49–69; Flickema, “‘Sam Ward’s Bargain’: A Tentative Reconsideration,” The Hispanic American
Historical Review, Vol. 50, No. 3 (August, 1970), pp. 538–542.
502

This episode is described in great detail in Whigham and Casal, La diplomacia estadounidense; and
John H. Saunders, “Diplomacy Under Difficulties: United States Relations with Paraguay during the War
of the Triple Alliance,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Athens, GA: University of Georgia (1966).

503

Peterson, “Efforts of the United States to Mediate,” p. 8.

305

Silence ensued after the reception of these rejections, until one final attempt was tried in
January 1868, by the U.S. Minister in Brazil, Webb. This new proposition had a more
restrained tone and tried to err on the side of impartiality. In the new offer, however, the
war was near its final completion, which weakened the allies’ need for a peace agreement
involving an extra-regional power. Equally, a number of indiscretions—such as the implicit
idea that Brazil bore the main responsibility for the outbreak of the war—irreversibly
damaged the spirit of the U.S. proposal. By mid-1868, therefore, all three allied powers
had already sent their replies to the U.S. government rejecting the proposal: the replies by
Argentina and Uruguay were issued in March, while Brazil’s followed in late April.
In this way, the ultimate failure of the U.S. mediation in the War of the Triple
Alliance reached an ignominious and embarrassing end. The lack of professionalism and
diplomatic “tact” by U.S. officials and ministers affected the tone of the offers of mediation
and, in turn, facilitated the allies’ rejection of each proposal. In the end, the numerous
attempts by the U.S. played no relevant role in the amelioration or termination of the war.
At no point it can be said the allies seriously considered any of the intended “pressures” by
the U.S., nor contemplated a potential coercive measure by the U.S., in how they carried
out their respective war efforts and foreign policy strategies. If anything, the image of the
U.S. was further tarnished by what the Allied nations perceived as an opportunistic and
threatening involvement by the U.S. in a region of the Americas that was beyond the
purview of U.S.’ national interest.
To conclude, it is imperative to explore a second source of intended mediation
during the latter stages of the war: that of the Quadruple Alliance. In the previous chapter,
the process of reaching out to the Atlantic powers was treated from the perspective of Chile,
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and its diplomatic missions sent out to all South American countries—and the U.S.—to
gather support in erecting a common front against Spain. In this chapter, however, the effort
of the Quadruple Alliance is presented through the lens of the countries involved in the
War of the Triple Alliance. Overall, the exploration of this crucial intra-regional diplomatic
interaction offers significant information in support of Burr’s view about the “bridging” of
both sub-systems: Atlantic and Pacific, or Platine and South Pacific, which forged a
common interests of the entire South American region into one single inter-state system.
Beyond Burr’s view, however, this chapter suggests that also a society of South American
states emerged as a product.
When the news of Pinzón’s occupation of the Peruvian islands reached Buenos
Aires, the first reaction of the Mitre administration was to consult with Balcarce, the
Argentina agent in France, to find out “from a solid source” in Madrid whether the
government of Isabel II would confirm or reject the claims of “revindication” made by the
Spanish agents in the Pacific.504 Mitre, well aware of President Pezet’s internal scandals of
corruption and mishandling of the country’s finances, tried to avoid being dragged into a
situation in which Peru would negotiate peace bilaterally with Spain, while Argentina,
Chile and the rest of the neighbors demanded explanations and antagonized Madrid
collectively. 505 To avoid such embarrassment, Mitre changed Sarmiento’s original
instructions and reached out to the Chilean president to propose a coordination and
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potentially an alliance in case Madrid refused to disavow the action of its diplomatic
agents.506
Throughout the entire diplomatic crisis, as well as during the Guano War itself,
Spain stalled, providing no clear or compelling answer. It neither recalled the agents, nor
disavowed their claims, limiting itself only to communicate that the Cabinet in Madrid
deeply regretted the situation created by the occupation of the islands. This persistent
ambiguity on the part of Madrid, therefore, had to be contemplated and counterbalanced
by Peru’s own duplicity in its handling of the issue. The extensive communications
between Mitre and Sarmiento, as well as between Elizalde and Sarmiento, and Elizalde and
Balcarce, demonstrate well how this complex dual international front was handled with
care by the Argentine diplomacy—considering also that the Uruguayan imbroglio was
unfolding in parallel across the River Plate from Buenos Aires.
The Brazilian diplomacy also faced a similar situation, which was further
compounded by its condition as a monarchy—a factor that was still a source of mistrust
for many Pacific countries. The Brazilian representative in Santiago and Lima, Adolfo
Varnhagen, however, handled the Brazilian neutrality with extreme care.507 Although he
was assigned to both Santiago and Lima, the news of the Spanish aggression reached him
while he was in Chile. Varnhagen reported accurately not only the general public sentiment
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of outrage in Santiago, but also was a keen observer of the activities of the Lima Congress,
gathered in Lima. Later, he was a privileged witness to the Spanish blockade and
bombardment of Valparaíso—following which he wrote letters to Admiral Pareja and to
the U.S. agent in Chile, Thomas H. Nelson, condemning the Spanish aggression.508
Given the vast distances and the still deficient communication technologies, the
diplomatic agents of all South American nations deployed in the Pacific were endowed
with ample powers—by today’s standards—so they could, in the right situations, take
important decisions in situ without consultation with their respective chancelleries.
Varnhagen, as well as Sarmiento, made critical use of these attributes, reacting to the
Spanish aggressions with official public condemnation. In both cases, however, they
earned the admonishment of their respective governments, more interested in maintaining
a strict neutrality on the Pacific question, given the unpredictable situation in Uruguay’s
civil war. In the case of Sarmiento, his own personal “Americanist” political and
ideological inclinations imprinted on the Argentine diplomacy towards the region—and
towards this particular war as a whole—a distinctive tone that extra-limited Mitre’s and
Elizalde’s intended level of involvement. In the case of Varnhagen, being a historian with
an extensive diplomatic experience in Portugal and in other countries of Europe, his own
idiosyncrasies and professional traits also got him in trouble with Itamaraty. In reaction to
the bombardment of Valparaíso, Varnhagen joined the Diplomatic Corps letter of public
condemnation of the Spanish Admiral’s decision, and issued statements that sent mixed
signals to the Chilean government in relation to Brazil’s position towards the war with
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Spain. 509 The initial impression of a potential Brazilian adherence to the Quadruple
Alliance, was followed by an official denial from Río de Janeiro, which created a popular
sentiment of resentment against Brazil that complicated the bilateral relations in during the
rest of the 1860s and early 1870s.
The members of the Quadruple Alliance had two main contentions with the Triple
Alliance. The first issue was that Argentina had joined Brazil, a monarchy, to wage war on
Paraguay, a country that many in the Pacific considered as a “republic,” although little to
nothing was really known about López himself or Paraguay’s political system, due to its
long history of isolation from regional affairs. This led to an implicit bias in favor of
Paraguay, and in disguised hostility against Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. A second issue
was the fact that none of the members of the Triple Alliance rushed to the protection of
Peru’s autonomy and independence when the Spanish squadron occupied the Chincha
Islands in April, 1864. Many historical works by Chilean or Peruvian authors, for example,
still maintain a skewed and negative view of the so-called “abandonment” or “betrayal” by
Argentina and Uruguay of their sister republics of the Pacific. This narrative, however,
ignores an important series of diplomatic risks taken by the Atlantic powers in clear support
of the cause of the Quadruple Alliance.510
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As previously mentioned, in 1864 Argentina and Brazil were preoccupied with the
unfolding Uruguayan crisis and the potential interjection of Paraguay into it. Nevertheless,
Brazil maintained a practical neutrality in a situation where the monarchical element played
an inverted constraining role. It was not the case, as the Pacific allies believed, that Brazil
kept its neutrality out of solidarity with Spain as a monarchy, but in effect it maintained a
neutral position in order not to antagonize the Pacific republics, who were deeply
suspicious of Brazil’s intentions to begin with. Brazil, moreover, had unresolved border
disputes with Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador, which Itamaraty tried to close as soon as
possible. 511 Argentina, for its part, not only offered Chile an early alliance—which
Santiago rejected—but also made numerous diplomatic efforts via its diplomatic agent in
France to propose either an Argentine mediation or a joint Anglo-French mediation to
bridge the relations between Peru and Spain bilaterally.512
For example, although short of a formal endorsement of the Pacific alliance,
Argentina instructed its sole representative in the European capitals to make clear
Argentina saw with great concern the principles invoked by Pinzón and Salazar y
Mazarredo, as well as the very means by which the occupation had been carried out. This
consistent policy of pressure to force Madrid commit to a format explanation was pursued
511
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even at the cost of damaging the negotiation of a critical treaty between Argentina and
Spain over commerce and mutual recognition.513 Mitre was, therefore, taking a serious risk
by acting unilaterally towards the Spanish Court, while also proposing an alliance with
Chile. The Pérez administration rejected Mitre’s offer because at the very beginning of the
diplomatic crisis, while Tocornal was Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chile itself had
adopted—just like Ecuador—a neutral position towards the Peru-Spain dispute. Chile
would later come to lament that early rejection, when its “Americanist” fervor, personified
in Tocornal’s replacement, Covarrubias, would come to drag Chile into a war with Spain
for which it was not prepared.
Paraguay itself, during the offensive phase of its military campaign against the
Triple Alliance, also rejected several offers of support and military assistance made by
Bolivia—its neighbor to the west. Bolivia’s foreign policy was, just like Chile’s, strongly
pro-Americanist and solidarist during the reign of Melgarejo. But unlike Chile, it had a
chronically unstable domestic order characterized by a plethora of caudillos that ruled
arbitrarily and whimsically until they were toppled by the next caudillo, who perpetuated
the cycle. During the rule of Mariano Melgarejo (December 1864–January 1871), Bolivia
sent three diplomatic missions to Asunción to explore the possibility of establishing an axis
with López, to assist him in his fight against the Brazilians, and to potentially defuse the
war on the Atlantic and, thus, “free” Argentina and Uruguay to join the Quadruple Alliance
against Spain.514 Melgarejo, at one point, even offered López troops to help him fend off
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the invading allied army—which he refused.515 Melgarejo’s rapprochement with López
had begun some time earlier, however, during the early months of the war.516 López had
put too much trust in the country’s difficult terrain and believed, as seen with his rejection
of the Uruguayan proposals for alliance, that Paraguay could raise the costs of the war for
the allies and then exploit their domestic weaknesses, as well as their lack of coordination
and intra-alliance rivalries, and force them into a negotiated settlement.
Colombia, which had refused to join the Quadruple Alliance, dispensed all kinds of
honors and tributes to Francisco S. López and the “heroic” defense that the Paraguayan
people were undertaking for their independence and freedom.517 The Colombian people’s
affection towards Paraguay, however, as well as that of Venezuela and Ecuador, never went
beyond a mere rhetorical identification with López’s cause as a way to antagonize Brazil.
No troops, money, nor any other type of resources were ever mobilized by any of the
Pacific nations in support of Paraguay’s war effort.
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Apart from Bolivia’s diplomatic offer, Peru and Chile were the most serious about
supporting Paraguay in reaching a peaceful and negotiated resolution in its war with the
Triple Alliance. 518 After the bombardment of Valparaíso and the subsequent Battle of
Callao in mid-1866, the two countries led a diplomatic offensive to mediate in the War of
the Triple Alliance.519 Through the Peruvian representative in the Platine capitals, Benigno
G. Vigil, and the Chilean special envoy, José V. Lastarria, the Quadruple Alliance tried
between 1866 and 1867 to offer favorable negotiating concessions to Argentina on the
Patagonia border dispute, as well as to secure Uruguay’s and Brazil’s closing of their ports
to the supply vessels of different nationalities used to assist the Spanish squadron with fresh
water, coal, and other provisions.520 Although ex post facto the military stage of the Guano
War was effectively over by the end of 1866, Chile and its allies could not afford to remain
idle, for Spain could attempt a new incursion in the near future.521 Without a professional
navy to confront Spain, Chile pressed Uruguay and Argentina even further for the
acceptance of the letters of marque issued by Chile and the practice of privateering in the
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Atlantic. Lastarria, however, overplayed his hand while negotiating these concessions.
Pressed by the need to steer the Atlantic powers’ attention towards the Pacific, Lastarria’s
accusations of Uruguayan support to Spain prompted the Uruguayan government to revoke
the diplomat’s exequatur, which led to a serious diplomatic crisis between Chile and
Uruguay.522
The tension grew higher when, in March 1866, the content of the “secret” Treaty
of the Triple Alliance became publicly known. The offers of mediation, therefore, were
followed by official letters of protest by Chile, Peru, and Bolivia. Ecuador, for its part, only
indirectly joined the diplomatic protests by allowing the Chilean diplomatic agents to
“speak for Ecuador” on this particular matter.523 Although the efforts of the Quadruple
Alliance failed in getting its mediation accepted by the members of the Triple Alliance and
Paraguay, and deepened ever further past intra-regional rivalries among the countries on
both sides of the continent, it did signal something important. The simultaneous
development of both wars in the mid-1860s, while the U.S. was undergoing its own civil

522
On this crisis, see Uruguay, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Publicación oficial del negociado
entre el Ministerio de Relaciones Esteriores y el Sr. Enviado Estraordinario y Ministro Plenipotenciario de
la República de Chile, con motivo de su pretensión sobre venta de presas que las fuerzas navales chilenas
pudieran hacer a la España (Montevideo: La Tribuna, 1865); and ibid., Negociaciones entre el gobierno
oriental del Uruguay i el ministro diplomático de Chile sobre el consulado chileno en Montevideo y la
venta de presas (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de Buenos Aires, 1866).
523

See Jorge W. Villacrés Moscoso, “El rol del Ecuador en el ofrecimiento de la mediación de la cuádruple
alianza de la guerra entre el Paraguay y la Triple Alianza,” Boletín de la Academia Nacional de Historia,
Vol. 51, No. 112 (julio–diciembre, 1968), pp. 200–208; Villacrés Moscoso, Historia diplomática de la
República del Ecuador (Guayaquil: Programa Editorial de la Biblioteca de la Muy Ilustre Municipalidad de
Guayaquil, 3rd ed., [1989] 2007), Vol. 2: pp. 43–45; Bolivia, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores,
Memoria que el ex-Secretario General de Estado y actual Ministro de Gobierno, Justicia y Relaciones
Exteriores de la República de Bolivia presenta a la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente reunida en 1868 (La
Paz: Imprenta Paceña, [1868]), pp. 274–293; Juan Siles Guevara, “Juan de la Cruz Benavente y la
participación de Bolivia en la cuádruple alianza contra España de 1866,” in Revisiones bolivianas (La Paz:
José Camarlinghi, 1969), pp. 77–101; and Peru, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Correspondencia
diplomática relativa a la cuestión del Paraguay, esp. pp. 24ff.

315

war, introduced leaders on both sides of the region to a new strategic reality from which
there was no coming back. Firstly, the momentarily orphan Monroe Doctrine had to be,
necessarily, re-appropriated and defended by the South American nations themselves, as
the powerful United States could not be counted on for protecting the hemisphere from
European interventions. Secondly, the region’s own geopolitical dynamics opened South
American states to the realization of their own political, economic, and military
weaknesses. Whether fighting an extra-regional power, or among themselves, South
American nations awakened to the strategic necessity of the “new” costs of contemporary,
large-scale international war. The experience of the Pacific nations, as well as those
involved in the war against Paraguay, were able to reap few true benefits from their
“victories” on the battlefield.
In conclusion, the most recent technological advancements, as well as the process
of consolidation of the new independent states, brought all states together in an interlocking
web of complex interests. Perhaps the most powerful realization of all was the fact that the
war affected not just those directly involved, but also the stability and common interests of
the entire region. Indifference increasingly ceased to be a viable, long-term strategic option.
Despite the ultimate success or failure of each of the mediation efforts and diplomatic
missions of peace elicited by the War of the Triple Alliance (and the same must be said
about the Guano War), the subtle lessons learned during this whole period left an indelible
mark in how future generations of leaders, diplomats, statesmen, and decision-makers
conducted their foreign relations toward one another. The process was a painfully slow,
costly, and gruesome one, but it configured the power relations and dynamics that
eventually came to determine the future quality of international relations in South America.
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Testing Alternative Explanations
H2: The U.S. as a Regional Hegemonic Stabilizer
There are six alternative explanations that advance competing narratives and sets of
predictions regarding the War of the Triple Alliance, or Paraguayan War. The first main
alternative explanation (H2) points to the role of the United States as a broker of peace in
the region via the suppression of armed conflict among neighbors, the implementation of
a certain institutional “tutelage” over the region, and an asymmetrical type of “solidarity”
that is premised on its own hegemonic leadership, principles, and values. As with the case
of the Guano War, the two background conditions identified in Chapter 1 were present,
although deeply affected by the U.S. civil war. Its “power preponderance,” for example,
can be considered a factor that was present and effective, but hindered by a domestic
conflict that focused much of the U.S. decision-makers’ attention away from foreign affairs
(and South America in particular). Unlike in the Chincha Islands case, however, where the
main incident occurred in early 1864, in the Paraguayan War the U.S. was able to
demonstrate an increasing willingness to lead as its civil war waned. This was exemplified
by its insistent and, at times forceful and rude, offers of mediation beginning in the second
half of 1868, when the victory of the Union was already secured. As the present Chapter
illustrated, although willing and able, the United States was successfully rebuffed by
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, thus making evident not only a lack of means to exert
diplomatic pressure on the allies, but also a lack of political capital and legitimacy behind
its actions. Even though the U.S. civil was over, the three allies felt it was within their
powers and prerogatives to deny the colossus from the north any legitimate interest in what
they considered a purely Platine affair.

317

Although the U.S. commercial interests in the River Plate area were rather
inconsequential at the time, the role of the in situ diplomatic agents Washburn and
McMahon was a key piece in interesting Washington in mediating the war in such a
relatively peripheral a region for the U.S. It was McMahon, in particular, who raised the
cause of republicanism in favor of institutionalizing a hemispheric principle based on the
sharing and protection of this particular type of government over the monarchical one,
associated with ancien Europe and imperialism. The members of the Triple Alliance,
however, counting a monarchy among their own ranks, rejected basing intra-regional
principles of solidarity and cooperation on such standards. “Order,” “progress,” and the
Liberal values associated with “civilization” mattered more than considerations of regime
type and New-World–Old-World rivalries, as suggested by the U.S. agents—and in part
also by the Quadruple Alliance in the Pacific. Paradoxically, the absence of a McMahon in
Chile or Peru during the Spanish aggression shows why the U.S. considered the issue of
monarchical government irrelevant in the Pacific, while important in the River Plate area.

H3: A Platine Balance of Power
Regarding the second alternative explanation, that of the traditional balance of power (H3),
several elements seem to offer support for at least two of the three main theoretical
expectations or predictions. Moreover, both background conditions also seem to obtain;
thus, making the exploration of this hypothesis a valid and meaningful task. The first
condition, that of short-sightedness by the elites in power, and the second one (the
“trigger”) related to the presence of threats to state survival, played a relevant role in how
the Blancos in Uruguay and Francisco S. López in Paraguay perceived their strategic
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environment in the early 1860s. As the present Chapter has shown, López and the Blancos
shared a view of their precarious geopolitical situation, which was seen as threatened by
Brazil and Argentina. The post-independence history of the region certainly justified the
Uruguayan and Paraguayan leaders’ blunt interpretations and suspicions regarding their
powerful neighbors. However, with the hindsight of history one can confidently see that
none of their fears were realistic by the 1860s. Brazilian policy had fundamentally changed
after 1828, when it accepted (although reluctantly) the independent existence of the
Republic of Uruguay, which was guaranteed by the British Empire. This policy was tested
throughout the civil war that engulfed Uruguay up to 1852; and yet, the Blanco leadership
perceived a mortal danger from both sides. From Argentina, for example, the Blancos
believed in an even more sinister threat in the form of a plot by Buenos Aires’ to
“reconstruct the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata,” which would engulf both Uruguay and
Paraguay into one large political unit.
Perhaps more distinctively, López saw in these conjectures and plots an existential
threat for which he had been preparing Paraguay for several years, militarizing almost the
whole of Paraguayan society. Randall L. Schweller, a prominent advocate of the traditional
balance-of-power approach in IR, argues that López in effect “over-balanced” against
Paraguay’s neighbors by believing that the threat that Argentina and Brazil posed was more
prominent than it really was.524 But this shows precisely the limits, rather than the strength,
of the H3 perspective as it pertains to the case. Contrary to what the classical balance-ofpower perspective would expect, state leaders did not act upon a “real” distribution of
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material power, therefore producing a balance-of-power as an outcome unintended by the
actors involved. It was, in fact, the balance of power as an idea or principle—that is to say,
“in their minds”—which had a real impact on the power dynamics between states. Leaders’
concerns about the balance of power led them to war, rather than to stable equilibrium. In
the case of the Paraguayan War, López did not “read” the situation in the Platine region in
terms of a calculated strategy based on the distribution of material capabilities, or as if
Paraguay could engage in offensive war because it was strong enough to dominate others
by force and conquest. It was, in fact, an overreaction to a fear that was, ex post facto,
simply not there. López, in short, succumbed to the Blanco framing of the situation as one
in which Uruguay was going to fall first, while Paraguay would soon follow.
The idea of the “balance of power,” not as an unintended resultant of offensivelyminded states, but as a learned or acquired principle of statecraft, therefore, seems to lend
more credit to the H1 understanding of this phenomenon than the purely power-political
one. López’s, as well as Herrera’s, strategic sensibilities to the virtues and applicability of
the principle of the balance of power, based on the European experience, played a major
role precisely because key individuals in key decision-making positions at key moments in
time held those particular notions in their minds, and so filtered and interpreted in a similar
way their strategic environment. In the end, the militarily weaker states in objective terms
(Uruguay and Argentina) did not ally against the more powerful ones (Paraguay and Brazil)
as it should have been expected in the traditional view of the balance of power. Paraguay
clashed with a triple coalition by Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, over the terms of which
rules and standards of foreign conduct should dominate the international relations of the
River Plate area. In the end, it was the actors’ concern for prestige, status, and legitimacy
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that drove their patters of balancing and counter-balancing—not the objective distribution
of military power among them.
The allied leaders, although not explicitly invoking the balance-of-power principle,
could also be interpreted as upholding a similar notion in the implementation of their
foreign policies. The diplomatic missions prior to the outbreak of the war itself, for
example, illustrate well their own sensibilities to the virtues of maintaining a balanced
power relation in the Plata region, in which Uruguay’s independence and autonomy would
be maintained and protected. Their distinctive framing of the situation, however, led
Argentine and Brazilian leaders to understand the long-term strategic necessity of
“pacifying” or “ordering” Uruguay’s civil war. As the Brazilian and Argentine experiences
demonstrate well, the unfinished process of state-formation in the mid-1860s in the Plata
region generated problematic “externalities” between one country’s domestic front and
another’s external front—a situation that was clearly unsustainable in the long run. One
front had to be ordered for the other to do so as well. It is on this point that perhaps the H3
overlaps substantially with the H1 on the understanding of war as a “taming” or “regulating
mechanism.” The “facts” of the case show that “fear” and “legitimacy” concerns cannot be
so clearly disentangled from one another as drivers of either understanding of war.
As part of the H3 proposition, one can consider the second expectation regarding
the role of mutual fear as a key ordering mechanism. But although “fear” was an important
factor in how Paraguay precipitated a regional war with its neighbors, it was not an
overriding factor, for López not only rejected making formal alliances with the Uruguayan
Blancos when it was more sensible to do so, but also rebuffed Bolivian and U.S. explicit
offers of support during the worst stages of the war for Paraguay. More than fear, it seems
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López injected an important quota of self-serving egomania, concerns for prestige, and
international status, that ultimately led Paraguay down a ruinous path of self-destruction.
Contrary to the H3 expectation, Paraguay did not “balance” by way of forming
international alliances against its enemies; while Argentina and Brazil forged their
rapprochement not in direct reaction to López’s aggression but several months earlier as
they tried to “pacify” the Uruguayan imbroglio. Their formal alliance, signed on May 1,
1865, do certainly show a dynamic component, overlooking concerns over regime type and
a past history of rivalry inter se. Nevertheless, a stronger shared view of the two country’s
“common interests,” personified in the Elizalde–Saraiva connection, seems to have won
out. Sarmiento’s early mistakes in the 1870s, abandoning this common understanding, cost
Argentina dearly as Brazil was able to hold a stronger economic and political grip over
post-war Paraguay for several decades until the eventual collapse of the Empire in 1899.

H4: River Plate Geopolitics
The geopolitical approach (H4), for its part, offers a different reading of the situation and
the motivation behind the actors’ crucial decisions. The topography of the entire area
certainly played a crucial role in shaping the actors’ perceptions of the power dynamics
underway in the 1860s. As it was pointed out before in the Chapter, López considered
Paraguay’s terrain as a power potential obstacle in case of having to fend off an invading
army. This may have emboldened the Paraguayan leader in believing that, in the unlikely
case of an alliance between two former bitter rivals, Argentina and Brazil, Paraguay could
drag both powers into a protracted wat of attrition and irregular combat in which the allies’
domestic front weaknesses could be exploited in combination with growing human and
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military costs on the battlefield. López’s strategy almost triumphed towards mid-1866,
after the provisions of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance was made public and international
condemnation created severe difficulties to the allied governments. A series of brutal
defeats for Paraguay opened a window of opportunity for López to offer a peaceful and
negotiated solution to the war in September 1866. His proposal was rejected, however, as
Brazil and Uruguay were adamant about fulfilling the Treaty objectives—partly as a save
facing mechanism, and partly as a way to preserve the Triple Alliance.
In the case of Uruguay, as well, the shared condition of “buffer state” with
Paraguay, played an important role in pushing the former to seek the latter’s assistance
during the early stage of the diplomatic crisis with Brazil. The proximity of all the
countries’ capitals, connected by an extensive waterways system in the River Plate estuary,
was undeniably a central component of the dynamics of the rivalries in the area. During
the time of colonial rule, these dynamics had driven Portugal and Spain against each other.
The very founding of the city of Buenos Aires and later “upgrading” to the status of
Viceroyalty, was an attempt by Madrid to erect a bulwark against Portugal’s relentless
territorial expansion towards the southern part of the region. These same dynamics, also,
were transferred over the independent nations which inherited the seats of power and
territories of the former colonial units. This, as was detailed above, expressed itself in
Argentine and Brazilian rivalry over the Banda Oriental region from 1810 until 1852. In
the 1860s, however, the War of the Triple Alliance breaks with this purely geopolitical
dynamic, as Argentina and Brazil did not fight over the issue of the protracted civil war in
Uruguay, but actually coordinated their efforts and polished their common understanding
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of the reasons behind Brazil’s necessity to forcefully put an end to the “anarchy” and
“disorder” in Uruguay.
Contrary to the three specific expectations in the geopolitical hypothesis (H4), the
overall geographical outlook of the region was not a physical obstacle to war, making it
practically impossible, but actually a crucial incentive for Paraguay to risk major war with
its main neighbors. It also occupies a central place in the explanation of Paraguay’s
capacity to prologue the inevitable result of the war for four more years, after its early
strategic defeat in late 1865. Much has been written in the classical and recent
historiography of the war about Paraguay’s brave, heroic, and courageous defense, deeply
rooted in their Guaraní culture and influences. However, without the right kind of
combination between a difficult and largely unknown terrain and the inadequate war
technology for that type of war, one can speculate that Paraguay’s resistance would most
certainly have been shorter, and its defeat markedly swifter. Perhaps thousands of soldiers
on both sides of the war would not had to die in such large proportions by the hand of
Mother Nature.

H5: A Common Culture of Anti-Imperialism
The “common culture” perspective (H5) offers an alternative interpretation of the factors
that may attenuate war, increase the institutionalization of order, and promote solidarity
among states. Based on the prevalence of two main background conditions, the
expectations are, first, that states will try to eradicate war among themselves; second, that
states would further try to progressively unify into a larger political unit; and third, that the
prior two developments will be premised on an underlying sentiment of solidarity that rests
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on ideological and cultural commonality. In the case of the Paraguayan War, as much as in
the case of the Guano War, a shared legacy of a recent anti-imperialist past was clearly
present in the societies and, most importantly, in the political elites and decision-makers of
each country involved. Unlike the Guano War case, however, there was no extra-regional
aggression which could have justified a stronger sense of “American” solidarity against a
common enemy.
In this specific context, the Paraguayan war is normally considered by many South
American historians as the prototypical case of foreign imperialism. The argument
typically focuses on the British Empire as the main “power behind power,” as the local
elites in Argentina and Brazil waged war on Paraguay due to the latter’s challenge to the
“Liberal” capitalist model of national production. Subservient to this foreign power and its
capital, the allies are seen as crushing the alternative model of autonomous national
development in Paraguay. The facts of the case, however, show no empirical support for
this narrative. The British Empire, in effect, had a real interest in preserving Uruguay’s
independence and autonomy, as well as in preventing war from ever occurring in the
region. It was precisely British economic and financial interests what propelled the
diplomatic agents Lettsom and Thornton to actively participate in the pre-war negotiations,
facilitating as much as possible all sources of common understanding between the countries
involved. After the failure of these negotiations, however, it was Lord Russell who ordered
the publication of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance—a decision that was clearly intended
to injure the legitimacy of the allies’ cause, and augment their level of difficulties in the
war. The intention was to force the allies’ hand diplomatically so they would feel obliged
to accept a negotiated settlement of the conflict with López. If the British Empire’s interests
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were in enjoying the benefits of commerce by keeping the entire River Plate area open to
international trade, it makes little sense for it to have continuously tried to prevent and then
undermine the war.
Even after discarding this potential role of a foreign power “intervening” via its
regional puppets, other element of the hypothesis (H5) seem to provide a poor explanation
for understanding the case. Although no extra-regional intervention really occurred, a
common legacy of anti-imperialism (mostly Spanish) was present. However, this did not
translate into the three expectations identified above. For example, none of the participants
in the war pushed for the eradication of war either prior, during, nor after the conflict itself.
The “horrors of war” were certainly a factor considered by Mitre and López, as well as
other prominent political figures, such as Alberdi and the members of the Unión Liberal in
Chile, but practical efforts focused only on “attenuating” or alleviating the effects of war;
yet not on the elimination of it as a political phenomenon. The lesson was not that modern
war had to be eradicated, but that it had become so destructive, costly, and dangerous that
its political objectives, justification, and effects had to be reconsidered anew in a more
restrained and “civilized” manner. The practical necessity of the recourse to use force,
either as a self-defense mechanism, or as a collective tool for preserving order, however,
remained.
Similarly, the state leaders involved did not seek politico-economic unification or
fusion as an alternative option to avoid future war. Although they all came to “fear war
itself,” the reaction of the Triple Alliance to the Quadruple Alliance efforts of mediation
illustrate well the difference in strategic understanding of the impracticability of the Pacific
nations’ aspirations towards forging a larger association premised on an “American”
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identity, opposed to an “European” element. As Elizalde’s reply to the Peruvian
convocation to sign the 1856 treaty clearly established, the American republics were
independent and if they ever were to secure their future survival as such, the only real
option was to establish solid basis of coordination and cooperation that rested on pragmatic
considerations of common interests, but not on passé Bolivarian dreams of continental
“brotherhood” and unity. In short, the South American regional order had to be promoted
and maintained not via the invocation of artificial ideological or cultural commonalities,
but their more reliable overlapping interests in a stable regional order inter se, a modus
vivendi of sorts.

H6: State-Strength and State-Weakness in the River Plate Area
The H6 hypothesis puts the emphasis on the states’ shared condition of incapacity for
engaging in large-scale war over long periods of time. Severe domestic constraints, such
as “strong-men” or caudillo armed rebellions, who persistently contest the central
government’s authority, can indirectly affect how the South American states performed
militarily in the war—and thus offering important alternative sources of limitation in the
use of force. In short, the argument rests on “state-weakness or incapacity, instead of state
“self-restraint.” This, in turn, is expected to be amplified with a “trigger” condition in the
form of mutual security externalities is present. Under these conditions, the H6 argument
expects three concrete developments: first, that major war will not to occur, or if it does
occur to be short-lived and limited; second, that formal and informal institutions will only
emerge as supplements, acting as political “stretches” to compensate via regional
coordination for the lack of state-capacity to face the dangers of war; and third, that inter-
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state “solidarity” will only be focused on the avoidance of externalities between regional
neighbors.
The Uruguayan case fits quite nicely into this framework. The diplomatic crisis that
eventually led to the War of the Triple Alliance was, in fact, sparked by the necessity felt
by Brazil to put an end to the pressures of the rebellious state of Rio Grande do Sul. This
southern Brazilian state had endured for several decades the spill-over effects of the
Uruguayan civil war on its own territory. Even well-off hacendados with investments in
northern Uruguay had experienced severe violations of their property and private rights.
After Argentina’s understanding of Brazil’s interest in solving the Uruguayan crisis, the
two found common ground enough to put aside their historical rivalry and coordinate a
solution. It was Blanco party fanaticism and brutal tactics which had pushed Venancio
Flores’ faction of the Colorados to seek exile and support from the two neighbors. Their
refusal to meet the Brazilian demands as presented by Saraiva in Montevideo, further
deteriorated the situation, leaving Brazil with few options but to exert pressure and use
force legitimately—with the approval, that is, of Argentina and the British Empire.
Although this hypothesis partially holds true for these early diplomatic dynamics
in the River Plate area, it loses explanatory power when applied to the larger context of the
war itself. Paraguay, for example, had a distinctively different domestic scenario. After
decade of rearmament, technological modernization for war, and deepening of a model of
power of the state centered around the figure of Francisco S. López, the Paraguayan state–
society balance was clearly tilted. In other words, the Paraguayan state was “strong” in
terms of the state-strength/weakness hypothesis. This internal homogeneity, as Alex
Weisiger, Randall Schweller, and Thomas Whigham, among others, have pointed out,
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allowed Paraguay to put up a dangerous offensive in the early months of the war, as well
as a stubborn resistance once López’s multiple strategic mistakes had wasted Paraguayan
military capacity by early 1866.
Although Paraguay’s behavior gives partial support for the H6 argument, it is
overshadowed by the equally impressive logistical and strategic war effort put up by the
allies themselves. Neither Brazil nor Argentina were prepared for a war of such
proportions. Argentina, in particular, was not ready for any war whatsoever. The opposition
to the war became more intense after the publication of the Treaty in 1866, but it had always
been an important factor for Mitre due to the death of Urquiza and the new uprisings in the
interior provinces. The caudillos from the northern provinces, in particular, put up a serious
fight against the national government. This became so intense that by 1868 Mitre had to
step down from the command of the allied forces and refocus on the upcoming election
and the final “pacification” of the caudillo armed rebellions. The Argentine military
participation in the war also progressively dwindled with Mitre’s own political retreat from
the frontline. While Uruguay, after several decades of protracted civil war, was not only
materially incapable of waging an external war, but also psychological and morally
exhausted. Its collaboration to the allied army was minimal, and as the allies were ready to
capture Asunción, the few remaining troops returned to Montevideo.
In conclusion, the factor of state-weakness helps explain some, yet not all, the
dynamics in the Paraguayan War. It helps illuminate López’s overall performance, yet it
cannot account for the allies’ relatively weaker state-society relation and their own
resilience in maintaining, despite extreme costs, the fight against López—and eventually
end victorious(!). Importantly, the generalized “weakness” of the states involved, contrary
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to what H6 would logically expect, did not induce a restrained, limited, or short-lived type
of war. In fact, this interacted with geopolitical factors, and actually helped make the war
more protracted, costly, and long-lived—leading in turn to the loss of more life than
otherwise expected. As the war intensified, the battles became increasingly more brutal and
ferocious, and sparser in between. It was precisely in those long months of “pause” or truce
between each battle that pandemics and disease made their profound impact on the
enormous casualties for which the war is so infamously remembered today.

H7: A “Liberal” Peace?
The final alternative hypothesis to evaluate is that of the so-called “triangulation of peace”
(H7). Based on the notion of an inter-democratic peace, the sharing of “Liberal values” can
offer an alternative explanation for certain dynamics of the Paraguayan War. The issue of
type of regime was certainly a center piece of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, which
explicitly declared that the war was not against Paraguay but against its leader, Francisco
S. López and his tyrannical rule.
Despite this important aspect, however, the allies were not bound by their sharing
of a “democratic” republic system of government. Considering the peculiarities of those
concepts and their meaning in the 1860s, however, it is clear from the participation of
monarchical Brazil that although stated in the treaty text it was not a crucial component in
the dynamics of the war itself. The Pacific countries, for instance, did not see López’s
Paraguay as a tyranny, but as a “fellow republic.” This, coupled with their necessity in
bringing Argentina and Brazil to their side against the Spanish intervention, led the
Quadruple Alliance to undermine their own efforts in mediation by taking a priori a biased
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stance in favor of Paraguay. While important for them, it was relatively secondary or
unimportant for the Triple Alliance powers.
What seems to hold a better promise for the H7 hypothesis, however, is the more
loosely defined “Liberal values” that the porteño Unitarios in Buenos Aires did share with
the Liberals in Dom Pedro II’s court in Río de Janeiro. This connection, however, was more
ideological than interest-driven, and thus cannot be clearly associated to a “defense” of a
type of regime, or the creation of Liberal regional institutions. The only possible connection
that can be made is that between Argentina’s and Brazil’s interests in “pacifying” the River
Plate area in order to secure the free navigation of the interior rivers and waterways. In so
far as their common interest can be interpreted in terms of repressing López’s disruptive
strategy for international free-trade, then one of the three factors identified in H7 can be
said to have played a significant role. Seen in this light it is interesting to note that, although
Paraguay and Uruguay had recurrent fears of a potential “closing up” of the River Plate
estuary if either Brazil or Argentina controlled the margins of the River Plate and isolating
the interior provinces and ports to international trade, it was Argentina and Brazil who
waged a war with both countries in order to maintain the free navigation of those
waterways. After all, it was Paraguay which seized the Marquês de Olinda when it was on
its way upriver to the Brazilian province of Mato Grosso.

Some Preliminary Conclusions
The War of the Triple Alliance against Paraguay offers what at first sight would be an easy
case in support of the common culture (H5) hypothesis, centered on the region’s past in
resisting anti-imperialism, as well as in support of the state-weakness/strength argument

331

(H6), centered on Paraguay’s distinctive internal socio-cultural and political cohesion and
its capacity for engaging in “proper” European-style war. Similarly, prima facie, the main
hypothesis defended in this dissertation (H1) seems to face a harder tests than the rest. The
specifics of the case, however, show that although the final evaluation of the relative
strengths of the different alternative explanations is mixed, the best-performing arguments
are those which expect some form of “amelioration” or “taming” of war (H1, H2, H3, and
H6), yet not the more ambitious “eradication” or “impossibility” of war (H4, H5, and H7).
A combination of some of the hypotheses’ expectations, for its part, can help
illuminate different aspects of the war, yet none seems to consistently and convincingly
offer a general explanation for the attempts at minimizing the effects, as well as the political
objectives, of the war, that is superior to the H1 proposition. Nor does any of the competing
arguments seem to articulate a good explanation for the alliance between Argentina, a
republican government, with Brazil, a monarchical one—compounded by the fact that
these were bitter rivals in the prior decades, after independence.
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CHAPTER 4

THE STRUGGLE FOR RESOURCES:
WAR AND PEACE IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC, 1873–1884

Y al que le toca la herencia
Donde quiera halla su ruina.
Lo que la suerte destina
No puede el hombre evitar.
Porque el cardo ha de pinchar
Es que nace con espina.525

From Allies to Enemies: The Historical Context
The story of the War of the Pacific (1879–1884) is the story of how three of the four allies
in the War against Spain turned into bitter enemies in one of the most important large-scale
military conflicts of the 19th century. To understand how former allies, bonded so uniquely
in “Americanist solidarism” in the 1860s, became engulfed in a war that lasted more than
five years it is essential to explore the confluence of several factors. First and foremost, the
colonial legacy left behind by Spain created a situation not conducive to stable, long-term
diplomatic relations between the Pacific countries of South America. Undefined borders
inherited from the former Viceroyalties of Peru and Nueva Granada were transferred after
independence to Chile, Bolivia, and Peru. The problem was further compounded by the
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application of the uti possidetis principle, by which the new territorial borders would
respect follow the territorial divisions previously maintained by the Spanish empire.
This unclear demarcation problem interacted with a second factor, that of vast
territories separating each country’s capital city and centers of power. The discovery of
guano deposits in the area in 1842 added an explosive combination of empty spaces with
disputed borders and the presence of new strategic resources coveted by everyone. The
entire area from northern Chile to the southern Peruvian provinces of Tacna and Arica,
therefore, became the center of geo-economic and political tensions in the second half of
the 19th century, centered around Chile, Bolivia and Peru.
A third factor, worthy of mention here, is the fact that during this tense period the
domestic orders in Bolivia and Peru were deeply unstable. In contrast, since the 1830s, the
Portalian era of stable and efficient administration in Chile had created a sense of normalcy
in politics that allowed the country to articulate a steady and clear-eyed foreign policy
towards the region. 526 Victory in the War of the Peru-Bolivian Confederation further
consolidated Chile’s vision of “a balance of power in its favor” in the South Pacific.527 In
Bolivia, however, the contrast was abysmal. Since independence, internal politics had been
characterized by the rule of the “caudillos bárbaros.”528 Government in Bolivia was violent
and unstable, dominated by regime survival and party mentality, rather than by a national
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vision coherently articulating the domestic and external fronts into one grand strategy. The
successive replacement of one caudillo by another left Bolivia with a chronically inwardlooking political elite who could only afford to concentrate in self-help, survival, and shortterm strategic objectives—spelling doom for the country in the long run. In Peru, the
market boom created by the discovery of guano met with a corrupt and inept political class
that squandered for over two decades most of this financial bonanza and soon faced a
violent reality check from its own citizens and political opposition. The context in which
the Spanish aggression occurred, therefore, was prima facie propitious for such an
enterprise. The Pezet administration was on the verge of collapse in early 1864, and none
of the neighboring countries—except perhaps Chile—was in condition to articulate a
serious regional effort to protect Peru and South America’s common interest.529
The importance of “the critical 1860s,” therefore, is not only evident when studying
the two simultaneous wars that erupted on both sides of the continent, but also for
understanding the political dynamics of the entire second-half of the 19th century—
including the War of the Pacific. The war between Chile and the Peru–Bolivia alliance
offers a good example of the dark and violent side of a “civilizational” view, which was so
predominant at the time, but which underpinned the formation of South America’s society
of states in the long run. As with the case of the Paraguayan War, where Argentine and
Brazilian leaders took upon themselves that task of “pacifying” the region by intervening
in the internal affairs of a neighboring country, Chile also took upon itself to pursue a
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foreign policy that would put an end to the chronic problems of instability emanating from
its northern neighbors.
In doing so, however, it became quite clear that the construction of a regional
consensus over the common interests of the region also had a violent side. If order was to
be secured, it required the commitment to employ force when necessary. The coexistence
of differently consolidated states with different levels of internal order, and sharing a
common regional space, was unsurprisingly conflictual and unstable. However, the lessons
acquired from this period would leave an important mark in the history of the region that
would later become, quite paradoxically, the basis for more stable and orderly relations.
In this context, the present chapter reviews the War of the Pacific from the
international society perspective, exploring the role of its three main causal mechanisms:
the taming of war, the institutionalization of order, and pragmatic solidarity. While these
aspects are explored in the first section, a second part offers an evaluation of the alternative
competing arguments (H2–H7), and their relative explanatory strengths. This is followed
by a concluding section with some preliminary remarks for the case.

The War of the Pacific: The Violent Side of “Civilization”
Before the Spanish aggression to the Peruvian islands in the Pacific and the forging of the
Quadruple Alliance, Chile, Bolivia, and Peru had a convoluted history of geopolitical
rivalry and competition for power and prestige in the Pacific. The 1840s added to this mix
the element of strategic natural resources. Before the inclusion of guano and salitre
(saltpeter or sodium nitrate), the power dynamic in the South Pacific was distinctively
traditional and self-contained. In the late 1830s, for example, the Bolivian caudillo Andrés
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de Santa Cruz finally achieved the historic dream of many fellow caudillos of uniting Peru
and Bolivia into one political entity. 530 This constituted an obvious threat to Chilean
interests, which had historically competed with Peru over Bolivia’s role in the balance of
power of the Pacific.
With Chile’s victory in 1839, the Peru-Bolivian Confederation was finally undone
and, in an exemplary display of restraint, Chile contented itself with a simple redress to the
status quo ante. It reinstituted Bolivia’s independence and autonomy from Peru, and vice
versa. Bolivia’s coastline at the time, although neglected by La Paz, was crucial for Chile,
for it acted as a “buffer” between Peru and Chile. An independent Bolivia, thus, made
possible for the two rivals to compete almost exclusively by developing their navies. The
tensions between Chile and Peru, therefore, emanated from the placement of their
respective major ports: Chile’s port of Valparaíso, for example, enjoyed a strategic
advantage over Peru’s port of Callao due to its proximity to the Magellan Strait, which
connected the entire South Pacific region to Europe. The Argentine border with Chile was
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also a contending, unsettled issue, which further complicated Chile’s foreign policy by
implicating the country’s interests on too many fronts.531
Although the early historiography recreated “national theses” about the causes of
the war, typically accusing one country or another for precipitating the conflict,532 modern
works by professional historians, although qualitatively superior in the use of primary
sources and overall information, have not been able to entirely break with the mold of
investigating the war from the vantage point of one or two of the belligerents.533 Two
exceptions that present a more general view the war, however, only focus on the military
aspects of the war.534
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The academic discussion about the causes of the War of the Pacific have recurred
over the years, falling into three main groups. A first thesis argues that the responsibility
for the war rests on Chile’s ambitions towards the coastal territories of Bolivia and Peru in
the Atacama dessert. Unsurprisingly, this explanation has been most consistently
elaborated by Peruvian and Bolivian authors, who believe Chile had a premeditated
strategy. This strategy was put into action several years in advance by populating the areas
of guano and salitre production with Chilean citizen-workers and penetrating with Chilean
and foreign capital.535
A second thesis maintains that the main responsibility for the war relies on Peru
and Bolivia. Chilean authors, in particular, put the emphasis on a “secret” treaty signed by
both countries in 1873, which Bolivia activated during a crisis with Chile in 1878 to drag
Peru into the fight. In this view, the war erupted because Bolivia’s caudillo, Hilarión Daza,
feeling reassured by this treaty in case of a war, provoked Chile into war; while Peru
instigated Bolivia into a clash with Chile over the possession and exploration rights over
the export of guano and salitre in the Atacama Desert. From this vantage point, therefore,
Chile was the victim, surrounded by neighbors that were planning its demise. Most Chilean
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writers, moreover, see the War of the Pacific as a war strictly between Chile and Peru, with
Bolivia as Lima’s puppet.536
The most recent, and well respected, literature on the causes of the war has dealt
with this dichotomy quite problematically. The tendency has been either to repeat one of
these theses but with more supporting documentation, or to ignore the discussion about the
causes of the war entirely and focus on other aspects—such as the soldiers’ experience,
domestic cultural factors, the role of the church, the role of women, the local press, etc.537
The current consensus, however, associates the post-colonial territorial legacies with the
struggle for resources as the main driver of the war. In other terms, it was a “tragedy.”538
No study has yet been performed on the placement of the War of the Pacific in the
context of 19th-century South America in terms of a regional system—and much less as a
society of states. Although not entirely neglecting the important military and powerpolitical aspects that shaped the war itself, it is also important to explore a view of the
conflict that rescues the diplomatic efforts that preceded the war and which tried to “tame”
or curb its potential effects, as well as frames the “civilizational” values that came to
dominate Chilean leadership and society. It is important to look into the efforts at
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institutionalizing the conduct of the war itself through the offers of mediation by the United
States, and other related aspects, such as the treatment of prisoners, and the difficulties that
arose after Chile occupied Peru’s capital for three years.

Chile and the Taming of Two Wars
Despite its victory over the Peru-Bolivian Confederation in 1839, which meant a politically
separate and independent Peru and Bolivia, Chile could not avoid the frequent
collaboration between these two neighbors. When the Spanish squadron occupied the
Chincha Islands, however, the Chilean leadership at the time had to balance between
tolerating the presence of a European power in the Pacific or assist the weakened Peru in
its struggle for independence. The temptation was strong, for a prostrated Peru would give
Chile more freedom of action to pressure Bolivia. The pro-Americanist sentiments of the
political elite in Santiago, however, prevailed and Chile decided to momentarily put aside
all animosities with Peru and Bolivia in order to serve a higher set of regional interests.
Bolivia, at the same time, took the Spanish aggression with surprise and was forced
to redefine its international strategy up to that point. Since the early 1840s, the relations
between Bolivia and Chile had been deteriorating as a rapid pace due to the overlapping
commercial interests of Chilean private interests in the exportation of guano and salitre in
the region of Atacama, backed by foreign capital—mostly British.539 The confluence of the
Spanish aggression and the need to pool all regional efforts into a “common front,” pushed
both Bolivia and Chile to seek an agreement on the disputed border between the two
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nations—now containing important strategic resources. At least for a short while, therefore,
the more elevated strategic necessity of collaborating for a “higher cause” forced Chile and
Bolivia to bypass decades of rivalry and mistrust, and try to solve their lingering disputes
in order to forge the Quadruple Alliance in early 1866.
In August 1866, Bolivia and Chile exercised mutual self-restraint by signing a
treaty of unique characteristics, known as “treaty of the medianería” (or Mutual Benefits
Zone). The Bolivian dictator, Mariano Melgarejo, pressed by his internal opposition and a
crippling national debt, saw in this agreement a way to assuage Chile in its problematic
“re-population” strategy in the Bolivian portion of the Atacama Desert, as well as a good
way to secure a steady source of revenue for Bolivia.540 The treaty was subscribed on
August 10, 1866, and represented an enormous risk by Melgarejo. Although Bolivia needed
external peace to confront internal opposition, the concessions could also potentially lead
to territorial adjustments in Chile’s favor in the long run. 541 The uniqueness of the
medianería relied in an absolutely unprecedented agreement that determined a “mutual
benefits” zone or band, instead of a single line, as a demarcation border between both
countries. The zone comprised the area between parallels 25º S and 23º S, and was divided
in half by the parallel 24º S. Furthermore, the medianería allowed Chilean capital and
manpower to exploit Bolivian natural resources inside the zone, thus granting Chile semisovereign rights over the southern strip, between parallels 24 and 25. [see infra Map 5].
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MAP 5 –– The Atacama region, c. 1866.

Source: Wikimedia Commons [https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fe/MBT.en.svg]
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During the struggle of the Quadruple Alliance against Spain in the Pacific, this strange
arrangement by Bolivia momentarily cleared the way for the collaboration between Chile
and Bolivia in the alliance. However, Bolivia’s chronic domestic anarchy and recurrent
civil wars led to the deposition of Melgarejo in 1871. He was replaced by Agustín Morales,
another caudillo bárbaro. 542 During his rule, the Chilean government became anxious
about the future of Melgarejo’s “generous” 543 concession and commissioned the
construction of two ironclads that would give Chile naval superiority in the Pacific. Once
again, Chile’s relations with Bolivia were triangulated with Peru’s foreign policy in order
to balance one against the other and thus keep them separate. At the time of the agreement,
Peru had four ironclads, Chile had only two older ones, while Bolivia had no navy at all.
A serious dispute emerged when new guano deposits were found in the early 1870s.
Rich mines were discovered in Mejillones and Caracoles, in Bolivian territory, but their
location was quite unfortunate. The location of the mine in Caracoles was almost exactly
on the northern limit of the medianería zone (parallel 23º S), which prompted Chile to
pressure Bolivia to include it as part of the 1866 agreement. Bolivia refused, claiming the
mine was actually located north from the parallel, but this was disputed by Chile. It soon
became apparent that Bolivia, unable in terms of infrastructure and manpower to exploit
its own littoral resources, would have to face more forcefully the continuous Chilean
expansion inside the zone of medianería.
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By 1872, the Guano War against Spain was already over and a peace with Spain
guaranteed.544 Bolivia, therefore, started to resent the provisions of the 1866 treaty. The
traditional caudillo infighting had created new financial restrictions, and the government
was desperate for new sources of revenue. A diplomatic campaign was then put in motion
to reach out to Peru, whose own mineral production in the Tacna and Arica provinces
competed with Chile’s, to secure an alliance in case Chile decided to take by force part of
Bolivia’s territory. These negotiations led to the signing of a “secret” treaty in 1873 by
which Peru and Bolivia committed to come to each other’s defense in case of aggression,
and to further extend this pack with other neighboring states (i.e., Argentina).545
The rumors of the existence of this pact reached Santiago fairly early, however
there was no confirmation of its existence. Since Chile had an ongoing dispute still pending
with Argentina over the Patagonia region and the Magellan Strait, President Pérez sent a
special representative to La Paz to negotiate a treaty with Bolivia. The Chilean agent’s
mission was to negotiate a new treaty that maintained as much as possible the commercial
benefits carved out from Melgarejo in 1866. While this negotiations were underway, Daza
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sent the Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Serapio Reyes Ortiz, to Lima in a special
mission to sign a treaty of alliance with Peru.546
Considering the gravity of the Bolivian request, Peru’s Minister of Foreign Affairs,
José de la Riva Agüero, wrote to his peer in Santiago expressing his concern for the
developments in the Bolivian littoral. Peru feared the occupation of the zone, which had
provoked the Bolivian government to adopt a tougher stance on the matter. If Chile were
to occupy Mejillones or Antofagasta, said Riva Agüero, “Peru could not stand as an
indifferent spectator and would be forced to back Bolivia in guard of its own interests
which are common, for we could not allow Chile, by breaking the American balance, to
appropriate a littoral that does not belong to it.” The message ended with a warning: Peru
would offer its mediation, and if it were not accepted by Chile and then continued to occupy
the littoral, the inevitable and necessary consequence would be that Peru would seek to ally
Bolivia.547
The assassination of the Bolivian president, Agustín Morales, in November of
1872, led Tomás Frías—the interim president—to adopt a more conciliatory approach
towards Chile. On December 5, Bolivia and Chile signed the Lindsay–Corral protocol to
fix the lingering problems of the execution and application of the 1866 treaty. Since this
protocol was ill-received by the Bolivian public opinion, Chilean authorities expected the
agreement to be revoked by Congress at some point. The expectation of more immediate
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troubles with Chile prompted Bolivia to finally secure the 1873 Treaty with Peru, which
was signed on February 6 of that year. One way or another, Bolivia was trying to guarantee
its territorial possession of the Atacama region against the encroachment of Chilean policy.
In this triangular drama of the Pacific, however, there was a fourth actor crucial for
the Bolivian strategy: Argentina. As indicated above, one of the provisions of the 1873
treaty considered the need to extend the treaty to other states to join the alliance. Although
the text did not explicitly specify which state, it was obvious to everyone that this meant
Argentina—for the treaty was aimed specifically against Chile. In this context, Argentina
had a unique opportunity to join the “secret” treaty between Bolivia and Peru and thus
pressure Chile to make important concessions on the Patagonia and Magellan Strait
questions. Well aware of the cataclysmic effects that its participation would have had for
Chile, Argentina did not break with its traditional policy of strict neutrality—thus saving
Chile from one of the most dangerous regional scenarios imaginable by Santiago’s elites.548
The Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carlos Tejedor, offered a series of
reasons for looking upon this alliance with reluctance. First, it was not clear to him that the
proposed alliance was simply defensive. Although Peru defended the pact as a way to
neutralize Chile and thus guarantee peace, Tejedor believed this could dangerously corner
Chile into an overreaction—which by all means had to be avoided. Second, Argentina and
Bolivia had also an unresolved territorial dispute of their own, whose resolution the
Argentine Congress raised as a sine qua non for advancing with the proposition of alliance.
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Since neither Bolivia nor Argentina would cede on this matter, the prospect of Argentine
participation went dead cold. If the true objective of the treaty, said Tejedor, was to protect
the territorial integrity of Bolivia—and not to organize an aggression against Chile—then
Argentina could join immediately a separate alliance only with Peru. Finally, Tejedor
feared that joining the Peru-Bolivian alliance would elicit a reaction by Brazil, who would
ally with Chile to counterbalance Argentina. As the negotiation with Brazil over post-war
Paraguay was becoming terse, Sarmiento and Tejedor did not want to provoke Brazil
further.549
With the failure to include Argentina, Peru suggested that Bolivia try to renegotiate
the 1866 treaty of medianería once again, reinforcing the 1872 protocol. In 1874, therefore,
a new treaty secured the 24th parallel as the new definitive border between Bolivia and
Chile. This was a painful concession of territory to Chile, but one deemed necessary given
the military weakness of Bolivia and the fact that after all Chile’s productivity and
investments reaped benefits for both governments.
Article 4 of the 1874 treaty stipulated that Chilean citizens, capitals, and property
would not be subjected to further contributions (i.e., taxes) beyond the ones already
established. This provision would hold for twenty-four years. In 1866, Melgarejo had
granted to two prominent Chilean citizens the concession of certain lands in Antofagasta,
which were transferred in 1868 to the Antofagasta Nitrate and Railroad Company to exploit
the resources in the area. The privileges were so great that the Bolivian public opinion put
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increasing pressure on Daza and the Congress to modify the situation. In early 1878, the
conditions of the agreement were reviewed and the taxes were raised by 10 cents per quintal
of exported saltpeter. This new gravamen sparked the protest of multiple sectors in Chile,
from the wider populace to the most directly affected miners and financiers involved in the
exportation of nitrates and guano in the region.550
Daza’s violation of the 1874 treaty meant that the original 1866 agreement and its
subsequent protocol of 1872 were no longer valid. On February 10, 1878, therefore, the
Bolivian caudillo put into effect a new law, approved by Congress, establishing the new
tax requirement. Then, an ultimatum was issued to the Antofagasta Nitrate and Railroad
Company, which was partially owned by Chilean and British capital, indicating that noncompliance with the new regulations would be met with a public auction. Since this option
was absurd, for no private citizen had enough money to put forth even a first bet for the
whole value of the Company, Daza’s policy was obviously a move to eventually
expropriate the Company. On February 14, 1879, just before the Bolivian ultimatum
expired, Chilean troops landed on the Bolivian coast and occupied the city of Antofagasta
in anticipation of the threat of expropriation by Bolivia. On March 1, Bolivia declared war
on Chile, and the latter reciprocated a month later, declaring war on both Bolivia and Peru.
The War of the Pacific had started.
A good indication of Chile’s anticipation of the possibility of a war, although the
country was not ready for one, is the fact that after the Bolivian new tax was announced
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but before the expiration date of the ultimatum, Chile reached out to Argentina to negotiate
peacefully their pending territorial disputes. Neither Argentina or Chile really desired a
war, despite a constant pressure from their society and public opinion. 551 In Chile,
President Aníbal Pinto was strongly criticized for its “weak” policy towards Bolivia, trying
to strike deals since 1866 instead of adopting a more forceful approach. When the
agreement with Argentina was finally achieved, the popular outcry was enormous, and
Pinto was accused by the political opposition in Congress of betraying the national interest
of Chile by “conceding the Patagonia” to Argentina and only partially securing control
over the Magellan Strait—crucial for Chile’s commercial interests in Europe.
The Fierro–Sarratea Treaty, signed on December 1878, represented both a sign of
self-restraint on part of Chile as well as a necessary strategic move in preparation for a
potential Bolivian aggression in the Atacama region. Chile was forced to tame two
potential wars at once, for which Pinto decided to secure Argentina’s implicit neutrality
and concentrate on the Bolivian question. By the time Bolivia declared war on Chile, in
March of 1879, therefore, Chile had at least secured one of its two problematic fronts. As
Robert N. Burr explains, the diplomatic maneuvering prior to the war “clearly
demonstrated the ushering in of a new era in intra–South American relations. […] Under
the influence of their integration into the world economy, they had become rivals for
influence over lesser states. At the same time, they had become loosely bound together by
a network of interlocking interests.”552
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During the early months of the war, an important factor demonstrated Peru’s
interest in preventing the conflict between Bolivia and Chile. This display of restraint by
Lima officials, who tried to avoid being dragged into a war by the activation of the 1873
treaty of alliance with Bolivia, ultimately ended in utter failure due to the fact that the
“secret” treaty had created in Pinto and his cabinet a larger effect than the one intended
originally by Peru and Bolivia in 1873. For Peru, the treaty’s objective had been to prevent
war all along, not to encircle Chile and provoke a military confrontation. However, the
secrecy clause and the persistent denial by both Peruvian and Bolivian officials had
undermined Chile’s confidence in the behavior of Peru. The earlier attempt to incorporate
Argentina to the pact also played a powerful role.553
In this context, when Peru sent one of its most reputable diplomats, José A. de
Lavalle, to Santiago to offer Peru’s mediation on March 5, 1879,554 public opinion as well
as the President received the Peruvian envoy with profound reluctance and suspicion. Prior
to his departure, however, Lavalle had a meeting with Mariano I. Prado, the Peruvian
President; Manuel Yrigoyen, the Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Serapio Reyes Ortiz, the
Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs and special representative in Lima. According to
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Lavalle, none of them raised the issue of the 1873 treaty in their conversations, thinking
that he was well aware of its existence and provisions—which he was not.555
Once in Santiago, where he arrived on March 4, 1879, Lavalle was received by
Aníbal Pinto, who conveyed to him the difficulties for his government to accept the peace
after Bolivia’s declaration of war. Although Pinto was prudent and desired no armed
conflict with Bolivia, he also feared that if he backed down he would be forcefully removed
from power either by the mob in the streets or by the fierce political opposition in
Congress.556 For this reason, Lavalle’s conditions for the mediation could not be seriously
met. The Peruvian offer of mediation required that Chile retreated from the occupied
territories so a peace negotiation could take place. In their multiple conversations, Pinto
and his close adviser Domingo Santa María—who would later succeed Pinto in the
presidency—interrogated Lavalle about the existence and content of the 1873 treaty.
Lavalle, in full honesty, claimed that he had no instructions on that regard and that he would
have to consult with Lima. Later, the Chilean officials asked Lavalle about the undergoing
naval rearmament in Peru, to which Lavalle—once again—answered evasively.557 This
interaction fueled Chile’s fears and suspicions that Peru’s mediation was an insincere act
meant to gain time for Peru to prepare militarily to join the fight as Bolivia’s ally.558
Chile detained Lavalle and proceeded to declare war on both Bolivia and Peru. The
Lavalle mission had spectacularly failed precisely at the moment when it was most needed
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for all the belligerents. In reaction, Chile dispatched two diplomatic missions, one to
Argentina, led by Manuel Balmaceda, and a second one to Brazil, led by José V. Lastarria.
These two missions represented for Chile the crowning of its far-sighted diplomacy of
stability and order in the region, during an extremely difficult period of its history. 559
Balmaceda was successful in identifying the constant pressure on the Argentine
government by anti-Chilean groups, as well as Sarmiento’s reluctance to engage them,
which was exemplified in Argentina’s eventual refusal of the Peruvian invitation to join
the 1873 treaty.560 Lastarria, for his part, was even more successful in coordinating with
the representative in Buenos Aires and securing the Brazilian implicit “good will” for
Chile’s cause in the upcoming war. It was through the Argentine delegate in Buenos Aires
that Chile was finally able to confirm the existence of the 1873 treaty and to read its articles
and provisions.561 Since the bilateral relations with Chile had not been positive during the
Paraguayan War, Brazil was trying to win Chile’s support to counteract Ecuadorean,
Bolivian, and Peruvian border disputes still pending with the Brazilian Empire.562
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The development of the war spanned from April to April, between 1879 and 1884.
During the first months of the conflict, the character of the war was strictly naval between
Peru and Chile. In October of 1879, however, the capture of Peru’s flagship, the monitor
Huáscar, dealt a deadly blow to the Peruvian navy, for the naval balance was now tilted in
Chile’s favor. With this naval superiority, Chile was able to quickly move north, capturing
almost the entire Atacama and Tarapacá regions in a matter of a few months, and before
the end of 1879563 [see infra Map 6]. In 1881, Lima was captured, unravelling a political
crisis in Peru that for almost three years saw two civilian governments, one supported by
the occupying Chilean force, and another “legitimate” one in hiding in the countryside.
Under the command of Andrés A. Cáceres, surviving Peruvian troops waged a “brokenbacked” war of attrition against the Chilean troops in Lima564—inflicting serious casualties
on them. In 1884, following the signing of a treaty of peace by Peru, Bolivia also officially
surrendered, thus putting an end to the purely military stage of the conflict.

563

For a good military account of the stages and campaigns of the war, see Sater, Andean Tragedy; and
Farcau, The Ten Cents War, pp. 47–117. See also Gabriele Esposito, Armies of the War of the Pacific,
1879–83: Chile, Peru and Bolivia (Osprey, 2016), pp. 7–18.
564

Farcau, The Ten Cents War, p. 171.

354

MAP 6 –– Main battles in the War of the Pacific (1879–1884).

Source: Gabriele Esposito, Armies of the War of the Pacific, 1879–83: Chile, Peru and Bolivia (Osprey, 2016), p. 11.
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A new period had opened with the occupation of Lima by the Chilean troops, for this
military presence soon turned into a fiscal, administrative, and moral burden for the Chilean
state. As historian Carmen Mc Evoy notably put it, the Chilean state was effectively
duplicated or “unfolded” onto the Peruvian space, thus creating an unprecedented situation
for the troops, officers, and those directing the war from Santiago.565 This heavy burden
was compounded by a growing tension between the civilian leadership back in the capital
city, and the military commanders on the field—who at some point acted as Chilean “proconsuls” in Lima.566
During Chile’s rule of Lima, three army veterans governed the enemy’s capital:
Manuel Baquedano, Cornelio Saavedra, and Pedro Lagos. However, it fell on Patricio
Lynch, a ruthless military commander of both the navy and the army, to continue the
operations against the Piérola “government in the shadows” and the irregular army
organized by Andrés Cáceres and still resisting in the countryside. Back in Santiago, the
new president Domingo Santa María, also felt a similar omnipotent power emanating from
the occupation and effective administration of the former enemy’s finances, governmental
activities, and—partly—even its foreign affairs. 567 This feeling of superiority led the
Chilean authorities to re-conceive of their role in the occupied territories as a “civilizing”
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mission, as if almost ordained by God, and to develop mythical tales about the war and its
campaigns as an epic, with heroes and martyrs.568
During this new phase of the war, the issue of the “civilized” conduct during war
rose to prominence. An important element to consider for exploring the taming of war in
the Pacific, therefore, is the issue of the treatment of prisoners as a relevant factor in the
conduct of the war itself. Unlike the case of the War of the Triple Alliance, the war between
Chile and its neighbors unfolded in an international context where the “laws of war” and
the “civilized” conduct of the belligerent armies was incipiently developed and more
widely accepted. During the 1879–1884 war, therefore, the Chilean political elite took upon
itself to protect the legitimacy of its cause by behaving according to the standards of the
“civilized nations” at the time. This included accepting the Lieber Code. In this context,
two elements became relevant for the war. One element pointed to the legal boundary
defining what type of combatant was included under the category of belligerent, and thus
also who could be considered as legally “protected” by certain rights and duties during war.
Another element pointed to the humane and legal treatment of prisoners of war. Those
combatants who did not respect these same rules and standards were considered as outside
the purview of the laws of war and were thus not granted the same treatment or rights
granted to others. In this non-protection fell upon those waging guerrilla or irregular war.
Beyond the Lieber Code, Chile and Bolivia also subscribed to the 1864 Geneva
Convention in July 1879, relevant for the treatment of those wounded in battle. Before their
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subscription, however, Peru had unilaterally signed the Convention, which was considered
at the time as a very risky decision for it would have bounded Peruvian troops to a selfrestraint that at the time had not been reciprocated by the enemy.569 Incorporated in each
belligerent army’s code of conduct, therefore, each country was compromised in the fair
and human treatment of the wounded and the prisoners of war. When the situation allowed
it, those wounded in battle had to be picked up and transported to medical unit for treatment
regardless of their nationality. These and other humanitarian dispositions were distributed
and publicized in Chile, for example, in a document titled El derecho de la guerra según
los últimos progresos de la civilización.570
Although these legal and normative regulations were practically applied only
inconsistently by the soldier on foot and the officer corps, it signals an incipient recognition
of the willingness of all the belligerents to incur in self-restraining behavior during war—
sometimes even unilaterally, as in the early case of Peru. Unlike the previous wars in the
continent, and in particular the Paraguayan War, the War of the Pacific took place in a
“thicker” normative international framework in which the three belligerent countries
voluntarily entered, procuring the creation of battle-ambulances, campaign hospitals, and
military chaplains. 571 The abundance of correspondence kept in the archives of all the
countries involved shows that the prisoners were, at least, not prohibited to communicate
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with their families and friends. Moreover, security was lax, as shown by the frequent
instances of prisoner escapes and breakouts.572 Although several excesses have been well
documented throughout the war, two episodes stand out above all: one is the Chilean
occupation of Lima in 1881 and the subsequent sacking and violation of property carried
out; and a second episode is the imprisonment of the interim Peruvian President and his
family, Francisco García Calderón, and his relocation to Chile after the war.573
Towards the end of the war, the occupation of Lima by Chilean troops and the
support for the puppet government of García Calderón for almost three years strained
Chile–Peru relations. From the countryside and the mountainous regions of Peru, Andrés
Cáceres, a hero of the war, continued to resist the Chilean occupation via guerrilla tactics
and irregular war. This tenacious resistance not only prolonged the presence of the Chilean
army in Lima, but also complicated the negotiation of a final peace treaty, for as long as
Cáceres presented battle, the government of García Calderón would remain overshadowed
by the parallel “legitimate” government of Nicolás de Piérola, which sided with Cáceres
and refused to capitulate.574 During the most bitter periods of the war, excesses were
reported by battlefield medics and surgeons, who after some battles found that certain
wounded soldiers had been killed. This is what some called at the time as “el repase,”
which consisted in the “review” of the field and the killing of those laying mortally
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wounded on the field. These episodes, however, were rare and occurred only sporadically
after some particularly bitter or hard-fought battle.575
The War of the Pacific, although brutal and with excesses as most wars in the 19th
century, cannot be categorically seen as a “war of extermination” or “all-out war,” for the
parties involved engaged in frequent capture and exchange of prisoners, treatment of the
wounded, and even conceded certain liberties of communication and mobility within the
cities occupied. As one historian put it, the key is “to distinguish between what happened
during battle from what occurred after.”576

Institutionalizing Order in the South Pacific
As the Chilean army approached Lima, two international efforts tried to further
institutionalize the war into commonly agreed and more pacific channels. Both initiatives,
however, were stillborn. The first effort was that of the United States, which in late 1880
tried to mediate in the war. The improvised and unprofessional cadres occupying the
diplomatic posts in Lima and Santiago, however, set in motion a negotiation that was bound
to fail given the multiple mistakes by the U.S. agents in bridging the two belligerents’
positions prior to the negotiations. The second effort came also in late 1880, as an initiative
by Colombia to summon a new “American Congress” in the style of the prior ones from
1826, 1848, 1856, and 1864. The simultaneous occupation of Lima prompted Chile to
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relentlessly undermine this international gathering by actively disincentivizing Central
American countries to participate or by trying to pre-arrange their objectives. Chile feared
that the Panama Congress invoked by Colombia would turn into a regional forum for
judging the Chilean occupation of Lima and its overall territorial gains secured as part of
the military victory over Peru and Bolivia. Argentina’s acceptance of the Colombian
invitation was the last reason needed by Chile to boycott the initiative.577
Before the end of the 19th century, therefore, the U.S. had a second opportunity to
reassert its international prestige as “the champion of peace in the Americas” after the
diplomatic debacle in the Paraguayan War. The role of the U.S. was initially driven by a
generic economic interest in securing the assets of U.S. citizens and companies located in
either of the belligerent countries. As the war progressed, however, Washington feared that
through Chile’s victory in the war interests of other European powers—mainly Great
Britain—were being served. This was deemed unacceptable by the U.S., for it clashed with
the U.S.’ interpretation of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. Popular opinion in the
U.S., reflected in the vast majority of newspapers, believed that the eventual defeat of Chile
was a certainty, however.578 Despite popular inclinations towards the allied cause (i.e., to
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Peru and Bolivia), the official U.S. government position at the very beginning of the
hostilities was one of “strict neutrality.”579
Although the economic interests of the U.S. in the South Pacific were small, much
like its economic interests in Paraguay and the River Plate basin earlier, the enormous
leverage that British and French companies enjoyed in the exploitation of the mineral trade
in the region, soon became an important source of concern for the U.S. in its quest for
reasserting its presence in the entire continent while also shielding the region from all
European strategic interests. As Millington put it, “[a]lthough certain European nations had
far more at stake in the Pacific War from an economic point of view, the United States
hastened to assume the lead as champion of neutral rights and as defender against
intervention.”580 The past effort at mediation by the U.S. in the war against Spain in 1871
had left a positive opinion of the U.S. in Chile and Peru. The U.S. tried, therefore, to cash
in that diplomatic check and reinvest it in the present war between the two former allies.
The U.S. position tried to reconcile the principles of the Monroe Doctrine with the
respect by the three belligerents of the rights of neutral commercial powers active in the
region.581 This came as a prime directive from the Secretary of States, William M. Evarts,
to the U.S. Minister in Peru, Isaac P. Christiancy, because as part of the military conflict
among these neighboring states, a parallel commercial war (potentially affecting sea trade
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routes) was quickly emerging. 582 As the war started to affect international trade and
property, pressure mounted in the U.S. to intervene in a more direct manner. But presented
with the options of mediation or military intervention, the Hayes administration decided
for the former.583
A critical development in the war, however, threatened this traditional plan for
mediation. Despite the popular support in the U.S. for this policy, U.S. ministers in Bolivia,
Peru, and Chile largely ignored such principles and, without waiting for official
authorization from Washington, issued promises and reassurances to the respective
governments to whom they had been deployed. They conveyed the impression that the U.S.
would support their causes if mediation was officially requested.584
As the conflict intensified and Peru’s early naval defeat represented a virtual
strategic loss, Peru and Bolivia started to seriously consider involving the U.S. into the
conflict as a way to constrain Chile. Chile, for its part, had accepted an early offer of
mediation from Great Britain, thus raising the stakes of the role of European powers as
influential diplomatic actors in the dispute.585 Therefore, Peru and Bolivia declined Great
Britain’s offer, in a clear gesture towards the U.S. The inflexibility of the U.S. commitment
to non-intervention, however, started to erode the confidence of the allies, as the Chilean
armed forces kept marching north towards Lima.586 When the Bolivian territory Atacama
and the Peruvian province Tarapacá were effectively occupied by Chile towards the end of
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1880, a new issue emerged for the would-be mediator. The U.S.’ hopes for a pacifying role
had become reliant on its ability to broker a peace treaty between the three belligerents that
could simultaneously reassure the return of these occupied regions to Bolivia and Peru.587
Onboard the U.S.S. Lackawanna, in October 1880, the representatives of Chile,
Peru and Bolivia met with the three U.S. Ministers accredited to each respective country.588
The U.S.-sponsored conference, however, had been arranged despite clear indications to
Isaac Christiancy by the Chilean President, Aníbal Pinto, that Chile was firm in its decision
not to concede the Atacama region (including the medianería with Bolivia), nor any of the
occupied Peruvian territories. Christiancy thought he could persuade Chile to rethink this
point while at the negotiating table. However, his failure to do so condemned the
Lackawanna conference to utter failure. After the meetings, in fact, each country issued
public memoranda putting the entire blame for the failure of the negotiations on the other
party. In this sense, the amateur approach by the U.S. agents had deepened, rather than
assuaged, Peru–Chile relations. In the U.S. itself, public opinion turned on the incumbent
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administration for, as an editorial of the New York Herald put it, “[t]he half-hearted attempt
[onboard the Lackawanna] made American diplomacy the laughing-stock of the South
American continent.”589
The failure of U.S. mediation left a clear road for Chile’s advance towards Lima
and reinforced its occupation of the Bolivian and Peruvian territories even further. The
subsequent occupation of Lima by Chilean troops in 1881 changed the tone of all future
negotiations entirely. For the parties involved, and above all for Peru, no other involvement
other than a forceful U.S. ultimatum to Chile would now be realistic. The balance of power
among the belligerents was so broken that Peruvian hopes were now placed on the promises
that were irresponsibly extended by the U.S. ministers some months before, but which were
now less realistic than when they were first uttered. In the U.S., incoming Secretary of
State, James G. Blaine (March 7, 1881), tried to further Evart’s policy of mediation in the
war but, unlike his predecessor, he interpreted the war as one of “Chilean aggression.”590
This implied a more interventionist view of mediation that the one dubbed in the U.S. as
“pugilistic diplomacy.”591
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With the occupation of Lima, chaos ensued and two Peruvian governments formed.
One was a collaborationist government supported by the occupying Chilean force, and was
led by García Calderón, while the other was established “in the shadows,” and was led by
Nicolás de Piérola.592 Christiancy one again acted in a controversial manner, recognizing
De Piérola’s government as the legitimate one. However, running against the Minister’s
advice, Blaine decided on its own account to officially recognize García Calderón’s
government instead. Behind Blaine’s assertiveness was a strong commitment to the
traditional policy of the Monroe Doctrine, through which he intended to thwart British
imperialism in South America. Since the perception in Washington was that Chile was
backed-up by Great Britain, a support for the collaborationist García Calderón in Lima was
expected to win the sympathies of Chile for the U.S. diplomatic efforts. However, the
appointment of new Ministers to Chile and Peru—Judson Kilpatrick and William H.
Hurlbut, respectively—created an embarrassing episode which would seal the fate of U.S.
mediation efforts in the war for good.
In an apparent miscommunication between Blaine and Hurlbut, the latter issued a
proposal to Chile indicating the U.S.’ willingness to concede to the Chilean demands for
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territory only if Peru could not pay an indemnity.593 Since this “offer” implied the adoption
of a semi-protectorate of Peru (at least in the handling of its foreign relations), the Chilean
government, enraged, rejected all proposals noting that South American countries could
very well resolve their disputes “without foreign tutelage.”594 After this incident, Blaine
term as Secretary of State was short-lived. He was soon replaced by Frederick
Frelinghuysen, who redressed Blaine’s more confrontational instructions issued to the
ministers in Chile and Peru.595 Two new ministers were appointed, and Chile became once
again free to impose on Peru the peace of the victors. In February 1882, the fate of Tarapacá
was finally sealed, becoming Chilean territory. In October, 1883, the Peruvian “guerrilla
army” was finally defeated and thus, free from all opposition, a final treaty of peace was
signed, effectively terminating the war. Soon after, Bolivia also agreed to an armistice and
signed separately “a truce” in 1884.596
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MAP 7 –– Main territorial gains for Chile in the War of the Pacific.

Source: Gabriele Esposito, Armies of the War of the Pacific, 1879–83: Chile, Peru and Bolivia (Osprey, 2016), p. 18.
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The victory for Chile was total. Its army had marched all the way north up to Peru,
occupying its capital for almost three years [see supra Map 7]. Bolivia, for its part, lost its
most western provinces, and with them as well all access to the Pacific Ocean. Although
Chile signed separate peace treaties with Peru and Bolivia, the final territorial and legal
arrangements would not be settled until 1929, when a final treaty sealed the fate of
Bolivia’s former Pacific provinces, and settled with Peru the most contentious aspects of
the Tacna and Arica dispute.597

Restraining Chile: Towards a Continental Pragmatic Solidarity
Unlike the previous two major armed conflicts in the region, which occurred almost
simultaneously in the mid-1860s, the Chilean victory in the War of the Pacific was
followed closely by all the neighboring states and even the United States. Chile’s
occupation of Bolivian and Peruvian territories far beyond the initially disputed zone of
medianería and the subsequent occupation and administrative control of Lima alarmed
Argentina—with whom Chile had a pending dispute over the Patagonia region. For
Colombia, who convoked the second Panama Congress in late 1880, the Chilean victory
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became an additional source of concern after the growing U.S. involvement in the Panama
Canal. Since one of the main topics in the agenda of the Congress was the issue of
permanent arbitration to negotiate regional disputes, the continental congress turned into
an important regional forum where both concerns could be debated and regional dynamics
of collaboration, solidarity, and resistance, could form.
Chile’s neighbors, despite their concern for its growth in power, did not rush to
form a counter-balancing coalition. Countries like Argentina and Peru, however, did try to
use the Panama Congress to create a common institutionalized front within which curtail
in legal and diplomatic ways the post-war gains made by Chile at Bolivia’s and Peru’s
expense. The Congress was successful in channeling a regional interest in establishing
“mandatory arbitration” as a formal practice in South America, but due to Peruvian and
Bolivian protests against Chile’s occupation, the whole issue was seen as extremely
sensitive by Chile’s officials as it would have been the main focus of the debate and
commentary by the rest of the region. Eventually, this sealed the fate of the Congress,
which had a poor beginning and an ignominious end. Delegates from all the invited states
either failed to arrive on time, or simply speculated and stalled, but never made it to the
meetings.598

598
See Colombia, Documentos referentes a la reunión en Panamá del Congreso Americano, iniciada y
promovida por el Gobierno de Colombia en favor de la institución del arbitraje (Bogotá: Rivas, 1881). See
also Burr, The Stillborn Panama Congress, pp. 87–11; Rafael Núñez, “El Congreso Internacional de
Panamá,” in La reforma política en Colombia: Colección de artículos publicados en “La Luz” de Bogotá,
“El Porvenir” y “El Impulso” de Cartagena, de 1878 a 1884 (Bogotá: La Luz, 1886), pp. 38–43; Gustavo
Otero Muñoz, Un hombre y una época: La vida azarosa de Rafael Núñez (Bogotá: Biblioteca de Historia
Nacional, Vol. LXXXIII, 1951); and Jesús M. Yepes, El Panamericanismo y el derecho internacional
(Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1930), pp. 90–104.

370

During the War of the Pacific, Colombia’s relations with Chile were strained by the
transfers of arms, munition, and other provisions, through the canal—then under
Colombian control. The chaotic and profoundly decentralized domestic front in Colombia
created “parallel diplomacies” by the Colombian national government and some of the
coastline states, further complicating the effectiveness of Chile in interrupting the flow of
war contraband in support of Peru during the Lima occupation.599
Argentina’s own growth in power across the Andes also raised Chile’s concern.
Argentina’s final solution to the tensions with Brazil over the arrangement of post-war
Paraguay allowed the government to refocus on its pending disputes with Chile, with whom
several rounds of negotiations in the course of the 1870s had produced no tangible results
on the Patagonia and Magellan Strait issues.600 Despite this growing tension, Argentina’s
foreign policy towards post-war Chile was resoundingly prudent and restrained. When the
Peruvian diplomacy reached out to suggest its incorporation to the “defensive” 1873 treaty
with Bolivia, Argentina could have dealt a devastating blow to Chile’s foreign policy,
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opening a second front that would have produced a complete strategic encirclement of
Chile by the end of the 1870s. It was the Brazilian timely reaction, as identified above, that
ultimately saved Chile from such a fate, for by confirming the existence of the “secret”
treaty to the Chilean agent in Buenos Aires, a new tacit alliance was born between Chile
and Brazil. The dynamic was simple: Brazil had an interest in seeing Chile remain powerful
after the War of the Pacific to help counter-balance Argentina’s growing influence in the
River Plate. Also, a more assertive Chile would help Brazil triangulate more favorably all
its negotiations with the Andean republics, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador, over the common
Amazonian borders.
And so, it was that, at the expense of the weaker states in the region, a strategic
triangle emerged in South America. The War of the Triple Alliance and the War of the
Pacific, in sum, forged a dual balance of power in the region by which the three countries
became local “great powers” and custodians of the status quo. Although the stabilization
of this balance created tensions in the transition to the 20th century, eliciting a naval arms
race between the three countries, it soon gave way to a three main improvements in the
quality of the region’s international affairs. First, it consolidated the internal and external
fronts of the three main actors in the region—thus, also, contributing to an overall
pacification of South America. Second, it made clear which states would bear the higher
costs and bear the heaviest burdens of “responsibility” for upholding the regional order.
And third, it cleared the way for an important—although imperfect—dynamic of
coordination under the notion of the “A.B.C.” triangle, which played a meaningful role in
several diplomatic initiatives in the Americas since the later 1890s, after Brazil’s transition
to the republican form of government. The importance of the Argentina–Brazil–Chile
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cooperation can be seen in the multiple initiatives in Central America and the Caribbean in
the 1910s and 1920s, as well as in the last major war of the Americas, the Chaco War
between Bolivia and Paraguay. It is also a tacit common understanding underpinning the
“May Pacts” between the three states, which offers voluntarily display of self-restraint by
three (at the time) competing, rising powers.601Lastly, it represented the last obstacle for
Brazil’s foreign policy to be finally “accepted” into the larger continental consensus of
Latin American republics. It thus helped solve one of Brazil’s most perennial problems of
the 19th century: its identity as an “American” country.602
One major issue, however, was left unaddressed in this new regional order. The two
weakest links in the South American chain, that is: the defeated countries in the previous
wars, viz. Bolivia and Paraguay, would come to challenge this entire diplomatic
architecture one last time. Their unresolved dispute over the ownership of the Chaco Boreal
region, problematically brewing in the background since the very end of the Paraguayan
War in 1870, escalated to war in the 1930s testing not only the strength and underlying
stability of the “society” of states forged under the A.B.C. triangulation of power, but also
the resolve of the United States and the newly-formed League of Nations, in their frantic
attempt at bringing the war to an end. This tension between a nascent international legal
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framework for conflict resolution, plus the resolute willingness of the United States to
intervene in the dispute, clashed with this incipient regional consensus among South
American nations interested in finding their own solutions to their own problems.

Testing Alternative Explanations
The case of the War of the Pacific offers another chance to evaluate many of the competing
hypotheses identified in this dissertation. In relation to the three mechanisms associated to
the international society approach (H1), six alternative approaches (H2–H7) offer a set of
contrasting interpretations of the chained causal-mechanisms that may have affected the
progressive reduction of conflict and consolidation of regional order in South America in
the 1880s. An exploration of the contrast between each hypothesis’ case-specific
“predictions” and the historical record is required to evaluate the strength or weakness of
all the competing arguments, including the main one (H1).

H2: The U.S. as a Regional Hegemonic Stabilizer
The role of the United States in limiting war and institutionalizing regional peace is
premised on two background conditions: its preponderance of power and its willingness to
lead. Both conditions are met for the present case. Passing the “hoop text,” therefore,
allows one to continue with an evaluation of the distinctive case-specific predictions. In
relation to the expectations of the “suppression of war,” the first causal-mechanism, the
War of the Pacific shows that not only the United States failed to prevent, ameliorate, or
terminate the war, but actually it helped incentivize the Chilean advancement in late 1880.
The diplomatic performance of the U.S. agents in each of the countries involved shows that
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U.S. diplomacy was uncoordinated, unprofessional, and irresponsible. While the agents in
Peru and Bolivia gave false impressions of a determined U.S. support to their host
governments, thus defying the main foreign-policy stance outlined by the Department of
State, the interaction with the U.S. agent in Santiago made the negotiations onboard the
U.S.S. Lackawanna stillborn and with no real chances of success. This blunder made the
Peru–Chile bilateral relations even more antagonistic, while also damaging the U.S.
reputation as a “broker of peace” in the process.
On the issue of institutionalization of order, the sudden change of Secretary of State
in Washington, precipitated in part by the assassination of the U.S. President, but also by
the lack of regional expertise of the Secretary of States themselves, produced a similar end
result as in the previous War of the Triple Alliance. In the War of the Pacific, however,
some of the belligerents (Peru and Bolivia) readily accepted the U.S. offer of mediation—
whereas in the Paraguayan War none of the contenders, including López, accepted the
legitimacy of the U.S. ambition to arbitrate the dispute. Furthermore, the British diplomatic
backing of Chile’s foreign policy in the war triggered U.S. concerns about the Monroe
Doctrine which ultimately undermined its position as an impartial regional moderator. The
Chilean, Peruvian, and Bolivian interpretations of the Doctrine were substantially more
multilateral than the unilateral view defended by Washington. While the former signaled
assistance, collaboration, and solidarity, the latter implied tutelage and imposition. In sum,
while the expectation of U.S. “suppression of war” was tried out in practice, it failed to
deliver its intended effects.
The third prediction in the H2 argument indicates that the belligerents will flock in
solidarity under the hegemon’s wings for protection from one another. Of the three states
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involved, only two looked for the Washington for protection. However, this coincided with
the downturn in the military balance, thus indicating that only the losing side tried to open
the door to the U.S. involvement in the dispute. Chile, however, theoretically on the losing
side before the outbreak of hostilities and threatened from two fronts, did not seek an early
rapprochement with the U.S., and instead appeased Argentina with important concessions
over the Patagonia dispute, and moved on to secure the tacit collaboration of Brazil to
contain both Argentina and the other neighboring Andean nations. As indicated by Sater
and other historians, as well, Chile and the U.S. were early rivals in the South Pacific since
the closing of the Guano War. The inaction of the U.S. navy during the Spanish
bombardment of Valparaíso during that war had left an indelible impression in the Chilean
elite that a solid foreign policy could not rest on the U.S. for support. If the Monroe
Doctrine was to be upheld, it was Chile itself who should do it. In conclusion, the H2
generates three very “unique” predictions, which do not find high “certitude” in the socalled facts of the case.

H3: A “Pacific” Balance of Power
The second alternative hypothesis is concerned with the balance of power (H3) as
understood in traditional power-political terms. Since the publication of Robert N. Burr’s
classic studies of Chile’s foreign policy during the 19th century, a multitude of Chilean
historians and foreign affairs experts normally take the idea of Chile as “the champion of
the balance of power” in South America as a given. A closer reading of these key studies,
however, reveals that the idea of “equilibrium” or “balance” in Burr’s work is not treated
as an outcome—that is, as an expectation of a situation among states—but as an idea in the
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minds of those individuals in power, taking decisions, and using this principle as a guiding
compass. This, therefore, indicates that Burr’s diplomatic history supports the international
society interpretation of the balance of power, instead of the contemporary “Realist”
approach to IR. Put differently, 19th century Chile is not a “posterchild” for offensive
realism, as delineated by John J. Mearsheimer, nor even a model defensive realist state, as
originally suggested by Kenneth Waltz.
Contrary to such realist perspectives’ expectations, Chile pursued a rather
restrained foreign policy for most of its history. While it is certainly true that Chile
occupied and maintained territories previously undisputed, from Bolivia and Peru alike, it
is also true that the war was thrust upon it by the reckless and fearful Peru–Bolivian
diplomatic arrangements, who tried to encircle Chile by reaching out to Argentina and the
U.S. to reduce Chile’s power to a minimum expression. It is also correct to notice that the
source of Bolivia’s international troubles, repeatedly losing parts of its territory throughout
the 19th century, is more directly associated to its own domestic anarchy and chronic
caudillo in-fighting than to the rapacious behavior of its neighbors. Diplomacy matters.
Yet, in order to exercise an effective defense of a country’s interests and values, domestic
order had to be a reality first.
Burr’s work, therefore, makes any discussion about the presence of the H3
background conditions quite unnecessary. Both Bolivia and Chile felt mortally threatened
in the 1860s, after the costly victory over Spain—from which Bolivia came out almost
unaffected. Chile, on the other hand, had learned an invaluable lesson about unabashed,
principled “Americanist” solidarism: a lesson which the same Chilean leadership that had
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presided over the Spanish aggression to Peru and Chile (of the likes of Santa María, Pinto,
Vicuña Mackenna, Lastarria, etc.) did not fail to remember a decade later.
In this context, the H3 generates three discrete predictions. First, the expectation of
“war” as a regulating mechanism among mutually-fearing neighbors. This is a prediction
shared in part with other approaches, so it adds little value to its explanatory strength (cf.
H1). It simply passes the “smoking-gun” test. The expectation of “mutual fear” as a
potential driver of regional institutionalization, however, does entail a higher degree of
uniqueness in this case. The “facts of the case” seem to strongly support this second
prediction, as exemplified in Bolivia’s post-1866 foreign behavior and the Peru-Bolivia
alliance of 1873. Both efforts were clearly driven by the fear of Chilean growing economic
interests (and population!) in the zone of medianería. Peru feared not just for its traditional
ally, Bolivia, but also for its own guano and sodium nitrate export markets which contained
enormous economic potential.603 Fear also seems to have driven Chile into the appeasing
of Argentina particularly on the Patagonia issue, in order to deal with the more immediate
and concerning threat from Bolivia’s expropriation and Peru’s naval and commercial
rivalry.
The case seems to corroborate one of the first two predictions of the balance of
power approach. Since this is a highly “unique” prediction, its explanatory power is
partially strengthened. The third prediction, related to the formation of “dynamic”
alliances, is also unique, but finds only partial support in the case-study. The “dynamic”

603

A recent study found that, had Peru and Bolivia not lost their territories to Chile in the war, their
“government revenues could have been at least double their historical levels” today. See Richard Sicotte,
Catalina Vizcarra and Kirsten Wandschneider, “The Fiscal Impact of the War of the Pacific,” Cliometrica,
Vol. 3 (2009), p. 97–121.

378

element alludes to the fact that in a purely power-political region, states can only form a
system, yet not a society, of states. One of the main reasons is that in a realist context, states
can only “afford” to be shortsightedly self-centered. The decentralized condition of their
environment rewards only that kind of behavior. This also implies that when alliances form,
a dynamic component will play an important role: that is, today’s friends will be tomorrows
enemies. Thus, predictable geopolitical patterns should not emerge in the region, for
although geography does not change, the interests of states do.
In the War of the Pacific, however, this highly unique expectation seems to run
against the rather patterned set of alliances at play. The Chile–Brazil–Ecuador group tends
to counter-balance the Argentina–Peru–Bolivia one in a semi-geopolitical fashion. That is,
partly determined by their geo-spatial placement in the region system of states. In the H1
approach, on the contrary, the alliances are expected to partially follow a geographical
factor or proximity that is correlated with a sense of proximity ins values and interests as
well. In the H1, therefore, alliances are better understood as patterns of “pragmatic
solidarism” determined by the confluence of a common interest in order—not just by
mutual fear of a common threat.

H4: Geopolitics of the South Pacific
The geopolitical hypothesis (H4) is premised on a rather static set of patterns that should
endure as long as the geography does not vary. The War of the Pacific, paradoxically,
shows that rather than an obstacle to war, the vast arid deserts over which the war was
fought, were readily bypassed by Chile’s early achievement of supremacy at sea. This
allowed Chile to mobilize troops directly to distant ports and key strategic places—
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including Lima—without having to suffer the full operational caos of the inhospitable
Atacama and Antofagasta deserts. Peruvian and Bolivian forces, however, were
constrained to land operations, which they failed miserably to coordinate or employ
effectively.
In this context, the two background conditions of H4 are met, for the topography
did present serious obstacles for war operations, and in this sense the costs seemed to
outweigh the benefits. Nevertheless, both Chilean and allied forces managed to mobilize
and battle over a vast open space, with little technological advantages, and even without
some basic supplies, like water or proper medical equipment. The “facts of the case,”
therefore, seem not to support the first prediction: that of the impossibility of war.
Secondly, only minor efforts were made to prevent the war or attenuate its effects by
appealing to regional formal institutions. The Panama Congress of 1880 was proposed by
Colombia, not Peru or Bolivia, and it was never directly aimed at stopping the War of the
Pacific, but in fact it was invoked to consider the status of “mandatory arbitration” in the
Americas—aimed, at the same time, to the developments in the Panama Canal. It only
became an option for Peru when the U.S. mediation failed and its capital was on the verge
of falling into the invading Chilean troops. Yet, this effort was ultimately unsuccessfully.
Perhaps the most important contribution from the H4 argument is the element of
geographically-driven alliance patterns. Contrary to H1, these alliances are completely
determined by geography, which gives to this prediction a stronger level of uniqueness.
The idea of shatterbelts and checkerboards, in fact, does seem to explain quite well the
patterns of alliances formed prior and during the war.

380

H5: Common Culture
The H5 hypothesis is premised on two background conditions, which are only partially
met. The idea of a common legacy of anti-imperialism is certainly a factor in understanding
the war; however, when employed, it seems to lead to the opposite effect. Instead of acting
as a coalescing and moderating force, its acted as a catalyzer for war. Historians and experts
who have written about the war from an anti-imperialist perspective, such as Bonilla,
Mayo, Amayo, and others, in fact invoke either British or U.S. “imperialism” as a
motivating force for Chile and Peru respectively to push the other side further down the
path to war. Foreign capital and commercial interests, the argument goes, made each
country’s government greedy to expand into a largely unexploited region where abundant
strategic resources were accessible and unprotected. In this narrative, anti-imperialism
played no ameliorating role at all.
Interestingly, it was the U.S., and not any of the involved states, who via its
unilateral interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine during Blaine’s tenure in the Department
of State, tried to cast Chile’s victory as the servant of British interests. With the U.S. failure
to mediate and the short-lived administration of Blaine himself, the initiative receded into
the background—and so did the relative explanatory strength of the H5 hypothesis. Beyond
the U.S., neither Argentina or Brazil, nor any other powers in the region, behaved according
to the three main expectations of this approach. For example, no international effort was
made to “eradicate war” from the region. Chile’s growth in power raised alarms among its
neighbors, but neither war itself nor foreign imperialism were seen as the real source of the
problem. The second prediction, that of a push for unification, also did not obtain, for the
factor of regional common-cultural “solidarity” did not play a significant role. The absence
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of a direct extra-regional aggressor, as in the Guano War case, helped undermine its effects.
Furthermore, the War of the Pacific was par excellence a war for resources among fellow
South American neighbors. Despite certain interpretations to the contrary, there was no
one to blame but the belligerents themselves both for unleashing an international war with
unpredictable consequences as well as for failing to prevent it in time.

H6: State-Strength and Weakness
The argument in H6 suggests that patterns of regional order in South America are mainly
driven by state-strength/weakness dynamics. The background conditions do seem to
obtain, for all actors involved suffered in one degree or another of domestic constraints and
thus generated security externalities onto one another. This argument is perhaps at its
strongest when analyzing the 1866 treaty of medianería subscribed by Chile and Peru under
a very particular moment in the region. More importantly, these are highly unique
predictions, for which the level of certitude could potentially be a key determinant of the
whole argument’s strength.
When confronted with the historical case, however, these very promising
background conditions fall short of delivering a “highly certain” (or “doubly-decisive
test”). The first prediction, for instance, points to the “incapacity” to wage war. Yet, both
Chile and Peru, crippled by domestic crises at the time, managed to organize in relatively
short period and practice large-scale war for at least one year—until Peru’s loss of the
Huáscar towards the end of 1879. This seems to indicate two things. On one hand, that
even poor and crisis-stricken states can mobilize and practice international war; but on the
other, that these same weak states will only be able to wage high-stakes war efficiently for

382

either very short periods of time, or by intermittent “chapters”—just like the War of the
Triple Alliance. The Peruvian resistance, coupled with Chile’s capacity to secure an early
naval superiority yet failing to “finish off” the irregular army of Andrés A. Cáceres or direct
a campaign across the Andes to La Paz, demonstrate that international war among weakstates can actually prolong, rather than muffle or diffuse, war. It is only moderately
comforting, at least, that in their shared condition all belligerents were sensitive to the
standards of “civilization” of the time, which in turn, helped practice some modicum of
restraint during the actual conduct of the war. Less optimistic, perhaps, is the
acknowledgement of the fact that the same “civilizational” standards also set the rules of
the games (of war) for the belligerents, and in that, also sanctioned and legitimized certain
forms of violence—instead of none.
In this framework, the second prediction of institutionalization as supplementary to
the inability of states to contain problematic neighbors, offers at least a partial
interpretation of the case. Bolivia, the most unstable and erratic of the countries involved
in the war, quickly becomes the center of the whole drama. It was Bolivia’s rebellious
domestic (dis-)order which generated capricious and unchecked leaders, such as Mariano
Melgarejo, who drove Bolivia into the abyss. It was his successors, too, who sparked no
only the ambitions of entrepreneurial Chilean interests into the Antofagasta region, but also
the clumsy treaties and agreements which were later dishonored by Hilarión Daza in 1878.
Bolivia is, for this case, the problematic weak-neighbor par excellence. However, Chile,
who also was transitioning a period of internal fiscal constraint and popular unrest, was
able to perform much better than Bolivia or Peru—showing and interest variance across
weak-states. Chile’s more solid, institutional domestic political order allowed its leadership
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to strategize with an eye on the long-term, thus negotiating the right kind of deals with
specific neighbors, at the right time. This, moreover, helped Chile overcome what was,
otherwise, an objective disadvantage in pure power (material) terms.
The fateful 1873 treaty, which contemporary historians “blame” for the War of the
Pacific, when seen under this light seems to indicate a validation of the H6 hypothesis in
terms of Bolivia’s and Peru’s attempts at avoiding the externalities that they themselves
were producing for Chile. Peru’s externality came from its own sodium nitrates bonanza,
which further incentivized Chile to develop its own. Bolivia’s externality, too, through the
strange and unstable medianería pact of 1866, and mended in 1872 and 1874, and the
virtual “free hand” that is produced for Chile within the shared zone itself. Bolivia’s failure
in handling the dual need of extricating more benefits from the Antofagasta mines without
antagonizing Chile is what, in the end, caused the war—instead of preventing it. As it
seems, the factor of the quality of a country’s diplomacy and political leadership was key.

H7: A “Liberal Peace” in the South Pacific?
The final alternative hypothesis articulates three specific predictions, premised on two
distinctive conditions. It expects that when the Liberal values, like republicanism, freetrade, and (Liberal) institutions are present, they will converge in three ways: first, by an
inter-republican eradication of war; second, by the construction of Liberal institutions to
help maintain and protect this “separate” peace; and third, by displaying solidarity among
republican democracies. In the case at hand, only Chile could be regarded as a republic—
according to the standards of the time. Neither Bolivia nor Peru had any substantial
republican form of government. As pointed out above, Bolivia was ruled by alternating
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caudillos bárbaros who governed with an iron fist and sought mainly political survival.
Peru was only “democratic” in a superficial sort of way, with recurring military leaders,
like Mariano I. Prado in the late 1870s, giving way to other civilian—but equally
undemocratic—leaders like Nicolás de Piérola in the early 1880s.
Although the predictions of H7 do not seem to offer any important information
about the case, it is relevant to point out that “the masses”—as it was often put—did played
a role in how political opposition managed to put pressure on the incumbent
administration—particularly in Chile. In Peru and Bolivia, public opinion also mattered,
but in a more uncontrolled or un-channeled way, for there were no strong political
opposition to capitalize on it. Thus, political opponents often recurred to violence to
remove from office their political rivals, instead of Congress or wait for the next round of
elections.
In conclusion, a related theme: that of sameness of type of regime, seems to have
played no role in how Chile and Brazil came to forge their implicit alliance. Thanks for
this important linkage between one Pacific and one Atlantic power, South America was
able to overcome one of the traditional patterns of earlier periods. It was the first time states
from different margins of the continent established a non-confrontational relation. As
pointed out above, this was Brazil’s baptism of fire which officially introduced it to the
regional “society” of states in South America. Chile’s induction allowed Brazil to begin to
play a more stabilizing and assertive role in the 20th century and, most distinctively,
actively participate in regional congresses and conferences for the very first time in the
history of the Americas.
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Some Preliminary Conclusions
The War of the Pacific is an important chapter in the history of South America’s society of
states. Its unfolding during the 1879–1884 period is deeply rooted in several decades of
rivalry and cooperation between the same countries. Allies in the 1810 in their common
struggle for independence against Spain, then enemies in the late 1830s, and then again
allies in their “second war of independence” in the 1860s. During the 1870s, intra-regional
dynamics of state- and nation-consolidation interacted with new discoveries of strategic
resources in a common space connecting geographical the three states to one another as
well as to the Pacific Ocean. Internal dynamics, as well, spiraled out of control producing
a pervasive cycle of mutual fear and security externalities, which eventually sparked in a
war between Chile and the alliance Peru–Bolivia. The circle was complete, beginning in
the 1830s, it relied upon Chile once again to disjoint the two allies in the 1870s.
Those involved directly in the war, as well as those observing from the sidelines,
picked up valuable lessons from the war. Chile, for example, found in Brazil an important
ally with whom, thanks to not sharing any common borders, it was easy to find common
ground in constraining Argentina and Peru. Moreover, its experience during the occupation
of Lima also left the indelible impression of the costs of war—even when victorious! The
“unfolding” of the Chilean state onto Peru’s territory created fiscal, administrative, and
moral burdens on Chile which deeply affected the post-war “return to normalcy.”
Argentina and Brazil, over their tense negotiations in post-war Asunción, experienced a
similar learning process. In both instances, the victorious occupants counted the minutes
and the seconds to leave their unwelcoming hosts.
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It became clear for all South American states that, even when victorious, large-scale
international war was more a burden than a tangible asset. It created a more fervent
domestic opposition, in was opposed by the independent press, and it was more often than
not condemned internationally. Further, it opened the regional door to unwelcomed
powers, like the United States, to extend their “good offices” and international mediation.
Well socialized by the recent common struggle against Spanish and Portuguese rule,
however, South American elites and public intellectuals soon learned the best way to avoid
external meddling and interference was to have their house in order: both domestically and
regionally.
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CHAPTER 5

THE STRUGGLE FOR ORDER:
WAR AND PEACE IN THE CHACO BOREAL, 1928–1939

Atención pido al silencio
Y silencio a la atención,
Que voy en esta ocasión,
Si me ayuda la memoria,
A mostrarles que a mi historia
Le faltaba lo mejor.604

Of all the wars in Latin America, the Chaco War is the most relevant one. Its importance
is not given by the number of casualties produced, the size of the territory that was lost or
gained, or the duration of the conflict itself. On that regard, in fact, it was quite a
prototypical South American war. The distinctive factor of the Chaco War is that it was the
last major armed conflict between states in the continent. It is, in other words, a tipping
point in the history of the entire region—a history with a plethora of lessons learned.
The Chaco War also represents the clash between the two weakest countries in the
region in terms of military and economic power. After its territorial losses in the war with
Chile, confirmed by the 1884 “Pact of Truce,” Bolivia became a land-locked country
almost overnight. Its particular topography, making it simultaneously an Andean and a
valley country, had always made it difficult for either La Paz or Santa Cruz, the two main
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centers of power, to reach the littoral region with infrastructure, people, or goods. Its ports
on the Pacific Ocean, however, were incipient centers of commercial activity together with
some Peruvian ports to the north. After the loss of this territory, Bolivia was left with two
uneven options: since sparking a new war with Chile was—for the foreseeable future—
ruled out, the only realistic option for Bolivia at the turn of the century was to search for
an outlet to the Atlantic Ocean through the Paraguay River.605
Paraguay, for its part, defeated in the War of the Triple Alliance, was forced to
abandon its former territorial claims in favor of Brazil and Argentina, and become a de
facto “buffer state” between both neighbors. Post-war Paraguay, therefore, returned to a
more traditional moderate and isolationist foreign policy of its earlier decades in the 19th
century. Powerful Argentine and Brazilian commercial interests penetrated the country in
the second half of the 19th century, further deepening its dependence on foreign trade and
investments for its productivity and growth.
In this context, the present chapter explores the war between Bolivia and Paraguay
from the international society perspective, making focus on three key causal-mechanism
related, first, to the sources of restraint and moderation in war, and the taming of the use
of force; second, to the progressive institutionalization of regional order; and lastly, to the
consolidation of a “pragmatic” version of solidarism among South American states which
is different from the more traditional view of “Bolivarian solidarism” most popularly
association to Pan-Americanism and inter-American unity.
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The Historical Context of the Chaco Dispute
The origins of the war are firmly set in the mid-19th century before Paraguay’s defeat at
the hands of the Triple Alliance and Bolivia’s defeat in the War of the Pacific. Although
both of these wars had a more immediate effect on the Paraguayan and Bolivian foreignpolicy objectives in the early 20th century, the first source of concern by both states about
the Chaco Boreal region emerged out of a treaty signed in 1852 between Paraguay and the
Confederated Provinces of Argentina. Part of the agreement specifically stated that
Paraguay owned its homonymous river “from bank to bank,” thus casting a shadow of
doubt on Bolivia’s official borders with Paraguay over that river. Although Bolivia issued
several protests and demanded an official clarification, Argentina’s own internal
convulsions at the time between the Confederated Provinces, led by Justo J. de Urquiza,
and Buenos Aires, led by Bartolomé Mitre, postponed a final resolution of the dispute until
the mid-1860s.
During the War of the Triple Alliance (1864–1870), Bolivia maintained a vigilant
eye on the fate of Paraguay. Months into the war, the Bolivian President, Mariano
Melgarejo, not only extended its personal sympathies to Francisco S. López, the
Paraguayan President, but also offered him military support in the form of 12,000 soldiers
and “an offensive alliance against the common enemy.”606 At this time, Bolivia was not
yet part of the Quadruple Alliance against Spain, so the possibilities for Melgarejo to join
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forces with López was a real one.607 In January 1865, the Paraguayan Minister of Foreign
Affairs, José Berges, wrote to Aniceto Arce, the Bolivian representative in Asunción,
insinuating that Paraguayan troops were ready to initiate an offensive on the Brazilian
province of Mato Grosso and that this was perhaps “a propitious moment” for Bolivia to
revindicate its territories and rights usurped by Brazil in this area. “It is about time that we
understand each other on this issue and that you have ports on the Paraguay River.”608 After
a hiatus of several months, explained by the difficulties of communication in the area
between both countries, Arce replied in mid-October, congratulating “Paraguay’s heroic
struggle.”609 The pressing Bolivian concern for the unsettled border with Chile, which was
pushing both countries to the verge of war, was abruptly solved by Melgarejo’s pact of
medianería and the adherence to the Quadruple Alliance against Spain. Although
Melgarejo remained in power until January of 1871, no official reply to Berges’ proposal
nor follow-up conversation about the promised 12,000-strong column was ever issued.
In the course of the war, Bolivia extended to Paraguay and all the members of the
Triple Alliance its offer of mediation in conjunction with Chile and Peru. 610 After the
publication of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance in March of 1866, Bolivia joined its allies
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in issuing an official protest to the governments of the Triple Alliance concerning the
content of certain provisions and articles included in the treaty. In particular, Bolivia
expressed concern about the projected re-distribution of Paraguay’s eastern territories after
the war.611 Rufino de Elizalde, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, true to his style,
stalled with promises and reassurances that Bolivia’s rights on the west bank of the river
would be protected.612
Over the course of the second half of the 19th century, therefore, Bolivia followed
closely the Argentine–Brazilian execution of the Treaty of Triple Alliance. To further
assuage Melgarejo’s anxieties, in February of 1867, the Brazilian Empire commissioned
Felipe Lópes Neto to La Paz to broker an agreement on the portion of the post-war
settlement concerning both countries. In less than two months, the crafty negotiator
managed to sign a treaty of limits, commerce, and navigation that sealed another territorial
loss for Bolivia—this time on the northern fraction of the River Paraguay.613 The Bolivia–
Brazil rapprochement infuriated López, who now regarded Melgarejo with disappointment
and contempt.614
In June 1867, Bolivia sent Quintín Quevedo to the River Plate republics and Brazil
to follow the allies’ negotiations more closely, as the end of the war was becoming clearer.
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The Bolivian diplomacy became increasingly active once López’s death in Cerro Corá was
confirmed, and the articles of the Triple Alliance entered into effect. In 1872, therefore,
Mariano Reyes Cardona was commissioned as new plenipotentiary and special envoy to
Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, in order to try to involve Bolivia in the post-war
negotiations. Facing the resistance of Carlos Tejedor, the new Argentine Minister of
Foreign Affairs in the Sarmiento administration, Bolivia turned to Río de Janeiro, where
he found only word of reassurance that the stipulations of the treaty of alliance would not
damage the interest of Bolivia over the Chaco region. Not yet satisfied with the allies’
verbal promises, Reyes Cardona wrote to Salvador Jovellanos, the new Paraguayan
President, saying:
The Chaco question cannot be negotiated between [Argentina] and Paraguay, with the
exclusion of Bolivia, without making the treaty radically nulled and compromising the
bilateral relations between my Government and Yours. No man of common sense could
entertain the possibility of a final territorial agreement disputed among three nations that
is carried out without the presence of all three.615

Despite the numerous efforts of Quevedo and Reyes Cardona, nothing tangible was
achieved by Bolivia. Without Bolivia at the negotiating table, Argentina and Paraguay
reached an agreement on February 3, 1876. The region known as “Chaco Boreal” was
divided into three sections. The “Central Chaco,” between the rivers Bermejo and
Pilcomayo, was conceded to Argentina [see infra Maps 8 and 9].
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MAP 8 –– The Chaco Boreal region.

Source: Ann Zulawski, Unequal Cures: Public Health and Political Change in Bolivia, 1900–1950 (Duke University Press,
2007), p. 55.
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MAP 9 –– The Chaco War: Main forts and territorial lines (1907–1938).

Source: Bryce Wood, The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932–1942 (Columbia University Press, 1966), Appendix.
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The treaty also stated that Argentina officially abandoned any claim to the Bahía Negra
port (in the north) and the Verde River (in the center) [see supra MAPS 8 and 9]. The rest
of the territory between that point and the Pilcomayo River would be deferred to the
arbitration of the U.S. President, Rutherford B. Hayes. Although Bolivia tried to pass a
memorandum to re-ascertain its rights on the Chaco Boreal region, the Secretary of States,
William Evarts, refused to include the Bolivian petition as valid documentation. On
November 12, 1878, Hayes issued his final decision: Paraguay would have legal rights to
the entire area between the Verde and Pilcomayo rivers. This also included the Villa
Occidental, formerly owned and controlled by Argentine commercial interests.
By 1879, therefore, Paraguay had affirmed all its territorial borders with its main
neighbors—except Bolivia. But given the outbreak of the War of the Pacific, between Chile
and the alliance Bolivia–Peru, a treaty of limits between Bolivia and Paraguay was
eventually approved by Hilarión Daza, the Bolivian President, and signed on October 15,
1879. Between this year and 1894, numerous treaties and protocols were agreed and then
not ratified by one or both of the respective congresses, thus postponing the definition of
the frontier between Bolivia and Paraguay into the 20th century.616
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At the turn of the century, Paraguay and Bolivia had settled all their international
borders with their respective neighbors, except with each other. In the case of Paraguay,
the country had been achieved this moderate progress despite extreme internal and
diplomatic conditions generated by the prolonged occupation and the fiscal constraints
produced by the war with the Triple Alliance. In the case of Bolivia, the resolution of its
international borders had come via defeat in war, after the loss of an outlet to the Pacific
Ocean and the entire region of Antofagasta—rich in guano and sodium nitrates. The
importance of this territorial loss is evidenced by the fact that after the War of the Pacific,
and until the end of the century, more than half of Chile’s governmental revenue came from
the exportation of minerals produced in former Bolivian and Peruvian territories.617

The Chaco War: The Final Lesson
In this general historical context, it is important to explore the Chaco War from three interrelated perspectives. First, from the diplomatic point of view, related to the pre-1932 efforts
in preventing the conflict. Second, from the more military-political angle, related to the
conduct of the war itself. Diplomatic efforts by other South American countries continued
in parallel to those of the United States and the League of Nations. All of these initiatives
were ultimately ineffective in stopping the war between 1932 and 1935; however, the
combination of politico-economic exhaustion by the belligerents and the relentless efforts
of the neighboring countries (the A.B.C.P group) ultimately made an armistice possible in
June, 1935. Lastly, the chapter explores the angle of “pragmatic solidarity” among South
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American nations and contrasts it with the U.S.-led effort under the doctrine of the “GoodNeighbor” policy to invoke Pan-Americanism and the Monroe Doctrine as a hemispheric
basis for collaboration and intra-hemispheric peace.
Discussions about the causes of the Chaco War have always been surrounded by
impassioned rhetoric and polemics. Part of the reason for this is that many of the individuals
involved in the peace negotiations before, during, and after the war wrote memoirs and
pamphlets, and revealed private documentation that expressed some of their own personal
as well as national idiosyncrasies. It should come as no surprise, for example, that in both
countries there still exists a strong national sentiment of having lost the war. In Bolivia and
Paraguay, moreover, there is a general impression that succeeding administrations during
the 1930s made either military or diplomatic blunders that lost them the war on the battle
field or the negotiating table, respectively.
The voluminous literature on the war, therefore, tends to focus either on the military
aspects of the war,618 or the equally long period of peace negotiations that followed it.619
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However, few scholars have produced synthesizing accounts of the war from a more
holistic perspective. 620 The existing literature, most commonly produced in Bolivia,
Paraguay, or Argentina, is largely out-of-print today and access to some of the primary
documentation is difficult even for those living in these countries. Similarly, there is very
little academic production in English or in other languages beyond Spanish, that makes the
study of the Chaco War (1932–1935) and its subsequent Peace Conference (1935–1938)
quite a taxing process.621
Since the deepest roots of the dispute over the Chaco Boreal can be traced as further
back as the colonial period, when the Spanish “Royal Audiencia of Charcas” exercised
jurisdiction over the entire area, many legal experts from Paraguay and Bolivia made
important contributions to thicken the files that both countries used to employ to legally
justify possession, control, or jurisdiction over the Chaco Boreal. These experts, however,
colloquially dubbed “doctores del Chaco” (or “Ph.D.s in the Chaco Question”), have been
unable to overcome the basic limitations of the uti possidetis principle in the Americas:
that is, the problem of overlapping credentials and documents.622
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The main discussions about the causes of the Chaco War, therefore, have typically
centered on the more contemporaneous disputes about the competition for the placement
of small garrisons or out-posts, called fortines, over the vast 297,000 km2 uninhabited space
of the Chaco Boreal. The climate is extremely hostile throughout the year, alternating from
arid, scorching-hot and dry weather between May and November, to swampy, mosquitoinfested and densely humid throughout the rest of the year. Seasonal tropical storms flood
the central and eastern plains, whereas the sloping western region irrigate the windy areas
of the valley. As a prominent Bolivian historian graphically put it, the interior Chaco
alternates between “an ocean of mud” and “an ocean of fire.”623 Parts of the eastern Chaco,
however, were crucially important for Paraguay. 624 In this largely inhospitable region,
Bolivia and Paraguay, two of the poorest countries at the beginning of the century, clashed
over the effective control of those few areas most susceptible to become arable lands,
located near or around sources of fresh water.
The traditional historical accounts, therefore, put the responsibility of the war in the
expansionist ambitions of both countries. Those who blame Bolivia, for example, point to
the perennial quest for a port as an outlet to the Atlantic Ocean via the Paraguay River.625
Those others who see Paraguay as the main culprit, however, point to Paraguay’s
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nationalism, reinvigorated in the earliest decades of the 20th century by the indirect cultural
and political patronage of Argentina. 626 Some historians place the responsibility in the
Bolivian oil fields, located on its valley region in the western part of the disputed Chaco
area. The expectations of finding more oil in the rest of the Chaco Boreal, according to this
view, propelled both countries to compete for its control and occupation.627 A popular
hypothesis proposed by Argentine, Brazilian, and Paraguayan authors, reverses the
argument and suggests that it was Bolivia’s ambition for oil what precipitated the war.628
More drastically, some authors point to the role of international oil corporations, like the
Standard Oil Co. and the Dutch Schell Co., as “master puppeteers” behind both countries’
interests in the Chaco. These multinational corporations are viewed as pushing Bolivia to
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war in the late 1920s over control of a potentially oil-rich area. In this view, it is
imperialism, not local national ambitions, what caused the war.629
The Chaco War spanned two years and nine months (September 9, 1932 – June 12,
1935). Its preceding decade was equally important, for a preview of the war took place—
although it was successfully defused for a time by the diplomatic intervention of the United
States and the Argentine government, and the early collaboration of the League of Nations.
After the war, in 1935, a diplomatic conference of unprecedented importance and scale in
the history of the Americas took place in Buenos Aires—eventually bringing the war to a
stable end. Paradoxically, the Buenos Aires peace conference lasted longer than the war
itself (June 12, 1935 – July 21, 1938). In the rear-mirror of history, the Chaco War was one
of the most anticipated armed conflicts, with decades in the making, and yet it could not
be prevented. It left behind close to 90,000 deaths and two economically devastated
societies.630 Throughout the war, as well as the preceding and following peace negotiations,
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however, several important political and diplomatic factors show that neither Bolivia or
Paraguay faced one another as bitter enemies or with profound cultural-ideological
contempt. As many of the soldiers’ and officer’s own accounts show, this was a technical
war, fought for purely strategic reasons, between two rather similar societies and political
cultures. As was the case with the Paraguayan War and the War of the Pacific, the soldiers
who fell in battle were outnumbered 2:1 by the number of deaths from thirst, famine,
exhaustion, or pandemics. 631 By any standards, however, the Chaco War pales in
comparison with the levels of brutality experienced in the two most prominent wars of the
20th century.

The Conduct of the Chaco War: Restraint among Friends
During the first decade of the 20th century, Argentina and Paraguay subscribed to a final
agreement over their shared border—now established on the Pilcomayo River. Although
the substantive issue was settled, the more practical aspects of its in-situ demarcation
reopened the debate. The Pilcomayo River has several branches along the frontier, so both
countries had an interest in settling which one was the stronger branch to serve as the
definitive border line. In 1907, after many years of unsuccessful negotiations, the Pinilla–
Soler Protocol was finally signed between Bolivia and Paraguay, thus establishing their
first Chaco frontier [see supra MAP 9]. The new agreement included “a mutual
commitment not to finance or extend the existing positions.” A debate soon arose over
whether the respective Ministers of Foreign Affairs had meant to say “positions” or
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“possessions.” 632 Although the treaty was later defeated in the Bolivian congress, the
Paraguayan government considered that a certain status quo had been reached between
both nations.633
In Bolivia, as well as in Paraguay, the first decades of the 20th century came with
profound internal unrest and civil war. 634 Several political factions, from Liberals, to
nationalists, to conservatives—and even the armed forces—all became active political
players vying for power in a context of economic crisis. This dynamic reinforced
Paraguay’s disdain for Bolivia’s internal politics, although this eventually brought the chief
architect of the non-ratification of the 1907 treaty, Daniel Salamanca, to power.635
In Paraguay, an internal split within the Liberal party broke out into civil war in
1921.636 These common internal convulsions not only damaged the government’s finances
but would also hinder their handling of foreign policy. Under these constraints, the
perceptions of the domestic political actors that could articulate Argentine or Brazilian
support were a destabilizing factor, for these perceptions turned local elites more
intransigent when dealing with peace negotiations either abroad or internally. This dynamic
made them more prone to challenge the establish authorities via the support of an external
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ally. Thus, the domestic politics of Paraguay was “internationalized” by the mere
perceptions and calculations of the elites in their disputes for power. 637 During the
Paraguayan civil war, moreover, the government completely neglected the Chaco area,
recalling units back to the capital, where they were more urgently needed to confront the
opposition. This gave Bolivia a window of opportunity to initiate a policy of occupation of
the unprotected or uninhabited zones in the Chaco Boreal.638
Bolivia’s policy of expanding fortines soon led to the first serious incident between
both countries. To counteract Bolivia’s incursions, Paraguay initiated a similar policy of
counter-occupation, which soon escalated to dangerous proportions and would, a decade
later, lead both countries to war. The first armed clash occurred on February 25, 1927,
when (quite ironically) four Paraguayans and their local guide presumably got lost and
inadvertently ran into the Bolivian Fortín “Sorpresa.” After being taken prisoner, Lt. Rojas
Silva, the Paraguayan officer, attempted to escape and was killed by one of the guards.
Bolivia officially notified Paraguay of the incident and the tensions escalated to the verge
of breaking diplomatic relations.
Argentina extended an offer of good offices, which both countries accepted. In
April 1927, therefore, both countries were able to relax their diplomatic posture by signing
in Buenos Aires the Díaz León–Gutiérrez protocol. Bolivia and Paraguay agreed to send
delegates to solve their differences. In September, a formal conference took place in
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Buenos Aires.639 The Argentine government, led by Marcelo T. de Alvear, proposed a
series of options for peace: first, that Paraguay accepted a direct arbitration on the
substantive issues; second, that both countries demilitarized their fortines; and third, that
both countries issued a joint declaration stating that their advancements had created a de
facto armed situation that granted them no rights, nor could be used in allegations to the
arbiter. The parties could not reach an agreement on the type of arbitration to be had, nor
on the conditions for demilitarization. Bolivia, for instance, agreed to reduce its troops, but
not to abandon the fortines that were already under its control. The final agreement was
bitter-sweet, for no formal solution was reached, yet both countries issued a shared
declaration accepting that their dispute “would not be resolved but other means other than
peaceful ones, except in case of self-defense.”640
With the failure of the Buenos Aires conference, the situation became extremely
tense for Bolivia and Paraguay, but also for their neighbors. Despite Argentine efforts in
restraining both countries, significant changes had occurred during the conference. Bolivia,
for example, now denied Paraguay any claims over the Chaco Boreal—a radical departure
from previous Bolivian foreign policy attitudes. While Paraguay had tried to “normalize”
a certain status quo, or modus vivendi, Bolivian officials and so-called “Chaco experts”
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adopted a stubborn legalistic attitude that rejected the present demarcating lines of the de
facto situation in 1928. Paraguay, for its part, was trying to avoid war while also attempting
to push back some of the Bolivian outposts located either too close to, or simply inside the,
“Hayes zone” of 1879 [see MAPS 9 and 10].
The situation worsened rapidly in the second half of 1928. After both countries
intensified reconnaissance missions in the area, a new incident erupted between two
neighboring fortines: Vanguardia (Bolivia) and Galpón (Paraguay), located in the northern
region of the Chaco, near Bahía Negra. Early on December 5, 1928, the Fortín Vanguardia
was surrounded by a considerable Paraguayan force. The entire garrison was soon
captured, producing only five casualties. The prisoners were taken back to the Paraguayan
Fortín Galpón. Later that same day, both the Bolivian and Paraguayan armies mobilized
for war. News of the incident soon made headlines all over the world when Bolivia broke
diplomatic relations on December 8. Paraguay immediately reciprocated.
Both incidents, first with Lt. Rojas Silva in Fortín Sorpresa and later with Fortín
Vanguardia, showed that the Chaco was a serious and intractable dispute which could erupt
into major war at any moment—as it did. Behind curtains, presidents Hernando Siles of
Bolivia and Eligio Ayala of Paraguay had been acquiring weaponry and military equipment
for years in advance in clear preparation for a confrontation.641
641
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MAP 10 –– Logistics of the Chaco War.
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All these preparations were supported by the general public, who in reaction to the incident
in December, filled the streets in La Paz and Asunción, while the neighboring nations
looked with desperation on how two weak and militarily insignificant nations had
exacerbated their territorial dispute to the brink of war. On December 14, Bolivian troops
captured Fortín Boquerón—a strategic outpost located in the center area of the Chaco [see
supra MAP 10]. Shortly after, a second assault captured Fortín Mariscal López. By the end
of the day, the two advancing Bolivian companies had pulled back, leaving a small force
in Boquerón. The next day, Bolivian airplanes dropped four bombs on Bahía Negra, which
did not explode. This episode outraged the Paraguayan people, who demanded war. But
Paraguay was yet not ready for one. Its acquisition of armament and equipment had not yet
been delivered, so it arranged a small force to adopt defensive positions on those central
fortines that could be the next targets of the Bolivian marauding forces.
Coincidentally, the International Conference of American States on Conciliation
and Arbitration was meeting in Washington DC and its members decided to extend its good
offices, which Bolivia and Paraguay agreed to. During the negotiations (March and
September of 1929), however, only moderate success was achieved as not all the issues in
the agenda could be solved. The most substantive achievements were those related to the
exchange of prisoners, a mutual “forgiveness” and the reestablishment of the status quo
ante. Paraguay and Bolivia agreed to normalize their relations and make two clear
diplomatic gestures: first, Paraguay would rebuild Fortín Vanguardia, and second, Bolivia
would abandon Fortín Boquerón, which could not be occupied right away by Paraguay.642
642
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Back in their respective countries, the delegates who negotiated the agreement were
accused of failing to uphold their country’s reputation and international honor. Tomás M.
Elío, the Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs, for example, faced general discontent for
not securing a monetary compensation from the Commission of Neutrals, as he had
promised. In Paraguay, the final agreement was interpreted as a defeat, for Paraguay looked
like the aggressor, while in fact it had been the aggressed. Contrary to Bolivia, which was
actively trying to prevent a U.S. intervention by force of arms, Paraguay was trying to
precipitate that possibility in order to use it as a guarantee against any Bolivian attack.643
However, Bolivia scored some very important points in this negotiation, exposing
Paraguayan intransigence on the negotiating table and further adding pressure on the
government in Asunción, who now faced an incensed pubic who continued to appeal to
war as a solution.644
On September 9, 1932, a series of contained and sporadic minor incidents continued
to poison bilateral relations and prepared the way for both armies to reach their full
potential before the outbreak of the war. It was still a period of rearmament, domestic
coalitions, and planning for war. During this transitional stage, however, two important
events had a direct impact on the forthcoming confrontation. One was the ousting of the
Bolivian president, Hernando Siles, on May 28, 1930, who was replaced by a Council of
Ministers and the Chairman of the military government, Carlos Blanco Galindo. But this
was a brief interregnum. In March 1931, Daniel Salamanca became President, inaugurating
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a new period of misfortune for Bolivia. Upon taking office, Salamanca implemented a
series of unpopular measures: first, he repressed the political opposition and imposed
severe austerity measures; and second, he rekindled a policy of antagonism against
Paraguay. It was a recipe for disaster for Bolivia, for the involvement in the war would
only deepen the economic problems already endured by the general Bolivian population.645
A second major development during this period was Paraguay’s acceptance of the
offer of good offices extended by the Council of Neutrals, championed by the U.S. The
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gerónimo Zubizarreta, was a seasoned diplomat and knew
about Salamanca’s reputation as a “hawk,” so the acceptance of the good offices was a
clever attempt to entangle the recently elected Bolivian president in a web of international
mediation led by the U.S. Forced by the situation, and trying not to appear as an
intransigent, Bolivia reluctantly accepted the role of the Neutrals as mediators. As part of
this agreement, a non-aggression pact was proposed.646
Growing unrest in Paraguay, which included a thwarted military coup against
President José P. Guggiari and a new incident in the Chaco in September 1931, derailed
the Neutrals’ efforts to reach an agreement. On April 13, 1932, the Commission of Neutrals
made one final exhortation to both countries, expressing its concerns over the multiple
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reports confirming the secret mobilizations in the Chaco and the acceleration of military
preparations and armament procurement.647
Although negotiations continued for a few more months, both governments had
already convinced themselves that war was “inevitable.” Reporting from Buenos Aires, for
instance, Vicente Rivarola, Paraguay’s representative, captured the same sentiment in
Argentina. However, he noted, good reliable sources had confirmed Argentina’s support
“under the rug” in the upcoming confrontation.648 The Argentine representative in London,
Manuel E. Malbrán, further reinforced this impression that war was “almost imminent.”649
In May, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, W. Francis White, who had been presiding
over the Committee of Neutrals in Washington, proposed a final project of non-aggression
by which both sides would agree not to initiate any military offensive, nor advance their
positions further in the Chaco.650
On June 15, 1932, while the work of the Committee was still trying to secure the
pact, Salamanca ordered Bolivian troops to search for good sources of fresh water in the
central Chaco. Mayor Oscar Moscoso, the officer in charge of the operation, warned
Salamanca that if any new encounter with Paraguayan troops occurred it could lead to the
outbreak of war. However, Salamanca insisted on the order and the Bolivians mobilized to
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take the Pitiantuta (or Chuquisaca) lagoon, near the Paraguayan Fortín Carlos Antonio
López. The expedition predictably ended in a confrontation with Paraguayan troops in
which their outpost was overcome by a Bolivian assault. After confirmation of the
occupation of the fort, Salamanca asked Moscoso to abandon the fort, but the officer
replied that it was impossible to do so now, given the arid conditions of the area—water
was key. Moscoso suggested a plan for building an alternative fort on the other bank of the
lagoon, but the fuse had already been set.651
In Asunción, President Guggiari recalled the Paraguayan delegation in Washington,
abandoning the Commission of Neutrals conference. Lt. Cnl. J. Félix Estigarribia initiated
a successful counter-offensive that retook Fortín Carlos Antonio López.652 This marked
the beginning of the military stage of the war; a stage which would last for almost three
years and cost tens of thousands of lives from countries that were clearly not ready for war.
The war itself developed in two major phases. In the first stage (1932–1934), the
Paraguayan forces took the initiative by carrying out a major offensive in the Chaco, during
which Pitiantuta and Fortín Carlos Antonio López were retaken. The operation continued
towards the center of the Chaco area, occupying other Bolivian outposts like Boquerón,
which fell after a bloody encounter. Upon receiving news of the loss of Pitiantuta,
Salamanca called a cabinet meeting and demanded almost impossible military feats from
his generals, who reacted by trying to carve out some autonomy for themselves in matters
of military decision-making. But Salamanca was stubborn and only accommodated slightly
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to these commonsense demands, further insisting on a full counter-offensive against the
southern forts in the Chaco, near the River Pilcomayo. But the incompetence of the
President was equally matched by that of his Generals.653
When news of the fall of Boquerón reached La Paz, Salamanca ordered General
Hans Kundt to retake that strategically important fort for Bolivia. Kundt’s preference for
clear and frontal attacks contrasted with the outflanking maneuvers of Estigarribia, who at
every turn outwitted the Bolivian general. After a series of subsequent encounters and
maneuvers for the control of other strategic forts, like Fortín Saavedra, the battle for Fortín
Nanawa654 represented a horrific disaster for Bolivia. Repeated frontal assaults could not
break the Paraguayan defense, and Kundt sealed in that battle not only the deaths of
thousands, but also the strategic fate of the war for Bolivia. After the disastrous failure of
the Kundt offensive, in which the best Bolivian regulars perished in repeated reckless
assaults (more than 2,000 soldiers were lost at Nanawa alone), a new balance in the war
emerged. In total, Kundt’s frontal assaults cost Bolivia more than 5,000 casualties and
10,000 prisoners, while the Paraguayan losses did not exceed 160 killed and 400 wounded.
Without a doubt, the battles for Nanawa were a clear turning point for the war—and for
Kundt’s generalship.
Despite the tactical blunders committed by Bolivia’s command, however, no new
forts were lost to the Paraguayans. While the situation still unclear, Estigarribia had
adopted a prudent attitude and, after experiencing the carnage of frontal attacks on well-
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fortified positions, he decided not to launch an immediate counter-offensive—despite the
favorable conditions for doing so. This allowed Kundt’s troops to retreat and reorganize.
Throughout this initial phase of the war, the Bolivian army counted an important
advantage: it had a substantially larger army than the Paraguayans. This meant that, even
after such considerable losses in some key strategic battles, La Paz could keep feeding
Kundt’s war machine. While Kundt awaited reinforcements, therefore, he decided to
economize his existing troops and create two strong points of resistance for the eventual
Paraguayan advance in Fortín “Km 31” and Fortín Alihuatá.
The subsequent Paraguayan counter-offensive finally came about and, after a series
of gruesome battles at Fortines Campo Vía, Alihuatá, and Km 31, the back of the Bolivian
army was temporarily broken. At every turn, moreover, the battles not only produced
casualties and wounded, but also prisoners. Tens of thousands of them. Vast amounts of
weapons and equipment also transferred to the Paraguayans with them, as the Bolivian
general retreated frantically. Desertion also became a big problem for La Paz at this point.
As Christmas approached, Kundt had a hard time convincing La Paz to accept a 10-day
cease-fire suggested by Estigarribia. This truce, however, was finally agreed on December
19, 1933 and it was later renewed.655 Quite ironically, the first and most brutal phase of the
Chaco War ended with an improvised Christmas cease-fire.
The second phase of the war (1934–1935) was a comparatively shorter and less
frantic one. It was characterized by smaller and less frequent battles. The general pattern
was one of Bolivian retreat and a Paraguayan slow but steady advance towards indisputably
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Bolivian territories located beyond the original area of dispute in the Chaco. In this context,
however, Estigarribia’s offer of a cease-fire soon became controversial in Paraguay, for it
entailed an enormous strategic concession to Kundt by voluntarily halting the Paraguayan
offensive, thus allowing the Bolivian commander to reorganize.656 After the disaster of
Campo Vía, Estigarribia displayed a humanitarian sensibility by not persecuting or killing
the scattered Bolivian troops escaping towards the Pilcomayo River. President Ayala
justified this decision to the Paraguayan opposition and public opinion by arguing that
Paraguay already had its hands full with its 14,000 Bolivian prisoners and adding thousands
more would put the country in serious risk of violating international conventions. Paraguay
had, according to Ayala, an extremely limited capacity for handling such a high number of
prisoners appropriately.657 The pace of the war was rapidly accelerating and threatening to
get out of control for commanders on the both sides. Both Estigarribia on the field and
Ayala in Asunción agreed to take the opportunity of the cease-fire to advance a formal
proposal of truce presented to the belligerents.
The general perception at the time of the signing of the Protocol of June 12, 1935,
which put into effect a lasting armistice in the Chaco, was that despite the reciprocal
offensives and counter-offensives, a certain status quo (or “stalemate”) had been reached
on the battlefield. The further Bolivia pushed east, the longer the communication and
supply lines became. In an inhospitable terrain like the Chaco, it was almost impossible to
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maintain an advantage because the ability to re-supply the offensives on time was severely
limited. This applied not just to Kundt’s troops, but the Paraguayans too as the further they
counter-attacked west, a similar problem emerged for Estigarribia’s considerably smaller
army. 658 More territory and forts had to be protected and a substantial change in the
topography of the Chaco—closer to the Andes valley—not only gave Bolivians physical
advantages but also shortened the supply and communication lines of their larger army. By
June 1935, therefore, it was clear for those in power in Asunción and La Paz that little to
no further progress could realistically be made in terms of territorial advantages. Paraguay
had reached it maximum geographical extension in terms of occupation of the Chaco but
had to voluntarily stop its own momentum. Bolivia, previously in general retreat, had
managed to contain the Paraguayan advance somewhat, but faced a difficult dilemma
between preparing a painfully costly all-out counter-offensive and risk utter defeat, or take
a more moderate path assisted by diplomacy and the collaboration of the interested regional
neighbors.
The respective public opinion in each country was divided. In La Paz, the general
public was incensed by the conduct of the war and demanded a culprit for the Nanawa and
Campo Vía disasters. Although large part of the blame rested on Kundt himself, the army
generals conspired to depose President Salamanca, who had personally insisted on making
such costly strategic (and even tactical) military decisions. A new government, led by José
L. Tejada Sorzano, took office on November 28, 1934. This administration would preside
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over the rest of the war and well into the first year of the peace conference that followed
the armistice of June 12, 1935.
In Paraguay, the domestic front was much more convulsed. From August 1932 to
February 1936, Paraguay had maintained a relatively stable consensus both politically as
well as militarily. Unlike Bolivia, the operative relation between President Ayala and
Estigarribia had been a positive one overall. Although pressures were mounting up in
Paraguay over the “fateful” decision to slow down the offensive in a key moment of the
war, the duo Ayala–Estigarribia gave Paraguay a steady leadership during the most crucial
periods of the war, which despite the differences in size and capabilities between both
armies, was crucial for Paraguay’s military superiority on the battlefield.659
Although the Liberal party in Paraguay exercised a hegemony over other political
factions, most political battles occurred within the Liberal party itself. In February of 1936,
however, a nationalist movement deposed President Eusebio Ayala and initiated the
“febrerista” revolution. As it happened with Salamanca’s removal in Bolivia, the change
in political leadership had a more direct impact on the political and diplomatic front rather
than the military one, where strategy and commanders remained the same despite the
changes in government.660 The conservative, catholic, and anti-communist movement that
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put Cnl. Rafael Franco in power from February 17, 1936 to August 13, 1937, shared many
of the fascist characteristics of contemporary Europe, but channeled for many in Paraguay
a fervent sentiment of nationalism experienced for the first time by the large masses.661
Paraguay had risen from the ashes of a 19th-century Paraguay devastated in a war with its
neighbors, thus the Chaco War came to represent a contemporary opportunity for a younger
generation to reaffirm a sense of self in a new war—a war that they believed Paraguay was
close to winning decisively.
In La Paz, a similar view led to the replacement of Tejada Sorzano in May 1936 by
a series of military commanders. Between May 1936 and the very end of the peace
conference in Buenos Aires, in 1938, Germán Busch and David Toro alternated positions
as Chairmen of a Military Junta.662 In their view, two promising factors gave them renewed
hope: one was the potential plans for enlisting younger Bolivians to the army (and with
whom to launch a future offensive against the current Paraguayan positions); and the other
was the fact that by pushing back the Paraguayan line the negotiators in Buenos Aires could
perhaps obtain more concessions from the intermediaries and from Paraguay itself. In
short, although Bolivia was going to the negotiating table after losing some ground in the
war, a diplomatic victory on the international front could still be achieved.
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Filling the Void: Institutionalizing Order in the 1930s
During the war (1932–1935), two types of peace negotiations took place. One was centered
around the involvement of the United States as a mediator in the conflict; and a second one
was the active participation of the League of Nations early in the dispute. The international
context, in the aftermath of the First World War, was marked by a growing tension between
a new group of powers (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Imperial Japan, and Authoritarian
Spain), who had defied the League’s legitimacy and tested its effectiveness in Abyssinia
and Manchuria. A second group contained free-market, Liberal-democratic nations, and
were led by Great Britain and the United States.
In this global context, the U.S. and the League interventions in the Chaco dispute
represented an extra-regional effort in institutionalizing order in South America between
two of the weakest links in the regional structure of power. Despite the military and
economic might of the U.S. at the time, the international financial crisis initiated in the late
1920s had left world markets in profound distress. This global depression also affected
South America, given its role as net producer of primary-sector goods and other strategic
commodities, like oil, gas, and minerals. 663 A war in South America not only took
resources away from a much-needed global economic recovery in the 1930s, but also
generated a source of strategic uncertainty that the League was morally and legally bound
to attempt to redress, for Bolivia and Paraguay were signatory members. The U.S., for its

663

See Paulo Drinot and Alan Knight, eds., The Great Depression in Latin America (Duke University
Press, 2014); and Leslie Bethell, ed., The Cambridge History of Latin America (Cambridge University
Press, 1991), Vol. 8.

420

part, had an interest in maintaining the entire Western Hemisphere free of war and of extraregional interference—so the two would-be pacifiers clashed.
Beyond the League of Nations, there was no other international institutional
framework to which states could appeal to for assistance in times of war. Although deeply
limited in its own capacity to act effectively in the Chaco dispute, the League was the only
“peace machinery” at the time.664 There existed an informal normative framework which
played an incipient role in the late 1860s and 1870s in Latin America. During the Chaco
War, however, these normative frames of references largely supported a restrained conduct
in the war, which helped ameliorate some of the intrinsic and unavoidable horrors of war.665
Given this “institutional void” in the 1930s, the Peace Conference of Buenos Aires (1935–
1938) became a perfect opportunity for the South American society of states to take the
front seat and ultimately triumph where others had failed. During the Peace Conference,
South American states came to terms with the issue of “war” as a common regional
problem from which no responsible neighbor could approach with detached indifference
or rapacious opportunism. This, in turn, prompted a strategic awakening of a regional sense
of raison de système, based on the necessity of bringing order and stability to their
international relations, according to principles acceptable and tolerable for all.
After an exhausting war, fought in such an inhospitable place as the Chaco Boreal,
the two belligerents had become stalled, finding no more room for military maneuvering.
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Bolivia and Paraguay then turned to diplomacy to continue their struggle for the possession
of the Chaco. The opportunity was ripe for Argentina to emerge from the diplomatic
backstage of the war and propose a collective mediation that would put an end to the
conflict for good. Tomás M. Elío, the Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Luis A.
Riart, his Paraguayan peer, were officially summoned by Carlos Saavedra Lamas, the
Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, to meet in Buenos Aires to initiate a peace
conference. On June 12, 1935, therefore, delegates from La Paz and Asunción signed a
protocol that definitely closed the military phase of the war. Now an even bigger battle was
about to begin in Buenos Aires, under the eyes of the entire hemisphere and the world.666
Despite bringing the military action to an end, the signing of the 1935 protocol
generated a larger controversy, which protracted the diplomatic conflict for several years.
In contemporary Bolivia and Paraguay, for example, the Protocol of June 12, 1935, is still
the subject of polemic commentary in newspapers and certain academic works. When Elío
and Riart convened in Buenos Aires in 1935, the armistice that had made possible for the
negotiation to take initiate was still fragile and war could return at any moment. It had been
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made possible, as well, by the opening of a small window of opportunity given by the
advancing Paraguayan troops closer into Bolivian territory and the timely intervention of
the A.B.C. mediators.
The pressure on the Bolivian and Paraguayan diplomats, therefore, was enormous.
If, at any moment, their respective governments felt that the negotiations in Buenos Aires
were leading nowhere, war could still resume—thus shattering all chances of peace. The
Bolivian delegation confronted not only a stubborn Paraguayan delegation that was tied by
domestic party intrigue and public opinion pressure, and could concede little in order for
the formal peace negotiations to advance, but also internal opposition among its own
delegation. In this unpromising context, Tomás Elío made a courageous “executive”
decision. In the morning of June 8, 1935, Elío, who was a prominent national figure and
had served as Chancellor in the late 1920s during the first incidents in the Chaco, decided
to sign a protocol despite the prior approval of his government, or the consultation of the
rest of the delegation with him in Buenos Aires.667 With this decision, if later disavowed
by the Bolivian president, Elío was risking more than his reputation and position as head
of the delegation. He was also burying his political aspirations for the forthcoming
presidential elections in Bolivia.668
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Elío’s decision generated mixed reactions in Bolivia at first. Although the President
ultimately approved his action, some historians and prominent politicians in Bolivia
publicly condemned the decision, equating it with the surrendering of all of Bolivia’s
interests in the Chaco.669 The general public, on the contrary, exploded in celebration after
the confirmation of the agreement of peace. Although the status quo was momentarily in
Paraguay’s favor since the Bolivian troops had retreated from the central region of the
Chaco, the Paraguayan advance had been effectively stopped—a fragile condition that Elío
wanted to maintain at all cost. Rumors of a preparation of a new Bolivian counter-offensive
gave critics, such as Bautista Saavedra, who was a member of the Bolivian delegation to
the conference in Buenos Aires and former president of Bolivia, reasons to believe that
more benefits could have been achieved for Bolivia if only Elío had not been “duped” by
the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affaits. Bautista Saavedra wanted to soften the
Paraguayan delegation with more of the same “prudent intransigence” he had proposed in
earlier meetings. Other members of the delegation, for their part, such as Miguel Mercado
Moreira, also criticized Elío’s decision as “unnecessarily rushed and naïve.” While
Saavedra called the episode an “immolation” of Bolivia, Roberto Querejazu Calvo, a
prominent Bolivian historian, qualified it as an “entrapment” that led to Bolivia’s
“surrender.” 670 Several years after this polemic episode, Tomás G. Elío, the Bolivian
chancellor’s son, looked back at these accusations with a more critical and retrospective
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eye, arguing that “it [was] easy, at the impetus of popular clamor, to embark a nation in
war; the difficult thing [was] to assume the responsibility to put an end to it, especially
when there were successes and defeats that penetrated deep into the national
consciousness.”671
A careful reconsideration of Elío’s personal correspondence, documentation, and
notes, however, suggest that far from naïve or “defeatist,” his decision had been prudent
and far-sighted, justified by the information conveyed to him by the military advisors in
the delegation, who had a direct line of communication with the army commanders
themselves—thus bypassing the civilian government in La Paz or the other diplomats in
the delegation, such as Saavedra or Mercado Moreira. According to several confidential
reports, the rumored “new counter-offensive” was not realistically possible without
imposing an unbearable burden on the younger generations of Bolivians under the age of
twenty. Nor wes there any real evidence, according to these reports, to support the idea of
creating a better situation in the Chaco than the fragile one momentarily maintained during
the fragile negotiations in Buenos Aires. If any change in the positions had occurred, this
would have certainly been in favor of Paraguay—and not Bolivia. More importantly still,
the positions of the Paraguayan army at the time were alarmingly close to the city of Santa
Cruz and the newly-discovered oil fields in southeast Bolivia.672
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Behind Elío’s decision, therefore, there was a carefully calculated assessment of
the real strategic situation for Bolivia. It was not ideal, and certainly not in accordance to
the plans imagined by the government when the war was declared. Although Elío did not
consider the condition of Bolivia in the Chaco as optimal at the time, he also did not think
it could be improved by force. He believed that if Bolivia overplayed its hand in Buenos
Aires, the whole country would soon have been at risk—and not just the disputed area of
the Chaco Boreal.673
After the signing of the Protocol, therefore, the Peace Conference focused on
turning the provisions of the protocol into a definitive treaty of peace, which would
eventually be signed in 1938 and ratified a year later. The central objectives of the
Conference were four. First, to resolve the territorial dispute through a direct agreement
between the parties, or by arbitration of the International Permanent Court of Justice, in
The Hague. Second, to promote the reciprocal return of prisoners captured during the war.
Third, to create a Commission to determine the issue of the responsibility of the war—that
is to say, which one was the “aggressor.” And fourth, to resolve all the practical issues
related to the execution of the security provisions and guarantees for the cease-fire.
Additionally, the two delegations agreed to an immediate cease-fire and the creation of a
Neutral Military Commission, which would deploy in the Chaco to certify the cease-fire
and put into effect the truce. The Military Commission played a crucial role in freezing all

673

Cf. Elío, La guerra y la paz del Chaco, pp. 27–85; and Saavedra, El Chaco y la conferencia de paz de
Buenos Aires, p. 88.

426

military operations in the disputed zone and in the provisionary demarcation of buffer areas
between the armies.674
One of the first obstacles faced by the delegates throughout the whole conference,
however, was the chronically unstable domestic governments of each party to the
negotiation, which created tensions not only between the delegations of Bolivia and
Paraguay, but also among their representatives themselves, as determined by their political
party affiliation or personal ambitions and reputation. A second source of obstacles was
the tense truce between the standing armies in the Chaco, positioned only some miles away
from each another, and which excreted enormous pressure on the issues discussed in
Buenos Aires. Although the members of each delegation were charged with the prominent
objective of elaborating a “good” peace treaty favorable to their respective countries, interpersonal and ideological factors also strained the relation between delegates of the same
country. In the Bolivian case, for example, Elío continuously faced the “prudent
intransigence” of Bautista Saavedra, a former Bolivian president and prominent member
of the delegation. Saavedra’s positions were noting but prudent, but very intransigent,
suggesting at times extremely inflexible positions even on secondary issues.675
In the Paraguayan delegation, too, tensions regularly emerged when the head of the
delegation or other members were replaced after a change of government in Asunción. The
laborious work, for example, of Gerónimo Zubizarreta during the Ayala administration was
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threatened by his sudden replacement for Juan Stefanich during the febrerista revolution.676
In less than a year, the fall of the revolution in Asunción restored civilian government, and
President Félix Paiva named J. Isidro Ramírez as the new head of the Paraguayan
delegation in Buenos Aires.677
Another factor that the traditional historiography usually accepts as an obstacle
during the conference, but which upon closer scrutiny seems to have been a crucial
component of the final agreement, is the “controversial” figure of the Argentine
Chancellor, Carlos Saavedra Lamas. As the host nation, Argentina was bound to play a
central role. However, several written accounts by other participants in the conference
often reserve only negative commentary about Saavedra Lamas. For example, he is
repeatedly accused by the U.S. delegate, Spruille Braden, of being a petulant and verbose
individual, with a high opinion of himself, and who on several occasions let his personality
become an obstacle to otherwise promising diplomatic solutions developed by him in the
course of the negotiations.678 Similar opinions can be found in the Brazilian, or Chilean
accounts of the sessions and meetings during the conference.679 It is interesting to note,
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however, that the top members of the respective delegations of Bolivia and Paraguay
usually do not have such negative views of the Argentine minister. It is mostly those who
competed with Saavedra Lamas for a central role as “champions” of the Chaco Peace who
had derogatory words saved for his personae. Both Brazil and Chile at some point during
the early stages of the dispute tried to host the Peace Conference in their respective capitals.
For the neighboring countries, including Argentina, the Bolivia–Paraguay dispute was also
a contest of intra-regional prestige and global recognition. In the case of the U.S., it is
usually U.S. authors, like Bryce Woods, who fail to objectively assess Braden’s own
extravagant and idiosyncratic personality and, much like Saavedra Lamas, a very high
opinion of himself. A mere glimpse at Braden’s anecdotes from the Peace Conference in
Buenos Aires suffices to see that perhaps more than contempt, it was envy what motivated
his personal antagonism towards Saavedra Lamas—who received the Nobel Peace Prize in
1936 for his efforts in the Chaco Peace Conference in Buenos Aires.680
One of the many aspects that made Saavedra Lamas’ subtle diplomatic
manipulation more a well-planned act than a mere display of his ego is that, in what many
observers noted only as a stalling (or filibustering) technique in the duplicity behind
Argentina’s support for Paraguay, Saavedra Lamas was in reality “testing the waters” for
ripe moments during the negotiations to introduce the “right kind” of propositions.
Argentina’s tacit support of Paraguay during the war, a pseudo-patronage inherited from
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the end of the Triple Alliance War, gave Saavedra Lamas the upper hand in “reading” the
regional strategic context as well as he read Paraguay’s internal politics. He was the first
diplomat to realize that peace in the Chaco would only come when those—like the U.S.—
who professed to be trying to solve the war out of “good-will” or “disinterested” intentions,
focused more on the internal political dynamics of the parties and less on the actors at the
negotiating table itself. Delegates, after all, were bound by the domestic balances of forces
in their respective countries. In the rare case of Elío, it took the Bolivian diplomat several
interactions with Saavedra Lamas to come to understand that memorable statesmen always
those who know when they should stand above the mass of partisan and ideological
antagonisms, and tend for the larger common interest not only of its own constituency but
also of the whole context of which that constituency is also a part.
In this sense, each of the four objectives of the conference were able to be achieved
precisely because of (rather than “in spite of”) the slow and grinding process instituted by
Saavedra Lamas, which consisted of stalling and prolonging those situations that, with the
manipulated passing of time, could be normalized into more permanent realities (or faits
accomplis), accepted by the parties. On the substantive issues, that of Bolivia’s quest for a
port on the Paraguay River and that of Paraguay’s of the portion of the Chaco previously
established by international treaties with Argentina and via arbitration, the conference was
able to provide a final solution after several rounds of negotiations lasting more than two
years. After such arduous negotiations, Paraguay agreed to grant Bolivia a northern portion
of the Chaco region, with a small port just north of Bahía Negra. This port, however, had
no practical value for navigation in that sector of the river, since is it was only possible to
use by smaller ships built for shallower waters—not the kind of ships that could transport
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heavy mineral cargo to the Atlantic Ocean. Paraguay, for its part, managed to secure the
main portion of the Chaco region that it had always claimed, yet only poorly maintained.

The Triumph of Pragmatic Solidarity
The Chaco War and the Peace Conference that followed it offer fertile examples of the
interplay between two approaches to solidarity in the Americas: one, led by the United
States’ unilateral vision of a hemispheric order under its leadership; and another, built out
of an impending necessity by the three major states: Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, to reestablish order in their immediate neighborhood. The first victim of the clash between these
two competing visions was the League of Nations itself, which was pulled into the region
by Argentine and Chilean diplomacy to act as a counterweight to the U.S. “goodneighborly” involvement, but was then swiftly dismissed at the first opportunity when the
U.S.’ own failed mediation cleared the way for the South American powers to play a larger
role in the Chaco dispute themselves. Their guiding principle was always to find South
American solutions to South American problems. This strategy necessarily entailed
playing one actor against the other and excluding (or severely limiting) the role of the U.S.
in the process.
No other South American Chancellery embodied this strategy better than the
Argentine one. Argentina’s diplomacy, under the personal leadership of Saavedra Lamas,
was keen on tilting the region’s support towards the U.S. or the League depending on the
issues being negotiated and Argentina’s convenience. When sanctions or a more coercive
approach were deemed necessary to constrain one of the two belligerents, for example,
Argentina and its regional partners did not hesitate in soliciting the League’s involvement
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to be “the bearer of bad news” for the belligerents A similar approach was followed with
the U.S. to expose the limits of its Good Neighbor policy. This offered chances for Chile
or Argentina to exert more leverage in the negotiations with their respective “protégés.”
They put the burden of the 1934 arm-sales embargo imposed on both belligerents, for
example, flatly on the U.S., creating “moral hazard” for Washington. This also had the
double purpose of “softening” the belligerents before other interventions by Argentina “at
the appropriate time.” After using the U.S. or the League to test less popular proposals and
peace plans, Argentina would unsurprisingly enjoy higher chances of submitting mutually
acceptable propositions based on the failure of previous attempts by the U.S. or the League.
At the same time, not only would Argentine diplomacy gain prestige and recognition for
itself, but the mediation would also get closer to a mutually agreeable and realistic solution.
Thus, both Argentine and common regional interests would to be truly served.
Among the A.B.C. countries, however, there was also competition and rivalry.
Chile enjoyed over Bolivia the same type of leverage and influence that Argentina had over
Paraguay. Both Chile and Argentina were uniquely intertwined with the domestic interests
of the two belligerents and, thus, could have a deeper impact on the course of the
negotiations by helping shape Bolivia’s or Paraguay’s internal politics. In this sense,
therefore, success in the Peace Conference was not just a matter of adjusting a final treaty
to the interests of Bolivia and Paraguay, but also a question of harmonizing the interests of
Argentina and Chile inter se. This reality became evident for Washington only after
incurring several failures of its own: first in the 1920s, then again in the 1930s as part of
the Commission of Neutrals, and lastly in the Buenos Aires Peace Conference itself—being
outplayed by Saavedra Lamas. Frustrated with the A.B.C. group’s better control of the
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political processes running behind closed doors, the U.S. unsuccessfully tried to develop a
parallel channel via the Pan-American conference system.681
The United States’ interest in the Chaco War had two levels. At the level of
government, the U.S. declared its neutrality and championed the three initiatives mentioned
above. At the level of private individuals and companies, however, the war offered multiple
opportunities for U.S. manufacturers to make large profits by selling weaponry and
munition to Bolivia. Although Paraguay counted with the patronage of Argentina, who also
provided equipment, loans, and military intelligence, the government deeply resented the
U.S. indirect contributions to its enemy, Bolivia. Trying to correct this embarrassing aspect
of U.S. foreign policy, President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared an arms embargo on both
belligerents.682 Argentina and Paraguay maintained that the smuggling of weapons into
Bolivia had continued despite the official posture in Washington, and further accusations
were levelled at the U.S. Standard Oil Co. in Bolivia, suspected of indirectly financing
Bolivia’s war effort.683
The Good Neighbor policy implemented by the United States during the interwar
period and the early 1940s followed a foreign-policy principle that, at least on paper, should
have been welcome by all South American nations—and particularly by the two
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belligerents. Its main claim was that of the non-intervention into the domestic affairs of
other American states and the deepening of cultural, political, and commercial ties between
them and the U.S. 684 In practice, however, this policy was also in tune with the more
traditional Monroe Doctrine—and many in fact considered it a mere amendment or
corollary to it.685 After the radically interventionist approach of prior administrations, such
as Woodrow Wilson’s in the 1920s, the Good Neighbor policy was a substantial
improvement in the tone of U.S. relations with the rest of the American nations. However,
Roosevelt’s attempts at mediating in the Chaco War were ultimately resented by Bolivia
and Paraguay, for despite the non-coercive and non-interventionist aspects of the U.S.
policy, the belligerents themselves saw more legitimacy in the action of fellow South
American countries, like Argentina or Chile, than in the United States. The belligerents
were equally angered by the U.S. refusal to intervene or pressure one another’s enemy, and
frustrated by even the most minimal insinuation of pressure on themselves. In a speech to
the Bolivian Congress, delivered on August 6, 1934, President Salamanca declared that:
The new pacifist doctrine of the American nations makes its grand entrance into the world,
with violent steps at the expense of a weak country. The neutrals, with our own consent,
exercise nothing more than their good offices, in accordance to international law. They now
come forward in the role of tutors and judges, pretending to preside over us in our affairs,
exercising a jurisdiction which we have not conferred upon them. These violent acts are
done in the name of the American nations, invoking legal principles that condone all
violence. Such acts entail the conclusion of the principle of sovereign independence and is
based on strength.686
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That very same day, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru issued a joint declaration in a
similar line, expressing their desires to “save the interests of peace in America,” now
severely threatened by “the imminent danger of war” and in protection of their “moral
responsibility as members of the same continental family.”687
In this context, the role played by the League of Nations merits a close examination,
for both Bolivia and Paraguay were part of the international organization, while the U.S.
was not. The League of Nations first involvement in the Chaco dispute was prompted by
the early incident in Fortín Vanguardia, and the inability of the early U.S.-led efforts to
prevent the war. 688 During the early years of the war, Argentina and Chile had also
attempted a bilateral mediation, which was later defeated by Bolivia’s and Paraguay’s loss
of confidence in both negotiating states.689 With the failure of the Commission of Neutrals
and the Mendoza Agreements, therefore, two changes took place. On one hand, Chile and
Argentina incorporated Brazil and Peru to their subsequent offers of mediation, formalizing
the A.B.C.P group—which was successful in the end in brokering the peace between
Bolivia and Paraguay. On the other hand, the belligerents themselves saw in the League of
Nations a valid alternative interlocutor.
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However, although the Spring of 1933 was a propitious moment for the League,
given the impasse that had emerged in the Chaco, the League of Nations represented a third
“formula of peace” to be added to the already complex web of negotiators, good offices,
and intermediaries. As Ronald Klein eloquently put it, “too many cooks spoiled the
broth.”690 The A.B.C.P, the U.S., the Commission of Neutrals, plus the numerous proposals
from each, overwhelmed the peace process leading to an inefficient and unproductive
overlapping. In the absence of regional or hemispheric formal institutions for conflict
resolution, the actors most affected by the geographic proximity of the war, or its economic
effects, rushed to fill in the void and thus indirectly helped prolong the war. Even when in
coordination with one another, such as in the imposed embargo on arms sales to Bolivia
and Paraguay by the U.S. and the League, the U.S. (a non-member) had a stronger interest
in keeping the League out of intra-hemispheric affairs.691 Although the belligerents were
members, the U.S. was not. Thus, the League represented for Washington an unnecessary
European meddling in the Americas. Lastly, after the League’s determination on the issue
of the responsibilities for the war, Paraguay—sanctioned equally as if an aggressor by the
League’s resolutions—abruptly abandoned the League to avoid any legal sanctions. This
defiance further deepened the lack of trust and credibility in the League’s capacity for
brokering peace between even two small and weak countries in South America.692
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Despite these numerous hurdles, not all factors in the League’s involvement in the
Chaco dispute were negligible or unimportant. The work of the League of Nations, through
its special commission for the Chaco dispute, helped set the legal ground with which the
efforts of the neighbors (the A.B.C. group, plus Peru) and the U.S. were able to implement
the Neutral Military Commission in the Chaco to certify the armistice and preside over the
demilitarization of both contenders in the Chaco. The prior work of the League also
facilitated the later work in the Peace Conference during the negotiation and application of
the issue of the liberation and exchange of prisoners.693
The history of the Chaco War, and its equally hard-fought peace, shows the
strengths and limitations of a regional society of states when it lacks a more formal
institutional framework for the maintenance of order. It was only with the creation of the
Organization of American States (OAS), in 1948, that such institutional void would finally
be filled, thus opening a new chapter in the history of the consolidation of South America’s
society of states and in the provision of a self-standing regional order for and by its own
members.

Testing Alternative Explanations
The case of the Chaco War offers the possibility to evaluate the competing hypotheses
identified in this dissertation. Contrary to the previous case-studies, the Chaco War and its
subsequent Peace Conference seem to offer a very fertile ground for most of the seven
alternative arguments.
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H2: The U.S. as a Regional Hegemonic Stabilizer
The U.S. involvement in the Chaco dispute was a constant feature that came at a moment
of great international standing and power for the U.S. Through implementation of the Good
Neighbor policy, Roosevelt imprinted an important quota of self-restraint never-beforeseen in the U.S. foreign policy toward the region. Furthermore, the Good Neighbor policy
praised the most cherished of diplomatic principles for all Latin American nations: that is
non-intervention into the domestic affairs of other countries. Prima facie, therefore, the
Chaco War is a case that creates an extremely “easy” test for the H2 hypothesis. However,
as seen in the present chapter, the facts of the case show that not only was U.S. “pacifying”
role unsuccessful to prevent, ameliorate, or stop the war, but also that its very participation
was contested and repudiated by all the South American nations involved—including at
different moments even the belligerents themselves.
This is an extremely important fact when evaluating the relative strength of the H2
hypothesis. Despite the presence of the two background conditions: preponderance of
power and hegemonic willingness to lead, none of the three main expectations for the case
obtain. The U.S. failed to suppress war in its own strategic “backyard,” despite serious and
continuous attempts in institutionalizing through the work of the Commission of Neutrals
its role as the central disinterested broker of the peace. This fact is compounded by the fact
that the two belligerents were military pygmies in comparison to the U.S. power at the
time. Its own version of an inter-American “solidarity” based on the Good Neighbor policy
and channeled through the parallel regional conferences, betrayed in fact a deeper wedge
of a longer duration between South American countries and the U.S.: that is, the diverging
interpretations of the principles expressed in the Monroe Doctrine. While U.S.
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interpretation has always been unilateral, that is via an asymmetrical “tutelage” of the entire
hemisphere, the South American nations—specifically Argentina, Brazil, and Chile—have
in contrast defended a version of those same principles in a more multilateral, cooperative,
and thus truly “solidaristic” fashion.
These aspects make the failure of the H2 to explain the Chaco War case all the more
spectacular and resounding, and—at least on this single case—show the severe limits in
terms of explanatory power. Failure in this case, when seen in a larger perspective with the
previous cases, also cast a very long shadow on the overall strength of the hypothesis as a
whole when trying to ascertain South America’s “long peace” in the 20th century.
Although the rise in U.S. power since 1776 to the present, presumably felt more strongly
in its own regional area of influence that anywhere else, correlates powerfully with the
progressive decline in frequency and ferocity of war in South America, the mismatch
between its hypothetical premises and the test results when applied to the historical cases
shows that it makes for a poor theoretical explanation of the long peace in South America.

H3: A Balance of Power in the Chaco Boreal
The second alternative hypothesis is concerned with the balance of power (H3). The Chaco
War, and in particular the Peace Conference, shows that considerations about the balance
of power in the region were a crucial component of the case. The Chaco war, for example,
did not begin until both Bolivia and Paraguay felt they had reached a good-enough level of
parity inter se. This can potentially illuminate Paraguay’s and Bolivia’s reluctance to
initiate a war in the 1920s despite similar fortín-related “incidents” occurring during that
preliminary period. Mutual fear, that is, interacted with the militarization of the early 1910s
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and 1920s to produce the outbreak of the war only when the “trigger” of Bolivian reckless
policy of deeper penetration in the Chaco created a perception of “threat” to Paraguay’s
survival. Given that for Paraguay, unlike Bolivia, the Chaco had a crucial economic
importance, representing more than two-third of its government revenue, the situation
blends itself perfectly for the premises and expectations of the H3 hypothesis.
In conclusion, therefore, the H3 argument performs very strongly on at least two of
the three main expectations for the case. On the issue of alliances, as well, the fact that
Chile’s backing of Bolivia and Argentina’s support for Paraguay were instrumental in
bringing about peace, shows the validity of the third prediction. It was precisely the “right”
alignment of Bolivian and Paraguayan interests with those of the two larger regional
neighbors, what helps explain the failure of all other peace proposals championed by the
U.S., a coalition of neutrals led by the U.S., or the League of Nations itself.

H4: Geopolitics of the South Pacific
The geopolitical hypothesis (H4), based on the role of geography in making war an
impossibility, and thus incentivizing “coping” institutional mechanisms according to
crisscrossed geopolitical alliance dynamics, find a very hard test in the Chaco War.
Ultimately, the H3 hypothesis fails in explaining the case because it would be difficult to
find a more inhospitable area in the entire western hemisphere for two of the weakest
nations to wage a war than the Chaco Boreal. However, in spite of the extremely obtrusive
conditions of the terrain and weather, Bolivia and Paraguay managed to wage for almost
three years(!) the first “modern” war of the Americas in the 20th century. Failure in this
test, is doubly-decisive against the H4 hypothesis.
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Instead of finding the core propositions strongly confirmed, the Chaco War
distinctively disproves them. For example, instead of seeing the unique topography of the
Chaco Boreal area as making large-scale war impossible, it actually helped two weak states
prolong it, for the long pauses imposed on the contenders by the seasons and changing
conditions of the area allowed the two countries to rearm, resupply, and return to the fray
when weather conditions permitted.
The second expectation is, perhaps, the only one with an incline of confirmation,
for the Buenos Aires Peace Conference offered the same type of “coping mechanisms”
expected in the H4 argument. However, this should only be taken partially because the
successful institutional “coping mechanism” came after the signing of the armistice
(Protocol of June 12, 1935), and not during the war itself. Other factors, apart from the
rather regular and predictable topographical and meteorological conditions of the Chaco,
pushed the two belligerents towards peace. The same conditions were there before during
and after the entire period; however, it was only when the countries had become exhausted
with the war effort and a technical deadlock emerged on the battlefield that the confluence
of other factors—rather than geopolitics—allowed peace.
Finally, the alliance dynamics according to shatterbelts and checkerboards seems
to explain quite well the evolution of the conflict—and even the politics of the diplomatic
negotiations. However, upon closer scrutiny, the “facts of the case” seem to suggest that
the shelterbelt between Chile–Bolivia, on one side, and Argentina–Paraguay, on the other,
was determined more by their historical and cultural past than by “objective” geo-political
factors. After all, it was under the same geopolitical scenario that decades earlier Chile
fought Bolivia, and Argentina battled Paraguay. The fact that in the Chaco War the so-
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called “shatterbelts” aligned according to that specific patter comes from the inherited
semi-tutelage that Argentina and Chile had over their two prior enemies, defeated and
occupied after two serious wars. In short, the geopolitical aspects of the Chaco Boreal seem
to have made war worse and more protracted, instead of shorter and more limited.

H5: Common Culture
The H5 hypothesis is premised on two background conditions: the pacifying role of a
common legacy of anti-imperialism, and the “triggering” intervention of a foreign power.
Although the U.S. was not a foreign power—that is, an extra-hemispheric power, it was
considered by the South American countries involved in the Chaco peace process as an
extraneous actor with interests that could not be “tuned” to those of the South American
region as a whole. The expectation of solving the Chaco dispute in order to remove all
possible opportunities for “foreign” intervention of meddling certainly seems to have
played a role in the Chaco War case.
But although the general condition and the “trigger” are present, the case-specific
expectations obtain only partially or with slight modification. In the case of the “eradication
of war,” the eloquent and embellished rhetoric of the Peace Conference would certainly
support the idea that the architects of peace, like Saavedra Lamas, were intending precisely
“the end of all wars” in the Americas. This same notion was an intrinsic component of the
U.S. Good Neighbor policy as well. After all, the were no more wars after the Chaco War.
At least no more large-scale, interstate ones between neighbors. However, if one looks
beyond the rhetorical proclamations and correlates with the historical evolution of the
region form there forward, it becomes evident that the correlation is merely coincidental—
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but not causal. After the creation of the

OAS,

and in all other institutional and legal

arrangements in the continent, the use of force (“war”) is not banned or eradicated, but
merely “tamed” and channeled to fulfill specific objectives, such as self-defense and the
application of collective legitimate sanctions on other unruly members. Although war is
profoundly curtailed, it remains a factor in intra-hemispheric relations.
Secondly, the Chaco War is certainly not an exemplary case for “unified” action or
potential unification against common threats, like the U.S. or war itself. The rivalry
dynamics between the U.S. and the League or the A.B.C.P. countries, as well as among the
South American countries themselves, makes the Chaco War a poor case for testing the
second prediction of the H5 hypothesis.
Lastly, and quite importantly, the factor of “ideological solidarity” deserves
consideration. This expectation, although partly shared with the H1 hypothesis, must be
considered as a third contender between H1 and H2 propositions about solidaristic
cooperation in general. Unlike the H2 interpretation, however, the ideological component
of H5 clashes with the pragmatic component of the H1 interpretation. To solve these
differences and partial overlapping, it is crucial to consider that in the H5 argument the
expectation is for states to develop a profound security cooperation that is triggered by their
common struggle against imperialism and external interventionism. When applied to the
Chaco War case, the first factor to consider is that the U.S.—although potentially
considered as a “foreign” power—intervened in the case only diplomatically, and not
militarily or even coercively. Moreover, this diplomatic intervention was an intervention
pro peace, not an intervention of war. These two elements run in the face of the H5
propositions, dealing a devastating blow. If the U.S. was not an aggressor and was only in
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form, yet not in substance, a foreign power to the region, then it becomes illogical and
invalid to explain South American states’ negative reactions towards the Good Neighbor
policy as it applied to the case of the Chaco War.

H6: State-Weakness in the Chaco War
The H6 argument finds strong applicability to the Chaco War case. As analyzed in the
present chapter, the most important factor that helped the peace agreement finally reach a
stable and consensual point was the Argentine and Chilean diplomatic readjusting to the
domestic conditions in Bolivia and Paraguay. The absence of this factor, as it was seen,
also condemned the negotiations led by the U.S. and the League of Nations. In the 1930s,
much like in the previous wars of the 19th century, weaker and internally troubled
neighbors made for catastrophic regional dynamics of instability and order. The “Holsti
dynamics” that chronically pervaded South American throughout the 19th century we also
at play in the 1920s; and similarly, they led to international war. Holsti intra-state dynamics
do not lead to peace but to externalities and international war. The H6 propositions,
however, makes the inverted argument. “Centeno dynamics” are the key for this
hypothesis; that is: state-weakness should make war less likely, more limited, and less
frequent.
When applied to the Chaco War, however, the dynamic that seems to obtain in the
peace process is Centeno’s rather than Holsti’s. For example, of the few factors that
influenced Bolivia and Paraguay positively toward peace and restraint, one must count
their military incapacity for war itself. As with the H3 argument, to understand why the
war broke out in the 1930s, and not before, it is important to consider the military,
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logistical, and financial assistance that Chile gave Bolivia—plus the flow of armaments
from the U.S. before the arms embargo—and that Argentina gave Paraguay.
In line with Centeno’s argument, it was their incapacity for war which made the
difference between the 1870–1920s and the 1932–1935 period. But even when considering
this factor, Bolivia and Paraguay expended their “artificial” military capacity (including
here also their demographics and “manpower”) in the short time-span of two years and
nine months. Unable to find ways to maintain the high-intensity of “modern” war, and with
the withdrawal of their allies’ military patronage, both belligerents had no other option but
to sue for peace.
In summation, the H6 hypothesis finds in the Chaco War a highly-unique and
highly-certain case study, for the involved parties had to choose peace reluctantly given
their exhaustion after years of war. Even if the fighting was interrupted by the weather or
the terrain. The particular geography of the region raised the costs for war (cf. H4), yet it
only led to peace when the flow of allied support, both in political capital and war materiel,
ran dry. That is, geographical factors alone cannot account well neither for the outcome,
nor the process, of the Chaco War when it is not correlated with the technological capacity
of the states to overcome those geopolitical costs and the level of political involvement and
support of the neighboring states indirectly affected by the outcome of the conflict.

H7: A “Liberal Peace” in the South Pacific?
The final alternative hypothesis articulates three specific predictions, based on two
distinctive conditions: one as a “background” and another as a “trigger.” When applied to
the Chaco War case, these two conditions are present, for in Paraguay and Bolivia civilian,
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democratically elected governments were in office. Moreover, both nations subscribed to
Liberal principles of free-trade and participated in similar international organizations, like
the League of Nations. Unlike the previous case-studies from the 19th century, where these
background conditions applied—if at all—partially or with modifications, in the early 20th
century, the League of Nations represented the historical summum of the Liberal aspirations
in world politics. Both Bolivia and Paraguay were signatories of the Covenant, thus making
the application and testing of the H7 argument more appropriate than in past case-studies.
This means that the “trigger” of the “convergence” of the similar Liberal values could also
be counted as active and present in the 1930s.
The case-specific predictions, however, interrupt all expectations of wide
explanatory power for the H7 argument. For example, as seen with H5, the eradication of
war inter se, is the first element to be discarded, for Bolivia and Paraguay did not consider
at any moment of the dispute to minimize or reduce their levels of aggression to one another
because of the confluence of similar democratic regimes, or a similar predisposition
towards the maximization of commercial profits over military costs. Not even their shared
membership to the League of Nations seems to have restrained the two countries, nor—
quite interestingly—empower that international organization in any significant way. If
anything, one should count the Chaco War as one more example of the League’s weakness
in preventing, and much less stopping, international war. Although the war was fought by
two of the weakest members, the Chaco War also contributed to the collapse of the League
after the cases of Abyssinia and Manchuria.
In conclusion, war was nor prevented between two democratic and Liberal
members of the League of Nations, during an international period of stress for the League,
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but also of world depression and distress. The League, in this scheme, failed to act as an
“institutional supplement” or to help the parties in the avoidance of their security
externalities—as expected in the H7 argument. Paradoxically, it was democratic openness
that weakened the civilian administrations in Bolivia and Paraguay, leading to either
military governments that continued the war or to virulent “popular” participation in strong
support for the war. Even more challenging, it was under a democratically-elected
administration in Bolivia that the country precipitated the outbreak of hostilities in 1932,
and with military governments or juntas that the most substantive peace agreements were
achieved. The fact that Argentine President, Agustín P. Justo, had acceded to power in
1930 via a coup, further complicates the strength of the H7 argument as a whole. If not a
feeling of inter-democracy solidarity and Liberal values, then what exactly moved
Argentina to mediate and help stop a war precisely when his protégé state, Paraguay, was
close to achieve military victory?

Some Preliminary Conclusions
For both contenders, the war was devastating. The hardships of the terrain and the logistics
of combat, joined the lack of fresh water supplies, famine, and sickness. Scurvy and
diphtheria plagued both armies at war. Although the overall conduct of the war was limited
within pre-established legal and normative constraints, several episodes of execution of
wounded and non-wounded prisoners were known during and after the war. Mass desertion
became increasingly common as the war moved to its second stage before military
exhaustion and attrition in the arid Chaco. The technological conditions also helped make
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the Chaco War more devastating for those “on the ground” than otherwise expected in a
war between two of the poorest and militarily weakest of South American nations.
Although an incipient normative framework was in place, no regional equivalent
institutional architecture existed, apart from the League of Nations—discredited by its
ineffectiveness in the Abyssinia and Manchuria cases. The League’s view was juridical,
while the A.B.C.P group focused on confluence of pragmatic interests and solidarity. This
contrasted with the U.S. “disinterested” participation, premised too strongly on a unilateral
interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine and other sentiments of “Pan-American” solidarity.
When contrasted with the alternative explanations, the H1 or international society
argument does not seem to explain perfectly or exhaustively every aspect of the war or the
peace negotiation. However, it does seem to perform holistically better than almost all its
alternatives. That is, while the alternative explanations account unproblematically for only
one or a few of the case-specific predictions, the international society seems to out-perform
them by explaining precisely the other alternatives’ “paradoxes” or dead-ends.
One of the best performing alternatives is the H6, followed closely by the H3
hypothesis. The historical specifics of the Chaco War case, however, make both H3 and
H6 incompatible inter se. It is here that the international society can help bridge them by
accommodating some of their strengths into a larger, encompassing perspective.

448

CONCLUSION

“ORDERED ANARCHY” IN SOUTH AMERICA694

The study of a war is also the study of its peace. The main question proposed at the very
onset of this study was what the main causes of South America’s stable order were. More
specifically, what explains South America’s contemporary regional order in the absence of
traditional sources of international peace found in other regions of the world. These guiding
questions are important for the exploration of the paradoxical presence of external peace
amid internal violence in Latin America. Since the so-called “long peace” obtains in the
20th century, after the end of the Chaco War in 1938, the main question of this dissertation
points to the exploration of the historical preconditions that made such a paradoxical peace
possible in the first place.
The main argument advanced in this study is that the explanation of the 20thcentury phenomenon of the “long peace” in South America is rooted in the emergence of
a “society of states” in the mid-1860s, and in its long-term process of consolidation
thereafter. This dissertation, therefore, has only focused on the origins and the earliest
stages of consolidation of this regional society of states until the 1930s. A future study that
continues with the historical process post 1930s can complement the application of the
main theoretical argument presented here. The argument suggests that a society of states
emerged in South America only after the formation of a system of independent and
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autonomous states in the relatively short period running from 1810 to 1860. After this
initial condition, two other background conditions emerged in the mid-1860s: one was the
far-sightedness of the governing elites, who struggled with the pacification of their
domestic orders and the externalities of the domestic orders of the neighboring states. This
dynamic was further “triggered” or activated by an uneven process of strategic awakening
across the region, forcing leading elites to link their respective states’ “national interests”
with those of the region as a whole. The confluence of these two dynamics further produced
an interest in creating and upholding a regional “order” among autonomous peers, rather
than other alternative forms of organization. These generated three interlocking sets of
practices: first, the taming of war; second, the progressive institutionalization of order via
formal and informal legal and diplomatic arrangements; and third, a pragmatic solidarism
among members of the society of states.
The main argument, therefore, entails a series of relevant analytical and practical
implications. First, it argues that the “long peace” phenomenon cannot be understood
without the proper consideration of the regional dynamics of the 19th century.
Contemporary studies of South America’s peculiar international relations often neglect the
19th century, or merely make assumption about it that are not always warranted or accurate.
With surprising regularity, for example, otherwise well-developed theoretical arguments
discussing South America’s long peace leave the historical preconditions of this
phenomenon unexplored. The focus is placed, therefore, on factors located “inside” the
long peace itself. That is, on factors that are present betwee the late 1930s and now. The
19th century, therefore, is normally brushed aside as an unimportant, “war-stricken”
period.
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This generalized neglect of the 19th century regularly leads scholars to two related
problems. On one hand, it can potentially blind the researcher from considering causes that
may have long-term effects—for which a historical approach would be better suited. And
on the other, it can lead to interpretations of the 19th century based on poor or simplistic
notions that can assume it as inherently violent, and thus also as irrelevant for the study of
peace.
The main argument explored in this dissertation tackles these potential problems
head on. In this sense, it offers a historical exploration of four “hard” case-studies that point
to the presence of a regional “society of states” and its tangible effects on the evolution of
the quality of the region’s interstate relations. South America’s society of states formed
after the struggle for independence in the Americas produced a system of independent
states, which further consolidated during the second half of the 19th century. These four
historical cases studies, analyzed in Chapters 2–5, are considered “hard tests” (or “least
likely” cases) because, first of all, they were major wars. In fact, they were the largest
military conflicts in the entire history of the region. As such, they acts as “stress tests” for
an analysis centered on the historical preconditions of a long interstate peace. At the same
time, the absence of any major war in South America after 1938 makes the exploration of
the prior wars all the more compelling in the search for historical, potentially hidden,
sources of peace that may have been dormant or operating with a very long-term effect.
The potential for “lessons learned” from the conduct of those wars must also be
contemplated, when one considers the presence of of ruling elites that lived through at least
three of the four major wars of the region. Between the 1860s and the early 1880s, which
is the period where the Guano War, the Paraguayan War, and the War of the Triple Alliance
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took place, political figures like Domingo F. Sarmiento, Benjamín Vicuña MacKenna, José
V. Lastarria, Bartolomé Mitre, Mariano I. Prado, or Álvaro Covarrubias, among many
others, moved in and out of political role in government, as diplomats or advisers, or simply
as narrators of the events.
These four case studies were explored using historical analysis and process-tracing
methods, making use of multiple primary and secondary sources. In application of these
methods, the main argument was contrasted with six other competing arguments to have a
more solid appreciation of its relative strength vis-à-vis the empirical record and the other
contending explanations (see TABLE 4, p. 148). In contrast with the international society
approach (or H1), the second contender (or H2) maintains that the long peace was caused
by the pacifying role of the U.S., who through a preponderance of power and a willingness
to “lead” can generate three distinctive sets of practices, or causal-mechanism: the
suppression of war, an institutional tutelage, and a solidarity based on the leadership of the
hegemon itself.
The third contending argument (H3) proposes that a balance of power could also
explain the long peace by way of an unintended equilibrium of power between states. This
is premised on a short-sightedness of ruling elites that is most prominent when the survival
of the state is at stake. The three sets of causal-mechanisms identified by H3 are the use of
war as a regulating mechanism for restraining others, the primacy of mutual fear and selfhelp behavior, and the forming of essentially dynamic alliances based on pure power
calculations only.
The fourth contender (H4) sustains that geopolitics can offer a better alternative
explanation for the long peace. This is premised on the rather fixed geopolitical factors of
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the region, marked by vast open spaces in between the main centers of power and other
factors that can raise the costs of war, and thus, dampen war’s frequency and intensity.
When the topography constrains states, then the costs of waging large-scale war far
outweigh the technological capabilities of states. In such conditions, there are three
expected mechanisms: first, the impossibility of states to wage war inter se; followed by
the instrumental use of regional institutions as a coping mechanism; and lastly, the
formation of “shatterbelts” and “checkerboards” as intra-regional dynamics.
The fifth contender (H5) argues that the long peace can be explained by the
“agglutinating” role of a common culture, based on a shared legacy of anti-imperialism
against foreign interventionist powers. In this view, member states look to the eradication
of war among one another, the (re-)unification into a larger political entity to provide
security for all based on a solidarity that is underpinned by the sharing of an anti-imperialist
ideology or culture.
The last two contenders stipulate that the internal make-up of states can explain the
long peace. The sixth contender (H6) argues that the long peace is the result of state
incapacity or “weakness” that emanates from serious domestic security constraints. These
constraints can produce externalities that spill-over onto other neighboring states. States
sharing these problems cannot wage or sustain large-scale war inter se, even if intended,
nor remain idle on the wayside. Their incapacity for war, therefore, leads them to develop
regional organizations as supplements or coping mechanism to solve collectively their
diplomatic differences and avoid or contain further externalities.
The last contender, the “Liberal Peace,” argues that the sharing of Liberal
republican values can explain the long peace via the elimination of war among Liberal
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republican and free-trade loving member states, and the institutionalization of that separate
peace on a regional or international level.
In this context, and building upon the preliminary conclusions at the end of each
case-study chapter, the main findings from the overall study are the following:
1. The proposition of the emergence of a society of states in South America in the secondhalf of the 19th century, and the related argument about its progressive consolidation
in the 1930s, as the main explanation of the region’s “long peace” in the 20th century
is widely supported by a series of case-specific assessments, which are visible only
from a long-term perspective cutting across the four selected cases. In that regard, the
H1 argument outperforms all other alternative explanations on a one-to-one basis.
While isolated aspects of each case study can be enriched by one, or a combination, of
the contending arguments (H2–H7), no single argument, nor stable combination of
them, survives a cross-case comparison, such as the one performed in this dissertation.
Only the H1 seems to hold its ground across the four selected case studies.
2. When considered as a whole, therefore, the strength of the international society
argument is evident by its capacity to explain the progressive qualitative change in the
international relations of South America, in its transition from the mid-19th century to
the early 20th century. Its strength is also clear in its superior capacity to explain
satisfactorily a large number of “highly-certain” intra case-study tests (mostly “hooptests”). Although “doubly-decisive tests” are hard to find in general, and even harder
to pass, the international society argument scores some important points in the cases of
the Guano War, the Paraguayan War, and the Chaco War. In the first two cases, for
example, the international society argument offers a solid explanation of the mayor
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dynamics at play in those simultaneous wars—finding explanations for dynamics that
confound other contenders (i.e., scoring high on the “unique” side of the tests).
Similarly, for the cases of Ecuador and Chile in the Guano War. The behavior of these
two countries towards Peru in 1865–1866 cannot be consistently explained by any of
the other alternative hypotheses, except perhaps partially by H5. In the case of Bolivia’s
behavior towards Chile, it can also only be partially explained by a handful of
alternatives arguments apart from H1. Perhaps only H6. On the issue of the alliance of
Argentina and the Brazilian Empire, only the H1 hypothesis can unproblematically
explain the underlying motivations for the Argentine–Brazilian rapprochement, which
overlooked “regime type” considerations and a long history of intra-regional rivalry
and mutual suspicion in the River Plate area.
3. When contrasted with all four case studies, the H2 hypothesis (“U.S. hegemonic
stability” in the Americas) is the weakest-performing alternative explanation. Across
the board, the U.S. did show an increasing willingness to act as an impartial arbiter,
mediator, and “good neighbor.” This, moreover, correlated strongly with its ascent to
great power status towards the later 19th century and early 20th century. That reached
its apex during the 1930s in its sustained efforts to mediate the Chaco dispute.
However, not only were all U.S. offers of mediation flatly rejected by those to whom
the olive blanch of peace was extended (i.e., Francisco S. López in the Paraguayan
War), or postponed and eventually turned down (Paraguay in the Chaco War), but they
also provoked a generalized animosity in almost all the South American states.
Although extending good offices and proposing peace, South American countries
resented the patronage or “tutelage” implicit in the U.S. mediations. These feelings
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were intensified by the unilateral U.S. interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine and its
guiding principles for “hemispheric inoculation” from European meddling. The
momentary “absence” of the U.S. during the two conflicts of the 1860s, provoked by
its civil war, further helped instill in the South American countries a shared sense of
urgency and fragility. Their successive “victory” against Spain in the Guano War,
however, reinforced countries like Chile in their appreciation for the protection of
regional order from a multilateral, rather than unilateral and submissive, way—as
implied in a U.S. leadership. Despite the popular representation of Latin America as
the proverbial “backyard” of the U.S., the evidence analyzed in the case studies shows
a radically different story, marked by active and self-conscious South American states
and state-leaders in full exercise of their roles as deserning and autonomous political
actors—despite the vast disparities in economic and military power deparating the U.S.
from its sister American republics.
4. Of the four case studies explored, the Chaco War stands out as the most important in
support of the international society argument. Popularly seen as “the lowest point of
Pan-Americanism” in the history of the Hemisphere, the history of the Chaco War and
its Peace Conference, however, emerges as the strongest point of the incipient society
of states formed in the fulcrum of the second half of the 19th century. Its regional
identity was further reaffirmed and formalized in the A.B.C.(P.) group at the very
beginning of the 20th century, after the signing of the “May Pacts,” which would
eventually play a crucial role in developing an active diplomatic profile for the region
in the U.S.-Mexican war, as well as in later initiatives like the Contadora Group, which
helped atenuate conflict in Central America during the Cold War. Through the artful
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diplomatic maneuvering of the Argentine Chancellor and secretary general of the
Chaco Peace Conference, the meddling efforts of the U.S. and those of the League of
Nations took a back seat in the 1930s as South American states struggled to find South
American solutions to problems of their own making. The Chaco War, therefore, while
for many contemporary observers represents the failure of a hemispheric view of
ideological “cooperation” by way of failing to prevent the Chaco War, from the vantage
point of the international society approach it offers the highest point of a sense of
American “solidarity” that is pragmatic at its core and devoid of all empty rhetoric of
transnational cultural, pan-national, or ideological continental unity. In short, it
showcases the ultimate triumph of “pragmatic solidarty,” or a view of inter-state
cooperation premised on basic common interests, rather than common culture, regimetype, or ideology.
5. The most challenging case study for the international society argument appears to be
the case of the War of the Pacific. While Chile and its neighbors did adjust their
behavior to the precepts of “civilization” as understood in the late 19th century,
incurring important strategic costs along the way, the war also showed the “ugly” (or
more violent) side of international society. Although logically in accordance with the
expectations of H1, the “civilized” components of international society can at times
take violent expressions when the protection of the regional order and stability of the
entire system is at risk (i.e., the Triple Alliance against Paraguay). As discussed in
Chapter 1, societies of states do not seek the erradication of war among its members,
but simply tame and multilateralize the use of force through legitimating institutional
channels. In the War of the Pacific, Chile reacted to a regional conext that risked to
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encircle it in a web of alliances and pacts indirectly aimed against Chile’s interest. It
seems that a traditional security-dilemma dynamic was fueled by the internal
“weakness” of Bolivia and its caudillos bárbaros, then erupting in a war that nobody
intended, but which all needed to win. The behavior of key regional players, such as
Argentina and Brazil, further support the idea of a regional strategic environment that
escapes mere power-political, self-aggrandizing foreign policy dyamics. The struggle
for resources behind the War of the Pacific shows the staying power of classical shortsightedness when driven by elite greed, mutual fear, and a sense of cultural superiority
(in these cases, by Bolivian and Peruvian leaders). But it also helps to reinforce the
roles that self-restraint, institutionalization, and “pragmatic solidarity” play in
containing aggression and spill-over effects in times of war under the overarching
presence of a regional society of states.

In each successive chapter, the South American society of states transitioned through four
difference struggles: First, through a struggle for the confirmation of its independence
against Spain—a foreign or extra-regional monarchy. Second, through a struggle for the
protection of the status quo and the Platine equilibrium against a destabilizing internal
force. Third, through a struggle based on the acquisition of resources and the resolution of
inherited territorial ambiguities in a context of rapidly growing intra-regional competition,
fueled by work markets and foreign investors’ private interests. And finally, the triumph
of a common vision of regional order championed by the A.B.C.P. group countries during
the Chaco Peace Conference and thereafter—successful in bringing about peace where all
other, stronger actors, had failed.
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Contrary to traditional and widely popular representations of an “Americanist”
solidarity and cooperation—promulgated since the Cold War by the Latin American left—
the notion of a “pragmatic solidarity” contained in the international society approach offers
one of the most interesting conceptual innovations for further debate and analysis. It is a
offers a new lens with which to re-interpret the history of international relations in the
Americas. In the “Americanist” view of solidarity, international relations should follow a
sentiment of continental unity, liberty from foreign oppression, and be inherently peaceful.
From the vantage point of this vision of a patria grande (pan-latin-american nation) one
cannot but despair in frustration when reviewing the history of South America in the late
19th and the early 20th centuries. But when solidarity is understood in such an ideological
sense, it imprints a strong bias towards (peaceful) “cooperation,” and thus quickly reveals
itself as a normative aspiration that has never been achieved in the past, nor could possibly
be in the future. “Americanists” of this kind are thus bound to be professional pessimists.
But when solidarism is understood in the “pragmatic” sense, however, it helps to reinterpret the long record of “cooperation failures” of the American states in more realistic
terms, closer to how the elites and political actors at the time understood their actions. In a
society, just like in a family, members do not always have to agree to be part of the whole.
And sometimes, “failures” could be important lessons with large implications for the road
ahead.
In conclusion, one of the important findings of the historical review of these four
case studies is that the “long peace” in South America can be better understood in its
historical dimension, rather than in a more presentist fashion. When seen in this light,
therefore, instead of interpreting the 20th century as a “radical departure” from the region’s
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past, relevant historical connections, traditions, and enduring features come to life,
revealing dynamics that were previously ignored by more traditional analysis. Using the
international society approach to re-interpret the origins and evolution of a longer “long
peace” in South America—one with roots that extend far beyond the pre-1930s threshold—
allows one to better comprehend the seemingly paradoxical dynamic of internal violence
and external peace.
Deeply rooted in the historical dynamics of internal insecurity and violent
contestation, the nation-states which formed and consolidated toward the end of the 19th
century carried onto the 20th century more than mere institutional weakness. Entire
generations of diplomats and decision-makers, among other states officials and political
elites, first acquired and later embodied over the long span of the 19th century certain
patterned practices for conducting their foreign affairs in conditions of internal and external
weakness. Through regional socialization and some very painful experiences of war, South
American officials institutionalized those same lessons into forms of state behavior that
seem to have survived well into the 21st century. Such a “diplomatic strategic culture” has
allowed, not just military governments from the 1930s up to the early 1990s to maintain
South America’s paradox and perpetuate a regional society of states that prioritizes order
among its members more than peace among its citizens. It has also allowed civilians in
democratically elected governments consolidated in the 1990s to continue this same
regional legacy under radically different global conditions. If this present condition of
relative order in South America—however fragile—is to be preserved and even perhaps
deepened, then the strategic and moral quality of those individuals in positions of power
will have to match the quality of the society of states of which they are, also, members.
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